

Introduction to Political Philosophy
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(Tape begins late.) ...Political action is founded upon knowledge. Therefore, all political action points to knowledge of the politically good; whereas the complete political good, we call the good society. In every political action there is implied reference to the good society. All politically acting men are concerned with that. Whether they call it the good society or another name is a secondary question.

There are people who would deny that there is anything to be called the common good, which is another way of speaking of the good society. But these very people speak of the open society, by which they mean, the good society. President Johnson likes to speak of the Great Society, which is in its working somewhat different from the good society. But I think by the Great Society, President Johnson and his contemporaries mean the good society. Why they prefer to speak of the Great Society rather than of the good society, is an interesting question. But it does not concern us now.

Now if it is so that all concern with political things, all political action, points towards the question of the good society, and the good society is the theme of political philosophy, one seemingly paradoxical consequence follows: that there is no fundamental distinction between political philosophy and political science. This was the older view, according to which the study of the more or less imperfect societies is part of the same study which is concerned above all with the good society. This can be compared with the relation between physiology and pathology. They are in a way separable, but obviously the study of the healthy body and its workings points to the possibility of diseases; and physicians cannot diagnose these diseases unless they know what is a healthy body. This is the way in which above all Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Politics deal with all kinds of political societies, perfect or imperfect.

The situation in which we find ourselves today is characterised by the fact that in the first place, political philosophy is thought to be radically different from political science. In the mildest form, political science is a whole of which political philosophy is one of many parts. But it is clearer and more straightforward to say that political philosophy is no longer credible at all, and that it is partly the continuation of an ever-weakening tradition which explains the fact that political philosophy is still academically recognized. Political philosophy is no longer credible; and political science takes its place... ~~to~~ make this quite clear, a non-philosophic political science. This is, if not the full reality today, at least the tendency.

Now while this is true and could easily be borne out by quotations, it is also true that political science is in need of what is called political theory. And in this respect I think there is unanimity. Theory, in contradistinction to philosophy, can be scientific. Think of the theory of numbers, theory of functions, theory of evolution, and so on. These are all scientific phenomena. Political theory according to this view is a branch of political science among others;

only look at the announcement of this department, you will see that this is the prevailing view. All fields of political science are related with the others. For example, agricultural politics and foreign aid are in foreign relations. But political theory is more related to the other fields than any others among themselves. Political theory is the most general of the fields of political science. What is political theory? You would help me if you would answer me that question. Because I have some notion of that has been suggested in the course of the last thirty years as to what political theory is, but there is a great variety of opinions. Perhaps the most articulate among you would tell me....

Well, since I seem to be unable to overcome this shyness so becoming to young people, I will at least give a few of the views which I have found. (Laughter.) You find the view, for example, that political theory, the universal discipline which has its fingers in all pies, is needed for guiding research. It is the theory of theory formulations, one could say. Political theory thus understood does not meet, does not claim to meet, political issues, or the so-called isms. Therefore there is another understanding of political theory according to which political theory is concerned primarily with the "isms," democracy, communism, fascism... dealing with the ideologies, the operative ideals. Of course within the United States, the ideals are primarily those operative within the United States.

Political theory thus understood is not possible without history, and without history, for example, you cannot understand the American operative ideals without understanding what the United States Constitution was originally meant to be. You have to study the Federalist papers; and if you want to understand them properly you have to go back to the authority guiding the founding fathers, especially Hamilton and Madison, that is Montesquieu. And so you are eventually led back to classical antiquity. Now a third meaning is indicated by the recollection of the fact that fifty years ago, I believe the general answer to what political theory is about would have been that it had to do with the state, the state understood as a sovereign state. The sovereign state, according to this doctrine, was distinguished from society. And a development took place there, around 1900, which led to what is called pluralism, according to which the state is only one of many associations, each having a function of its own, but none of these associations can be said to be superior to any other. So the state in particular cannot be said to be superior to the churches, trade unions, etc. This pluralistic doctrine questioned the crucial importance of the state; and even if we take the state proper it is easy to observe that in a democracy its action is determined by the interplay of interest groups, or groups of other sorts. Furthermore, there are groups opposed to the state, denying the importance of the state, anarchism, and to some extent communism. And yet these movements, anarchism and communism, are without any question political movements. So it seems that political is a wider term than state. And therefore it was suggested that the theme should rather be the political than the state. So in other words,

the state has lost this evidence that it had for quite some time, surely throughout the nineteenth century. Now surely one can say political theory is sometimes meant to consist of comprehensive reflections about policy in our age. The reflections more elaborated--they can be elaborated in an inaugural address, or they will find expression to some extent within an inaugural address--these are views of political theory which one would discover on the basis of present-day usage. Did I omit any meaning of political theory with which you are familiar? Please tell me.

Now political philosophy I said before has become incredible. Implausible. In order to understand what that means, we have to formulate the objection to political philosophy. The simple argument which I stated earlier, which leads from the fact that every political action is concerned with better ~~or~~ worse, this simple reflection has no longer the plausibility which it has had for centuries. Now what are these objections? The most powerful one can be stated as follows.

All genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. But philosophic knowledge is not scientific knowledge. Hence political philosophy is not genuine knowledge. I will elaborate this while I go on. Let us first reflect upon the crucial part of this reasoning: all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. This view is called it may be called, positivism, and we will first discuss that.

Now the founder of positivism, the originator of that term, is the French thinker of the early nineteenth century, August Comte. And I will first present the Comteian position, which is by no means identical with the positivistic position of today, but we cannot understand that without having first understood Comte.

Now I will give you the titles of his chief works, as translated into English: Force of Positive Philosophy, six volumes from 1830 to 1842, and System of Positive Politics, 1851 to 1854. August Comte was originally connected with Saint-Simon, one of these early socialists, who were called by Marx and Engels the utopian socialists, and there are quite a few things which Comte has in common with Saint-Simon. But Comte ceased to be a socialist very early. Nevertheless, the similarity of his problem with the problem as seen by Marx is very great, as you will see. Now the basis of Comte's doctrine is the well-known success of modern science, since the time of Galileo, and its ever more impact on modern society. In order to be enabled to form an independent judgement of what this success of modern science means, let us remember the most striking features of pre-Galilean science. Traditional science, Aristotelian science. The simplest thing to do is to write here what I mean (going to blackboard). Now according to the Aristotelian scheme, philosophy or science, ~~there is no distinction made,~~ consists of two main parts, one called theoretical and the other called practical. Theoretical consists of three parts: mathematics, physics, which is in a wide sense including all natural science, and metaphysics. Practical philosophy or science consists of three parts: ethics, economics, and politics. Economics means here the management of the household, or family affairs, not what it has come to mean in modern times. Now in Comte's scheme, the division of the sciences is as

follows: mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and social physics, or sociology. These terms have been coined by Comte, social physics and sociology. There is in addition a philosophy dealing with these various sciences, understanding the meaning of mathematics, biology, sociology, etc., and this overall reflection on science and the sciences is what Comte calls positive philosophy.

Now what are the decisive differences between the Comteian scheme and--by the way it is the scheme now generally recognized, with minor additions. Mathematics is a fundamental science, and so on, and social science is the last in the order of the sciences. Now obviously in Comte's scheme there is no metaphysics. The second point, which there was no longer a question about for Comte at all, but which in the light of history is of immense importance, is this: that the natural science, or physics, in the wide sense of the term, was originally not metaphysically neutral. I mean by that, up to Galileo and Newton, in the seventeenth century, a student of nature was either an Aristotelian, or a Platonist, or an Epicurean, or a Stoic. There was not physics, but Aristotelian, Platonic, Epicurean, Stoic physics. There were pursuits which were metaphysically neutral, where it did not make any difference whether you were a Platonist or an Epicurean. For example, shoemaking; to some extent; also medicine, and also mathematics. But the epoch-making event was that the study of nature became as metaphysically neutral as shoemaking, medicine and mathematics always had been more or less. The third point which I mention right now is this: that what Aristotle calls practical science is here replaced by a theoretical science, sociology. Sociology is as theoretical as mathematics and chemistry. Every science, according to Comte, has its practical applications: naturally mathematics, physics--and so has sociology. But the science in itself, the science of man, of human affairs, is as theoretical as the other sciences. Therefore for Aristotle, ethics, or more specifically political science, is fundamentally independent of the natural sciences. That it uses the natural sciences in a subsidiary fashion goes without saying. But in itself it is independent of natural science. But in the Comteian scheme, sociology, the study of human society, is as much dependent on biology as biology is dependent on chemistry, and chemistry is dependent on physics, and physics is dependent on mathematics. That is a crucial difference, and this is of course very important for the understanding of what social science is today. It is no longer understood that a social scientist has had a very thorough training in mathematics, physics and chemistry, but on the highest level of social science, in the modern sense, this dependence on the preceding sciences, on preceding in the order of the sciences, is of crucial importance. Comte implies that the fundamental science, the science on which all others depend, is mathematics. Mathematics is the model. Hence, science formulates laws, equations, preferably in mathematical form.

Now ~~what~~ positive philosophy, the understanding of all intellectual activity, and all intellectual activity which has reached the level of science, ~~and~~ *this* one cannot *do* if one does not know its history. For Comte, this is true of every conception. One cannot completely know a science without knowing its history. And this is

impossible without studying in a general way, the history of mankind. The broad result of Comte's study of the history of mankind is that it consists of three stages: of three successive philosophies, as he calls them. So much so that every science, such as physics or chemistry, goes through each of these three stages. The stages are called by Comte the theological stage, the metaphysical stage, and the positive stage. Positive you can almost identify with the scientific; but I have to use his terminology. At all times, man needs a philosophy, for observing facts, as well as a social bond. We cannot observe facts without selecting them; we must therefore have principles guiding our selection. To that extent, theory, a theory, a philosophy, precedes all observation. But we need also a philosophy in the sense of Comte, as a social bond. Men cannot live together without agreement upon fundamentals. Now what are these three stages?

The first is the theological stage, in which man believes that he can answer the grandest questions, and that he can exercise an unlimited control over the external world by substituting to the things wills which he can influence. There are three stages of that according to Comte, which he called fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. In this early stage, which lasted up to the present day, man believes to know the origin as well as the destiny of the universe. He claims to possess absolute knowledge and he finds this absolute knowledge,.... he finds this absolute knowledge supplied by the assumption of supernatural, willing agents. Comte explains the primacy of the theological philosophy as follows, that man has a tendency to transport involuntarily the intimate sentiment of his own nature to the universal explanation of all phenomena whatever. An anthropocentric approach, in other words, is natural to man, and it finds its expression in the theological stage.

The second stage is the metaphysical stage, in which the beings, acting and willing beings, persons, are replaced by abstract forces, by personified abstractions. The highest stage of this is that in which Nature, with a capital N, is understood as the universal source of all phenomena. Another formula which he uses is that the metaphysical stages occur when entity is substituted for divinity. These two stages take as their principles our immediate sentiments of human phenomena, our immediate sentiments of man, and hence they seek to explain *the universe* and all particulars, in terms of will. You may-- those who have any knowledge of what is called metaphysics may not recognize metaphysics at all in Comte's description, but let me say only this: what he has in mind is a teleological analysis, say in the form of Aristotle, that a being tends toward something. This of course is not a will, as in a worm or any other being which tends toward the peak of its growth, but the very speaking of tendency implies thinking in terms of willing. That he has in mind.

The positive stage is characterized by the fact that its starting-point is obviously not will, but numbers. The fundamental science is mathematics; and therewith any attempt to explain phenomena in terms of will is excluded. In the positive stage, men abandon the question of the origin and destiny of everything. Philosophy abandons the claim of the aim of absolute knowledge. Only relative knowledge is

possible. What does that mean? In the positive stage, man does no longer ask for the why. He is only concerned with the how. How things operate, not why they operate in this manner. For example, there is no longer any speculation on the origin of life or the origin of the species, according to Comte. In this particular point, Comte was obviously refuted by the later development of biology, to say nothing of Lamarck, who had already preceded him. But the fundamental thesis that science is concerned with the how and not with the why has survived Comte up to the present day, in many circles. As another example, man is no longer concerned, in the positivistic stage, with whether animate and inanimate beings have or do not have the same or a different nature. This is according to Comte, an insoluble question. In the positive stage, man studies the phenomena alone, with a view to their laws, the invariable relations of succession and simultaneity. The type of this positive knowledge is, given these and these conditions, this and this happen. This is not in Comte's view, a statement about causes, but about correlations: under certain conditions, how are things related. Newton's laws of gravitation do not determine what attraction is in itself, what the cause is, but how attraction works. He says on one occasion the question of the first cause of all motion, of all life, whatever it may be, of the final causes, the last causes, is meaningless for us...a phrase which has recurred many times since. Now the positive stage, which cannot be properly understood if one doesn't see it as succeeding the theological and the metaphysical stage, is the final stage in the development of human life. There is no possibility of visualizing anything radically different from the scientific approach which has come into being since the seventeenth century and has existed evermore. The victory of the positive spirit is inevitable. That is, it has not been entirely victorious, especially not in the social sciences, but it is inevitable. For the human mind is powerfully disposed toward unity of method, and in the long run men will not leave it at proceeding in this very successful manner, say in chemistry, and proceeding in a radically different manner in the study of human affairs. For the time being, 1835 or thereabouts, the theological and metaphysical philosophy has still a certain practical superiority over the positive philosophy, because they still can maintain the claim to universality, to answering all questions, while positive philosophy has achieved a breakthrough only in certain fields, say physics and chemistry. But the human mind cannot but reach its true definitive maturity, positive science, in all fields.

What makes Comte certain of the future victory of the positive spirit is the constant progress of the positive spirit, from generation to generation, and the corresponding decline of the theological and metaphysical spirit. The most important lacuna, as far as the positive spirit is concerned, is the study of the social phenomena. This has surely not reached the positive stage; that does not yet exist for social science, in other words. The external fact that Comte coined the term sociology is an indication of this state of affairs: sociology did not exist before Comte. Hitherto we do not have, as Comte notes, a social physics, but only a social theology or a social metaphysics. And the examples which he gives are, for social theology, the doctrine

of the divine right of kings, which was of course still lingering on in continental Europe until the last century, and for social metaphysics, the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. And these are examples which give you some initial guidance as to what he means by this distinction between theology and metaphysics.

Now while there can be no doubt regarding the intellectual superiority of the spirit of science to all competitors, the positive spirit is not without its intrinsic dangers. The peculiar danger which is inherent in the victory of science is specialization. It becomes ever more necessary for men of science to be chemists or biologists or whatever it may be. Where do we get that comprehensive view which, in however spurious a manner, the theological and metaphysical spirit supplies? Comte's answer is we need a new kind of specialty, namely a special study of science in general, of science as such and its relation to society, and that is what the positive philosophy of Comte is about. The social situation now is that the positive spirit, scientific spirit, has destroyed the old certainties, i.e., the social bonds which hitherto kept society together. The consequence is anarchy, intellectual anarchy; the reconstruction is possible only through the application of the positive spirit to the social phenomena. For men need, the society requires, the assent, more or less conscious assent, of all, to a certain number of general ideas. These are no longer supplied by theology, and cannot be supplied by metaphysics; the only way in which we can escape the anarchy caused by the destruction of the old certainties is that science supplies these certainties. We must see how he thinks of that.

The meaning of science is clearly indicated by the fact that the first of the sciences, the science par excellence, is mathematics. By the way, what Comte says about mathematics is of course very much dated; there is no inkling of non-Euclidean geometry, for example. But within the limits of what could be known at the time I find this very interesting and very clear, and I think very helpful at least to begin to understand the fundamental difference between modern mathematics and a little geometry and calculus, in contradistinction to Greek mathematics. Now mathematics meant in Greek originally the same, a science. According to Comte, mathematics is the science which aims at the measuring of magnitudes. To determine unknown magnitudes through known magnitudes, according to precise relations which exist between them. This kind of precision cannot be expected in all science; hence science in general may be said to determine phenomena, unknown phenomena, by other phenomena, according to relations which exist between these series of phenomena. Science is essentially destined to dispense, to the extent to which the kind of phenomena permit it, with every direct observation, by permitting to deduce from a small number of immediately given data the largest possible number of results. So that theoretical mechanics would be the model of science. Every question ~~can~~ in principle be conceived of as reducible to a pure question of numbers. Descartes has shown that all ideas of quality can be reduced to ideas of quantity. Think of colors and wavelengths, and such things. In fact, this is possible also for very simple phenomena; it is not possible for the subjects of biology and sociology. In these sciences dealing with more complex phenomena, there exists a fundamental impossibility of our ever obtaining true mathematical laws. Yet this does not entitle us,

according to Comte, to give up the notion that all phenomena are necessarily subject to mathematical laws, although we shall never be able to discover them in these large fields. The positive spirit in Comte's sense does not depend on the availability of mathematical laws in all fields. It depends on the expectation of such laws. In a way the positive spirit is as old as man himself. At all times men needed, in order to survive, relations between facts. At all times men had arts which are based on such knowledge of relationships between facts. Generally speaking, men must have a reasonable respect for, I quote, "The crude but judicious indications of vulgar common sense: the true and eternal starting-point of all wise scientific speculations." In other words, common sense, pre-scientific understanding, is highly respectable, because it is already in a germinal way, scientific thinking. Now this importance of common sense applies especially to human affairs. Ordinary common sense is perfectly competent in regard to phenomena which by their nature are constantly submitted to its attentive consideration. A man dealing all his life with this kind of activity knows more about them than a scientist as scientist who doesn't have the same familiarity can possibly know. All isolated study of the various social elements, which is the way in which it is handled by scientists, is in itself irrational and sterile. In this sphere, all understanding must start from the whole and not from the elements. For the demand that one must proceed from the simple to the complex--a demand which in a way underlies Comte's whole scheme of mathematics and physics to sociology, is not the primary demand of the scientific mind. The primary demand is that we proceed from the known to the unknown. But in sociology, in the study of society, the whole is the thing which is known, and the elements are what we have to proceed to discover by analysis. In the social sphere, the most vulgar phenomena are the most important ones; and therefore the procedure in sociology and to some extent in biology must be different from that of the mathematical sciences strictly understood. The positive spirit we may say, is universalized common sense; and therefore not in opposition to it. Comte hesitates to assert that this is due to the fact that there is an essential difference between man, the subject of sociology, and brutes, the subject of biology, not to mention inanimate things. For according to Comte, there cannot be natures--a nature of man different from the nature of brutes--because this is metaphysics. Intimate natures, as distinguished from phenomena and their manifest relations.

But Comte's consideration regarding the primacy of the whole in sociology goes very far to compensate for this tacit denial of essential differences. The fact that sociology--which means here the study of all social phenomena--that sociology is not reducible to biology, etc., does not mean that it is not to some extent based on biology, for example. Biology, especially anatomy and physiology, have fulfilled a most important function in regard to the intellectual government of society. Anatomy and physiology must protect common sense in its, on the whole, just appraisal of the various levels of intelligence, against the metaphysical view that all human intelligences are fundamentally equal. Biology as here understood--I do not have to go into the particular *teachings* he had in mind--made sure that the different intellectual levels of different human beings are very great. The differences are very great, and

therefore the belief in intellectual equality of men is a wrong assertion. Biology fills here an important political or social function. Also the overestimation of the merely acquired abilities as distinguished from the native abilities. This--and that he said without any irony--error, the overestimation of the acquired abilities, is fostered by the scientists themselves, the majority of whom are men of very mediocre minds, and therefore must put all their emphasis on their learning rather than on their native abilities.

Yet the dependence of sociology on the preceding sciences means more than that. It means the primacy of the non-social and the sub-social, generally speaking, of the lower. Accordingly, there is only a difference of degree between the human mind and the mind of the brutes. The scholastic definition of man as a rational animal is, according to Comte, nonsense; no higher animal could live without being rational to some extent. Ideology, which means in Comte's terminology the same as what is now called psychology, is a part of zoology. Human psychology as such doesn't exist. In connection with this, Comte teaches the primacy of the passions, in contradistinction to reason and intelligence,

The passions are the primary motive power in human life, and so far from being dependent on intelligence or resulting from it, they are the powers which awaken intelligence and bring about its continuous development. The passions, not reason, determine the permanent goal of the intellect; and the lowest passions are the strongest. Does this strand, this important strand, in Comte's thought, remind you of something?

STUDENT: Hobbes.

Yes, Hobbes especially, but quite a few others in between. In other words, if we generalise from that, the materialistic tradition of the seventeenth century going through French materialism, is living on very powerfully in Comte. But the interesting thing is that Comte is no longer formally a materialist--that is the meaning, the important indication of positivism. From the positivistic point of view materialism is a metaphysical doctrine, and it is possible to oppose materialism as much as spiritualism. Yet it is a much greater--it is surely an heir to materialistic metaphysics.

Sociology is in a way the universal science. For all sciences must be understood in the light of a general theory of human development, the development of the human mind. So you cannot understand mathematics in terms of numbers, because mathematics is not a number. Mathematics is a human pursuit, and this human pursuit can only be understood in the context of the development of the human mind, i.e. of the law of the three stages. Furthermore, the guidance of research and of discovery in all sciences requires a rational theory, and this rational theory is ultimately supplied by the needs of man, which needs of man can only be scientifically known by a science of man, or a sociology. All sciences are the work of a human mind as a social mind. From this

point of view sociology is the fundamental science.

Now the supremacy of the positive spirit means simply the obvious superiority of scientific explanations to theological or metaphysical explanations. This obvious supremacy of the positive spirit proves the necessity of a positive science of society, of what, to repeat, Comte calls sociology or social physics. Why do we not yet have a social science? Why has not the positive spirit made itself the master of the study of social phenomena, as it has made itself the master in physics? Now in the first place, the logical order of the sciences, from mathematics, physics, biology, and so on to social physics, is at the same time the temporal order of their emergence. Chemistry could not become a possible science before physics came into being. So only after biology has reached the scientific stage, which according to Comte was not the case before the end of the eighteenth century, could a social science become possible. More specifically, and more importantly, the phenomena most important for making social science possible, did not yet exist before our time--our time being 1830, or thereabouts. Why?

What is the most important phenomenon for making social science possible? That phenomenon which makes it possible to see society as a whole properly. A society is in a way always a whole. But this is insufficient. The larger whole, of which all societies are a part, is the development of the human race. And the development of the human race finds its completion in the positive spirit, and its social implications. And this did not even exist before the reaction to the French Revolution was completed, according to Comte. Social science is not possible before the completion of the development which ends in the elite of the human race in our times. Prior to our times, the essential direction of the social movement was not sufficiently determined; there was no certainty as regards the progressive character of the historical process.

Classical political philosophy, that of Plato and Aristotle, coincided with the stage of decline of ancient society. The notion of a more perfect state of things replacing a less perfect one, i.e., of progress, is due to Christianity, according to Comte. The distinction between the new law, the perfect new law, in contradistinction with the less perfect old law. The forerunner of the positive social science, are especially three men: Aristotle, whom he highly respects; Montesquieu; and Condorcet, the victim of the French Revolution.

Those of you who know Aristotle, Montesquieu and Condorcet, at least to some extent, will be quite surprised by this combination. One can see that someone admires Aristotle and Montesquieu because of their very solid empirical characteristics of style, which of course Comte *does too*, but Condorcet is very far remote from that. Later on it shall be clear to you why he makes this peculiar selection. But he *has* also a *certain respect* for the political economists, especially Adam Smith, and the historical school of jurisprudence, in Germany.

Prior to the French Revolution and the reaction to it, it was impossible to see that the history of the human race is a whole, has a physiognomy of its own, and this is its progressive character. And that insight makes social science possible, therefore there could be none before. Social science is necessary now, not only theoretically, in order to round off the whole of science, but above all practically. Public morality needs a solid basis, and practical politics needs reliable guidance, a vision of the future. This indispensable agreement regarding the fundamentals, can now, after the decay of theoretical and metaphysical thought, be supplied only by science. As it is, there is intellectual anarchy. And the intellectual anarchy is the root of the moral anarchy, which in its turn is the root of political anarchy. At present there are no established principles regarding which all members of society can be united. Human reason needs above all fixed points, which alone are susceptible to rally in a useful way its spontaneous effort and for which the skepticism momentarily produced by the more or less difficult passage from one dogmatism to the other constitutes a sort of morbid perturbation, which cannot be prolonged without grave dangers.

In other words, there was a dogmatism in the past, religious dogmatism. This was destroyed by the revolutionary critical philosophy, and there will be no order, no stability, before there is not yet a new dogmatism, and this new dogmatism can only be based on science because science is the only intellectual power anymore which commands universal respect. This means, and Comte doesn't hesitate to draw his conclusion from that, there cannot be universal toleration. Universal toleration, for any opinion, is defensible as a transitional thing, for the pulling down of the untenable old views and institutions, so that room is created for the emergence of the new science, but not in the elementary stage. Systematic tolerance cannot exist, and has never really existed, except regarding opinions regarded as indifferent or progressive... as is proven by the very practice of revolutionary politics, in spite of its absolute proclamation of the freedom of conscience. But this new doctrine finds itself guaranteed in the last analysis by a kind of religious consecration, in which these metaphysical dogmas would necessarily be--without which these metaphysical dogmas would necessarily be exposed to a continuous discussion, which would compromise much the efficacy of these doctrines.

He speaks in another context of the fundamental dogma of free examination, and of the dogma of equality, in order to indicate that the revolutionary position which he attacks is itself based on unquestionable premises without which the revolutionary position would be as little possible as any other political position. The root of the present anarchy in morals and politics is to repeat, intellectual anarchy. Now how can Comte diagnose the situation prevailing in his time as chaotic, or anarchic? He must have some notion of order, not really a fantastic notion, which may not have any solidity, but an order which is solidly possible. Comte indeed takes it for granted that there was

once an order, intellectual order, hence moral, hence political. And this existed in the Middle Ages. According to Comte, Catholicism is the most noble work of the theological spirit. But since it is based on theology, which is untrue, it must be rejected, to say nothing of the fact that it has also lost its social power to some extent. In addition, it is already undermined by the critical revolutionary philosophy of the Enlightenment, which according to Comte stems from Protestantism, from the Protestant principle of free examination. Theological politics no longer is compatible with society, and is forced into one compromise with secularized society after another. Metaphysical politics, on the other hand, let us say Rousseau, because Comte thinks of Rousseau probably more than of anybody else, is good only for pulling down, not for the construction. The final superiority of positive philosophy is undeniable, as our discussion of its own development will show.

To positive philosophy alone it belongs, in the realized state of human reason, to develop in us within our most daring enterprises an unshakeable vigor, and a reflective constancy, drawn directly from our own nature, without any external assistance, and without any chimerical impediment. The propriety to unite as well as to stimulate and direct belongs from now on in an ever more exclusive manner, since the decay of religious beliefs, to the whole of positive conceptions, which alone are today capable to establish spontaneously from one end of the world to the other, on bases as durable as extended, a true intellectual community which can serve as a solid foundation to the vastest political organization. This is the practical task of the positive philosophy. There is then an obvious need for the new order; and this order is the final order. It is final for the simple reason that science is the final philosophy, modern science. The new order will come inevitably; its power is based on the power of science, which destroyed the alternatives. The new order we may say is the order in accordance to nature, and especially in accordance to the nature of the elite of the human race. There is some difficulty in the argument which I would like to read to you.

The elite of the human race as the necessary and final result of all diverse earlier evolutions points now to the direct coming of the social order best adapted to its nature. The theological and metaphysical philosophy have alone really undertaken hitherto to operate the political reorganization of modern societies; and their having failed, it follows evidently either that the problem would not be susceptible of any solution, which it would be absurd to think, or we have to have recourse to positive philosophy. Comte does not consider it possible that there might be a problem which cannot be solved by any philosophy, philosophy in Comte's sense of the term. In the new order men will be guided by a small elite: that is implied in everything I said before. And these men are the men devoted by nature to contemplation. In a very strange, not to say fantastic way, Comte has dared to demand and even to predict the rule of philosophers in the nineteenth century...and the imminent rule of philosophers, these philosophers being now modern scientists. One can say Comte has been refuted a hundred times by the development which has taken place, and as a predictor, he surely is subject to refutation. But this does not mean that his suggestions are not of the utmost importance

for us to consider. There is a thing which is coming up time and again and which is something very actual in our society, although not preponderant, which is called technocracy. Our society requires to some extent rule by experts, which means rule by scientific experts. No one has stated the argument in favor of this possibility and half-necessity as strongly as Comte. There are a few passages regarding this subject which it might be good to read.

Every individual, however inferior, has always the natural right, provided he does not behave in a pronouncedly anti-social manner, to expect from all others the accomplishment of the general considerations following from the dignity of man. But in spite of this great moral obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of slavery, it is evident that men are not equal among themselves nor even equivalent; and hence could not possess in society identical rights apart of course from their fundamental right mentioned. Or rather, the fundamental right necessarily common to all, of the free and normal development of personal activity. The continuous progress of civilization, far from bringing us closer to a chimerical equality, tends on the contrary by its very nature to develop extremely these fundamental inequalities. And this is at the bottom of the fact that there must be a government by the simply superior people. And these are of course those who are not mediocre: scientists. We can say, although Comte would never use such a phrase, the rule of the philosophers, that is the only way possible. And to repeat for Comte, it is not merely, as it is at most in Plato, a wish, a pious wish, but something which he can predict; because there is no other solution to the social problem, and the social problem must have a solution. It would be absurd to think that it could not have a solution, as we will see. Let us now turn to some details of Comte's sociology, of his positive political philosophy, as he calls it-- he still speaks of political philosophy as a matter of course. I see it is rather late, and that this would lead us much beyond the time. I propose that we use the remaining few minutes for discussion. There must be some questions.

STUDENT: Earlier you said that Comte favors the passions over reason--
Favors?

STUDENT: He said that the passions are...

Are primary and strong.

STUDENT: Also this is reminiscent of materialism, but not formally materialism, because he denies the possibility of metaphysics, and my question is, on what grounds does he claim the primacy of the passions, and if these aren't metaphysical grounds, what are they?

He would say observation...the study of individual men will always show that apart from very rare exceptions, due to particular circumstances, men are more passionate--passion in the wide sense, I mean. There are

of course not only noble passions. Passions of any kind than rational.

STUDENT: Then Comte would consider it a sufficient argument that an overwhelming number of people did something...

No, not quite. There is one point into which I didn't wish to go because it would lead us so far--he has--regarding biology, he thinks very highly of one writer of the early nineteenth century, called Gall, the founder of a thing called phrenology, the study of the brain. He was in a way a very materialistic man, believing he would find the locus of each mental activity in a part of the brain. And on the basis of this--I've forgotten now how he localized the passions and where is reason, and what the bulk of the passionate part of the brain was compared with the bulk of the rational part of the brain. These things do play a part in Comte.

But this view of the preponderance of passion in the majority of men was rather a common view. I mean, Plato and Aristotle wouldn't say anything different about it, only the possibility of truly rational men was more important for Plato and Aristotle than it was for Comte... In other words, you think that this is not sufficiently established in a scientific manner, according to the notion of science which he has? ...Well, to which Comte would reply, that common sense is not so untrustworthy in these matters as it is according to the now-prevailing view of science. Today such assertions would be questioned by scientists if they had not been properly established by what is called scientific methods. This is not Comte's view. Comte thought that in matters of such grave importance for men, the ordinary experience of men throughout the ages was quite trustworthy. And he would contend that this general experience of men throughout the ages is concerned with that, that men who are rational are an exception rather than the rule. And of course, Comte wants these men, these rare men, to be the rulers. You know, he doesn't draw the conclusion, since passion is more powerful, it should not be controlled. It must be controlled. The details of how he visualizes this control I will discuss next time. Because if there were not a partial control of passion by passion, reason couldn't do very much, you know. This was already a great theme of people like Hobbes: the passions counteracting each other creates a possibility for reason to throw its weight on the right side. And therefore reason doesn't have to be so powerful itself. Yes?

STUDENT: Is there any significant relation between the positivism of Comte and the ideology of

Yes, there is--but Comte rejects that. What is The term--there was a school at the end of the eighteenth century in France, Napoleonic times, which continued more or less what Locke started. And today what they did would be called psychology. This school called itself ideologic for this reason--because, as you know from Locke, the subject-matter of are ideas, the study of the human mind. And the study of these ideas is therefore ideology. And Napoleon, who detested these men because they were republicans, used the word ideology in order to show how incredibly stupid these men were. And from this Napoleonic use of the word ideology, the Marxian usage

is derived. Then it came to mean from Marx on, a wrong theory, a theory which is based a fundamentally wrong perspective, such as that of class--this is a meaning which it took on in Marx, and was taken over by half-Marxists, and by non-Marxists, and now is a perfectly respectable term, so much so that Khrushchev, in spite of himself, has spoken of the Marxist ideology. Imagine! (Great merriment.) But when some people, otherwise dangerous people, shout for an ideology, they want to have an ideology--by that they mean I suppose that they want to have a clear body of doctrine which guides them in their actions. But with regard to this word I consider the opinions of Marx as absolutely decisive, that an ideology is a wrong doctrine. And one shouldn't speak of it except under great provocation or pressure. Someone else?

STUDENT: Would you speak about why it was a reaction to the French Revolution rather than the Revolution--

Because the French Revolution led to this thing called the Terror, don't forget that. In 1793, Robespierre--and of course they got rid of Robespierre, eventually, but until some order came out of it, it took Napoleon. Napoleon is surely a reaction to the French Revolution. But still Comte detests Napoleon; because he detests the military spirit. I will take this up later. And therefore the character of the post-Revolutionary society became visible only partly under Napoleon, and partly even after the defeat of Napoleon. Very briefly, the industrial society. That is the point towards which Comte is working. Two powers now determining the world are science and industry. By the way the two names are combined in the designation of the Museum very close to this University. Science and Industry--and the idea being, the alternative is, Religion and War. You see here the kinship with Marx, which kinship can be explained by a common ancestry, because Saint-Simon, the original teacher of Comte, was in a way also the teacher of Marx. But Comte turned away entirely from socialism; and Comte believed that the nerve of the whole historical development is the human mind, the intellect, and not the relations of production at all. It is radical.

STUDENT: Mr. Strauss, may I ask--you said something about Comte's relation to Euclidean geometry as the modern mathematical, or the Cartesian mathematical mind?

No, I mean the difference between classical mathematics, also mechanics, say in Archimedes, and this radically new point in the seventeenth century, especially Descartes' analytic geometry and Leibniz' development of the calculus.

STUDENT: Comte accepted the latter...?

Yes, of course the modern assertion is that the ancient is only a primitive form of mathematics. The modern development by what he understands as the positive spirit, was prepared to some extent by Euclid.

STUDENT: Could you, if you think its necessary, explain a bit more about the nature of these technocrats, in the final stage?

Well, I will speak of that later. But regarding mathematics, one can use this simple thing: pre-modern mathematics, at least in the Western world, did not know of algebra. Algebra was a science they could reckon only with numbers, not with their strangely generalized numbers.

STUDENT: I wonder if you could tell me what was Comte's view of human nature in this sense. You mentioned the transition from the second to the third stage, from the metaphysical to the positivistic, intellectual anarchy occurs, in the sense of the old order falling into ruin, and no more are people asking why questions, now they are asking how questions.

Well, this is not quite correct. The chaos, the anarchy, is not during the transition from the metaphysical to the positive, but is coeval with the metaphysical period. The metaphysical philosophy is negative, critical, skeptical, destructive thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. And so only in the seventeenth century the power of religion and the old orders was still relatively unbroken; and the situation has progressed, has become bearable only in the nineteenth century. But the theories there, Hobbes to Rousseau--he doesn't mention names very frequently. Rousseau he simply calls the Sophist. And I haven't found the reference to Hobbes or to Locke, but I'm sure he also mentions them.

STUDENT: The question that I really wanted to ask was, when the last stage of science really becomes the last philosophy, does he now see the human being as the being above all concerned with moral questions?

Yes, of course. But these questions will be answered by science now.

STUDENT: Is science a new moral authority?

Sure! Oh yes. And you see here the most powerful difference between Comte and present-day positivism. In present-day positivism science is silent about all moral questions. Yes? Science can supply material with which moral men can answer their questions; but science as such does not answer these questions. But this is completely absent from Comte. For Comte science is an intrinsically moral authority. This creates certain theoretical difficulties for Comte, by the way, which are avoided by present-day positivism, but present-day positivism has some other difficulties instead. Did I answer your question? ("Yes.")

STUDENT: Earlier you explained the independence of the practical sciences from the theoretical sciences in Aristotle's scheme. Yet as I recall, in your introduction to Natural Right and History, after talking about certain political matters, you said that the answers to the highest questions were ultimately involved in the method one pursued, whether it was teleological or mechanistic. And I think the equivalent is from the Physics...

Yes. Well I do not remember the quotation; I remember the thought. In other words, the question is whether the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge is theoretically adequate. It is practically good enough, but theoretically perhaps not good enough--that would be a question. Could this not lead from that--something may be practically good enough, and theoretically in need of further clarification?

There are principles of practice which are not in need of theoretical justification, in order to be evident to us. But they can be obscured, by false theories. Now then you need, in order to fight a false theory, a theory to defend sound practice and its principles, against false theories. Now is this theory, let us say this apologetic theory, a theory like theories simply, or is it not of a peculiar character, because of its apologetic purpose? I think I will leave it at that..

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 2 January 11, 1965

...(tape begins) But the notions of political science include the just. To take a simple example, reapportionment on the basis of one man, one vote, is based on the opinion that one man, one vote alone is just. Now despite that prima facie evidence of political philosophy, political philosophy has become incredible, implausible today; and this is due in the first place to the view now prevailing, that the only kind of genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. This view is called positivism.

Positivism was founded by August Comte. I spoke last time of his central teaching, the law of the three stages, theological, metaphysical and positive, or scientific. The positive stage is the highest and the final stage in the development of the human mind. One cannot understand the human spirit if one does not understand the fundamental and typical obstacles to it, and these obstacles are precisely the theological and the metaphysical spirit. Comte, in contradistinction to present-day positivism, still holds the view that common-sense knowledge is genuine knowledge, so that scientific knowledge is only universalized common sense knowledge. And Comte still calls the scientific knowledge of social phenomena, what he was the first to call sociology, or social physics, he still calls that political philosophy.

Now sociology, in Comte's sense, depends on the sciences preceding it: first biology, then chemistry, physics, and ultimately mathematics. Yet sociology does not depend completely on the preceding sciences. It has a subject-matter of its own, which is not reducible to that of biology, etc. Yet on the other hand there is no essential difference between the social and the pre-social, or non-social. More generally stated, between the human and the non-human. Psychology, in the language of Comte, ideology, is a part of zoology, simply. Society consists of men, and man is the subject of biology. Yet society is a whole of which men are parts. This whole is something which escapes biology as biology. So there is a certain obscurity as to the possibility of reducing the more complex phenomena to the more simple phenomena.

We must go a step further. Sociology is not only to some extent independent of the preceding sciences; it is in a way even the science of sciences, the universal science. For all sciences are the work of the human mind as a social mind; and therefore the stratification of science as such is a part, the most important part, of sociology. I spoke also of what Comte teaches regarding the practical necessity of sociology. He starts from the prevailing intellectual anarchy; there is no agreement regarding fundamentals. This is due to the dissolution of the theological spirit; and that dissolution is the work of the metaphysical or revolutionary spirit, i.e., of the philosophies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The intellectual anarchy necessarily leads to moral anarchy, which in its turn leads to political anarchy. There man is in a transitional stage between an order, the order of the Middle Ages, and a new order, which will be the final order; and this order will be brought about finally by the consistent application of the scientific or positive spirit, by the extension of the scientific spirit to the social phenomena. In other words, science has to take

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over the function which theology had in the Middle Ages. The new order which is brought about by the unqualified rule of science, which means the rule of scientists--and he doesn't mean the rule of any mediocre scientists, he means the rule of the most outstanding scientists, whom he still calls philosophers. So what Comte demands is the rule of philosophers, but of course, of positive philosophers, not of metaphysicians, who are responsible in a way for the present chaos. This much to remind you of what I discussed last time. Before I go on, I would like to know whether there is any point of those just made which you would like clarified.

STUDENT: Last time you referred to modern physics, modern science, as being metaphysically neutral. And I don't understand what that means: how can modern science be considered as neutral? It strikes me that their metaphysics, although usually undeveloped, would be Epicurean--

Yes, but talk to any physicist, or to any theorist of physics, and he would deny that. He would simply say that while modern physics emerged originally from the so-called molecular philosophy, which is Epicureanism, this has long ceased to be the ethos of physics. That is of course questionable, but I stated only that modern physics, according to the interpretation which it has of itself, is metaphysically neutral. Whether one can leave it at that is a long question. Yes?

STUDENT: When you say every scientist takes from the preceding ones, do you mean anything more than that? That one accepts the results of the preceding ones.

At least that, but also the training acquired by the use of these methods is essential for the later sciences. Comte thinks that a chemist, for example, must be thoroughly trained in mathematics, and the same would be true of the biologist and of the sociologist. If this were so, then the preceding sciences would be mere authorities, and not truly understood. He wants a bit more than that, than to simply say that my colleague in the other department Joe has done it and we don't have to bother about that--it is a bit more.

Now let us turn to Comte's notion of positive political philosophy, which is the same as sociology or social physics. Sociology consists of social statics and social dynamics, you see here the connection with physics. Social statics deals equally with all societies, i.e. with the conditions of existence common to all societies, and the corresponding rules of harmony, in regard to first, individual; second the family; and third, society properly so-called. The notion of society properly so-called, when it has reached its entire scientific extension, tends to embrace the whole of the human species, i.e., it is no longer a national society, and principally of the white race. Now why does he make this strange, in our opinion strange, qualification or limitation to the white race? I think there is no inconsistency in that, because in Comte's time, the positive spirit was still a preserve of the Western world, which extended only later to the East and to Africa, and so on. The separate treatment of the individual in social science does not mean that the individual precedes society. Man's fundamental sociability is undeniable. There never was a state of nature, in the sense of Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau. Now regarding the individual we must observe the preponderance of the lowest and most egoistic instincts

over our social instincts. Our social instincts are weaker than our egoistic instincts. Hence the primacy of the egoistic instincts must clearly cease; hence the notion of common good, or as he says, of the public interest, has no intelligible sense without that of the particular interest in the first place. We cannot understand the common good if we do not first understand private good; and hence Comte admires the wisdom of the Biblical command, "Love thy neighbor like thyself." The personal instinct, as he puts it, self-love, must serve as guide to the social instinct, love of others. The strengthening of man's benevolence, which primarily is so weak, is due to the growth of his intelligence. Intelligence weakens his passions, and man achieves greater clarity about his social relations. He sees more and more that his private interests cannot be furthered without consideration for the interests of others, or the common interest.

Now in Comte's age people began to speak of conservative and progressive--you know this is now a very popular distinction, but it doesn't antedate the early nineteenth century. But the conservative spirit, according to Comte, is inspired above all by the purely personal instinct of selfishness, vested interests, as it came to be called later. And the spirit of improvement, or the progressive spirit, is inspired by the spontaneous combination of intellectual activity with the social instinct. In other words, the more the intellectuals are progressive. This is now extremely popular, as you know, and here we have one indication of it; because the intelligence strengthens the social interests, the interest in the common good, progressiveness. Comte has abandoned the notion of a state of nature, as we will see. He has not entirely abandoned the notion of natural right. There is indeed no necessary connection between the state of nature and the natural right. He says every individual always has the natural right, unless he has behaved entirely antisocially in a very pronounced way, to expect from all others the scrupulous and continuous fulfillment of the general regard to the dignity of man. This much about the individual. Now we turn to the question of the family.

According to Comte, the family is the school of social ability. And the main reason for this is that every society imposes some inequalities, and the family is characterised by two fundamental inequalities, that of husband and wife, and that of parent and children. And so here we learn the rudiments of living together on the basis of these fundamental inequalities. I will read you a few passages which show you how conservative Comte was compared with his present-day successors. Doubtless the institution of marriage suffers necessarily, as all other institutions, spontaneous modifications through the gradual course of human evolution. Modern marriage, as Catholicism has finally constituted it, differs radically from Roman marriage, just as Roman marriage differed from Greek marriage and both of them from Egyptian or Oriental marriage, even after the establishment of monogamy. However great one may suppose these spontaneous changes from the Oriental marriage to the present-day monogamous marriage as understood by Catholicism, they ~~nevertheless~~ constantly conform to the invariable spirit of the institution, which alone is clear of primary savagery. Now the spirit of marriage consists always in this inevitable natural subordination of the wife towards the husband, which is always reproduced in all the changes. And this is proven according to Comte not only historically, but more

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scientifically by biology. Positive biology tends to represent the female sex, especially in our species, because in other animals it may be different, as necessarily constituted, compared to the male, in a sort of continuous infancy, which removes her especially in the most important respects, from the ideal type of the race. So science proves that women cannot reach the level of men. One cannot seriously doubt today, merely on the basis of biology, the evident relative inferiority of the woman, who is much less capable than man, to the indispensable continuity as well as to the high intensity of mental work... either by virtue of the smaller intrinsic power of her intelligence, or because of her more *lifeless* moral and physical susceptibility which is so opposed to every obstruction and every concentrated scientific work. And all history will show that. Especially women are wholly unfit for government; he goes much beyond the tradition, because the tradition generally said, for government, women can be quite good. Proof would be Queen Elizabeth I, Catherine of Russia, and some others. But the question is only regarding science. I read this to you more to show how very conservative Comte is on these subjects.

Now the third and most important subject, society strictly understood. Society consists of families, not of individuals; this is a clear return to the older view against the view of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, where society is based on a contract between the individuals and not on family. What is characteristic of society at large is the invariable reconciliation of the separation of work, the division of labor, with cooperation. Division, and yet cooperation. Individuals of very great intellectual and moral differences work together without an organization or a plan, spontaneously. The principle of society is the division of labor, which leads naturally to cooperation, and this is the crucial difference between society and the family. The family is characterized by social affections, love, parent and child, husband and wife, and so on; but love is of no importance in society, where solidarity is the necessary consequence of the division of labor; that men have to work together.

The division of labor, and hence cooperation, also explains or justifies, the multiplicity of nations. Each nation makes its contribution to the one world of mankind. The division of labor constitutes principally social solidarity. Social organization tends ever more to divide labor: the more society progresses, the more it tends to divide labor, and this takes place in accordance with the characteristics of each individual. Everyone gets that parcel of social labor for which he is best suited. Some of you may remember the beginning of the discussion of Plato's Republic, Book II, when he describes the division of labor and how everyone gets that job for which he is best fitted. But Comte is not as strict as Plato: he says the division of labor in accordance with the characteristics of each individual, regardless of whether these characteristics are natural, i.e., congenital, or due to the education received in social position. In other words, here the problem of justice arises but is not faced by Comte. Say there is someone who is

congenitally very gifted but does not receive the proper education because of his social position, whether that is fair that he remains at the bottom of the social ladder. The division of labor even produces differences both intellectual and moral among the individuals. In other words, these are not merely the natural inequalities there, these natural inequalities are increased through the division of labor. Someone who works all the time intellectually, his intellect is as a natural result superior to the intellect of one whose intellect is never used, or hardly used.

Since through the division of labor, each has a very restricted sphere--making some part of some machine--he doesn't see clearly the relation of his private interest or persuasion, or maybe even his class interest, to the public interest. There is a certain atomization of society; therefore the need for permanent social discipline, that is to say, for government. Government is necessary because society is necessarily divisive. Social progress is due to society; but government renders possible society. Comte comes here very close to the view of Thomas Paine, the true and good thing is society, and government has only a necessary but marginal function. Yet as you will see immediately Comte differs very radically from Paine. For the action of the government is not merely as he puts it, material, by which he means coercive, the police, but also and above all, intellectual and moral. For government stands for the spirit of the whole, whereas society is characterized by the division of labor. More precisely, the division of labor leads to the consequence that the more specialised kinds of labor place themselves spontaneously, naturally, under the continuous direction of those of greater generality. That is to say, there is a natural hierarchy. The simple worker who does this kind of very limited work has a foreman, and so on...which hierarchy emerges without any planning, by the nature of things. This fact increases of course the intellectual and moral inequality. That doesn't mean that the men at the bottom of the ladder are immoral, but simply that quite a few moral potentialities are not actualized there which are actualized on the higher level. More intellectual and moral qualities are needed at the top than at the bottom. Every human society tends then toward a spontaneous government. This tendency is in harmony with another natural phenomenon: namely that some individuals are inclined by nature to command, and others to follow. Nature is so kind, we can say, as to provide for this distinction. Yet we have to consider that there is a need for two kinds of government.

In the first place, we need a government which vouches for the preponderance of a certain system of common opinions. There is a need for the permanent existence of a speculative class; in other words, for the continuous division between theory and practice. A privileged class which enjoys physical leisure, indispensable for the culture of the intellect. The function of this speculative class is to organize opinion and education, in the larger sense of the word, not merely what is going on in schools. Its function is limited to moral influence; i.e., the intellectual rulers, whom as we know are the scientists, are excluded from political power. The medieval separation between Church and State, or rather between power spiritual and power temporal, is a not quite perfect model for Comte. Spiritual government, the

government of the scientists, or we could say intellectuals, if we understand by intellectual a man of science, has the function to approve and disapprove of the public and private life of temporal government. In other words, a power of censorship, which has itself no direct political effect, however. The temporal government was originally of a military kind; now it must be industrial, peaceful. The temporal government will naturally consist of the captains of industry and banking. Captain, we remember in Italian is a military title, so there is a connection. At the top there would be a dictatorship of three bankers--not elected, but named, by their predecessors--but checked, by the freedom of the press, and public opinion in general--the idea being that public opinion is formed by the wisest men of the society, the men of science.

Now the need of a power spiritual is connected with the fact that no society is possible without religion, according to Comte. But Comte being a positivist, cannot have a religion with God; it must be a religion without God, which at that time may have seemed paradoxical--but it has in the meantime become a very popular notion. I read an article for example by one of the present-day positivists, that a scientist who is absolutely unbelieving is religious because of his dedication to science. This is not quite Comte's view; the object of worship of his religion is the human race, a religion of humanity, a religion which consists in the worship of humanity, and especially of the great benefactors of the human race. Now this is in agreement with Comte's moral teaching; morality according to Comte consists in altruism: living for others, *vivant pour autrui*. This does not mean to exclude self-love, as we have seen, because Comte accepts the Biblical command, love thy neighbor like thyself. And it is also not merely of the present generation, but of future ones as well. This morality is very stern; it demands severe self-control. Man has no right to do what he pleases. A life of self-indulgence and mere amusement is impossible. Every citizen, high or low, must regard himself as a public functionary. Intellectual power, no less than the power of wealth, needs moral control. The mind, the intellect, must be subordinated to the heart. So in other words these scientists as rulers are supposed to be permeated by the highest morality; they are not mere technocrats.

I have switched more than once from Comte's social statics to his social dynamics; because the social dynamics is the authoritative and the fundamental part of Comte's teaching. The chief contents of Comte's new political philosophy as a whole is the law of the three stages, and this belongs to social dynamics, the changes that society has undergone in the course of time. More generally stated, the chief teaching of Comte's political philosophy is to the effect that the whole development of the human race constitutes a progress, that is to say an ever-increasing power of the characteristic faculties of humanity, as distinguished from animality...of our most noble inclinations, and our most generous sentiments. The conditions of progress are, in the first place the continuous renovation of the ages of the social movement, and that is to say the death of the individual; if this did not take place, rigidity would set in; and second the progressive increase in numbers. Progress requires large population centers, throughout history.

Comte faces for a moment the possibility of overpopulation in the future, but doesn't see it as an imminent danger. The core of progress, however, is intellectual progress. The history of society is dominated by the history of the human mind; and the history of the human mind, intellectual history, philosophy, is the key to all history. Now history of philosophy does not mean of course philosophy as a field, an academic field in any sense; philosophy is the overall view which men have whether it is theological, metaphysical or positive. The change from military societies, feudal societies, to industrial societies, is a consequence of the changes in philosophy, i.e., in Weltanschauung, in ways of thinking.

The military regime always had as its indispensable political base, the individual slavery of the producers, so that the warriors had the free and full development of their characteristic activity. This institution of slavery was of crucial importance because the slaves, the producers, were the forerunners of the men of the Industrial Society, because of the non-warlike and productive character of their work. No military regime could have established itself, and especially a lasting one, except by being based on a sufficient theological consecration, without which the intimate subordination which it demands would never have been possible. Without this intimate consecration to the theological spirit, it is evident that the military spirit could never have fulfilled the highest social destination of which it was capable. In other words, the military spirit required the theological spirit, was based on it; and therefore the fundamental thing is the theological spirit in the human intellectual history.

Now for the better understanding of Comte's new political philosophy we shall consider at somewhat greater length his critique of what he calls metaphysical politics, in contradistinction to his critique of theological politics. For metaphysical politics at least claims to be based on man's natural faculties alone, whereas theological politics claims to be based on divine revelation. But above all metaphysical politics was not sociology; whereas positive political philosophy is sociology. What was the fundamental error of that political philosophy which was not sociology? In other words, what was the fundamental error of all political philosophy proper?

This question is answered by Comte's criticism of metaphysical politics. Generally speaking, Comte identifies metaphysical political philosophy with that of the modern age, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. But on at least one occasion, he identifies metaphysical political philosophy with medieval political philosophy...the metaphysical sort of legalistic political philosophy. He probably thinks of the importance of the idea of natural law in both the Middle Ages and in modern times. But this is not the decisive point. Metaphysical politics speaks directly to all intelligences on whatever level, i.e., no training, scientific training is required such as that you must have in order to be a chemist or a biologist. The various social questions were subject

of simple inspiration; and this simple inspiration you can have without labor and without any native gifts. In other words, metaphysics treated social and political subjects as if they could be understood by men not thoroughly trained in natural science as a whole. And there is of course an element of truth in that, because the predecessor of Comte assumed that the principles of politics, i.e., the modern principles, have a source of their own, and therefore there is no need to establish them by means of biology and so forth. Even Hobbes asserted, or precisely Hobbes, who was in Comte's sense a metaphysical political philosopher, that political philosophy is intelligible without natural science.

Now what is common to both theological and metaphysical politics, and here we come to a deeper level, is the belief that social phenomena are as it were indefinite and arbitrarily modifiable, by the legislator or by providence. In other words, metaphysical politics exaggerated in an absurd manner the influence of the individual genius. It was blind to the fact that political phenomena are subject to verifiable natural laws; hence political actions are subject to fundamental limitation. From this Comte concludes the vanity of the search of the best government, which is absolutely the search characteristic of metaphysical politics, i.e., without regard to every definite state of theorization, for the invariable natural laws, to which Comte appeals, circumscribe for each epoch the fundamental limits and the essential character of political action. Metaphysical politics takes the political and social organization in isolation; that is to say, as independent of the corresponding civilization. In the language now prevailing, we would say it disregards the cultural matrix of the political and social organization. The harmony between the whole and the part of the social system is intrinsically spontaneous, not due to conscious actions; government is an outgrowth of society, proceeding from a spontaneous consensus. In other words, government is not made, as the metaphysical politics, according to Comte, assumes. The primary action is that of society; that of government is secondary. The artificial and voluntary order is a simple prolongation of the natural and involuntary order. We can state this view as follows. Society is natural. It comes into being naturally; hence it subsists naturally, without any human doing. Naturally--that means in accordance with natural laws. To use another distinction not used by Comte, but parallel to it, I think: society has grown and grows, it is not made. Now those of you who know a bit of what Comte calls metaphysical politics must be wondering, where do we find this metaphysical politics, does he set up a phantom--or was there such a politics once, which assumed the omnipotence of government, of human voluntary action--and so in it the ground of society and government? Where do we find it? You remember that Aristotle said that the polis, the city, is by nature, i.e., it grows out of families, clans, etc. So there is nothing new there. But where do we find this view of the omnipotence of government?

STUDENT: Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the social contract idea.

Yes. What does the social contract, at least as understood by these men, imply?

STUDENT: It implies that there was a time when society existed without government.

Oh no, no. Perhaps Locke believes that, but surely not Hobbes and Rousseau. So we have isolated individuals, and these isolated individuals figure out that they are in a very bad situation. And on this basis of this figuring out, they consciously form society through this conscious act of the social contract. This is what he had in mind. And these people, when setting up their government, are of course perfectly free to set up this or that or that kind of government; they deliberate whether it should be a monarchy, an aristocracy or a democracy. And whatever they voluntarily and consciously decide upon, that government will come into being. So in order--Comte's description of metaphysical politics is a kind of caricature, but not altogether, of the teaching of the century, the most famous teaching of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Aristotle's politics was not metaphysical in this sense, although Comte does not make this distinction there. But surely what Comte has in mind is of course not the same as what Aristotle did. What is the difference between Aristotle's teaching on this point and Comte's teaching?

STUDENT: One difference would be that Aristotle did not distinguish the state and society.

Yes, that is crucial. There are families, naturally, and there are all kinds of loose associations among citizens, but there is no notion of society. This concept developed only in the modern age, in connection with the emergence of modern political economy. That is very true. Now this is connected with something else. The political society, according to Aristotle, the polis, is concerned with the common good, and politics means a conscious concern with the common good. The common good is above all the quality of the citizen body. Naturally also the walls of the city, they have to defend it and so on, but the major concern is the quality of the citizen body. Now this is intrinsically a much higher object than that of what Comte calls society, the production of goods. Is this not however admitted by Comte, too? Does not Comte admit that it is absolutely necessary to be concerned with the quality of the citizen body, with education in the widest sense of the term? To some extent, Comte surely does. And this is for Comte the function of the spiritual as distinguished from the temporal government. To some extent, what he calls spiritual government is an attempt to solve the question which Aristotle had in mind. But there is a great difference, in other words, between Comte and Aristotle on this point, because according to Comte what is decisive for society is the character of common opinion. Is that common opinion, which is always there, theological or scientific? And only if it is scientific is it truly good. Now how does this fit in with Aristotle's whole way of thinking? Let me leave it now at saying that Aristotle does not consider the possibilities of common opinion of society molded by science. Why this is so, and what that implies, that is a very broad question, so I limit myself now to stating the mere fact.

Now metaphysical politics in Comte's sense has this character: a thinker finds out that this and this is the right order; whether it is absolute monarchy of Hobbes, or constitutional monarchy of Locke, or the direct democracy of Rousseau, doesn't make any difference. and then he says what is required for its establishment is only that the legislator or founder have the sufficient force to bring about that establishment. Against this Comte argues that the power of the natural law is much greater than that of any human will. It is hard to find an example of this view of political philosophy according to which the founder of a society can establish any order he pleases on society provided he has the sufficient physical force. The closest approximation to that of which I know occurs in Machiavelli's Discourses, I:18, where Machiavelli discusses the question, can a man who wants to establish a tyranny in an incorrupt society, in a society unfit for tyrannical government, succeed in doing that? And Machiavelli says that is very hard; he needs a couple of generations to corrupt the citizen body and he won't live long enough, but if for one reason or another he has sufficient force he can bring it about in his lifetime. I believe that Machiavelli means this with a certain irony; this has no direct basis in the character of metaphysical politics itself.

Another characterization of metaphysical politics which is implied in what I said before, but I think I should mention it, is the belief in an unlimited power of education. Just as there is an unlimited power of government, so of education--you can make of men by education whatever you see fit. Impossible, according to Comte, because of the natural laws. I will read to you a passage here which describes the spirit of positive politics as Comte sees it.

The eminently relative spirit of positive philosophy will gradually dissipate, to the evident profit of the general order, this absolute disposition, as narrow as irrational, common to theological politics and metaphysical politics, which drives them unceasingly to wish to realize uniformly in all possible stages of civilization, their respective types of unchangeable concepts; and which in our age, has led people to conceive of no other means of civilizing Tahiti except with the help of the banal importation of Protestantism and parliamentary government.

So positive politics does not believe that there is a single desirable form of good government which can be established, at any time in any place; but which kind of government is good, for a given society, depends on the character of the society as well. The spirit of positive politics is described by Comte in the term, "wise resignation," a resignation imposed on man by the knowledge of the natural laws which cannot be transgressed and which limit human action. True liberty can only consist in a rational submission to the preponderance, the overwhelming power, of the fundamental laws of nature--as distinguished from the arbitrary commands of rulers, where it would be foolish to be resigned, because those commands can be changed, whereas the fundamental laws of nature cannot.

Another point: metaphysical politics is characterised by the preponderance of purely material considerations. He means by that,

the view that all political evils are due to faulty institutions, and not to the social ideals and morals, i.e., to the doctrines prevailing in society. Now the belief in propaganda which you find frequently is of course also a belief in institutions, in Comte's sense, insofar as propaganda can simply be manipulated, and is based on the view that human opinions can be manipulated. But Comte implies that the change of opinions cannot be manipulated, but is a very long process, and due especially in our age to the expansion of the positive spirit, which requires time and so on. In other words, metaphysical politics believes that the temporal rulers can do what can be done in a way only by the spiritual rulers; namely, the change of opinion taking place now over generations. Metaphysical politics expects salvation from political action, and especially revolutionary action; or overstated, as Comte does it occasionally, by military action, by force you establish the right order. Metaphysical politics is, we might say, unhistorical, although Comte doesn't use that term. It ascribes a chimerical fixity to an essentially variable condition; and at the same time, it despises the social or historical continuity. It trusts more in conscious actions, reform or revolution, than in the spontaneous changes. The very ends which men pursue are themselves, according to Comte, products of the historical process; i.e., these very ends do not lie within the power of an individual thinker.

In the real development of social evolution, the spontaneous modifications eventually produced by the gradual course of events, are generally speaking, by far superior to what the most eminent reformer would have dared to conceive in advance. A philosophy which necessarily takes history as its principle scientific base, which represents in every respect the man of all times, and in all places, as indispensable cooperators in the same fundamental evolution, intellectual or moral, moral or political, and which in any case, attempts always to attach the actual process to the whole of real antecedents, must certainly be judged today to be much more proper than any other philosophy to regularize the idea and the sentiment of social continuity, without incurring the dangers of that servile and irrational admiration of the parts. In other words, change is inevitable, but this change is a thing spontaneous, rather than to be brought about by human planning. Metaphysical politics conceives of society itself as due to human making. Some individuals founded society, because they became ^{aware} of the usefulness of society to the individual: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau--that implies that man is not by nature sociable, which Comte denies. Metaphysical politics is characterized by the primacy of the individual and his rights, and especially this leads to the belief in the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of the unlimited freedom of the conscience. It leads finally to distrust of the government, the belief that government is by its nature the necessary enemy of society, a thought intimated by Rousseau in the Social Contract and more clearly stated by Thomas Paine. The common defect of theological and metaphysical politics--they have no awareness of historical continuity and its salutary character. Proof: the theologians condemn the modern development, and the metaphysicians condemn the Middle Ages. Comte, positive politics, sees the necessary right and function of both the medieval order and the modern development. Social conditions in every epoch are as perfect as

possible; therefore the criticism of the Middle Ages, of modern times, or of any other society is absurd. Social conditions are in every respect as perfect as possible; which doesn't mean that they are or can be models for one another. They are of course not simply perfect; and therefore the possibility and the need for progress; a higher perfection is possible in the Middle Ages than was possible in ancient China, or whatever one you choose. Now if this is so, this leads to the consequence, and this is crucial, of the coincidence of the is and the ought. At every time the perfect is actual--only the perfect for stage A is not the perfect for stage B,C, etc. If this is so there is no need of cause for any ought. I read you a passage:

Positive philosophy alone has been constantly progressing since a long series of centuries, while its antagonists have been constantly decaying. (Now listen..) Whether this is good or bad, is of little importance. The fact itself is undeniable, and this is sufficient.

And so forth. In other words, every wave of the future is good; we do not have to raise the question whether it is a good or a bad wave. This is one reason why already in Comte and in the later development of positivism the question of the ought became less and less important, especially after the impact of the evolutionist doctrine on social science. Then evolution determines what will become, we don't have to raise the question of what should come, because this would be of no influence. And the great reaction to that, transcendent social science in the second half of the nineteenth century was the so-called fact-value distinction, which is so characteristic of social science today. In other words, against this so-called evolutionism, the real assertion that the evolution does not tell you anything as to the goodness of that trend. The question of the ought cannot be answered by the is. And in this respect, that was a very sound reaction.

Before I turn to some concluding remarks about Comte, I would like to see whether I have made these points clear regarding Comte's teaching. What is directly interesting to us as students of political philosophy is to repeat Comte's critique of pre-positivistic political philosophy, which he calls metaphysical philosophy, and therefore I enumerated these points. The general impression one gets from them is that this is a criticism directed above all against the political philosophy of Hobbes and Rousseau and similar thinkers. Whether to some extent it includes by implication also Plato and Aristotle, if you think of the structure of Aristotle's Politics, especially in the more practical parts of the politics Book VI where he always raises the question how to establish, to set up a democracy, a monarchy and so on--there clearly the emphasis is on voluntary action. Needless to say, Aristotle teaches all the time, that you cannot set up a democracy in the whole state, the whole situation is not suitable for it, and the same thing applies to monarchy, oligarchy, whatever else you might think of. The emphasis on what can be done by man, by political action, is much more powerful in Aristotle, even in Aristotle, than in Comte, where the chief expectation is from what will take place spontaneously, as they call it, especially through the spread of the scientific spirit.

STUDENT: If these states are supposed to be in a certain historical order, does he explain why for instance, Aristotle and Plato, who are metaphysical philosophers, came before the Middle Ages?

No. I wanted to bring this up; this is not clear.

STUDENT: Does Comte have any speculations as to what happens after the positive age. Is there anything after the positive age? Is there decay, or...

Nothing. Silence. Characteristic of nineteenth-century progressivism, forgetting about the thereafter, in both senses of the term.

STUDENT: What is the character of the natural laws--are these specifically behavioral laws?

Yes, absolutely behavioral laws, not normative laws.

STUDENT: I meant does he look for such general principles as a philosophy of man?

No, but we have one example: the ineptitude of the female sex. That's a natural law; if you try to establish the equality of the sexes, you will act against natural law, and it will not work. But I suppose you could also say the abolition of private property, or progressive income tax, go against the natural law; I would assume that.

STUDENT: How are these laws established?

By scientific method. Comte has made it clear to being with, that in social matters, the ordinary experience of mankind, common sense, is quite trustworthy. And as you know, that can lead to difficulties.

STUDENT: Mr. Strauss, there seems to be an inevitable question: what is the justification for Comte's writing at all?

Because the transitional stage, with all its miseries, will last longer than if people know what is the situation. If people are in a crisis, and this would be admitted by some people, I am sure--what is the root of the crisis? Even the insight that nothing fundamental can be done about it, is an intellectual solution to a practical problem, is it not? Think of Viet Nam today. If someone comes to the conclusion that nothing can be done, just hanging on--in other words, the crisis will go on for the possible future, that is still a practically important theoretical observation, is it not?

STUDENT: Well, you said earlier that Comte said that even individual acts were the product of development of historical stages. If that were carried to the full extent,...

No, Comte would say, if I don't point this out, maybe in fifty years, quite a few people will see without my help that this is a problem, and adjust themselves, and try to make others adjust themselves. Two hundred years from now it wouldn't make any difference. But in the meantime it would make a lot of difference, whether I write or not.

STUDENT: Is it proper for us to ask the evidence of some of his statements like "greater intelligence makes for greater social ability?"

Well, he argues that out to some extent; if people are more thoughtful, look into things more closely, then they will see that their responsibility extends further than if they had not done so; there is something to that, is there not? I mean, if someone says, "I don't care, that is none of my business," and you show him that his well-being depends on public affairs being done properly, then he would act in a more enlightened manner, less narrowly egoistic than in the first place. That does not solve the problem entirely, because there can be a kind of egoism advanced by intelligence, I know that. But generally speaking, as was shown also by the last statements which UI quoted, Comte is surely guilty of a very great optimism; and the strange thing is that he accuses the theologians and the metaphysicians of optimism. You know what optimism means originally, that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Now if someone says, social conditions are in every epoch as perfect as possible, is this not optimism? In other words, that is not a reasonable kind of discussion, "Are you an optimist or a pessimist?" One would have to specify it properly. Well, then I will make some further considerations about Comte; I was happy to see that some of the points which I wanted to make have already been anticipated by some of you.

Now the core of Comte's teaching is the law of the three stages, as successive stages. Can one understand the history of the world, or at least the history of the West, in terms of that law? For example, if you take the development from Plato to Archimedes, and here we have in between the Stoics, who have some influence on Roman law, and social history...this would seem to be metaphysical rather than theological, and yet it was succeeded by the clearly theological Middle Ages--this is a minor difficulty for Comte. But more important, his prediction of the final victory of the positive spirit, in the foreseeable future, only the positive spirit will possess public power--he doesn't mean that there will not be individuals who think in either metaphysical or theological terms, that would be of no interest to him. But what about the isms, which raise their ugly heads after Comte, in the twentieth century especially; communism and fascism, appear to be something like metaphysical politics from the point of view of Comte.

But on the other hand, if you think of such facts as the Supreme Court decision regarding desegregation, based on the findings of social science--this would not have been possible a hundred years ago. And whereas a Supreme Court decision based on theological or metaphysical considerations, is, I believe, today unthinkable. This is one of the things which shows some element of truth in what Comte meant. Yes?

STUDENT: I was thinking that the 'isms' we have experienced in the twentieth century, communism and fascism, lay claim to validity partially on this basis.

Yes, but Comte could say that there is some possibility that the old metaphysicians also claimed to be scientific, and were not.

STUDENT: Oh, I see.

Therefore they are in fact metaphysical and not positive. Now to come somewhat closer to the core of his teaching, Comte's political solution,¹⁸ the rule of the men of science, the new power spiritual. This is based on the premise that ideas or opinions govern the world. From this it follows that the man of science will have the moral authority in the future, which the clergy possessed in the Middle Ages. But the situation is I believe somewhat different, because in the Middle Ages, the temporal rulers were checked not only by the power spiritual, but also by their armed subjects. What about the subjects of the captains of industry, the workers, peasants, and so on? And above all, in the medieval order, there were very great sanctions in afterlife, on obedience or disobedience to the power spiritual. There is no equivalent for that in the rule of the scientists. They do not have power over the souls of their subjects. Comte overstates the power of reason, or of ideas. And this is very strange, because he insists on the secondary character of reason, as compared with the passions, especially the selfish passions. From this point of view one could see why Marx could have a much deeper social influence already in the nineteenth century than Comte. Because Marx does not overestimate the power of ideas, or reason. Comte is clearly antidemocratic, and his notion of government shows this very clearly. The notion of sovereignty of the people, which emerged especially in Rousseau, on the basis of the context of metaphysical politics, is for him an absurdity. His antidemocratic stand is based on his belief in the incompetence of the masses; he puts his trust in the men at the top, the captains of banks and industry, controlled in a way by the men of science. The social organization tends evermore to divide labor, in accordance with the characteristics of each individual, regardless of whether these characteristics are congenital, or due to education and social position. Now therewith the question of justice arises. Is an inferiority due to inferior education, inferior social position, something which is necessary to adduce, or can this not be changed by a social action? And you know the tremendous importance which this thought had in time after Comte. The stabilization, the order, for which Comte longed, was brought about after his time by democracy. Democracy was at that time only in this country. And there was a great European thinker who informed Europe about this country, and the likely future of Europe as it could be seen in America. That was de Tocqueville.

Tocqueville was more foreseeing of these things, than Comte was. I do not say that a man should give bright prophecies in order to be wise, but if he insists on the prediction of the future as the sign of wisdom, as Comte does, to be a false predictor is fatal. In other words, stabilization was brought about not by science, but by democracy. To which one might raise this objection: is not the victory of democracy fundamentally the same as the victory of science? Dewey said that the method of democracy is the method of intelligence, and the method of intelligence is of course the method of science. Ergo, there is a fundamental harmony between science and democracy. Now this is a very long question. But that it is a question is shown by the fact that

within democracy the question arises--democracy or rule of experts--technocracy? And the technocracy is in a way closer to what Comte meant than the democracy. Although the technocrats would be strictly specialists, and the men whom he believed should be the rulers, were, could not be mere specialists, that goes without saying.

We must note the contrast between his positivism, his alleged sobriety, based on knowledge of laws, behavior laws, practical laws, and his amazing utopianism. Now let us look a bit more closely at this point.

Science as Comte understands it deals with the how, not with the why. He does not go into the question--for example he is perfectly satisfied with the law, the Newtonian law, of gravitation, without going into the question of what is gravitation, the innermost nature of it. As he also puts it, the question of the where and whither are not raised by science, only the question of how. Yet these questions not answered by science remain--that is to say, the questions of theology and metaphysics try to answer. Even if we grant that theology and metaphysics do not supply knowledge, they take men's deepest concerns seriously, and do not starve them, as science as understood by Comte does. What is most important to men is not dealt with by science. This experience of ever-increasing awareness has led to what has been called the flight from scientific reason. Science may profess indefinitely, but the more it progresses, the more it becomes aware of its essential limitations, the more it finds itself teaching: "I cannot teach you wisdom. And what is the use of all expertise without wisdom?"

Now Comte was in this respect too optimistic: that science could take the place and fulfill the social and human functions that surely theology filled and to some extent metaphysics. According to Comte, the fundamental error in theology and metaphysics consisted in making man the key to understanding everything. God understood in the light of man, teleological explanation of nature, as if all nature is willing and purposeful. According to Comte the fundamental science is mathematics--the non-teleological science. His hierarchy of the sciences implies that there is no essential difference between man and brutes--psychology a part of zoology. Yet is not mathematics a creation of the human mind, a social mind, and not of the brutish mind? Science is essentially of human, not of brutish origin. Can science be understood as the product of the subhuman, directly or indirectly? Is not man truly the key, if not in a very simplistic manner? Finally, regarding his religion of humanity, based on the unawareness of a religious sanction, it is clear that this religion if humanity is an ersatz religion. I suppose you know this term ersatz, which was coined in the First World War when Germany was in need of some substitute for coffee and cocoa, and perhaps even bread. Ersatz means substitute, but it has this especially nasty meaning, which it acquired in Germany at that time. Now an ersatz religion is a substitute religion with which you could perhaps be satisfied in an extreme pinch, but which is surely not the right thing. The question is, can men who are heirs to the Biblical tradition worship something that is not eternal? Now I will read you one quite revealing passage.

"The actual march of our individual development from infancy to maturity"--and the same is also true on a large scale, there is also the march of the human race from infancy to maturity. Well, if we look at the individual we know that if he lives long enough, there will also be a stage of old age, not to mention senility, and then death. What about the old age of the human race? to say nothing of its death? Here we see again his quote "optimism"--so strange because his major objection to theology and metaphysics is frequently expressed by the assertion that they are fundamentally optimistic. Now the reaction to this kind of optimism, Comteian, came very soon in the second half of the nineteenth century. Because this was especially the heyday of quote "pessimism", connected primarily with the name of Schopenhauer, but which had other famous representatives-- Melville, in this country, and which was the counterwave to these unsupported hopes. And it is clear that what remained of Comte up to the present day is the clarity about the fundamental difference between the modern scientific approach and all earlier approaches; and the second concern, that this has an enormous social influence, at least via technology, which no one can deny. But any further assertions regarding the positive spirit one makes are unsupported.

Now with this I conclude my remarks about Comte. We will now turn to the post-Comteian transformation of positivism, to come to our present problem. And the most important development as far as we as social scientists are concerned is the stripping of science, in particular social science, of all right to pass value judgements. This took place a long time after Comte's death, and had nothing directly to do with him. For Comte there was no question: he taught a morality, an "ought," without any feeling that in doing so he ceased to be a scientist--his altruistic teachings. He spoke of progress, all the time, and clearly when you speak of progress, you presuppose things of science--you presuppose that you know this and this are values. There was no question for Comte, but this became a question towards the end of the nineteenth century, and it has now after that become completely victorious in the Western world--the view that social science as science cannot pass any value judgement. Now if this is so, clearly political philosophy as concerned with good or just government is an impossibility. It can be a matter of preaching, but it has no place in academic halls, because there we are dedicated to science. To this issue I would like to devote the next lecture.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 3 January 13, 1965

At the end of last meeting one of the students asked me--raised an objection to my critical remarks about Comte. Now let me first repeat my statement, which he had in mind. Science in Comte's view deals only with the how of phenomena, not with the why. Yet the questions regarding the why, the where and whither, remain. That is to say, the questions which theology and metaphysics try to answer. Even if we grant that theology and metaphysics do not supply knowledge, they take care of men's deepest concerns, and take them seriously--they do not starve them. Hence what is most important to men is not dealt with by science, and this can lead to the flight from scientific reason. Now the objection was this: but theology and metaphysics are untrue, hence they are in no way a threat to science. Was this not the point you made? ("Yes.") Well, the difficulty is this: what if reason cannot say that the answers which theology and metaphysics give are untrue? It cannot go beyond saying that they go beyond the competence of science; they are scientifically baseless, but that is not the same as untrue.

This is a very serious difficulty. Now positivists in our age, and even Comte himself, have tried to find this way out: by saying that theology and metaphysics are not indeed untrue, but their propositions are meaningless. Meaningless. That is in a way worse than untrue. For in order to be meaningful, a proposition must be susceptible of being validated or invalidated by scientific means--which the proposition, for example, God exists, is not. Ultimately they must be able to be validated or invalidated by sense-perception, by observation. But the question arises, is all experience sense-experience? Is there not such a thing as religious experience?

There is a book by William James on The Variety of Religious Experience, which would give you food to think. Some people are, as Max Weber said of himself, quote "religiously unmusical," but this means of course that they are for this reason incompetent judges; just as an ordinary unmusical man is a bad judge of music, a religiously unmusical man is a bad judge of religion. So positivism would need a kind of what we can call negative metaphysics in order to take care of theology and metaphysics; but being positivism, it is incapable of developing such a negative metaphysics.

There is another point which one must consider. The primary view of the truth, which is still very powerful in Comte, is that truth is the aliquation of the intellect and the thing--aliquatio intellectus et res. Or in other words, that knowledge reproduces being as it is. There are certain difficulties here. In the very beginning of the modern development, in the seventeenth century, Locke made this distinction, on the basis of Galileo and Descartes, between primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities, extension and impenetrability; the secondary qualities, colors, sounds, and other sense-qualities--and the latter were understood to be only subjective.

Green, shrill, or whatever you might take. This was generally understood--but then the question arises, what about the primary qualities themselves? So the thing itself consists of the primary qualities alone. The things as understood by physics--are these the things as they are in themselves? Are they not theoretical constructs--i.e. human constructs--things relative to man, in contradistinction to the things in themselves? The conclusion from this line of argument was this: science gives us only knowledge of the phenomenal, or what is relative to man; of the absolute, it does not give us any knowledge. This field remains open for non-scientific or trans-scientific metaphysics. The very insight into the relativity of scientific knowledge causes the longing for absolute knowledge. This is in our age that school which still maintains these old, simple-minded views: that truth is the aliquation of intellect and the thing. The only school in our age which still maintains it is orthodox Marxism, Leninism.

The issue came to a head in Lenin's criticism of Mach, an Austrian physicist and philosopher, who had questioned this view, that knowledge is knowledge of the things in themselves. This school was called empyreal criticism, for some reason, and Lenin's criticism of empyreal criticism is very interesting to read. He tries to uphold the simple old-fashioned view: that to know things means to know them as they are in themselves, and not merely relative to man. And whether Lenin was victorious in that fight, that would be a long question to decide. Of course it was the older view that he repeated. But in our age on the basis of modern science this phenomenalistic view, as it is sometimes called, has proven to be more powerful. This is an additional reason why the longings for metaphysics continue to exist and to be quite powerful side by side with science. This difficulty is by no means solved. That would be my answer to your question.

I would have now to turn to positivism as it appears after Comte. And there are two difference which are of crucial importance. The first is this: whereas for Comte, science, positive science, is only common sense carried through, for present-day positivism that is understood that there is a radical difference between science and common sense. An important step for this change was the emergence of non-Euclidean geometry, already in Comte's lifetime, but Comte himself was not aware of that. Science is not the prolongation of common sense, but its radical transformation. The world as seen by physics, or the physicist, is not the true world; it is a different world, one which has immense uses, but one has no right to say that it is the true world in contradistinction to the phenomenal world. The second point is of much greater practical importance in the social sciences: in order to be scientific, social science, or science in general, must strip its subjects of all value predicates. And this applies of course especially to social science. In other words, not only the sense qualities blue green or whatever, but also the value-qualities are strictly subjective and have no place in social science--even less so than the sense-qualities, because there is a universal agreement at least among normal men that

this is brown, or that is green--but as to whether something is good or bad, there is wide disagreement among men. The starting-point of this doctrine is at first glance the distinction between the is and the ought. Is-statements, that this is so, and ought-statements, that this ought to be so, have no logical connection with each other. It is not possible to infer from the fact that something is, that it ought to be--nor vice-versa, to infer from the fact that something ought to be, that it is. To infer from the is to the ought means to be a conformist of the worst order--whatever is, is good; and to infer from the ought to the is is wishful thinking. Up to this point this is of course absolutely sound. So this distinction between the is and the ought which is a very difficult distinction is somehow in a way intelligible to everyone today. But the distinction between the is and the ought is not decisive for the present-day position, because this was made by Kant above all, or by Hume, for that matter, and neither Kant nor Hume said it is possible to make objective value judgements--on the contrary. So the characteristic premise of present-day social science does not support this distinction, but the additional assertion that there is no knowledge of the ought in any manner, shape or form--while there is knowledge of the is. This is a peculiarity of present-day social science, because there was a thing throughout the ages called skepticism, which denies the possibility of objective value judgements, but denies also the possibility of is-statements. There is no knowledge of the truth. Present-day social science is not skeptical at all; it admits the possibility of science. But it denies the possibility of objective value judgements. What I said implied another premise. Is-ought is the first stage. Now by the ought we understand some moral principle, duty. But this is extended beyond the sphere of morality, and that is implied in the term value. For example, if I say something is beautiful, there is no ought at all, and yet that is a value judgement. So value includes the good and the beautiful and if there is any other sphere of values in addition--it is much larger. Ultimate values, it is asserted, are irreducible to any is and hence indemonstrable. And furthermore, there are many, not only two, but ultimate values, which are incompatible with one another. Because if they were not incompatible with one another, there would be no difficulty; but the question is, which to choose--this question cannot be rationally settled. And ultimately it is because a given value--I don't define what a value is, following positivism itself--if I have a given value, it may be possible to reduce it to a higher value, to a more fundamental value. So value A would follow logically from value B, so value A is not a problem in itself--the problem is only value B, from which value A is derived. Still, it is asserted that science is not completely baffled by the existence of values; science can handle them in a certain manner. It can analyze them, it can describe them, it can clarify their meanings. Let us assume someone would say, my value is political liberty; well, the social scientist can take cognizance of that; and he can explain what this individual understood by political liberty, and distinguish it perhaps from other meanings of political liberty, without however being able to say, which is the superior meaning, or whether political liberty is in itself valuable. This is beyond its competence. Furthermore, social science can do the following: if the values function as science can establish which means are required for the actualization of these values. Which includes the possibility that science might be able to show that certain

ends cannot be actualized at all. And to that extent it refutes this end or this value as a possible one. Science can furthermore try to establish a correlation between values and human types: social, or racial, or what have you, showing that lower-middle class people as a rule go in for value A, upper-middle class people go in for value B, and so on; this is a relation between values and facts, without establishing therewith the value of the values. If a lower-middle class man, who by virtue of his social class position could be expected to cherish value A, but can only be expected to do that, He may be a loner, a Lone Ranger, and says, no, I prefer the upper-class values, that is his business, he is not obliged, obviously, to follow the value of his class. Now the fact-values distinction is meant as a logical distinction; what does this mean, I mean, what is the relevant meaning of this statement here? A psychological connection between a value and a given human type, for example, is irrelevant for the discussion of a value. For--and here we come to the meaning of the distinction between fact and value--psychology deals with the genesis of human thoughts. The validity of human thoughts is something entirely different, something beyond the competence of psychology. The non-distinction between values and validity is something said to be the error of psychologism. The proposition itself and its validity must be decided entirely in non-psychological terms, in terms of the genesis. So if a man would say, slitting men's throats and drinking their blood is good--there may be such a view--he cannot be criticized on the ground that this proposition stems from insanity, because that is only the genesis of the proposition, and has nothing to do with its validity. We have to take the proposition by itself, in isolation--that is another important indication of this view. Now this view is at present the official doctrine, by which I mean the large majority, the overwhelming majority of social scientists, especially in this country, but also in part of Europe, hold to this view. And therefore everyone is compelled to familiarise themselves with it, and to take a stand toward it.

This view emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth century in Germany; but it became acceptable in this country only after World War I. And only in the last two or three decades has it become unqualifiedly predominant. Now in order to get some view of this I will read you a statement. First, by Albert Einstein, the famous physicist.

If someone approves as a goal the extirpation of the human race from the earth, one cannot refute the viewpoint on rational grounds.

That is to say, on non-rational grounds, namely, I don't like it, of course, you can say that. But that is not a refutation. It is only putting one preference against another. You see also that Einstein says it is not refutable on rational grounds. Now Einstein was a physicist, and if he would have said on physical grounds, maybe he is right. He would surely be more competent to say that than I. But he doesn't say on scientific grounds, he says on rational grounds, hence identifying tacitly rational and scientific.

This we note only in passing. Now let us consider this example in order to enter this subject-matter. We have heard a different slogan in more recent times, "Better dead than Red." It agrees partly with the view expressed by Einstein, in relation to the H-bomb, which he probably had in mind. But what is the difference between the two propositions? There is a very striking difference from the point of view of rationality.

STUDENT: The word "better" means there is a good and bad implied.

Yes, that is right, but we can state it more exactly. In the second case, a reason is given. Einstein's man doesn't give any reason; he only says, I like the extirpation of the human race. The other man says, No, under I do not want the extirpation of the human race, but I want--I am absolutely opposed to Communism, and if the world should become Communist I am in favor of a last-minute war, which may have this consequence.

Einstein does not even attempt to give a reason; and he calls this rational. What could the reason be for men to say, I wish the extirpation of the human race? Well, he might think that men are such abominable creatures that they should be extirpated. Prior to investigation, that is of course possible, but naturally it would apply to the speaker himself, yes? And one could say, would it not be more sensible of him to commit suicide? (Great laughter.) ...And let the others decide for themselves!

Now let us take another example: the Nazis said, not that the human race should be extirpated, but that the Jews should be extirpated. Why? They were much more rational than Einstein. They said, it is good for Germany. So they have given a reason. I'm not concerned with whether the reason is good or bad, I note the fact that the Nazis were in this respect more rational than the great physicist Einstein. They gave a reason; now what is implied in that? That destroying human beings just for the sake of destroying them--or even destroying anything for the sake of destroying it--killing for the sake of killing--for kicks, as some juvenile would say--there is something savage, inhuman, in that.

When you read the Iliad, and see the manner in which Achilles treats the corpse, mind you, of Hector, in a very beastly manner, and the horror of the poet is quite clearly visible in that, here we have an example. This is a way in which human feeling goes. Something in us--we do not know what, but something in us as human beings disapproves of destruction for destruction's sake, killing for killing's sake. We are perfectly open to the possibility that some killings might be good. But cause must be shown, why it should be done.Perhaps there is a connection between being a human being, and humanity. The etymological connection is known to every one of us, because "humanis" is Latin for man. Perhaps there is a connection between being a human being and humanity, i.e., the is and the ought of humanity. This only a very general and provisional example. We can also take this into consideration: why are people empirically opposed even if they are old and willing to die and tired of life, why are they generally speaking opposed to the extirpation of the human race without any reason? I believe this is because most people

have children; and think that what is good for old people is not necessarily good for children. They think of the children. Via their children, these tired men have a stake in the future. And even if they do not have children, they think of themselves as members of society, of the United States, which they wish to have a future. One would have to take this into consideration, in order to form a judgement on Einstein's bald thesis: You cannot say anything against it. Now what is the character of the reasoning we use in discussing such a proposition?

We did not inquire regarding absolute values; for no reference was made in the statement itself to absolute values. Why should we open this question? An unsupported, practical proposal was made. We asked for support, as we would even if it were a very minor thing, say that we should have reading periods only of two weeks, instead of four weeks. Now this kind of argument in a very limited way demanded by the situation may be called dialectical argument in the original sense; we argue out the case on the basis of what is necessarily implied in it. We can also state it differently: what Einstein did was to identify science with reason. Is there not any other reason? Is there not, for instance, practical reason, which has a different character from scientific reasoning? Einstein's unconscious reasoning is characterized by the fact that it disregards the context in which this proposal is made, the inevitable human context. One can call this kind of reasoning, strictly speaking, abstract; insofar as it disregards consequences. Now the fact-value distinction is at present generally accepted as evidence. Those of Einstein are, as the mathematicians today say, elementary—you learn this in the first grade. This of course does not prove the truth of this distinction; for this precisely is the character of prejudice. If something is very evident, how could we ever doubt of it? It may be perfectly questioned. The power of this view merely proves that there are very powerful psychological incentives to it. The status of the fact-value distinction cannot be compared to the status of a very sophisticated theory in physics, for example, the very understanding of which requires a high degree of competence; say Einstein's own theory of relativity, or Copernicus' theory, which was also once paradoxical, and yet accepted and remained. Because the fact-value distinction is not a sophisticated theory; it is extremely simple. The mere thesis can be grasped by the meanest capacities, as Locke would say, in a single city. It is a very recent doctrine. When you think for example of John Dewey, who was a very powerful influence in this country for more than one generation; he still did not yet accept it.

Now the first statement of it, as I said, occurred in Germany, in a book by a philosopher-sociologist called Simmel, Introduction to Moral Science, 1892.*

Now what Simmel does in this book, as he says in the preface, is to give a psychological and historical study of moral principles. A historical-psychological study. And he calls this pursuit, positive ethics, positive here in the sense of Comte, which treats, as he puts it, good and evil,

* Einleitung in der Moralwissenschaft

as equally in different subjects of a merely genetic knowledge." He looks at good and bad as a meteorologist would look at good weather and bad weather, with complete indifference. I will read to you another passage. What is called "normative science;" as this ethics was traditionally thought to be, is in fact only science of the normative. Science itself does not establish or prove norms, but merely explains them, and their correlations. For science always raises only causal, not teleological questions. The question, what is the cause of this norm? that it is accepted in universal society, and norms and purposes may as well as anything else be the subject of scientific inquiries but cannot be the essence of science itself. In other words, science itself cannot be normative, it can only deal with norms. The pure and ideal scientific problem is this: given these purposes and conditions, what must we do in order to realize those purposes, while considering the conditions? Only a moral legislator, a practical revolutionary in moral matters, can say simply, while setting up moral goals in a dogmatic manner, this ought to be. No scientist as scientist can. For the ultimate setting up of a rule is an act which silences criticism. However, atrocious that rule may be, it silences criticism. Ethics can set up only hypothetical imperatives, in Kant's sense, not categorical ones.

Now a categorical imperative is one which says, Thou shalt do this and that. The ten commandments are categorical imperatives. And the hypothetical imperative is that if you want to drink this soup, you must use a can-opener. You must use a can-opener is hypothetical--if you want to have that soup in the can. I quote you another sentence, value is nothing objective, but arises only in the subjective process of preferring. Now I must confess in my earlier browsings in Simmel's book, I did not become aware of the fact that Simmel truly has this view perfectly. What prevented me from seeing it was this: here a man makes a complete break with the whole tradition of ethics in all its forms, without any apparent awareness of the immensity, of the enormous character of this change. And this I believe is not possible. Take this example, let me read one which Simmel gives. Science is causal, not teleological. Now that was an old story, since the seventeenth century. The greatest and most outspoken enemy of all teleology was a man called Spinoza. And what is the title of Spinoza's chief work? Ethics. And normative ethics. So the distinction between causal and teleological thinking cannot possibly be the sufficient reason for this view of a value-free social science.

I believe or I suspect, that no epoch-making change in human thought takes place without awareness of it. In other words, there may be great economic changes, for all I know, which take place without anyone being aware of it. But in human thought, that is not possible, I believe. How can we understand this great radical change in the character of the study of man, which is represented by Simmel's book, and Simmel's not being aware of the profound character of the change? Now Simmel was preceded by Nietzsche, who died four years before Simmel's book appeared. Now Nietzsche regarded Schopenhauer as his teacher. Simmel later on wrote a book about Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. Now Schopenhauer had said that all philosophers agree as to the content of morality; as he

phrased it, don't hurt anyone, but rather try to help everyone as much as you can, In this ordinary morality, there is agreement among all men. The only difference, and that is very great, among the philosophers, concerns the ground on which we believe these things to be our duty. Now this caused Nietzsche's violent reaction. I will read to you one statement: it is the correct judgement of scholars that men believe at all times to know what is good and bad, praiseworthy and blameworthy; but it is a prejudice of scholars, that we know it now better than any time. In other words, there is no knowledge of good and bad. Nietzsche goes beyond that. Ultimately, so-called knowledge of good and bad is based on acts of evaluation, not necessarily of the individual, of a group or a whole nation--but Nietzsche goes very much beyond that. Nietzsche says that ultimately all knowledge, all science, rests on such acts of evaluation. He is in this sense subjective.

Now what Simmel did we see in the light of Nietzsche more clearly. He made a compromise between Nietzsche's revolution, of which Nietzsche himself was fully aware, that it was a revolution, and positivism; in other words, he still accepted the positivistic view of the objectivity of science, and combined it with Nietzsche's view of the non-objectivity of values. One more point which is important in Simmel and to some extent also later. the issue of the conflict with which Simmel was concerned most immediately was that between an aristocratic ethics, as it partly existed or lingered on in Germany at that time, Prussia, and the socialistic ethics. The key point is, this conflict between these two kinds of ethics cannot be settled by rational means. Social science has to be neutral between these two kinds of morality, just as physics is metaphysically neutral between spiritualism and materialism...a neutrality of which I have spoken before. So from this point of view, the more recent development in the social sciences, seems to continue only the tendency of modern science towards a neutrality, but a neutrality now extended beyond metaphysics to ethics. Before I turn to a critical consideration of this view, with which I suppose you are all familiar, I would like to find out whether I have made myself clear, regarding the character of the thesis.

STUDENT: I wonder if you could go over once more a point that Simmel makes a compromise between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer?

Nietzsche's eventual thesis is that at the bottom of all human convictions there are acts of evaluating, of setting up of values, so that for example, modern physics, theoretical physics, itself, rests upon evaluation, and not of course only because science is based on the acceptance of the value of truth--this you could say of every form of science--but a very specific evaluation from which it proceeds. Now Simmel rejected that. He accepted the authoritative character of modern science, without any hesitation. But as far as moral things as concerned, he accepted it otherwise. So he is in a kind of compromise between Nietzsche and the then-prevailing view. Yes?

STUDENT: In your explanation of Simmel, you said that you couldn't understand how such a radical break could be made in the whole tradition of thought without his comprehending it.

Well, without--when you read that, what he says about these matters, in this enormous book of more than six hundred pages, it does not in any way make the impression of being a revolutionary book. When you read later on the statements of Max Weber, they are much more revolutionary in their substance, although Weber himself says it is nothing new, because this was already a kind of settled opinion in certain academic circles in Germany by Max Weber's time. But Weber is overwhelmed by this state of things, that certain things which were hitherto regarded as knowable are now admitted to be not knowable at all.

STUDENT: In other words, you didn't mean that simply stating the fact that Simmel combined Nietzsche with Schopenhauer takes away our shock at seeing him lay these things down.

No, no. There was no pedagogy or soft-sell--that becomes intelligible I believe when one presupposes that this book appeared in a country which had been hammered for at least a decade by Nietzsche's immoralism--a word which he himself used, which meant surely this: there is no knowledge of good and evil possible. It also meant more than that.

STUDENT: Could you explain Nietzsche's convictions a little bit more? Did he believe there was a knowledge of the good and the bad, that all scholars had been mistaken on this in the past?

Well, this was of course naturally implied. Because hitherto ethics had been a normative science, and not only with the doctrine of the so-called idealists, but the British Utilitarians. That is of course a normative doctrine: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Surely. But Simmel does not convey to the reader an awareness on his part that this is a complete change in the character of man's study of men. That what hitherto was taken for granted by everyone, a normative science, ceases to be. I mean there were of course some preparations for that--Marxism, for example. But Marxism in its attack on bourgeois morality--yes?--of course appeared to another, truer sense of justice, as it thought. No one could say that Marxism is simply non-normative and ethically neutral in the way in which this present-day social science claims to be ethically neutral. This I must say was the reason why I did not--was not inclined to credit Simmel with that, whereas Max Weber, whose essays on this subject appeared about a decade later, originally, Weber is filled with a kind of passion, to which he gives very powerful expression. Due to this new insight, he doesn't claim any originality, he says it is known to the logicians, as he put it--but Weber was the first who preached it. So it became after Weber a matter of intellectual integrity whether you will use value judgements in scientific considerations or not. Weber's articles are translated into English, and I remember in former times they were read in the College here in social science courses. I do not know what they do now, but I suppose some of you have read them. The most famous of these things is a lecture on science as a vocation, which gives to this view a very powerful expression. And I think if you can read it, you should read it.

STUDENT: Who was the writer who developed the idea that scientific values somehow are superior to common sense? How did Comte's idea that common-sense knowledge was scientific knowledge come to be doubted?

Well, you can say the other view, the contempt for common sense, was a much more powerful view in modern times. If you read Descartes' Meditations, and see what happens there to common-sense knowledge--that was a more powerful view. In Comte this has very much to do with his peculiar political or social preferences--a certain conservative inclination, in that he was exceptional.

STUDENT: Mr. Strauss, you said that this movement tried to be able to speak of values in a causative sense...from which discipline, from which area would the necessary universals for a causal analysis be supplied?You seem to have rejected psychology as a source.

Oh no. Max Weber thought very little of academic psychology, and he thought the psychology you need for the study of social phenomena is the kind you practice by playing bridge. You know, you have a certain estimate of the fellows with whom you play. And the refinements of academic psychology are of no value. But generally speaking, the discrediting of psychological questions, their loss of validity, has nothing to do with contempt for psychology.

STUDENT: How do these people see a causal aspiration in terms of value as possible?

Not in terms of values. At most in terms of people's believing in values, there is a great difference. So if people believe in say the Christian Bible, this will affect their action. And you have to take this into consideration, without taking into question values as in themselves good or bad. This is beyond the competence of the social sciences. But they would say, the prevailing view in this school is this, and it is also the prevailing view in this country: multicausal. There is Marxism, which says ultimately you must understand all social phenomena in terms of relation to production. And Weber wrote a long book in order to show why in some respects that is quite helpful. His famous study on Puritanism and the spirit of capitalism is meant to show that the religious motivation has a crucial effect on economic action. I think that this is the view now generally prevailing. They call it multicausal, there is no universal rule as to what has priority in a given situation. That depends. In a certain situation one might be able to show that the decisive causation originated in an economic sense. It may have been religious, or due to size...

STUDENT: May I ask, can this leave room open within the social sciences for ascertaining what the cause of a particular act is, with a view to a religious causation, an economic causation...?

That is a factual question, and I believe they might avoid getting into

any trouble on that score, that in a given case you cannot find out unambiguously that this or that are the cause. There is no difficulty in that. So social science gives only causal explanations, and cannot possibly engage in the explanation.

Now let us consider this position critically. Simmel had spoken of the indifference to good and evil, however good and evil may be understood. No consideration of good or evil can be permitted to enter social science. Nothing is intrinsically good or bad, intrinsically high or low, healthy or unhealthy; and preference is as good as any other. Science itself, of course it is a natural implication, is not intrinsically higher than prostitution; only some people prefer science, and others the other. To the extent to which we are sensitive to good and evil, however understood, we lack the objectivity of social scientists. The necessary condition is moral obtuseness, in any sense of the word. Social science thus understood, if it is consistent which it very rarely is, inevitably fosters moral obtuseness.

The question is, can one understand values without being moved by them, without one's horizon being changed by such understanding, so that our very hypothesis formation, our very science, will be affected by our understanding of values. People use the word empathy, and surely to understand something you must have empathy; even a criminal judge more than any body else, must have empathy with a criminal in order to see what speaks in favor of the case. Even with racketeers. And we as social scientists, if we have to deal with that unsavory subject, must have that empathy, because this can be rightly expected. From time to time you read works of political historians, in favor of the hero, who was at this time attacked by another party, without the historian making even the slightest effort, for a second, to look at the hero's enemy's point of view. Perhaps he had a point, maybe it was an important one, that should be shown, or duly considered. That would be a very poor historian, that would be a party pamphlet and not a historical work. So it is with the racketeers, you have to understand them. Now if we do that, then the values of the racketeers coexist in our mind with the non-racketeer values. There is conflict within us to some extent between square values and the crooked values. Is it merely blind preference in us which makes us prefer, after due consideration, the square values? Does it make sense to say of a man who is prepared to destroy thousands and of men, by drugs, for example, merely to have the maximum of sensual pleasures--does it make sense to say of such a man that he is a good man?

If there is an absolute relativity of values, then of course he could be said to be a good man. We sense something of what goodness is, the racketeer does not. He is blind to it; he is incompetent to judge because of his unawareness of that. He is at least as incompetent to judge of the issue as a blind man is incompetent to judge of the difference of colors. Some people argue that social science thus understood is not morally irrelevant. For instance, it can show that certain ends are impossible to achieve. Therefore, it gives moral guidance, evaluating this end which cannot be achieved. But as has been said somewhere in Goethe's Faust: Him I love who desires the impossible. To desire only the possible, rationality

is a value like any other. Or if you say then the matter is that everyone wants to succeed--that is a question. Do all men wish to succeed? Are there not some people who desire to fail? Tragic natures, as some people say? It is also said that social science can show that certain ends are based on objectively untrue premises. For example, the Nazi theory. But again the question arises, why should a man choose truth? Why not a myth, which would supply power one way or another? Truth is a value like any other. Social science cannot show itself that social science is good, because that would be a value judgement. Yet you hear from time to time this view: whatever end a man may choose, he needs clarity about the means. And this clarity about the means is supplied by social science. That is to say, while all ends are arbitrary, social science is not. Because you need it for whichever end you want. But there is this difficulty, of course, if this were so, there would be one objectively valid value judgement. Social science is good, and that is contrary to the whole position.

The fundamental questions, the most important questions, concern the ends; because the means depend entirely on the ends. Social science is incompetent regarding the ends. Social science cannot give us guidance regarding the most important things. Hence, the flight from scientific reason. Just as in the case of the why as distinct from the how, which keeps alive the concern for theology and metaphysics, despite the increasing progress of science. And this is true in a more direct way in the case of the value judgements. Now let me explain this a bit more fully. *(Tape is reversed)*

(tape begins)...desire which arises in man and for which he is not necessarily responsible, and that for which a man takes the responsibility. So let us say a value is more appropriately defined as an object of conscientious choice. Hence the range of values depends upon the answer to the factual question of what a value is. Many things which are values on the basis of the crude view according to which a value is an object of desire, are not values on the basis of the less crude view. So a different answer to a factual question answers a value question.

Take for example the difference between a coward and a conscientious objector. Both don't want to go into the army, but obviously for very different reasons. The coward simply fears death and wounds and discomfort; but the conscientious objector is willing to die for his objection. This is a practically necessary distinction, and implies a value distinction, because the conscientious objector, however wrong he may be, is a much more respectable human being than the mere coward.

Now let us apply this to the question of the goodness of science. Science may be an object of desire, like a cake; but it may also be an object of choice, conscientious choice. Even in the latter case science does not exist because it is intrinsically good, objectively good--such things do not exist, according to the hypothesis. It can only be chosen, in an act of choice which is not guided or enlightened by the insight into goodness. This act of choosing science cannot be justified by science. It cannot even be understood by science. For scientific understanding presupposes that we have chosen science already. The fundamental phenomenon, more fundamental than all science, is the abyss of choice. One way to overcome that abyss is the choice of science. The psychological explanation of this fundamental choice comes too late; it presupposes the choice of science.

Another consideration: science is susceptible of infinite progress. That is essential to the present view of science. This implies that reality is such that it cannot be understood in a finite process; otherwise science could not be essentially infinite. In other words, reality is unobtrusively and unretrievably mysterious. This mysteriousness of reality and the abyss of choice, they somehow belong together. One can say these are the starting-points of existentialism over against positivism in our age. It is essential for the claim of present-day social science to be amoral--morally in no way committed. Yet if we proceed empirically we observe that most of the sciences pick a very definite moral position, even a political position. Is this a mere coincidence? For example, generally speaking social scientists do not take the same moral position which physicians take. I mean the American Political Science Association has a different line than the AMA, which is I think a simple sociological fact. In the case of the AMA we have no direct interest but in the case of the APSA we do have. Now what is this peculiar position? We can say liberal, in the wide sense in which of the old-fashioned liberalism of Milton Friedman of our Economics Department as well as the New Deal liberalism, it goes together.

Now what does this liberalism mean? What is this liberalism? I would say, permissive egalitarianism. There is a certain difficulty within permissive egalitarianism because there may be a possible conflict

between permissiveness and egalitarianism; for example, to what extent should one be permissive toward non-egalitarian tendencies? that is a difficulty. Egalitarianism is I think clear. Permissiveness--think of such questions as homosexuality, the whole thing of the Kinsay Report, and the attitude toward penal law which now prevails. Now is there a connection between permissive egalitarianism, the prevalent posture of present-day social scientists, and the principle of social science as hitherto defined? The social science position implies that all values are equal. Naturally if they were not equal, there would be objective reasons for preferring value A to value B, and so on. So all values are equal, that is to say, the principles of actions are equal. Now for any man of common sense it follows that if all values are equal, or all desires are equal, they ought to be treated as equal. If you treat equal things differently, then you act in a grossly unfair manner. In other words, it is very hard to avoid this step from the is to the ought.

Naturally there is one limitation for every man of common sense. They ought to be treated as equal within the limits of the possible, so the man who has the value of slitting peoples' throats and drinking their blood, he cannot work very well with the values of most other people who strongly object to someone's doing that. There is a conflict of values; but how can such a conflict be rationally settled? Precisely given the equality of everyone around, the only just way of settling the conflict is to let the majority have it. The majority are absolutely opposed to this throat-slitter, for example, and therefore we have laws making this a forbidden action, and so on.

So I think there is a deep connection between social science, the allegedly strictly logical methodological teaching regarding the equality of all values, and the substantive morality for which most social scientists today stand up. Now let us have first an exchange about this subject. The question being the effect of value-free social science on morality and its connection with that. Yes?

STUDENT: You said before that there must be very strong psychological inducements to believe modern-day positivism. Would you care to comment on what these might be?

That is a very long question. What I have in mind fundamentally is that this social science as it exists now is the heir of a long tradition which was still normative--utilitarianism. By virtue of this heritage, the inclinations are in a certain direction. I said many years ago already, Scratch a present-day American relativist, as they call them, and you will find a utilitarianism. There is an old saying, Scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar. *le Russe et vous verrez le Tartare.* And in this sense--take off the thin garments of this methodological doctrine and you will find a simple, straightforward utilitarian. One reason why especially Max Weber and to some extent also Simmel developed their doctrines was insight into the grave difficulties

in which utilitarianism became entangled, and wholly independent of the socialism question, you know. The very great difficulty of defining what the greatest happiness of the greatest number means--although also in a crude way what Bentham meant. was of course clear--better food, better housing, better care for health of the large masses of the people, and in this respect nothing has changed. ...Yes?

STUDENT: Let's suppose that we are social scientists who are asked to join the next administration, and we are called in to come to the President. Now he's not going to ask us, what would be good policy; he's going to say, what do the people want? The point being that, it strikes me that while you have a valid theoretical objection to modern social science, but it is of little practical consequence; because the agency that decides what the values should be, the public values, are not philosopher-kings but the representatives of the people.

That is as it should be in a democracy, but it is not quite so simple. That may be true most of the time, but what is true most of the time may not be true in the most important cases. Some of you may remember what happened in 1945, when President Truman, in accordance with the sentiment of probably ninety-nine point nine per cent of the American people, demobilized the American forces in Europe. "The boys must come home." The consequence was, that the boys had to go again back to Europe a few years later. In other words, one could say precisely in a democracy it is the duty of the government to look somewhat further ahead than the average citizen does. If I am not mistaken, that was the underlying idea of representative democracy i.e., that the people do not govern themselves, but are governed by men supposed to be more far-seeing than the people at large. Now in addition, practical political questions are of such immense complexity that most of them would be themselves indifferent to the theoretical or moral position a man takes, because they have become truly merely technical questions in this manner. But at one point or another, and you can never tell at which point, the question of principles will arise. Yes?

STUDENT: Your point that social science would take an objective view as regards criminal and non-criminal actions might be defended in the following way: say that the criminal is as blind to moral things as the sightless person is to paintings. I was just wondering how far you could take this analogy, whether you want to imply *that* moral values are objects of perception in the same way that colors of paintings are.

They obviously cannot be objects of sense-perception. But there could conceivably be another kind of perception. When you speak of a perceptive man, someone senses in a way when another makes a tactless remark, does this not happen? And he is sensitive in a way as strongly, although it is very hard to say how this sensing takes place, it is not the same as when one senses a color or sound. Does this not exist? Have you never seen people either expressing sentiments which impressed you as very noble, or others expressing sentiments which are very base? You sense that nobility on the one hand and the baseness of the other. The analogy of what this sensing means is very difficult; but nevertheless there is a kind of direct awareness which we have, and which surely we would not have if we did not have a certain upbringing, so that a very

young child might not have it at all.

STUDENT: Certainly for most people you could say that if they didn't see a certain sort of action would hurt another person and would say, so what, we would call them morally blind or something like this. But wouldn't you say that for some people at least, most of these moral judgements are capable of being based on a more rational ground?

Yes, but it is not necessary that the individual should be able to state these grounds. Well, take a simple case: you talk to a man and you see he is incapable of any consideration other than what will be conducive to his earning money. Have you seen such people? I mean there are such people. And you see he is completely incapable of any other consideration, that something might be good for the country, or good for any other broader concern, he is completely unable to do that. This can surely be spelled out in the form of a proposition: money is the highest good. And when it is stated in the form of a proposition, you can of course go into it rationally and ask the question, why do we have money, what is the function and the purpose of money? And does not the understanding of the purpose of money show you that money cannot possibly be the greatest good? Then you find that this is not a very profound and far-fetched thing. People sometimes say of another man, well, he's amassing money, but he cannot take it with him. You may have heard that. There is something very profound implied in that. This can be spelled out. I am sure that these things can and must be spelled out to have their full evidence, but it is not necessary for us in daily life to have it fully explained. Our shock about a man of atrocious meanness is of course based on some reasoning which we are not necessarily able to fully develop at the moment, and perhaps have never taken the trouble to develop, and yet we can say the man who has this narrowness sees only the value of money, and another who sees also the value of genuine friendship, that the second man is surely a wider, a more competent man in human matters, than the first. This I would say without going into any deeper question. And to that extent we can leave it at this simple question of human competence. I fully agree with you that these things must be spelled out, and the only way to spell them out is to say what the purpose of a certain line of action if not of a whole way of life is, and to see whether it makes sense to say for anyone that this is the highest good.

STUDENT: Could not one say of your criticism of optimism that just like an inarticulate police chief who can't explain penal theory very well, but can run a very good department, modern-day positivists are not very deep, or articulate, and they can be easily destroyed, but what they produce under that seeming theory is significant. And so really you're attacking the strong man, and not the real substance of their work.

Well, it could be. But I would say this: there is a great difference between a police chief, especially in a smaller place, because here we have Orlando Wills, and he's a professor himself--and professors, university people, academicians. They are supposed to know what they are doing. To be able to give a theoretical account of what they do.

A police chief may be excellent, he may have an unfailing smell of who is a crook and who is not--and he may be wholly unable to give an account of that, and that's very good, because no defendant will be punished on the police chief's merely saying so, there must be proof, naturally. And therefore for police you have men who have such wonderful instincts. But in science, this rational pursuit, these kind of instincts are not sufficient. In addition, it is truly a question whether the political view generally favored by the general run of political scientists in this country are good. That is a question.

STUDENT: Well, to your first point, can't one answer, that just happens to be a characteristic of the American people, they aren't very theoretical, and political scientists are American people, as de Tocqueville has described them; so they have that defect, but that's the price of a little democracy. Now the second point---

Yes, there is something...I would say if they did not raise claims as theoreticians I would entirely agree. But they raise these claims.

I don't see which ones you're referring to, but the ones I had as teachers never raised that claim. That's why they weren't worth studying in the first place.

Well, of course it would be very indelicate to mention names. (Laughter.) But let us take a man who is I believe now regarded as the greatest American political scientist, Harold Lasswell; and he surely raises the claim to be a theorist, and he has said these things more than once. Otherwise it would be--I mean, this doctrine exists, and it has powerful representatives and a whole literature, in all kinds of books, pamphlets, and courses, and must therefore be faced. Even if it were.....that must be done.

STUDENT: But once you've faced it and dismissed it theoretically, do you still have to deal with their work--their publications.. I'm confused as to why--

But I believe their work is not so negligible, and this would show in empirical studies which they make. Because the value of an empirical study does not depend entirely upon whether it is exactly done, according to all prescriptions of scientific logic. It depends also upon the relevance of the study, which depends on the values.

STUDENT: Well, take a look at the great advance we have, to take one example, since Freud's day, in curing people who are mentally--in bringing back to competence people who are mentally incompetent.

Yes, that is an infinite question into which I cannot go, because the question arises immediately, are not these kinds of incompetencies a product of the same society which produced Freud? (Laughter.) This raises a question, whether the incompetencies which existed a hundred years ago, could have been taken care of adequately by Freud?

And we cannot take this for granted. One could also say some other things about that. All right.

STUDENT: It seems to me that a radical social scientist might grant that facts are value-constituted, and that the selection of his material proceeds from a bias, and the value of the bias is of some kind; and what I'm asking is, whether your criticism is directed more to their effects in practical, everyday political life, or to their methodology?

Well, one surely cannot disregard what the implication of their doctrine is if it is taken seriously. If it is not taken seriously, as our friend just said, that is all right, but we must reckon with the possibility that it is taken seriously, and what its social or moral effect is. But as to the question which you raise, that is complicated. I mean, what is generally admitted by the men who work in these things is this: that the distinction between relevance and irrelevance presupposes values. I mean, what is important and unimportant, what is relevant and irrelevant, presupposes values. So if a man writes a study on this particular subject rather than on that, there is a value involved. But what they say is this: that is uninteresting, because we are concerned with this, that after he has chosen his subject, no evaluation enters there, so if he says, x is the cause of y, there is no evaluation which enters here. The difficulty is rather this: whether there are not certain subjects, which are constituted by value judgements and which do not make sense without them. Now this example, which I gave also from Max Weber. Max Weber asserted, I am not now interested in whether it is right or wrong, that Puritanism had a bad effect, a deleterious effect, on music in England. Now this proposition is of any interest only because of certain assumptions: a) that Puritanism is a form of religion which is very high; and b) that there was music of a high order in England before, which was destroyed under the influence of Puritanism. The highness of Puritanism, and the lowness of the music coming from Puritanism, are essential for the phrasing of the question, Because if there were a low and mean superstition which issued in the production of very low and mean music, this is a different phenomena. The value judgements are essential to the definition, to the scholarly definition, of the subject-matter. Now I will take this up next time, when I will discuss the question of whether it is possible to understand social phenomena without making value judgements, that is, disregarding entirely the practical question of what the effect of this kind of social science on moral evaluations is. But whether it is possible as a purely theoretical pursuit. I believe you had a question, and I was deflected by these other students..

(Woman student): Yes. There are branches of the social sciences which say that when the last assumption is made it is impossible that it is falsifiable. Now if you have this kind of social science operating even though in choosing the study and the values it is questionable, the data itself is acceptable and can be used later on. It seems that the problem as some of the facts point out, is that if you're trying

to use the social sciences to prepare someone to assume that certain values are better than other values, how would you act, if you wanted to get power people to do something from either kind of study?

Because one kind of that is not communicable. For example, if a human being is not competent to understand a certain value and disagrees with it, it seems that when you get down to the basic assumption, there's just a disagreement and that's all you can say. Whereas on the other kind of study, when you get to the basic assumption you say, well I have falsified a principle there. You sense that there's a difference here that leads to action.... or non-action.

Yes.This was a very long statement, and would you do me a favor and write it up and hand it in to me at the beginning of the next lecture? Please do that. Because I would have to ask you to repeat it and it is rather late now.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 4 January 18, 1965

Mr. Strauss: (reading) "Mr. Azrael would be grateful if you would announce to your classes that on Wednesday, January 20th at 4 p.m., in the lounge of Foster Hall, there will be a meeting between interested students and a group of visiting Soviet writers, including one, quote, literary rebel, unquote. (laughter) All members of the department are invited." Good.

And now, here is this question. "Karl Popper claims that science can be separated from non-science on non-verificationist principles, and agrees that the verificationist separation is untenable. If this claim is true, it would mean that a value-free social science is possible. "

Well, in the first place I must say, what does verificationist mean? ...No, honestly, I do not know. And therefore I do not see the connection between this assertion and the possibility or impossibility of value-free science in general or social science in particular. Could you figure out--or could you explain to us what it means?

STUDENT: For verification, let's just say...if someone presents a proposition, "all pros are blacks" (? tape unclear) --and a verificationist asks, "How do you know?" then the first person must present a sequence of proof. And what he says is that at the end of their sequence is the answer that "Well, I don't know, but I will only ask this question, that is in principle falsifiable."

I see. Well, does it not amount ultimately to this: that the attempt to reject certain questions as meaningless, as distinguished from untrue, begs the question. You know, then the question is raised--this so-called metaphysical question regarding the whither and the where, as Comte puts it--and they cannot be answered by science, admittedly. And then the question arises, are these not the most important concerns of man? and is therefore science not of a very limited value? Then one can try to get rid of this difficulty by saying these questions cannot be answered by science, but for this very reason they are meaningless questions. So you see, then you have solved the problem by definition, i.e., completely arbitrarily. And I believe what he means by that, Popper rejects that probably--what he means by this "science can be separated from non-science on non-verificationist principles"--what I means by that I simply do not know. And so I cannot answer your question. Perhaps you will spell it out for us next time? ...It will do you well--

STUDENT: Well, its a long, five-hundred-page book..

Yes, but still the main point should be....I mean, I know Popper's propositions in a general way from some of his books, but I could not, could not...

STUDENT: Well, Karl Popper is rather important...

Yes, I know, Popper takes the ordinary view, or the ordinary positivistic view but he is more careful than some of the other writers of this kind around. But there is a difficulty in Popper in another way: that he tries to establish his position, his value-position, not his scientific position, but permissive egalitarianism by attacking people opposed to it, such as Plato, Hegel, etc. But in doing that he proceeds in a most unscholarly manner, i.e., in a most unscientific manner. And therefore there is something very awkward if someone whose principle is science is unable to behave scientifically when it counts. This is my objection to Popper.

STUDENT: Is this ad hominem?

Yes, sure, why not? It is a mere accident. But I believe the question is, whether there is not a deeper necessity. For that, whether the lacking concern for understanding these matters is not due to a fundamental certainty that, say, Plato, cannot be true as Plato meant it. But he doesn't take the necessary trouble of studying it. It is a bit more complex.

Let us leave out Karl Popper altogether, the relevant point to which you referred has not become clear to me, and I suppose to no one else. Or if there is someone who knows these things of Popper and would like to take them up?

STUDENT: You mean what he means by verificationist?

Yes, what this issue is, science can be separated from non-science on non-verificationist principles.

STUDENT: Oh, I see. Well, he would call Comte a verificationist, in that, in the end, if you would ask Comte a question, how do you know this, he would answer, I know it by empirical studies. So if you-- this to Karl Popper is verificationist, and this leads to infinite regress.

And how do you avoid this?

STUDENT: Well, we avoid it at the end by saying, "All I can say is that it can be falsifiable." And ANY PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE NOT FALSIFIABLE HE WILL NOT DEAL WITH. (capitals added) He will only deal with propositions that are falsifiable. He will say to the person that is talking, "Well, how do we falsify this?"

Without saying that nothing---

STUDENT: He believes that most theories are false, indeed, and that we have to analyze their falsity. But what he'll say is, "I don't know," and then go on....

Well, I suggest that we take this up, that you give us a somewhat more detailed report about it. Unfortunately I do not have the time now to do that. Good.

Now I have spoken of the crucial change which positivism has undergone after Comte. The *realization* that science or reason is unable to substantiate value-judgements. Social science cannot settle conflicts between fundamentally different preferences. When considering Comte, we saw that science must leave open the questions raised by theology and metaphysics. In Comte's formulation, the question is regarding the why as distinguished from the how. And this fact endangers the claim of science to be the guide of men. A claim which Comte raises on behalf of science. And which endangers the claim of science to take the place formerly occupied by theology and metaphysics. That claim of science to be the guide is still more in danger, of course, in the moment in which science becomes value-free. Because while we may perhaps turn our backs to the question of why, or where and whither, we cannot well turn our backs to the question of how we should live. Now the consequence of this examination of science is what has been called the flight from scientific reason--to something else, whatever it may be, which claims to give men guidance. I think that is a fact, but it is concealed somewhat by the following state of affairs

which creates the illusion that a value-free social science can nevertheless guide us. Now take the simple example supplied by the present situation, the last election. President Johnson's program is based on certain values, which from the point of view of social science, are as good or as bad as any others. Say they are as good or as bad of those of Senator Goldwater. But only the values cherished by Johnson have a sufficiently powerful political appeal, as was shown by the election, or *are* in step with the times. The argument is that Senator Goldwater has horse-and-buggy values, and therefore no one is interested. Now if we broaden the spectrum somewhat, we go beyond the United States, and we see that fascism has failed completely, and of Marxism we can say that while it has been conspicuously successful in some respects, it is theoretically or scientifically wrong. The great conservative statesman of our age, Churchill, failed in a decisive point. Churchill said, "I have not become His Majesty's minister in order to supervise the liquidation of the British Empire," and De Gaulle said similar things about Algeria, and look what has happened.

In brief, to summarize this kind of thing which you all know, merely factual considerations of what is possible and politically possible now decide in favor of what is now called the liberal line. That means, however, that science, value-free science, decides in favor of liberalism. This is one important *part of* our present situation. And from this point of view, the social relativism about values is a purely scholastic or academic affair, which has not any practical meaning. It is perfectly possible to take this view. The question is only this: granted that this is the wave of the future, and therefore the question of whether it is good or bad cannot arise, because you cannot do anything against the wave of the future, the question is whether this difficulty does not raise its ugly head in ordinary life.

Now I would like to read to you an old passage, which you will see has some relevance but perhaps not sufficient relevance. Very briefly, what people think today, many people, is this: we know where the development goes. Nuclear war is an insanity, and unless some insane individual like Hitler will come to power somewhere, there will not be a nuclear war. Since this will be avoided, surely the Russian system will become more liberal, consumer demands will make themselves felt, and on the other hand, the West will become more socialistic, and we can see that even China will eventually modify, because this cannot last. And so there is a development in front of us which is both obviously possible, and perhaps more than possible, and in addition absolutely sensible, so there is no problem.

Now the first passage I would like to read to you is from Nietzsche's Zarathustra, in the beginning of the beginning.

Zarathustra addresses the multitude:

One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you, You still have chaos in yourselves.
 Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star.
 Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself.
 Behold, I show you the last man.
 What is love? What is creation?
 What is longing? What is a star?
 Thus asks the last man, and he blinks.
 The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small.
 His race is hence as ineradicable as the flea-beetle.
 The last man lives longest.
 We have invented happiness, say the last men, and they blink.
 They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth.
 One still loves one's neighbor, and rubs against him, for one needs warmth.
 Becoming sick, and harboring suspicion, are sinful to them. One proceeds carefully.
 A fool, however, still stumbles over stones and human beings.
 A little poison, now and then: that makes for agreeable dreams.
 And much poison in the end, for an agreeable death.
 One still works, for work is a form of entertainment.
 But one is careful that the entertainment not be too harrowing.
 One no longer becomes poor or rich.
 Both require too much exertion.
 Who still wants to rule, who obey?
 Both require too much exertion.
 No shepherd, and one herd. Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same.
 Whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into a madhouse.
 Formerly all the world was mad, say the most refined, and they blink.
 One is clever, and knows everything that has ever happened.

Now this is Nietzsche's formula for what looks so very different in the Communist's, especially in Marx's own, presentation. Nietzsche says, although he didn't know Marx--disgraceful, he didn't know him--he says, as it were, what Marx regards as this final state of the Communist society as the society of the highest culture--this is what in fact we will get.

Now we all know that there is some little element of truth in what Nietzsche says: Some things which we know from our time make it worse. For example, he says those who feel differently go into a lunatic asylum; we know that is not necessary, we just go to a psychiatrist, we don't have to take this extreme step. But in other respects, Nietzsche doubtless exaggerates from every point of view.

I would like to read you a statement from a present-day sociologist, an American sociologist, who is very far from the extremism of Nietzsche. Now this is Professor Nathan Glazer. In a discussion which is not printed, but which I am sure he would permit me to use, he speaks of the most successful revolution of our age, the organizational revolution, or the scientific revolution and its implications. Through this revolution, the gap between the intellectuals, the radical and liberal critics, on the one hand, and the organizations representing the status quo, say the War Department, has been closed, or at least very much narrowed. The reason was that the intellectuals proved to possess new techniques for making organizations more efficient. One might say that in proportion as the scientists drew all conclusions from their basic premise, which is the assertion that science is limited to factual statements, as distinguished from value-statements, they lost the right to be radical critics of institutions, and became the willing servants of any institutions. ---Does that not make sense? I mean, in order to be a radical critic, you therefore have values, which you can defend intellectually. --Yet, strangely, the cooperation of science and men of affairs, including generals, has affected the values of the latter. So that one begins to wonder whether there is not a pre-established harmony between the allegedly value-free science and the liberal values. Be this as it may, the question for Professor Glazer is whether society rendered possible by the cooperation of the scientists and the managers, the society guaranteeing to everyone simple justice and simple freedom, can be regarded as a good society. I quote: "Both conservatives or reactionaries, on the one hand, and intellectuals and radicals and anarchists on the other, often come together in opposition to what we might call established liberalism."

Both the reactionary and the intellectual question the claim of the welfare state, the whole organization, the machine for doing good, to be the good society. Glazer sees only one way out: to improve the organization by setting up the great organization, or the big organization, or the determining center of allocation, which is then able to direct all other organizations, because it will have far more information, and make much better diagnoses, than anyone else can. Hence it will be, quote, the "good big society." But is this the solution? Not for Mr. Glazer. Alongside of it he predicts there will be developing good small societies, composed of reactionaries and anarchists and radical intellectuals. (laughter) ...But he is not sure whether the organization will be tolerant enough to let

them be. Nor whether they will be clever enough to evade it.

This is a statement of the problem with which you are all familiar, that this solution which seems to be so self-evident and demanded by simple justice and simple freedom, whether this will not necessarily lead to what is ordinarily known as conformism, the destruction of all human originality--that is of course what Nietzsche meant when he spoke of that star.

So in other words, however plausible the view is ~~that one need only~~ look around! for a serious and sober man, there is no question, we know what comes and no one objects to it, no one can complain about it--yet if one thinks a little bit deeper one sees that it *is* not so. And therefore the value question arises again.

Now last time I began a discussion of the value-free social science, and I would like now to continue that. I would like to ask the question, is it possible to understand social phenomena without evaluating? I do not deny that you can understand some social phenomena without evaluating them; that is not the point. Social science means of course all possible subjects of social science, and therefore the question is, is it possible to understand all social phenomena without any time evaluating them? In other words, I am not concerned now with the practical consideration; I take it for granted that social science is a merely theoretical science. Can it fulfill its theoretical function of understanding social phenomena without evaluating them?

Now, the general answer would be no, because social phenomena are always of a purposeful character; and therefore they demand to be judged in terms of the purpose which they are meant to serve. This kind of immanent evaluation, as we might call it, given this purpose, the fulfillment of this purpose, is inevitable--the question arises whether the immanent evaluation does not necessarily turn into an absolute evaluation, and not for an accidental reason?

For example, let me start from some very obvious facts: the analysis of the last election, It is absolutely impossible to say anything relevant about the last election without speaking of the ineptness of certain men who were running, and the non-ineptness of others. This value-judgement, if you don't use that, you don't say anything. Senator Goldwater stepped on every toe, one can say. And on the other hand, the handling of the Bobby Baker case was too obviously clever. I mean, these are value-judgements whether we like it or not. But these merely immanent evaluations take on an absolute significance, for the very reason that the beings who *are* judged are not merely running for general, or dogcatchers, whatever, but they are all human beings. While it entirely voluntary, in a sense, whether you run for President or general or dogcatcher, it is not voluntary for you to become a human being. You are subject to that standard implied in that without any possibility of avoiding it. The beings judged are men, and they are virtues and vices of men. A man who regards war as unqualifiedly bad must make a distinction nevertheless, between a good and a bad general, if he writes military history. But regarding war, as thoroughly bad, he must mean the distinction between a good and bad general like the distinction between a good and bad thief. Because here too we have a distinction.

But nevertheless, if he is not completely narrow, he must see a difference between the cause to which the thief applies his resourcefulness and the cause to which the general applies his resourcefulness--or rather the absence of a cause in the one case and the presence of a cause in the other. Fundamentally one can state this as follows: we are concerned with political sense. What is political sense? We can answer it etymologically, or from the point of view of an earlier age. Political is a derivative from the Greek word polis, the nearest equivalent to which is probably "commonwealth." Now a commonwealth has a purpose--it is controversial what that purpose is, but that it is meant to fulfill a purpose is granted. The standards for judging political things are inherent in political things as such. There are very great difficulties here; it suffices to think of Aristotle and Locke regarding the purpose of the society or the commonwealth. But that in which Aristotle and Locke agree is very frequently sufficient for political judgement, and this is that we do not always have to raise the most fundamental questions. We can remain sometimes in a more limited horizon. Judgements in this sphere are solid enough, despite the fact that they remain in an area surrounded by darkness. As Aristotle in his wisdom puts it occasionally, "to speak politically and crudely." To speak politically means to speak crudely--not to make very refined distinctions, which has no political relevance.

Plato presents in the first book of the Republic this old gentleman Cephalus. I think everyone likes that nice old man and everyone would wish to have such a grandfather. He is very nice, educated, reasonably delicate, and in addition also reasonably wealthy, which is always a good quality for a grandfather to have. (laughter) Now then when you read more carefully and follow Plato's presentation, and therewith begin to use the X-rays which Plato uses to look through Cephalus, we come to see that this wonderful gentleman has a very seamy side. Now Plato analyses that; I mean he still makes him a perfectly nice man, for all practical purposes...but only for all practical purposes. Now Plato has a theory of that, that true virtue, as distinguished from this more superficial virtue, requires a conversion, a conversion of the whole man, and this Cephalus has never undergone. Plato speaks of that at the end of the Republic, that this nice gentleman brought up well and decently who yet chooses this life, the life of a tyrant, meaning the most unjust life, because he has not undergone this conversion, which according to Plato can be brought about only by philosophy.

Now let us take a very simple example. A man, a sociologist, writes a sociology of art. In general or in particular. And then someone reads it and sees that the paintings which he has discussed are all trash. There is some impossibility in that. He should have called it a sociology of trash, of the 1920's, perhaps. But what is that distinction between art and trash but a value distinction? A sense of quality, as art historians say, is a prerequisite for being a competent student of art or a sociologist of art. Similar things apply to all other parts of the social studies. Let us take

another case which surely falls within the province of political science in particular. As you know, political scientists when they have reached a certain age are supposed to publish. As the maxim goes, "Publish or perish." Now they publish. Naturally, because they prefer life to death. But after they have published, something will happen which is ultimately as important as the publication--an old hand tells you that--namely there will be a review. And if the poor fellow cannot bring publications together with a series of reviews which are favorable, it may be worse than if he had not published at all.

Now in these reviews we find such statements as "perceptive," "imaginative," "deep," "broad," et cetera. And quote rightly, because these words indicate the standards with which a scientist or scholar is meant to comply. Naturally, not everyone can apply them properly; that is the great difficulty regarding the objectivity of reviews, and for that matter of science altogether. And someone might find a certain observation very profound which is shallow. There is no protection and no guarantee for that; this vicious circle cannot be overcome. And needless to say, that is one of the great secrets of University life, because all appointments are made under the assumption that the appointers are competent. How is competence to be judged? Ultimately by very external criteria. You can publish, you can lecture, and so on and so on. Very difficult. But I am concerned only with this: when people make these statements on scholarly productions, they mean as value-free social scientists say, only this: if scholarship, then good scholarship. But why scholarship? So in other words, this is a merely immanent evaluation, i.e., choose, for God knows what reason, surely not for a rational reason, scholarship. And then, if I have chosen it, I am subject to the idiotic standards. But this is not true to the facts, because when we look at such statements, or make such statements, we observe that we admire these qualities simply. If we see that someone is perceptive, we see more than "Since he has chosen to be a scholar, he ought to be perceptive." That is a quality of a human being that will show also in entirely different fields of endeavor than scholarship. And the principle again, to repeat, ~~is~~, that every human phenomenon and every human being is subject to being judged in terms of what is a good human being. And good in the widest

sense, not only moral in the narrow sense of the term. Perceptivity has--a man may be a good man in the moral sense of the word without being perceptive, perhaps, but we mean a good man in the full sense of all human virtues and vices.

Now to come back to the question of how a social science would look which had no value judgements. I would like to illustrate this by an example. Social science must of course use concepts; articulate its subjects in the light of concepts. One very famous one is found or invented by Max Weber, he being the most outstanding representative of the fact-value distinction; that is a distinction between the various kinds of authority, rational, traditional and charismatic. Well, let me take a more recent example, not as important, but still clear. For some time people used, especially at the Hoover Library in Stanford, the distinction between the authoritarian and the democratic personality--strictly value-free. But if you read that, you saw that it was very value-bound. The democratic personality was a nice man, and the authoritarian was just an ogre! (laughter) Not for one moment did they attempt to see that there could be an authoritarian personality, say a father or grandfather old-style who might be quite annoying sometimes but could also be very good as a guide for young people. But the Max Weber case is much more interesting.

Now I read to you from the English translation of Max Weber's Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by Henderson and Talcott Parsons.

The term charisma may be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional qualities or powers. These are as such not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin, [Of course social scientists cannot say whether or not they are of divine origin, but they are regarded as of divine origin] or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. In primitive circumstances this peculiar kind of deference is paid to prophets, to people with a reputation for therapeutic or legal wisdom, to leaders in the hunt, and heroes in war. It is very often thought of as resting on magical powers. How the quality in question would be ultimately judged, from any ethical, aesthe-

tical, or other such point of view, is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. [because the social scientist doesn't judge from an ethical or aesthetic point of view]. What alone is important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, his "followers" or "disciples."

For present purposes it will be necessary to treat a variety of different types as being endowed with charisma in this sense. It includes the state of a "berserker" whose spells of maniac passion have, apparently wrongly, sometimes been attributed to the use of drugs. In Medieval Byzantium a group of people endowed with this type of charismitic war-like passion were maintained as a kind of weapon. It includes the "shaman," the kind of magician who in the pure type is subject to epileptoid seizures as a means of falling into trances. Another type is that of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, who, however, cannot be classified in this way with absolute certainty since there is a possibility that he was a very sophisticated type of deliberate swindler.

Now what do we say to that? To the honor or dishonor of Max Weber, I have to say that this passage is mistranslated. Parsons apparently hadn't understood at that time what Weber's value-free social science was. Weber says, in effect, that it doesn't make any difference.... whether he was a swindler or not. In other words, the difference between a fake charisma and a true charisma is already a value-judgement, and therefore has no place in social science. But one can rightly say that while it is a bad translation, it implies a sound criticism: the question must be raised, and for the very simple reason that social science, if it is to be worth its salt, can never leave it at finding out how authority is regarded by its followers. If as society is subject to a fundamental delusion, and regards legal fictions as literally true, then it is the first duty of a social scientist to say that people were fooled about the character of the authority to which they were subject...the minimal critical duty of social science. Max Weber himself called the kind of constitutional monarchy which existed in Germany until 1919, sham constitutionalism. In other words, he said, this is not a truly constitutional government, but a barely disguised absolute monarchy. I will not go now into the substantive truth of this assertion. The main point is that such distinctions are of course necessary for the social scientist to make:

is it a genuine constitutional government or only a sham? The kind of authority in a given group is to be determined by what the people concerned regard as authority. It is impossible to leave it at that. It means literally passing the buck...to people who may very well be less competent than the intelligent social scientist.

In addition, this whole doctrine of the kinds of authority suffers I think from a very great defect. Naturally Weber didn't know anything of Hitler, although Hitler would really have to be classified as a charismatic leader in Weber's sense. But would this be sufficient, would this be fundamentally adequate? Is it not in every case necessary, apart from these formal characteristics, to ask regarding political legitimacy, as regards the cause which is the basis even of the claim of the charismatic leader? Hitler was elected, and had this tremendous intra-German success, not merely because he had this rhetorical and demagogic ability, and other gifts of this kind, but also on the basis of what he stood for, what he called National Socialism. When you disregard that, when you speak of what legitimacy meant at that time in Germany, without this cause, all his charisma would not have been helpful to him. I would like to add another point here; namely--and that has been asserted by more than one reader of Weber--in Weber's theory of charisma, rational and traditional authority, there is a value-judgement implied, although obscure. Of course Weber did not start with phenomena like Joseph Smith and so forth. He took this conception from Christianity, and especially from a certain Protestant lawyer, Sohm. Weber used the expression, the routinization of charisma, by which he implies that the original leader, who has this profound impact of people, because of his particular gifts, on this basis the social order cannot last for any length of time. There must be some substitute for the routinization of charisma. And according to Weber; this has taken place especially in the Christian Church, when Jesus and the Apostles were followed by the organized church. But the very term routinization implies a value-judgement, routine versus charisma.

A last point in this connection I would like to mention. The value-judgements are strictly forbidden by the ruling doctrine--they may not enter the front door--and they come in by the back door. Because there is one discipline not necessarily belonging to social science but affecting social science, called psychiatry, and here the distinction is made between well-adjusted and ill-adjusted people. It is naturally understood and meant as a value-judgement, whatever the pedantic and strict methodologists of the social sciences might say in a given case. The only difference between such a value-judgement as adjusted, well-adjusted, ill-adjusted, and one of good and bad, is that it is very poor. There are perhaps situations in which it is good to be ill-adjusted. I mean, if a child comes from an abominable home, the worse he is adjusted to that home, the better for him, even if he has to go through quite some troubles. In addition, it is a very narrow, unthought-through judgement. Incidentally, I happen to know of one psychiatrist at least who claims that the distinction between adjusted and ill-adjusted, sane and insane people, is also not scientific, because it is a value-judgement, and must be treated as such. What is sanity and insanity is differently understood in different cultures, and therefore we must even avoid that. Ultimately this would of course lead to the abandonment of the distinction between healthy and sick, in medicine or biology. There will be an occasion to come back to this later. I turn now to another consideration which has to do with the question of value-free social science.

Now value-free social science is distinguished from, and ultimately opposed to, the scientific political understanding. What we lose we call common sense; because common sense dealing with political or social matters of course evaluates all the time. Value-free social science questions common sense and therewith follows a great tradition, the famous example: Copernicus's refutation of common sense. Here we see how poor common sense is compared to the scientific approach, and what worked so well in astronomy, physics, et cetera, must also be done in the social sciences. Common sense evaluates, for common sense the judgement "X has been in politics for forty years" and "X is a corrupt politician," have the same cognitive status. I mean there is logical difference from a common sense point of view. Now

the radical questioning of common sense is of course the work of men like Copernicus, but above all by Descartes, Descartes who begins the whole philosophic - scientific enterprise with his universal doubt--literally understood, he must doubt of everything.

Something of this doubt is still visible in present-day social science, when people want to have scientific proof of every assertion. Of course this cannot be taken quite literally. For example, if there are Presidential elections every four years, and a political scientist makes this assertion, no proof will be demanded from him. This is easily well-known to common sense and to scientific political science. The important point is this: here is an example. That by being used in science, the statement or the truth, whatever you call it, does not undergo any change whatsoever. So common sense is capable of knowing the truth. This example shows even that science depends on common sense. That dependence can be shown most simply, and also universally, by the following consideration.

Political science deals with certain activities of human beings. As such, it presupposes that we have awareness of human beings as human beings, or simply that we are able to tell human beings from other beings--from trees, dogs, stars, or what have you. Now then when a social scientist or for that matter a political scientist from a Political Science Department are sent out with questionnaires to ask people about how they think about this or that subject, very detailed statements and in the ideal case, so that not the slightest misunderstanding by the poor student is possible--very well. But one thing they are not told: HOW TO TELL A HUMAN BEING FROM A NON-HUMAN BEING. How they should know to ask this being here and not this one. And how to distinguish that. Well, they learned this of course in their seminars. (laughter) No! They didn't learn it in their seminars. They didn't learn it in college, not in high school, and not in elementary school. Where did they learn it? How did they learn it? I don't know. Most of us would say, I don't know. But we all know that we know it.

Now this little thing, on which the whole enterprise absolutely depends, is not scientifically known, and yet is its basis. Political science stands or falls by the truth of the pre-scientific awareness of political things. The question arises, how are we aware of that truth? How do we become aware of this fundamental distinction to which I referred, between a man and a non-man? Do we in fact become aware of something, or is this not rather a convention of sorts, embodied in our language, and by learning language we become initiated into that convention.

Now this question of how do we know that, there is a name for this kind of question, which I'm sure you have heard, an epistemological question, the theory of knowledge. This is a very important and highly respected part of modern philosophy. There is however one difficulty. Every epistemology, of whichever persuasion, presupposes the truth of empirical statements. We try to understand how it is possible that such a thing as perceiving things, and perceiving people is possible. There are all kinds of theories about that. Yet our perceiving things and people is more manifest and more reliable than any theory of knowledge, any explanation of how our perceiving things and people is possible. The truth of any theory of knowledge depends on its ability to give an adequate account of that perception presupposed to be true. It depends on its ability to give an adequate account of this fundamental reliance which we have. When I say I see here a young man, and perhaps give a more detailed description, there is no question about it, that we are all in this room, 122. The fact that we know that is more evident, more manifest, more reliable, than any explanation of it, because any explanation presupposes that we are and that we know we are in Room 122. I use the word reliance which is the literal translation, and in this case, the best translation, of the Platonic expression, for the strange state of things that we know, without knowing necessarily how or why. When Plato describes in the famous discussion of the various forms of knowing, the sixth and seventh book of the Republic, there is one stage which he calls in one version sense-perception, which has here a wide meaning, like our knowing that we are here, for example. And in the parallel, reliance--our knowledge of things and people

has the character of such a fundamental reliance. One can state it as follows, what that implies: we are in the midst of things. We cannot begin with a clean slate, using only perfectly clear and distinct concepts. We cannot begin at the beginning, but we must try to ascend to the beginning. In other words, in dealing with human things at any rate, we are in an entirely different situation than mathematicians are, who do begin, and may begin, at the beginning. There is an interesting illustration of this state of things. Spinoza was perhaps the first philosopher who tried to present a true philosophic doctrine in mathematical form, in a book called Ethics demonstrated in a geometric manner, beginning with axioms, postulates, et cetera, as Euclid presents, and especially dealing with man, as the book is called Ethics. And then there is an axiom somewhere, or a postulate, which runs as follows: Homo cogit. Man thinks, man is a thinking being. He never defines man.

This is not a mere accident. It is the essential difficulty of beginning in this manner. Now before I go on, let me see if I have made myself clear up to this point. (tape is reversed.)

STUDENT: The problem is, I think, value-free social science doesn't strike me as being conscious fundamentally of having a theoretic function, just as political science which begins in common sense is not conscious of having a relation to theory. I mean I know that value-free social science has something that it calls theory--

Well. I'm not speaking...the theory is implied in the claim that it is a science in the same way that physics, chemistry and biology are sciences, and therefore the notion of science, which has developed in the modern centuries, is their theory of science, which has to be somewhat modified. One should say economics is a science in this sense. No, common sense has no theory, as such. That is a point. But common sense can lead to a theory; we will speak of this later on, when I come to Aristotle. In itself, common sense has no theory.

STUDENT: The problem with that is that I think the theory, the social sciences theory, is practically oriented. When you hear a value-free social science, they always take their bearings from practical matters--

Well, this is not necessary, because a practical statement would be of this character--if you want to have this and this thing, if you want to achieve this end you *must* use these and these means. But you can tell this is a theoretical statement by calling the means the causes and the ends the effects. The practical statement is then transformed into a theoretical statement. Whether the practical intention is very noticeable in many cases to social science is ultimately irrelevant. There is a fundamentally theoretical character to present-day social science. I cannot go now into a description; this is one of the deepest differences--that political science as you know was traditionally regarded as a practical science, not as a theoretical science, and changed from a practical to a theoretical science roughly in the seventeenth century. That is a change we have to consider later in this course. Yes?

STUDENT: You mentioned for example that the knowledge that the election of a President occurs every four years in the United States is ascertainable both through common sense and through scientific method. Now I'm wondering whether quote "common-sense" knowledge doesn't really depend on empirical verification, in the sense that we can look back and see that every four years, an election has taken place, but doesn't common sense in this case rest on empirically verifiable circumstances? For example, if a man were coming from another country, with no knowledge of the history of the United States, and came this past year and saw the way the Presidency was administered, his common sense wouldn't tell him how often elections were held.

That is perfectly true, as far as it goes. But the question is this. The positivists would say, the empirically verifiable statements are the preserve of science. To go somewhat deeper--we are all in a constantly empirical setting. But there is a difference between empirical statements and empiristical statements. You know, men

have always made empirical statements, but they are not always statements complying with certain canons--demanded by an empiricistic theory of knowledge. Take the obvious statement: you are a human being. That is not a human being. We wouldn't question the validity of that for a moment. But when you imply you cannot be certain unless you know how perception takes place and what gives it its validity, then the whole is changed. Did you ever hear of the view called solipsism? Strictly speaking, you can only say, I heard a perception of these and these colors, sounds, etc., which are patterns, and I have no right to say that this human being is by himself? That is phenomenology. This is one--and according to a very powerful school now, if one wants to be strict, one cannot go beyond solipsism. This is an example of the radical change which the word empirical undergoes, when it is taken over by certain kinds of epistemological theory. Sure, there is no question that common-sense statements are empirical statements, but that this is true of all common-sense statements is not enough. Mr. Levy, you wanted to say something.

Mr. Levy: Value-free social science does not, as I understand it, present what the observer thinks is good and bad, but what he is analyzing--prejudices. You have said that to understand the commonwealth, you have to understand what the commonwealth stands for, what its purpose is--("Yes.") If we all agree with this, and I think we should, why can't the value-free social sciences remain value-free and still say the American purpose is x,y and z.... the Russian purpose is a,b and c, the British purpose is c,d and e... and understand the politics of America, Russia...

I do not deny that within a limited sphere you may do that. But I believe in the long run, you cannot avoid the question, what the relative merit of these various definitions of purpose are. Because there are points--unless you are completely disinterested in the subject. Well then you shouldn't be a political scientist, I would say. But if you are interested in that, you are compelled to worry. Maybe you do not reach a result, but your worrying about it makes you nevertheless a better political scientist than if you did not worry about it, and just said, well, let these fools have their prejudices, whichever they like, and I don't care about it. Your understanding even of what these people say, can be deep or shallow, obviously--and this means already to enter discussion, to become involved in that dialectic going on within each side as well as between the two sides.

I have nothing against your intention to start in the most modest manner, but I believe you will be dragged into that eventually. Yes?

STUDENT:
If I understand what you said just now, its a matter of determining what are the problems of political science as it is now studied, and then it becomes a conflict of views as to whether we can ascertain the knowledge of absolute values. But you haven't evolved the foundations of science (sic).

Well, I didn't speak of absolute values, but take this question--

STUDENT: But that's implicitly what you're saying.

I do not mean--

STUDENT: You said that when you discussed Weber, you said that he could not help but make value-judgements, and that his claim to not make (sic) value judgements was invalid. ("Yes.") But the point of whether, in Weberian terms, something is true charisma: or not true charisma--one, you can't make such a statement, because the way Weber defines legitimacy is the way people perceive it; and in the second place---

Yes, I know that. But the fact that Talcott Parsons mistranslates Weber--for which Weber of course is not even responsible--indicates that problem. What about this case: Weber says, whether this charismatic leader is a charlatan, a swindler, is wholly indifferent provided that the followers don't notice it. But still I ask, must not the social scientist be critical regarding the opinion the followers have of their leader? In many cases, they may not have sufficient evidence to argue the question; but must they not at least raise the question, of whether the authority believed in is actually of that kind it is believed to be? I give a simple example: constitutional monarchy can be sham constitutional monarchy, can it not? And is there not a distinction between a genuine charismatic leader, what Weber calls a world historical hero, who identifies himself with a great cause, and a clever swindler?

STUDENT: True. But to determine the difference, that doesn't mean to make a value judgement.

Oh, yes, it makes a value judgement--

STUDENT: You didn't say one is good and the other is bad, You say he fits correctly into the category or he does not.

No, not quite. I stated before, perhaps in too general terms to be understood, that these so-called immanent value judgements, for example, good general or a bad general, that can be objectively found out...because one knows about which kind of qualities a general must have. And is that not an absolute value judgement, because why should there be generals? Why is not war altogether bad, and generals as bad as thieves? You can also make a distinction between good and bad thieves. But the question arises, is it possible to stop there, with an immanent judgement? Is there not a necessity, if you say of a man...a fake, and a genuinely dedicated, inspired man, you say this is only for purely theoretical purposes--it goes beyond that. You cannot arbitrarily put a stop to that. And the fundamental reason, I tried to say it in this form, is because we deal in all cases with human beings. Whereas it is arbitrary or voluntary whether a man is a general or a thief, a painter, or whatever it may be, it is not voluntary for any human being to be a human being. You see?

STUDENT: But to make an arbitrary stop--the man who attempts to make an arbitrary stop is doing that because he believes that the certainty of his knowledge ends at that point.

Yes, all right--

STUDENT: So then a conflict results as to whether we can have absolute values.

Surely, if he believes that, he must stop. But his belief may be erroneous.

STUDENT: So that's the disagreement.

That is the issue--

STUDENT: (continuing) whether the social scientist can hold such absolute values--

The word absolute values has so many connotations, which are in my opinion wholly superfluous, that I would not like to use it. But let us take it in this way. When I say, he is a first-rate general with these and these qualities, a very outstanding man, the greatest general around, whatever it may be, we can find out about this a bit in a common-sensical manner, or even if we know nothing about strategy, by a certain belief in authority. Knowing that Montgomery is admitted to be a very good general for the British, we can find out who did Montgomery regard as top generals, this can tell us more. But I do not want to bring this into discussion. The main point is that these conditional judgements, like "this general is good," means more, turn out to be more, than these if-statements, because the qualities ascribed, that is, some of them, are qualities which we call virtues, distinction, excellences, of a human being. And if you like that, we cannot simply say that you may, but if you don't, don't. Because these distinctions have the character that if we realize them, if we are open to them, we cannot but respect or admire them. All right. --I should have someone as a kind of chairman...yes?

STUDENT: Well, I'm wondering whether this points in one direction. It seems to me that the argument so far leads to the conclusion that factual judgements that have been made by the social scientist in his efforts to weed out values are things that must be taken into consideration and are values. For example, whether or not a man has the qualities he is reputed to have when you are making a judgement about him is not only whether these qualities are good or bad, but also whether or not he has them, so that this factual part fits into the judgements we must make of human beings. The discussion has to go also in the other direction, that somehow the social sciences can to a limited extent--necessarily need value judgements to become involved in such a discussion, do they not?

I believe so. I mean, you can find a possibility of arbitrarily limiting yourself. There are some kind of questions in which no value judgements arise. For example, in mere statistics that is possible. But we are now concerned with how you can define the scope of social science as a whole, of all the questions relevant for social science, in such a way that value-judgements are strictly forbidden.

A man may for example abstain from making value judgements for reasons of modesty, if the cases are too complex. He doesn't dare to judge. But he would misunderstand himself if he didn't see that this restraint implies that he is on his way towards a value-judgement, and he knows he has not yet sufficient equipment in order to pass a value-judgement.

STUDENT: In that case there's no disagreement over the fact that the two realms may be different in their nature and in the proof that is appropriate to them or to which they are susceptible, but the point of argument is that the modern social scientist is not going to be able to pay any attention to absolute value. And would the argument be that because these questions must be raised, they must be the concern of the social scientist anyway, even though they're of a different nature than the ones--

That is exactly what I deny. There are not questions which-- I mean, in an arbitrary manner, it can be done. But if we are concerned with purposeful things, we have to know not only the purpose, but the things demanded to be judged in terms of the purpose. This requires that you take the purpose seriously and see that it is a sound or unsound purpose. It belongs to that; you cannot settle that. And the great question is, whether a value-free social science by its arbitrary limitation, does not lead necessarily to misinterpretation?

I once discussed the case of Max Weber's theory of the origin of the capitalist spirit. It is roughly this, from memory: that Calvinism is a most important cause of the capitalist spirit. You have heard of that in college, I'm sure. Now when you read Weber more carefully, and don't leave it at this general statement, you see what he in *effect* means is, a certain corruption of Calvinism led to the capitalist spirit. That is something very different, from simply saying Calvinism. In Calvin's language, which Weber naturally would not use, it would mean, owing to a carnal understanding of a spiritual teaching--carnal, you know, fleshly, understanding, of a spiritual teaching--Calvinism led under certain conditions to the emergence of the capitalist spirit. Here you see that the omission of the value judgement, the corruption of that, a lower form of Calvinism, he arrived at a factually untrue judgement. As Toynbee put it, the Calvinism which became capitalism was a Calvinism which had made its peace with the world, i.e., which had become entirely worldly, which is another way of saying, it was not the real stuff.

These are not ultimate value-judgements, because the question is here left open whether Calvinism is the true religion, or the true religious understanding, but within these limits we must search. And that happens all the time. In many cases we are unable to judge, no doubt--I mean, I for example would be wholly unable to judge of musical things. Well I naturally don't judge them. But in other cases, the social scientist must judge.

STUDENT: Is it not possible to say that Calvinist spiritual belief was corrupted without saying that this is a good thing or a bad thing?

STUDENT (cont.) It's the same question, but we keep coming back to it.

Yes, but don't you see that in doing that, you cannot go on to more interesting or broader questions except after making value judgements. Just as you cannot go on in medicine before you have made the value judgement that this is a corruption of the liver, and then you ask how that corruption was introduced, by alcohol or whatever it may be. That is the point. Therefore I hesitate to speak of absolute value-judgements; these are questions which arise in *a proper* manner, so that we are prepared for seeing them or understanding them, only after a very long effort. Why not proceed in a truly empirical way, in a way in which we know our bearings, and ascend, step by step, and not simply state from the very beginning, cut these kind of things out because there are value judgements involved; because in this particular limited way, you can be sure of your decisions, you should at least be, and if you are not, you shouldn't make them.

STUDENT:

Going back to the questions involving common sense and science.. the essence of what you have said, is that common sense and science both rest on the same epistemology.

No, common sense rests on no epistemology. Science, whether it knows it or not, rests on an epistemology. In most cases, I believe scientists know that. There is this great change, a radical change in philosophy, connected with the name of Descartes, which is... Descartes, the great mathematician and physicist, who is at the bottom of modern science. One can say, strictly speaking, there is no epistemology before modern times. But surely common sense doesn't have that. The posture of common sense is that which we all have in ordinary matters. ...Are you sure that this was X who hit Y?-- Of course, I was there, I saw it. --Even in that case, errors are possible, as we all know. But still, common sense also knows the ways in which these things can and must be checked. Judicial procedure is based on some common-sense awareness of how such statements of a witness, for example, have to be checked. That has nothing to do with epistemology.

STUDENT: Yet isn't common sense based on empirically verifiable propositions?...that is, a common sense proposition is one that can be verified empirically.

Yes, but what does this mean? For example, if you have the statement, this is a human being, to whom I can address my questionnaire, what does it mean, that this is empirically verifiable; the one will not say hello, when I say hello (laughter)...this is an empirical proof, that the one is a human being, the other is not?

STUDENT: What I'm saying is that one can't raise this to a question of epistemology because science says that we accept no statements which can be verified empirically as resting on faith.

Yes, to that extent. But you see the divergence of common sense and science where it comes out in very simple things. Common sense tells us that the sun is rising in the east and setting in the west, that the earth is standing and the sun is moving. Then Copernicus, and there came infinitely greater complications later, especially in our century. Common sense has been proven wrong. What does common sense say about heaven, which can stand up after the invention of the telescope? What about the enormous worlds opened up by the microscope, which are wholly inaccessible to common sense? It would be more helpful to say, common sense is unarmed reason, and science is armed reason. Now if you state it in this way, the question arises, are there not spheres where unarmed reason is at least as good as armed? You know what I mean by armed; that is not the best thing, but you understand that. For example, in our relations with human beings, telescopes and microscopes--in our understanding of them, in our handling of them, we are not helped in any way to understand human beings. If you don't believe me, read Gulliver's Travels, where, you know when he was in Brobdingnag, where he looked in a way through a microscope, and saw people of enormous size, and so forth. This is a form of fiction, and shows the limitations of this analogy. Since the sciences have led us to a much deeper understanding of extra-human nature than we possessed formerly, then the application of the same procedures and methods to human things must bring about a similar progress, a radical progress and improvement of our knowledge of human things and human affairs. But this does not follow.

STUDENT: You said that social science must have a sense of its beginnings, and that mathematics is the beginning, and you gave as an example of this Spinoza's sentence... ("Man.") ..that "Man thinks" has an undefined term, the being man. But aren't there also undefined terms at the beginning of mathematics, so I don't see why this follows as a distinction.

From Spinoza's point of view, there is a definition of all terms in the beginning. I mean, must one not define a point, a line, a plane, a sphere, at the beginning?

STUDENT: I thought that point was an undefined term.

Well then.. *οτι μὴ*...if I remember well, Euclid begins with the definition of a point. But here the key point is this, that the chief subject of the Ethics or at least of three-fifths of the book, is man, and he does not say what man is. Of course the author tries to do it by simply saying man has this peculiar quality of cogitation, and if we learn what cogitation is, then we understand in this way.

STUDENT: I think the distinction to which most of us are accustomed as a premise of at least contemporary social science is not simply the distinction between armed and unarmed common sense, but rather the distinction between common sense--between sense-perceptions, I should say, along with the aids sense-perception employs, such

as telescopes, microscopes, on the one hand--and on the other hand, what are said to be non-empirically verifiable statements, such as questions of moral and esthetic goodness.

Yes, but that is the reason why I was a bit hesitant to leave it at the identification of science with common-sense, because for common sense this distinction doesn't exist. I give you this example. X is so-and-so many years in politics. Another statement: X is corrupt. Empirical statement, yes? From the point of view of common sense, there is no question, how do they know he is corrupt? because they have seen him acting so. But this is excluded in a certain manner--of course, the social scientist I suppose would say, you can speak of X as corrupt, but strictly speaking you have to use corrupt in quotation marks, in order to explain that this is a popular expression which, when it is used by a social scientist, does not have the simple condemning meaning which it has in ordinary political life.

STUDENT: Then if I understand your argument correctly, what you are saying is, although it is true, that science concedes that certain parts of our common sense are true without question, i.e., sense-perceptions, by the very act of splitting up common sense into sense-perceptions and sense of moral and esthetic qualities, science is denying the primacy of common sense. And only after having set up this arbitrary distinction, is it then going to concede part of the sphere of common sense back to--and by that act....

Yes, but there are representatives of this view who would not go so far, and would question that, because...well, look at this very simple example. Common sense speaks of things. When we speak commonsensically of sense-perception, we do not mean mere sense-data. You see a cow. That is not merely the sense-data. I mean, if I analyze exactly what is on my retina, and so on, and what I know by any other senses, that is not exactly what I mean when I say I see the cow. And therefore, there is a difficulty already here in sense-perception. As ordinarily understood, it means the perception of things and people. But from the scientific point of view, the question is, what is really sensorially perceived? not merely sense-data--and then the great question arises, how can we come from the sense-data to the thing? I mean, that peculiar pattern, which is constructed in some way or other out of the sense-data. The question then arises; and then we see that has something to do with language. And language of course differs from culture to culture, from nation to nation. And the question arises, should there not be an objective language, which is free from all the vagaries of the empirical languages? Now the extreme answer to that, is of course, you have mathematics--the true universal language, the objective language. Now this whole issue is involved in the question of common sense and science.

STUDENT: Well, wouldn't a more sophisticated social scientist not stand so strongly on this point of value-free science, but still try to base his original argument on the basis of what is sense-perception and empirically verifiable. When we say we are human beings, we are obviously saying something more than just I have an opinion, or I have a belief that is so. When we say a man is corrupt, the question arises whether we are really stating an opinion or whether we are stating something verifiable.

Yes, sure---

STUDENT: Now the more sophisticated scientist, the value-free one, might say, Well, just as you would say that saying so-and-so is a human ultimately depends upon a convention that grows from language, that that language depends upon having perceived certain perceptions, in an organized way, the fact that someone's doing that which is corrupt, would also depend upon certain perceptions of the qualities of pleasure and pain, and again, the best way to find out whether so-and-so is corrupt, just as whether so-and-so is human, is to hold surveys or collect examples, to see what the concepts are in certain societies...

No, not...all right, what the concepts are. This is...the judgements are a different thing. So the concepts in a given society may very well lead to the conclusion of a sufficiently discerning man that A is corrupt. But the general opinion about that A may be that he is uncorrupt, because one is not sufficiently discerning. But apart from that, I think one could not avoid the question, is the conception of corruption which is prevalent in a society a sound or an unsound one? And I believe one--after all, we want not merely to find out what the society thinks and does but also what kind of a society it is--and that has very much to do with how deep and thought-through and defensible its views on such matters as corruption are. I'm sorry, I must now stop. We will continue this discussion next time...and I hope, finish it.

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Lecture 5 January 20, 1965

(tape begins late) ..we take to be nothing, like air. And I meant in the first place, the fact-value distinction, as now accepted in social science. It is true, the fact-value distinction is made explicit and conscious, but what is not made explicit is that it constitutes a problem, and this is an enlargement of our horizon, or this greater clarity about the situation, that we should at least learn to consider the possibility that something taken for granted generally at least, may not be true. There is an old-fashioned word for this kind of thing, the word prejudice. It may be there are true prejudices, but as long as they are prejudices you cannot know whether they are true or not. To indicate the character of the view in question, I remind you of someone to whom I have referred occasionally, Simmel, who began this kind of thing, linked the fact-value distinction up with the notion that science is causal and not teleological, and hence it can deal with facts and not with values. But science is causal from its early inception in the seven - teenth century, as opposed to the teleological science of Aristotle, and yet no one ever dreamt until the end of the nineteenth century, that causal science must issue in a value-free social science. Or to take another example, some people take it completely for granted, that the basis of the fact-value distinction is the distinction between is and ought. But the distinction between is and ought is much older, and does not imply that there is no possibility of knowledge of the ought. So the specific condition is not only the distinction between is and ought but the alleged realization that there cannot be any knowledge of the ought. The distinction between facts and values arose about seventy-five years ago, and became quasi-all-powerful only after World War One. It has come into being, and therefore it may perish again; and not merely because of human inability to keep to that high level, it may also be due to a defect of that doctrine. Fundamentally I do not wish to convey more than this simple enlargement of our horizons.

Now before I go on I would like to say a word about the question raised by Miss Burnett regarding Popper, Popper's distinction between verificationist and falsificationist theories of science.

I read that statement, I am grateful to you. Let me read to you a few statements and then what I have to say is very brief. Popper claims that there is no appeal to any standard of rationality that must be accepted a priori. Since justificationists, the ordinary positivists, have at least one infallible element in their arsenal of criticism, or in other words, have the standard of rationality that is accepted a priori, they must succumb to the I.R.A., which is the infinite regress argument, and choose an arbitrary starting-point. Popper says that he does not choose an arbitrary starting-point, as we will see. Now how does he proceed?

Popper's answer to the "How do you know?" question is, I don't know, I guess. He may further add, I try to turn my guesses into criticizable ones, e.g., potentially falsifiable, so that they may be replaced not by knowledge, but by improved guesses. Popper's fallibilism is based on the falsifiability criterion; in other words, any statement which cannot be falsified by scientific methods, simply falls without the province of science. But if it is falsifiable, then it falls within the province of science. Of course, a skeptic could ask, how do you know that you improve your guesses by falsifying the first guess? But the answer is easy: I guess.

Now whether that is a satisfactory account of knowledge in general and of science in particular is a long question into which we do not wish to go here. We can say only this: it is hard to abolish the distinction between knowing and guessing, without which we cannot find our bearings. I guess Mr. X is in this room, then I go in the room and I see him; I do no longer guess, I know. A theory which excludes the distinction between knowing and guessing would seem to be radically imperfect. Now when making this remark I make one qualification, I have not looked at Popper proper, and you or your teachers may have misinterpreted him--that I cannot exclude. I can only speak about what I have seen.

But this is not our question, the whole issue is not relevant to what we are discussing. What we are concerned about is this: whatever Popper may say, he still needs--and in this respect there is no difference between himself and the other positivists, including Comte--that science is limited to certain kinds of questions, while

it cannot answer certain other kinds of questions, this remains unchanged. And he does not permit himself the folly to say, the questions which science cannot answer are meaningless questions. That would be extremely simple: then science would have the monopoly of all meaningful questions. That he does not do, and this is the difference between him and the more common brand of positivists. The questions traditionally answered by theology and metaphysics, the question of why, in Comte's formulation, and the question of value, remain, and are outside of the domain of science. Science cannot even assert that science is good, because that would be a value-judgement. Now this fact, that questions of the utmost importance, the most important questions, remain wholly outside the realm of science, leads and has led to what has been called the flight from scientific reasoning, toward theology or metaphysics. We shall see later that there is or there is thought to be an alternative by which one can escape from scientific reasoning, one must escape, different from theology and metaphysics. But before I take up this question I would like to complete my discussion of the value judgement question.

I will proceed in the following manner. I will discuss briefly some criticisms of the argument which I have advanced, in the few last lectures. The most detailed and serious criticism I found in a book by Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought, Princeton, 1969. Now this is a very solid and respectable book. It does not keep its promise to deal with the foundations of twentieth century political thought. You would think of things like liberal democracy and Communism and Fascism, and other things of the same nature. It is a strictly methodological book. So what he means by political thought is the thought you find in political science departments, not in the political arena. But this error is easily corrected; if you look at the table of contents, you see that this is a strictly academic and not a political book, a book dealing with political matters as such.

Now he says the following, I will read a few points. He describes the **Scientific Value Relativism**, putting the three words in capitals, in order to make quite clear that this is an entity by itself, and he says the following: most revolvers against **Scientific Value Relativism**--

Most revolvers against Scientific Value Relativism--
 [the vsage is interesting: Scientific Value Relativism
 is the established thing, and therefore he means those
 who disagree with that] --describe it incorrectly,
 in good faith, of course, but for that reason the more
 passionately. The commonest misinterpretation is to
 arouse the impression that scientific relativists
 are philosophic relativists, who teach that there is
 nothing of absolute value, and that all values are
 equal, a dogma which could be upheld scientifically
 only by someone who was not alone personally disinclined
 to believe in God, but was positively convinced that there
 was none, and more than that, who thought that the non-reality
 of God could be scientifically demonstrated.

Strauss says that Weber (I quote) "assumes as a matter
 of course that there is no hierarchy of value; all values are
 of the same rank." And Voegelin, that "Weber treated all values
 as equal." Now Weber taught nothing of the kind, and he would
 not have done so, because in the first place he was not of the
 opinion that the absence of a hierarchy of values, and that
 includes the non-reality of God, could be scientifically
 ascertained. And in the second, the very point of his work
 was that values are unequal, according to their different
 origins, implications and consequences, and also because of
 their different ideal meaning. [In other words, the value freedom
 has a very different meaning from the value piety. Hence they
 are unequal.] He did not treat values as equal, but merely their
 validity as equally undemonstrable, beyond the demonstrable
 consequences. [i.e., if you choose value A, you are bound to
 choose something else.] He did not even treat all values this
 way, but only ultimate values. For he held of course that
 each value can be judged scientifically, as to its consistency
 with, and its usefulness for, the attainment of some allegedly
 superior value.

Now I can only say this: the key point Brecht makes is that it is wrong to say that positivists regard values as equal, they regard them only as equally undemonstrable. This distinction would make sense only if social science had any other criteria than demonstrability and indemonstrability. For instance, all revealed religions regard each other as equally indemonstrable. But not therefore as equal. They believe they possess relevant criteria other than demonstrability and indemonstrability for preferring one's own position to that of other religions. There is no other possibility, there is no criterion whatever for regarding one value as preferable to another or as higher than another. The moment you say that the value guiding a Biblical prophet or guiding Socrates is higher than that of any member of the Cosa Nostra, then you have committed a value-judgement, they would say.

I think Brecht only tries to evade the issue by not facing that. On the contrary, I think that the belief in the equality of all values is, as I have said before on occasion, is the hidden reason why so many of the social science positivists are democrats of a certain kind. If all values are equal, then each value or each man's value should have the same right to be considered in the formation of government policy as another.

Strauss likewise sees inconsistency in the fact that relativists cannot help using value-judgements themselves. If they were consistent, he says, relativists in describing concentration camps would not be permitted to speak of cruelty, for this is a value-judgement. They can merely describe the acts committed in a factual manner [--In other words, you describe the various acts of torture in the way you would describe some chemical reaction, or something.--] Nor would historians be permitted to speak of morality, religion, art or civilization, when interpreting the thoughts of people or tribes that are unaware of such notions, or use them differently, or of prostitutes, or of epigones. Wickedly (Strauss is reading this with suppressed glee) he enumerates many value-impregnated expressions Weber uses in his own

historical papers, such as grand figures, laxity, absolutely unartistic, ingenious, crude and abstruse notions, and impressive achievement. These illustrations only go to show that Weber's own interpretation of his methodology was very different from Strauss's. No scientific relativist would condemn words like cruelty, civilization, prostitution, or for that matter crime or slums, whenever they are used within a clear frame of reference as descriptive in accordance with known standards... [Now he underlines] as long as these standards are not themselves at issue [i.e., as long as everyone concerned takes it for granted that crime must be fought, then we use the word crime and there is no difficulty.] Whenever the latter is the case, whenever the standards are at issue, then indeed according to Scientific Value Relativism it is scientifically not correct to continue using one's own standards as though they were absolutely proven. Then the scientist must analyse first the meaning and implication of the different standards within the possibility of science--possibilities that as we have seen are by no means so limited as to exclude scientific contributions--that means that science is capable of showing that certain values are not realizable, et cetera.

I would reply to this as follows. On the very basis of relativism, the standards are necessarily at issue. Whether they are at issue between two social scientists who happen to agree as to the badness of slums or corruption, is wholly uninteresting. That is merely a subjective judgement. From the point of view of social science, the standards are necessarily at issue. Since all value judgements are necessarily questioned, the strict social scientist ought to use value-impregnated expressions, such as corruption, only in quotation-marks--what the vulgar call "cruelty", you know, but which we would have to call X, Y, Z if at all. Those expressions imply that the things in question are bad. They speak of prostitution, they mean something by that, and so you have to coin a new word. We are calling it, let's say, free love of a certain kind. Free love which however is perfectly compatible with being--with remuneration, let me put it this way.

(Laughter.)

I once heard--(laughter continues)--I heard once the following argument in favor of corruption in New York City--namely that the conventional judgement of these people is so unfair, because these corrupt politicians gave great help to poor immigrants--the only way in which these poor immigrant fellows could get some hearing for their rightful claims was to find corrupt politicians. Now what is this? This is of course not a refutation of the ordinary view of corruption. It is an argument showing that what is regarded *prima facie* as simply bad, is in fact, in the circumstances, a lesser evil. These are all value judgements. No one if he thinks about these things, will say that these things condemned as such are under all circumstances bad. No one can defend corruption as such, namely the misuse of public power for private purposes. In other words, it is impossible to say that corruption is a subjective value judgement. I will come back to this issue later. Let me see a few more remarks. In an appendix, he comes back to this question.

First when he discussed Max Weber he spoke of misrepresentations, making it clear that is not deliberate--now he calls it misunderstandings.

Strauss resumes his objections in another paper.

"The relativists hold," he asserts, "that civilization is not intrinsically superior to cannibalism. Hence speech for the cause of civilization will be to relativists not rational discourse, but mere propaganda, a propaganda confronted by an equally legitimate and perhaps more effective propaganda in favor of cannibalism. Relativists teach," he further contends, "that the absolute truth of value systems such as Plato's has been refuted unqualifiedly, with finality, absolutely. And he contrasts the apparent humility of relativists with the hidden arrogance of considering all people provincial and narrow, except themselves."

What I meant was that they regard all people such as Plato and so on as narrow because they were the slaves of value systems accepted by their society, whereas they are completely free from such values.

This squarely-put challenge [Brecht continues] is particularly helpful, if it is neither ignored nor ridiculed [which he thinks would be the natural reaction of any sensible person (laughter)] but met in an equally forthright manner. And it can be met. For each of Strauss's statements is in conflict with the facts insofar as Scientific Value Relativism is concerned. First of all, where and when has a scientific relativist ever asserted as a fact that civilization is not superior to cannibalism? Such negative statements would be quite contrary to the principles of the scientific method.

I can only say if the scientific relativists did not assert it, then they simply keep silent about what they mean. ...But I do not have to go so far. Look at the use of the terms culture and civilization in present-day anthropology--whether there are cultures which are cannibalistic and whether they are treated in any way as inferior by the social scientists to those that are non-cannibalistic. Of course not. Now let me go on. The only question that may be raised by some pedantic relativist as a methodological argument is, what is the scientific evidence for the superiority of non-cannibalistic societies to cannibalistic ones? I would say this, in a matter of such importance, one cannot be pedantic enough.

How about civilizations that abhor the eating of cattle or hogs? To this I would say that the question of eating of cattle or hogs has the same status as that of the eating of human beings, which I think is a grave thing. [laughter] But here too Dr. Strauss would have no valid point. Scientific Value Relativism, although not satisfied with easy references to intuition [“that is a pig” --(laughter)] is-- [now listen]--Scientific Value Relativism is at no loss to show the superiority of non-cannibalism, once superiority is defined, as it generally is, in terms other than selfish satisfaction of personal or private passions, and with references to humanity. Even if the term “superior” in the proposition “Non-cannibalism is superior to cannibalism” is used in a strictly selfish sense, which

Strauss certainly would not do, scientific method would not be at the end of its resources. The long-run superiority of one pattern of behavior over another can often be demonstrated even when the question is solely that of personal satisfaction.

Well, take the case of drugs, where every doctor can prove to you that you have momentary satisfaction from the drugs but in the long run, damage. But here is the main point:

He regards it at least as possible that social science is able to prove the superiority of non-cannibalism, a) on non-selfish, b) on selfish, grounds. [i.e., on the basis of all possible grounds, because that seems to be a complete disjunction, selfish and non-selfish. Putting it in plain English, that social science can prove the superiority of non-cannibalism to cannibalism. Social science can establish at least one value-judgement, if this were true.]

On the other hand, Scientific Value Relativism may indeed be too humble to offer a scientific position on a question like this: when the captain of a marooned crew ought to be condemned if he permitted his men to eat the flesh of other men killed in battle or by accident, when this was the only alternative to starving.

This is a very interesting case. Why did he choose this example, of the starving men, in preference to an example of men eating human flesh while they have other food in abundance? I think that is perfectly understandable. The latter would be a much graver case than the former. These people have at least an excuse, namely that this was the only way in which they would possibly survive, and there might even be a deeper one, because it is assumed they have a public duty to remain and watch the enemy, then they have to survive for their country, and this may be defended. In other words, can social science legitimate the condemnation of what we may call frivolous cannibalism, which is not demanded practically by the circumstances?

Now I turn to another discussion which is in the book by Ernst Nagel, *The Structure of Science*,

We shall not attempt a detailed assessment of this complex argument. For a discussion of the numerous issues it raises would take us far afield. However, three claims made in the course of the argument may be admitted without further comment as indisputably correct: that a large number of characterizations sometimes assumed to be purely factual descriptions of social phenomena do indeed formulate a type of value judgement. That it is often difficult, and in any case usually inconvenient in practice, to distinguish between the purely factual and the evaluative contents of many terms employed in the social sciences. And that values are commonly attached to means and not only to ends. However, these admissions do not entail the conclusion that in a manner unique to the study of purposive human behavior, fact and value are fused beyond the possibility of *separation*. On the contrary, as we shall ^{try} to show, the claim that there is such a fusion of fact and value and that a value-free social science is therefore inherently absurd, confounds two quite different senses of the term value judgement. The sense in which a value judgement expresses approval or disapproval either of some moral or social ideal, or of some action or institution because of a commitment to such an idea, in the sense in which a value judgement expresses an estimate of the degree to which one commonly recognizes and more or less clearly defined type of action or institution, is embodied in a given instance.

Now Nagel calls in the sequel the latter kind of value judgement which he admits are indispensable, characterizing value judgements. He distinguishes them from appraising value judgements.

STUDENT: Could you give their definition again, please?

I mean, when there are appraising value judgements, which say "this is intrinsically wrong,"--and--the distinction is not very clear--and the other, the characterizing, doesn't speak of intrinsically good or bad. This is my formulation, not his. If you say prostitution, for example,

that is a characterizing word. Now he gives the following example. A given animal has anemia. Factual, and at the same time, evaluative to the extent that it is understood to be a defect. But according to Nagel, this characterising value judgement does not mean anemia is an undesirable condition. This would be an appraising value judgement. But the question I raise is this: does he not admit that anemia is a defect? Now let me take another example. Nagel cannot deny that it is possible sometimes to make the characterising value judgement, A is a crook. It is clear that crook is not very well defined, but in some cases the situation is so clear that everyone would admit its facticity. Now he would then say, this does not necessarily mean that A is undesirable--that would be an appraisal. And I can easily see that it doesn't follow, because somebody may be highly desirable for example, as a stool-pigeon, but in giving this illustration, I show already the intelligible context with which we make value-judgements, and by which we qualify them. But if I say X^{is a crook}--it surely means that he is despicable. Now if this is a good reason for you never to speak to him, never to meet him, that is a practical judgement that is left open, naturally. I mean, if you are Orlando Wilson, it may be your duty to talk to him. And there may be other reasons, maybe you are a relative, and you cannot avoid him without harming your nearest and dearest, and so on. But this is possibly the meaning of the distinction between characterizing and appraising. The key point it seems to be here is this: that characterizing value judgements are inevitable, as he classifies them. Now let me see how he continues that.

It would be absurd to demand that in characterizing various actions as mercenary, cruel or deceitful, sociologists are frequently although perhaps not always wittingly ~~characterizing~~ ^{asserting} appraising as well as characterizing value judgements.

In other words, they say not only, that it is a defect, but also it is undesirable to do this kind of thing.

Terms like mercenary, cruel, or deceitful, as commonly used, have a widely recognized pejorative overtone.

Accordingly anyone who employs these terms to characterize

human behavior can normally be assumed to express disapprobation of that behavior, in his approbation should he use terms like non-mercenary, kind or truthful, and not simply characterising.

Now here the question of course is this: when social scientists use these terms, do they merely give in to a temptation, that they are brought up in this way, or is there a necessity for that?

However, although many, but certainly not all, ostensibly characterising statements uttered by social scientists undoubtedly express commitments to various, not always compatible values, a number of purely descriptive terms as used by natural scientists in certain contexts sometimes also have an unmistakably appraising value connotation..not merely characterizing. Thus the claim that a social scientists is making appraising value judgements when he characterizes respondents to questionnaires as uninformed, deceitful, or irrational--

[this was an entirely fictitious example, which I used because I have never heard pollsters ever do that--]

First it is claimed that a social scientist is making appraising value judgements when he characterizes respondents to questionnaires as uninformed, deceitful or irrational, can be matched by the equally sound claim that a physicist is also making such judgements when he describes the particular chronometer as inaccurate, a pump as inefficient, or a supporting platform as unstable. Like the social scientist in this example, the physicist is characterizing certain objects in his field of research. But also like the social scientist, he is expressing his disapproval of the characteristics he is ascribing to those subjects.

Now it is clear that in the case of artifacts, it is impossible to judge whether they work or don't and to make this characterizing value judgement which in most circumstances becomes an appraising value judgement. But again we must make a minor qualification. This may not be the last word. For example if someone has a broken chair he might prefer it to one in perfect working order, if that broken chair happens to be an heirloom. Or has some other quality—well, it goes without saying. But a broken chair is still a defective chair, although in a given situation it may be preferable to a chair which is intact.

Well, these are the points which I wanted to bring up, and I must say I was grateful to Professor Nagel for admitting at least this much which would have been admitted by everyone thirty or forty years ago, but today creates some difficulty.

Now I think it is best if I take this up right away, although I thought of doing so in a different context.

In a way, Nagel's position as a whole is a positivistic position as it is familiar from many books. I would like to discuss with you here one question which he takes up. The fundamental question for all physical sciences, and of course for all social sciences, is the question of causality. After all, explanations, correlations, one set of reins functions over another set of reins, and we call this in the old-fashioned form, causality. Now what is causality? He quotes an author, with whom he seems to agree:

Whenever you come across an incomplete or disturbed system, try to the best of your ability to amplify it to one undisturbed whole, looking for the supplement, first among things known, near and far. If the desired supplement is not found among them, search for it among things unknown.

This is a kind of operative definition of causality. Now what is the fundamental question? What is the upshot of the discussion of the logical status of the principle of causality? Is the principle an

empirical generalization? Obviously not. An a priori truth, excluded by positivism as such? A concealed definition? which would be merely tautological. A convention that may be accepted or not, as one pleases? The principle is a maxim, but is the principle a rule that may be followed or ignored at all? Is it merely an arbitrary matter, what general goals are pursued by theoretical science in its development? It is undoubtedly only a contingent historical fact, that the enterprise known as science does aim at achieving the type of explanation described by the principle of causality, for it is logically possible that in their efforts at mastering their environment, men might have aimed at something quite different. According the goals men adopt in the pursuit of knowledge are logically arbitrary. And that applies to the principle of causality itself. Nevertheless, the actual pursuit of theoretical science in modern times is directed toward certain goals, one of which is formulated by the principle of causality. Indeed the phrase theoretical science appears to be so generally used that an enterprise not controlled by those objectives would presumably not be subsumed under these label. It is at least plausible therefore to claim that the acceptance of the principle of causality as a maxim of inquiry is an analytical consequence of what is commonly meant by theoretical science. Whether theoretical science is a pursuit which acts on this maxim, in any event, one can readily grant, that when the principle assumes this special form, so that it prescribes the adoption of a particular type of state-description by every theory, the principle might be abandoned in various areas of investigation. But it is difficult to understand how it would be possible for modern science to surrender the general ideal expressed by the principle, without however becoming transformed into something incomparably different from what that principle actually is, .i.e, it would cease to be theoretical science, in the meaning the term has previously had. This key principle is logically arbitrary. Other principles could have been chosen. It is historically contingent. That was chosen, say, in the seventeenth century, something else could have been chosen, other principles were chosen in other ages. Men have chosen—~~chosen~~—this particular kind of intellectual orientation; they might have chosen others. And this choice is not susceptible of any legitimation. Because if you say, but this is the only way

we could have made this tremendous progress in medicine, etc., then the answer is obviously, what about the thermonuclear bomb?

More generally stated, if modern science supplies very great benefits to the human race, as no one denies, it also endangers the human race. There is no possibility of saying that the abandonment of this kind of science would be a relapse into barbarism, as everyone would have said in the nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century. Logic deals with this particular kind of science. But this is only a particular kind of science. There are n others. Therefore logic has to be integrated into a larger whole, which deals with all these fundamentally different forms, in which men can take their bearings, and what is that most comprehensive study which deals with all possible forms of orientation? There is an ordinary name for that.

STUDENT: Philosophy?

No, misleading, it's too general. Intellectual history. Intellectual history would be that broader consideration in which logic, as the study of present-day scientific thought, would find a place. Now in a more general sense, positivism, the view that science, modern science, is the only genuine form of knowledge, leads eventually into historicism. And that is the subject to which I will turn now. Historicism is to that extent a deeper position, a more serious position, because it is aware, it takes seriously, the implications which positivism does not. Positivism was—one could say, still carries on the old notion of science going back to Plato and other people, that science is the actualization of a high perfection of man as a rational animal, knowledge of the truth. And yet it can no longer maintain this Platonic assertion, as we saw from Popper, for instance, when he speaks of this as only a kind of guessing, A controlled form of guessing, as distinguished from an uncontrolled form, and there is no longer any reference to knowledge and truth.

In a different way for Nagel, the fundamental and characteristic principle of modern science is a certain understanding of causality which is logically arbitrary. And the justification which would have been given for it, and is perhaps still given to it today by some more or less

backward people, the enormous progress of natural science made possible by this interpretation of causality becomes doubtful when progress itself becomes doubtful. And it must become doubtful if value judgements cease to have intrinsic validity. Yes?

STUDENT: I can understand that there are different kinds of science. But Hegel doesn't say that, I believe. He says that in their efforts at mastering their environments men could have chosen other kinds of science. I don't see how that could be.

He says it is logically arbitrary. That means there are logical alternatives, which were not true. But above all it is historically contingent. That refers us back to the decisive moment in the seventeenth century when this kind of science emerged. But there were some kinds of sciences before. There was Greek science, there was Babylonian science, there was perhaps a kind of sorcery, and ultimately this is based on a very different notion, they don't work in the way that modern science works, but perhaps they work in another way, as a form of satisfaction of human needs.

STUDENT: Yes, but from the little that I know of Greek science, for example, I don't believe that we would characterize Greek science as trying to control the environment, maybe as trying to understand it...

Yes, then it would be very simple. Modern science differs from other science by the fact that it tries to control the environment. Then there would be nothing quite so arbitrary about it. But he does not link up directly causality with control of the environment. I suppose that is probably because he doesn't believe that the primary function of modern science is to control the environment.

STUDENT: A point of information: would most present-day writers on scientific method and so on agree with Hegel that the principle of causality is logically arbitrary?

Usually they don't even go so far--they are not as honest as Nagel.

Reischenbach, for example, he is one of the more common sort of positivist. I read this discussion of causality some years ago; he did not even go so far as to say simply, it works, and so we assume it will work in the future. He evades it. Now I could also state what I was trying to convey by this quotation as follows: I referred last time to the ultimate dependence of science on concepts. But while *this* might be sufficient as a argument against positivism, it is of no help with political philosophy, with which we are concerned, for the following reason. For political philosophy according to its primary meaning, is the quest for the just or the good political order. But common sense is historically variable. And so political philosophy remains exposed to this much more serious difficulty, that it is built on historically shaky ground, and therefore can never be able to answer the question of the just or the good political order. One can state this also as follows: in order to be true, a proposition must be meaningful. Abracadabra is mabracadabra cannot possibly be true, because it is not a meaningful proposition. But what is and what is not meaningful depends on the specific historical situation: time, culture, nation, class. Hence, owing to this dependence of truth on meaningfulness, there cannot be a valid universal truth. If science depends on common sense, and common sense is historical, scientific truth cannot be universally valid,...which is tacitly admitted by Nagel, insofar as all scientific truths are based on the use of the principles of causality, as logically arbitrary and historically contingent principles. To this one can easily object and say look at the factual universality of mathematics and modern science in the world. This mathematics and science may be of Western origin, but they are obviously accessible to all men, who are sufficiently gifted, wherever they are. This does *not* go to the root of the matter, but I limit myself to only one point. Do we have the same universality in the humanities, and in the more interesting parts of the social sciences? No, there is no necessary conclusion from the natural sciences to the sciences of men, for the very simple reason that there may be an essential difference between the human and the subhuman. And natural science, this immensely successful enterprise, deals with the subhuman. And perhaps something radically different

appears when we come to men.

Now I would like to come back to this statement that positivism, for reasons I have not sufficiently explained, but which have to do with the fact that the original understanding of science has been abandoned, namely that science is the perfection of human nature--this was the rock on which science was built--when this was abandoned, in connection with the abandonment of the view that there are such things as perfections of natures--then eventually it became questionable, what is the basis of science, why is science good? Some answers were given in modern times that rejected the teleological conception of nature--for example, Bacon and Hobbes--Science is for the sake of power, for the sake of human well-being. This has great difficulties even prior to the emergence of modern weapons, because scientists frequently did not recognize what they were doing--mathematicians who are passionately concerned with the riddles of the theory of numbers, for example, are concerned with the fantastic order or disorder of prime numbers, there is no essential relation of what they are doing to the benefit of the human race--but science for the sake of science is a view still present in many mathematicians and also many physicists. They may go on, they are not professionally obliged, as it were, to give an account of why they do what they do--as long as it is regarded as a respectable thing. But the purpose of science has become a question. To question it leads, under modern conditions, to historicism. I will try to explain that.

Now let me first use a definition, because as is always the case, these positivist and historicists shade into each other, and the pure cases of positivism and historicism are extremely rare. Only this much, that they both at present rule the Western world, in the way in which Marxism rules the communist world; only because of the fundamental divergence between the two, there is of course considerable freedom of argument which cannot exist if you have a single monolithic doctrine interpreted by the government.

Now positivism we may say asserts that all values are subjective, while scientific truth is objective. Historicism says in the clear case, the distinction between facts and values is not tenable. The categories of theoretical understanding are inseparable from the principles of evaluation. At any rate, not only values, but science too, is in a radical sense, subjective. All human thought and action rests ultimately on actions which differ from age to age or from culture to culture, and none of which can be said to be superior to any other. This is so and I remind you of what I said in connection with Nagel's argument regarding causality; the consequence is that you have to turn from—for fundamental considerations—from scientific concerns, including those of political or social science, to those of history. History deals with the fundamental questions.

Now in order to understand the problem of historicism, one must first get this clear in one's mind, that this is a very novel phenomenon, and there is—in ordinary presentations, you find some remarks about Plato's philosophy of history. CA N'EXISTE PAS. You couldn't translate this into Greek, except into modern Greek. There are some people who say that the Greeks did not have that, but the origin is found in the Bible in the Old Testament. But the trouble is that there is no Old Testament word for history. There is none; the Hebrew word for history is like historia, the Greek word for inquiry, story. Briefly, let us consider the status of what we call history in classical times. The word history, historia, exists in the wide meaning first of inquiry. Therefore, natural history, the description of some animals, you may have come across in your childhood, lions, tigers, and some animals nearer home—history means inquiry and of course also the results of inquiry. But apparently it took early this peculiar meaning—inquiry with other human beings. Now it is obvious if you inquire about a hedgehog, you don't need other human beings. But there are other things where you cannot find out what's what except by inquiring with other human beings, living or dead. You look at their papers, and this eye-witness you would like to have. Then it came to mean the inquiry into the deeds and sufferings of political societies, and also the

presentation of the results of such inquiries. Herodotus' book can be called a history because it gives an account of the results of what he found.

In modern time, to make this clear from the very beginning, when people speak of the philosophy of history, they very frequently mean it in contradistinction to philosophy of nature. There is a dimension of reality called nature—while philosophy deals with kinds of beings, and therefore with proper names. Aristotle says therefore that poetry is more philosophic than history, because the poet, when he presents to us Achilles, makes us see, in Achilles, man; The historian is not supposed to *do* this—he is supposed to present Achilles as this particular man of these deeds and sufferings.

The most striking example of this you find in Thomas Aquinas's Summa, the first question, the second article, where he discusses the question of whether theology, what he calls sacred doctrine, is a science. The objection is, science doesn't deal with individuals, singulari. But theology does deal with individuals, for example, with the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—beings indicated by proper names. Hence theology is not a science. Thomas replies as follows: the individuals are not the principle subject in theology, but only are used as models of lives, as we do also in modern science, as Aristotle would also in the Ethics occasionally give some example of a man. But the questions in Aristotle are justice, magnanimity—and he might use an example of a just or magnanimous man occasionally to illustrate that—but his theme is a universal.

Political philosophy when it emerged, dealt with justice, with the just order which is possible. And it does not hesitate to use history as a storehouse of examples, naturally. But it is in no way a historical discipline. The just order was called or could be called what is by nature right. And this notion of what is by nature right was developed later into the notion of a natural law, which was conceived of as bidding all men as men. As such, it must be duly promulgated; everyone must be able to know it; otherwise he cannot obey it. Now whether or not—whether the natural law is or is not always duly promulgated, depends on how man was at the beginning.

That is the crucial case. If man was at the beginning Adam and Eve, created perfect, there is no difficulty in seeing why they should not know the rational law. But if man at the beginning was imperfect--the example used in the seventeenth century was the North American Indian--there is no reason to suppose that they would have been capable to understand such a law. And this view was accepted by the progressive thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the men who formed the modern tradition. An imperfect beginning, a beginning in which he cannot know the natural law, in which he cannot know what is by nature right. There is a development of man from a state in which he was incapable of understanding the natural law to a state in which he is now. The whole work of Vico for example is based on this. Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality is also a very important document, called by him a history of man, the history of man, I mean, not little anecdotes, but the fundamental fact of man is that man is essentially a developing being, or as Rousseau called it, perfectibility is of his essence. Here the true political teaching of Rousseau regarding the just society has become available only now, 1776--could not have been known earlier.

Now this thought which is so elementary to us we can say was wholly absent from the earlier tradition. Rousseau implies that his political philosophy differs more or less from the teaching of all his predecessors. Excuse me if I emphasize these trivial things but there are very great problems in that. In fact, every great political philosopher did this: he said, here I present the political truth, and that has nothing to do with modesty or immodesty, but it implies it is of course different from all others, else why should he write a new book? Take Locke, a man who was rather self-effacing compared with other political philosophers, and as such he refers and defers to other political philosophers: the judicious Hooker, Richard Hooker. But on one occasion at least he says, after having quoted Hooker: "But I moreover think.." Hooker was right 99%, but not 100%; otherwise there would have been no reason for Locke to write his treatise.

So in other words the simple elementary thing that great political philosophers say very different things about the just order. One can say we have no political philosophy, but only political philosophies. There is not one edifice impressing us by its unanimity, or quasi-unanimity, as modern science in a way does, where there is at least some notion of the identity of method. But here we have an anarchy. This of course could not have escaped men at an earlier time. But what was the conclusion which they drew from it? Those who were duly impressed by it, became skeptics, and said, this is obviously an enterprise beyond human power for one reason or another, it is not a feasible thing. But the political philosophers themselves were not disturbed by the scandalous state of their own pursuit. On the other hand, they did not pay particular attention to it. They knew it, but they did not pay attention to it. And the very strange thing is that after Rousseau, or after Vico, this fact had to be faced, for the first time. How can the variety of political philosophies be reconciled with its truth, with the possibility of political philosophies? Is this variety merely a disgraceful fact, or does it make sense? And the observation by virtue of which it proved to make sense, is this: every man can see, when he reads Aristotle's Politics, on the one hand, and Locke's Civil Government on the other, that either Aristotle is right and Locke is wrong, or vice versa. But they are surely incompatible. Now how can we--there are n political philosophers, a Babel of disharmonious sounds! And then someone makes this observation: there is not disharmony, there is perfect harmony, if you consider the context. Aristotle is concerned with the Greek city. Locke is concerned with the British state around 1688. And if you take these obvious facts into consideration, the conflict simply disappears; they do not contradict each other, because they speak in a way about different things. I suppose this is so elementary that it is taught, not even explicitly taught, but taken for granted in the general civilization courses.

Generally stated, doctrines are functions of times.

STUDENT: Could you give us an idea of who said that?

I will gradually come to that. ...This is a very minor rhetorical device, which you must forgive me. Good. Now--here is what I wrote down literally immediately afterward. The first great thinker who paid proper attention to this state of affairs was Hegel. This problem was in the air prior to him. The very last pages of the Critique of Pure Reason have the strange title, "The History of Pure Reason." Wholly unimaginable in earlier thought, that pure reason could have a history. And Kant meant it with many qualifications, but that he could speak of history of pure reason was a sign of the times. In Hegel's words, the individual--and he meant by that not only thoughtless individuals, but most thoughtful men, the philosophers--is the son of his time, and not in the way in which he shaves or wears clothes, but in the highest and most sublime and abstruse thoughts. This was corrected somewhat later by Nietzsche, but he was fundamentally in agreement with Hegel, that the philosopher is the stepson of his time, i.e., is not in step with his time. But this of course means that what he teaches belongs to the time nevertheless.

Now Hegel who had seen that the individual is the son of his time thought as little of anyone of his predecessors that his political philosophy is true only for his time. In other words, Hegel had realized that Aristotle was right for his time, Locke for his, and each of the others, for his. But as for Hegel, he was quite as naive as these earlier thinkers had been when presenting the true teaching. --Now this couldn't be, that would be wholly unintelligible. Hegel justified the absolutes of his political philosophy, contrasted with the non-absolutes of the earlier philosophies, by this consideration. Each philosophy belongs to a moment in time. But there is an absolute moment, and the philosophy which belongs to the absolute moment is the absolute philosophy. (laughter) Yes, it sounds funny. But we will have occasion later on to see whether this is not inevitable,

something of this kind, once you take the question of history seriously in this way. Now the reasoning of Hegel can be officially as follows: Hegel wrote in the early nineteenth century, when Germany was a Christian country. All his addressees were Christians, and naturally they took it for granted that Christianity is the true religion, or as Hegel calls it, the absolute religion. And for Christianity there is of course an absolute moment. Resurrection. And just as there is an absolute moment in Christianity, there is an absolute moment in history, in profane history, for the following reason.

Christianity appeared first in a wholly pagan world... the Roman Empire...in radical opposition to that pagan empire. Then expansion of Christianity in the Roman Empire, migration, a Christian order, a Christian world emerges in the Middle Ages. Here you have Christianity not separated outside the world of politics, but informing it. Yet in informing it in that way there is a fundamental distinction between the Christian proper, the spiritual and the temporal, shown especially in the distinction between the power spiritual and the power temporal. And the distinction between clergy and laymen, and other dualisms.

Now Hegel was not only a Christian, but also a Lutheran. And therefore he took it for granted that Protestantism was by far superior to Catholicism. What did Protestantism do, it abolished this dualism, it secularized not only the monasteries, it secularized Christianity. Every Christian is a priest, universal priesthood. Now this secularization of Christianity meant, according to Hegel, that the world, the secular, became Christianized. The secularization of Christianity is the Christianization of the world. And this culminated--again I repeat what Hegel says--in the Enlightenment, the great movement following the Reformation and the religious wars. The Enlightenment, according to Hegel's interpretation, only makes the last step in this secularization of Christianity, or the Christianization of the world. And that culminates in an event which at first glance seems to be simply anti-Christian: the French Revolution.

But for Hegel that was not so, even regarding the French Revolution as a terrible thing, it nevertheless was fundamentally progressive. Because it was the first time that at least on European soil, an old country, the rights of man became the foundation of civil society explicitly. In the formula which you surely have heard very frequently, the dignity of man, every man, based on the Biblical view that man is created in the image of God, that is a Biblical variation. The secularization, that it became politically effective, the basis of all legislation of a new order, this is a consequence of the French Revolution. Of course Hegel was not --saw that the French Revolution had one fundamental defect--it did not show the possibility of government--proof, the Terror. And therefore what came after the Revolution, Napoleon and his work, the Code Napoleon, this order which indeed did not last, ~~but~~ it supplied the outlines of what Hegel thought is the rational state. A state based on the recognition of the rights of man, but not--but where government is not simply derivative from the will of the mass of citizens. How this is so is of no interest, I only wanted to make this crucial point, that for Hegel this establishment of the rational state, of course not everywhere but that is a progression of a few generations, that is uninteresting, the fundamental question is now solved, the question of the just state, finally solved. And IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SOLVED earlier, namely, prior to the radical secularization of Christianity. History is completed. Only because this is the case can one say that the historical process is rational. How could we know that it is rational, if it is not completed? It might be rational up to a certain point, but we wouldn't know until later.

In other words, men now, say around 1830, live on the peak, however great the achievements of some thinkers and some societies may have been, they are fundamentally defective, because the decisive truth has not been known. And this philosophic theoretical truth and its knowledge is bound up with the actualization of the practically or politically right order. You see, when earlier thinkers such as Descartes presented his doctrine about the vortices, he didn't see any relation--there was no question whatever as to the most desirable

political society *to be* established. But here in Hegel's case the previous solution of the practical or political problem by the establishment of the just order is the condition for the completion of theory, theoretical knowledge. One can explain this as follows. Theory---philosophy has to do with, as one loosely says, all reality. But how can it do that if reality is incomplete? As long as reality is incomplete, philosophy must be incomplete. Only after reality is completed, by the establishment of the just society, can philosophy as a study of reality be complete. The difficulty is that within Hegel is indicated by one expression which Hegel uses. He says, the owl of Minerva, of the goddess of wisdom, begins its flight in the dusk. The evening of mankind has arrived. The progressive process has been completed. This is just what our heart desires. But it means also, there are not longer any fundamental human tasks for the human race. The night. Therefore, the view which Spengler has popularized in our century, about the decline of the West, meaning the decline of all high culture, is a possible interpretation of Hegel's own thought. But Hegel was the great beginning of this historicization, but historicism proper is a post-Hegelian phenomenon, and I will have to speak of this next time. We have a few minutes which we can devote to an exchange of opinion. Is there any point you would like to take up?

STUDENT: Way back at the beginning of the lecture, you were speaking of Nagel's distinction between characterizing and appraising. Now if you say that something is anemic, you are judging it in terms of its own ends and constitution. If I say a human being is anemic, there is a standard by which a human being exists, and he deviates from this. I don't say, I appraise, I don't say, it is good that he's anemic, or it's bad that he's anemic..

Yes, sure. That's what he means.

STUDENT: But somehow you said that this distinction wasn't really that clear, the distinction between appraising and characterizing.

Yes, but still you say this characterizing statement in such cases, means you think, whether it is an animal or a chair, this thing is defective. Now this is in itself no practical conclusions follow. The simple example of the broken chair, which I prefer for some reason--but still I give a reason. Why do I prefer the defective thing to the whole thing? Whereas if someone wants to have a horse--still simpler--a farmer says to a boy, bring me a horse. And he brings him a lame mare. Or he brings him a colt. Then the farmer says, I told you to bring me a horse! He meant of course, a normal horse. Normal means also grown-up. Therefore a colt which is also perfectly healthy, in my assumption, is nevertheless not a horse. You can say that is a simple starting-point of Aristotle. Or when we go over a street, and we come too late, because there are a lot of people ahead of us, and all these beings which prevent us walking quickly through the mess, are children, or all of them are women, I think we would not simply say, people prevented us, but we would say, a mass of children, or a mass of women. So in other words our ordinary language contains in itself a pointer towards the normal in the sense of the perfect, but don't think perfect means something farfetched--the complete. This is--I think for this reason one cannot leave it at this distinction. I gave the example of the stool-pigeon, which is clearly an undesirable human being, which shows that. Of course we must not have a very schematic notion that here are the good things and here are the bad things. It is in practice very hard to avoid the bad things, and even the bad human beings. But the distinction is nevertheless very necessary. Even if you use a crook, you must know that he is a crook. Or else you will not have that benefit from him which you might reasonably expect. Yes?

STUDENT: When Nagel says, X is a crook, doesn't it imply that X is undesirable? And does he understand that there might be other things about X which make it desirable that he be a crook?

Well, you see he does not go into that, that is the trouble. I mean in all of these men you find examples, and their discussion is so very important, because they open up the difficulty. And I think that will show how many value-judgements there are implied all the time. The usual view is so offensive to me above all because of its schematic composition.

STUDENT: I think we would have to interpret anyway that when he says X is a crook, it does not imply that X is undesirable. What he means is not that you may want to use X for an ulterior motive, it means simply that being a crook, although the word itself has a negative connotation, is not in any real sense undesirable. Someone might say, X is a crook, and therefore is desirable, on the basis of this.

I think he goes somewhat beyond that, I do not know...I think he cannot leave it at that.

STUDENT: Could you clarify the connection between Nagel's judgement that the principle of causality is arbitrary and (unclear) ?

I believe that there is no direct connection between the two things.

STUDENT: Why was it brought up?

Well, my argument was this, that--I had a number of arguments regarding the fact-value distinction of positivism, and one of them was that positivism turns into historicism, and in the latter connection I spoke of what he says about causality.

STUDENT: Then historicism as I understand you to say is regarded by many as an alternative...

No, no. He rejects historicism and all considerations regarding it

as wrong. He is not--that is exactly the point. He believes that non-historicist positive science is absolutely well-protected against any historicist objections. I may take this up next time, what he has to say on this subject. He doesn't see any difficulty there. But what I wanted to show is that whether he sees any difficulty or not, he is in fact exposed to them, as is shown by his remark on causality. Is this so hard to understand?

STUDENT: It surely is.

I am sorry, I do not see how I can--keep it in mind, and I will try to clarify it next time. Mr. Glenn?

Mr. Glenn: Mr. Strauss, the owl of Minerva is a symbol of wisdom, is that correct?

Well, no. Minerva is the goddess of wisdom. Pallas Athena in Greek. And the owl is her symbol. And Hegel makes a subtle joke with that, just as the owl flies in the dusk, so wisdom, philosophy, self-consciousness, emerges when a culture has fulfilled itself. And is about to go down.

Mr. Glenn: Does he include both theoretical and practical wisdom there--

It doesn't make any difference. Well, we will continue next week in Swift Hall, please do not forget that.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 6 January 25, 1965

The death of Churchill is a healthy reminder to academic students of political science of their limitations, the limitations of their craft.

The tyrant stood at the pinnacle of his power. The contrast between the indomitable and magnanimous statesman and the insane tyrant--this spectacle in its clear simplicity was one of the greatest lessons which men can learn, at any time.

No less enlightening is the lesson conveyed by Churchill's failure, which is too great to be called tragedy. I mean the fact the Churchill's heroic action on behalf of human freedom against Hitler only contributed, through no fault of Churchill's, to increasing the threat to freedom which is posed by Stalin or his successors. Churchill did the utmost that a man could do to counter that threat--publicly and most visibly in Greece and in Fulton, Missouri. Not a whit less important than his deeds and speeches are his writings, above all his Marlborough--the greatest historical work written in our century, an inexhaustible mine of political wisdom and understanding, which should be required reading for every student of political science.

The death of Churchill reminds us of the limitations of our craft, and therewith of our duty. We have no higher duty, and no more pressing duty, than to remind ourselves and our students, of political greatness, human greatness, of the peaks of human excellence. For we are supposed to train ourselves and others in seeing things as they are, and this means above all in seeing their greatness and their misery, their excellence and their vileness, their nobility and their baseness, and therefore never to mistake mediocrity, however brilliant, for true greatness. In our age this duty demands of us in the first place that we liberate ourselves from the supposition that value statements cannot be factual statements.

I turn now to the question Mr. Barber raised at the end of the last meeting: namely, is there a connection between the distinction which Nagel makes between appraising and characterizing value judgements, and his view regarding the status of the principle of causality?

There is no immediate connection. The distinction between the two kinds of value judgements serves the purpose of defending value free social science, within the limits to which it can be defended, in his view. What he says about the principle of causality shows that he is involuntarily succumbing to historicism. Nagel himself believes that positivism, the view which he defends, is in no way endangered by the problem of history. But his discussion of the principle of causality shows that he underestimates that danger.

I will show this at somewhat greater length. Let me remind you only of the simple starting point of historicism, the alleged fact that doctrines are functions of time, a historical situation. The question is whether this can be proven by history, by merely historical evidence. It cannot. Before you can establish that, you have first to prove that the doctrine in question is not tenable. Because if it

were the true doctrine, the relation to a particular time would be of no interest. Presupposed in this historical evidence is that these doctrines are all wrong--a presupposition which needs of course some form of proof before it can be accepted.

Now I would first like to discuss briefly, because of the interest which it has, Nagel's discussion of historicism, and of the view that all doctrines, of course not only those of political philosophy, are historically relevant. Let us first see how he states the issue.

Human behavior is undoubtedly modified by the complex of social institutions in which it develops, despite the fact that all human actions involve physical and physiological factors, whose laws are invariable in all societies. Even the way members of a social group satisfy basic biological needs, for instance, how they obtain their living, or built their shelters, is not uniquely determined, either by their biological inheritance or by the physical character of their geographic environment, for the influence of these factors on human action is mediated by existing technology and traditions--that is to say, by historical factors. The possibility must certainly be admitted that non-trivial, but reliably established laws about social phenomena, will always have only a narrowly restricted generality.

In other words against the claim of positivistic social science that the task of social science is to establish universally valid laws, is questioned by the fact of the decisive importance of the variety of historical situations.

It is therefore clear that the historically conditioned character of social phenomena is no inherent obstacle to the formulation of comprehensive transcultural laws.

In other words, he regards this objection as unimportant.

The relevance or the validity of a generalization for social groups belonging to other societies may be quite uncertain: for example, the generalization based on a study of American soldiers in World War II, that better-educated men drafted into the Armed forces of a nation show fewer psychosomatic symptoms than those with less education, is quasi-general in the above sense.

Meaning, one cannot be certain that it is simply general and not only quasi-general.

The possibility must be recognized that in comparison, with the variables employed in the past in proposed transcultural laws--I mean the laws suggested by political scientists or social science in general--that these laws are universally valid--the concepts required for this purpose may have to be much more abstract, may need to be separated by a greater logical gap from the familiar notions used in the daily business of social life, and may necessitate a mastery of far more complicated techniques, for manipulating the concepts in the analysis of the actual social phenomena.

In other words he means ordinarily in these proposed universally valid laws, terms or concepts are used taken from modern Western society, and there is not necessarily a correlation to these concepts in other societies. For you have to use much more abstract concepts, and the question of course arises, can we still recognize phenomena when we use concepts of that extreme abstractness?

Now this much regarding the historicity of social phenomena. Here with some hesitation and qualifications, Nagel believes the notion of universally valid social laws is still defensible. But what about the historicity of the concepts used? an issue to which he has already alluded. Now there is a long quotation which I will read to you, and which he introduces as follows:

A third form of this claim is the most radical of all. It differs from the first variant mentioned above in maintaining that there is a necessary logical connection, and not merely a conclusive or causal one, between the social perspective of a student of human affairs and his standards of competent social inquiry, and in consequence the influence of the special value to which he is committed, because of his own social involvements, is not eliminated.

This version of the claim is implicit in Hegel's account of the dialectical nature of human history, and is integral to much of Marxist as well as non-Marxist philosophy, that stresses the historically relative character of social thought. In any event, it is commonly based on the assumption that social institutions and their cultural are constantly changing, the intellectual apparatus required for understanding them must also change, and every idea employed for this purpose is therefore adequate only for some particular stage in the development of human affairs, and in this sense historically dated.

Accordingly neither the substantive concepts adopted for classifying and interpreting social phenomena, nor the logical canon used for estimating the worth of the concepts, has a timeless validity. There is no analysis of social phenomena

which is not the expression of some special social standpoint, or which does not reflect the interests and values dominating some sector of the human scene at a certain stage of history.

Now this view is fully familiar to you from the Marxists, but differs *from* the Marxist position in that it denies that there is some group, like the proletariat, which has the absolutely privileged position of seeing things as they actually are. Each of these social historical groups sees things in a certain perspective, and none of these perspectives can claim to be superior to any other.

In consequence, although a sound distinction can be made in the natural sciences between the origin of a man's view and its factual validity, between genesis and validity, such a distinction allegedly cannot be made in social inquiry, and prominent exponents of historical relativism have therefore challenged the universal applicability of the thesis that the genesis of a proposition is under all circumstances irrelevant to its truth.

This thesis being the thesis by which positivism stands or falls.

As one influential proponent of this position puts the matter—the man in question is Karl Mannheim]

"The historical and social genesis of an idea would only be irrelevant to its ultimate validity if the temporal and social conditions from which it emerges have no effect on its content and form. If this were the case, any two periods in the history of human knowledge would only be distinguished from another by the fact that in the earlier periods certain things were still unknown and certain others still existed which through later knowledge were completely correct."

[Roughly the view obtaining in the natural sciences.]

This simple relationship between an earlier incomplete and a later complete period of knowledge may to a large extent be appropriate for the exact sciences. For the history of the cultural sciences, however, the earlier stages are not quite so simply superseded by the later stages, say in which Newtonian physics is superseded by nuclear physics and it is not so easily demonstrable that early errors have subsequently been corrected.

Every epoch has its fundamentally new approach and its characteristic point of view, and consequently sees the same object from a new perspective, and you cannot say that the new perspective is superior to the old one.

But it is necessary for the people concerned, because of belonging to this kind of society, to this social group, they cannot help looking at things in this respect.

The very principle in light of which knowledge is to be criticised are themselves found to be socially and historically conditioned. Hence their application appears to be limited to a certain historical period, and the particular types of

knowledge then prevalent."

This view is known especially now under the title, sociology of knowledge. Now let us see how Nagel replies to that.

Even extreme exponents of the sociology of knowledge admit that most conclusions asserted in mathematics and natural science are neutral to difference in social perspective [in other words a proletarian mathematician and a mathematician who is the prince would learn the same mathematics, and also whether they are Westerners or Easterners wouldn't make any difference. That is in a crude way also true. Nagel goes on] Why cannot propositions about human affairs exhibit a similar neutrality?

(Why not?

And then he adds the qualification which I, if I had this position, would regard as favorable.)

At least, in some cases.

(Because the question arises, are these not likely to be the trivial and uninteresting cases? But here comes the decisive point.)

In the second place, the claim of these sociologists of knowledge faces a serious and frequently noted dialectical difficulty, a difficulty that proponents of the claim have superseded only by abandoning the substance of the claim. For let us ask, what is the cognitive status of the thesis that a social perspective enters into the content as well as the validation of every assertion about human affairs? Is this meaningful and valid only for those who maintain it, and who thus subscribe to certain values because of their distinctive social commitments? If so, no one with a different social perspective can properly understand it. The acceptance that it is valid is strictly limited to those who can do so, and social scientists who subscribe to a different set of values ought to dismiss it as a lot of empty talk-- or is the thesis singularly exempt from the class of assertions to which it applies, so that its meaning and truth are not inherently related to the social perspective of those who assert it? If so, it is not evident why this thesis is so exempt. But in any case, the thesis is a conclusion of inquiry into human affairs that is objectively valid in the usual sense of the term, and if there is one such thesis, it is not clear why there cannot be others as well.

Well, one can say very simply that this thesis that no universally valid knowledge of human affairs is possible, claims itself to be universally valid. And therefore there is something wrong. You can avoid this by all kinds of logical tricks, but ultimately this difficulty is a hard one, therefore on this ground Nagel regards this difficulty as finished.

In a way, I agree with him, but I believe he underestimates the danger of historicism. A universally valid social science must be based on historical knowledge. But all historical knowledge is selective, of course. Who could make use in history of every detail? Most of the details are lost, anyway. And there are no universally valid principles of selection. If you take such an example--when we read passages today in the fifties and sixties we are quite struck by the awful stories of the Terror and the Thaw--something which we have experienced in our age even without being fortunately, immediately exposed to this terrible experience. The experience opens us up to something to which we would not ~~be~~ open at least not to the same degree, and this is the experience of men of a particular time.

Or if you take the example which I discussed on a former occasion, Max Weber's distinction between the three principles of legitimacy, rational, traditional and charismatic--this is related to the experiences of the nineteenth century, and therefore belongs to that age. In a different age, say in 2100, an entirely different fundamental distinction might present itself, not on account of any progress of science, mind you, as it happens all the time in our society, but on account of changes in society, which one cannot possibly call progressive or the opposite, even the prohibition against value judgements.

Now Nagel does not discuss this issue at all; therefore he fails to discuss what is at issue. Without being aware of it, he is confronted by the problem in his discussion of science in general, not only social science, or ~~history~~, but science in general--namely in his discussion of causality. I remind you of what I read to you last time, that the principle of causality as understood by present-day natural sciences is logically arbitrary and historically contingent. At a certain moment, men, say the founders of modern science, chose this understanding of causality in preference to any other, and this is ultimately not intelligible except as a contingent fact. Because as I said at that time, if one says that modern science leads to enormous practical possibilities and progress which would be impossible on the basis of any other understanding of causality, the question arises whether this criterion is objectively valid given the fact that modern science itself constitutes the problem. Or more simply stated, to say that modern science is good is a value judgement which is forbidden by the demand of the new science.

I hope I have now cleared this up, Mr. Barber. Because the question of course, in spite of what Nagel says, is that the difficulty is ultimately not only social science, or the sciences dependent directly on human society, but finally in the natural sciences and mathematics as well. I will gradually explain that.

I began to take up the question of historicism last time, and spoke especially of Hegel's great attempt ~~at~~ reconciling political philosophy in the traditional sense--i.e., the claim to present the true teaching regarding the just society, with the fact of historical variety of political philosophies. Now Hegel's general solution as you ~~may~~ remember was that the historical process is a rational process, a progressive process, which leads to a peak, to an absolute time,

to an absolute moment, in which the true doctrine, which will no longer be superseded by a truer doctrine, belongs to the absolute moment. Now here the difficulties do not yet arise. Of course they arise in this way, that you would have to examine Hegel's doctrine, whether Hegel's philosophy of right is the sound and true doctrine or not.

In other words in this respect Hegel's philosophy would have to be criticized as any other political philosophy would have to be criticized. The problem of history arises only afterwards, and in the following manner: These men still accept the view that also is historical, i.e., belongs to a specific historical situation. Contrary to Hegel, they assert that history is unfinished, and unfinishable. It can be finished externally by nuclear war, by catastrophe, but in itself it has no principle of end. And this historical process is not a rational process; it cannot be a rational process because it is not yet completed, and we do not know what will come afterwards. It is not progressive, because all standards with a view to which we assert progress or its opposite, are themselves historical. Every epoch is immediate to God, as Ranke the famous German historian, wrote--i.e., every epoch is immediate to the truth. ~~It is~~ It is not so that the last epoch, the final epoch, is more immediate to the truth than the early epochs.

This is today trivia--I mean, the equality of all ages, and all cultures, is a tacit premise of present-day social science. It is not any longer so called, but it is in fact the case. If you think only of a similar case, all cultures are equal. That was popularized especially by Spengler, and when this was taken over by American anthropology, Ruth Benedict especially, it was applied to all cultures, not only to the six or seven high cultures to which Spengler had applied it.

What we know as truth differs from epoch to epoch. There is not the truth. We cannot help regarding certain things as rules, but we know that it will not be so regarded by a later age, or for that matter, by a past age. This fact, this historical relativism is the most comprehensive knowledge at which we can arrive. In other words, the highest theme of human knowledge is the fact of the variety of Weltanschauungen, as the Germans say, of comprehensive views of the whole. You may remember what I said on the occasion of Nagel, we arrive at a logically arbitrary, historically contingent, say, principle of causality--but you can also say the way in which time or space is understood.

And the sequence of these comprehensive views which underlie all science in particular, this is the most comprehensive thing. Now this view gradually developed in the nineteenth century, and then in the recent past, or at its problematic character was seen and faced for the first time by Nietzsche, in his essay "On the Use and Abuse of History." Of which I have to say something.

According to Nietzsche history teaches a truth that is deadly, It shows that culture is possible only if men are fully dedicated to principles of thought and action, which they do not question, and cannot question, which limit their horizons and thus enable them to have a character, a style, a culture. An unlimited horizon, so to

speak, as the nineteenth century and twentieth century historians claim they have, can no longer be bound to one particular character and style, and the same is characteristic of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the restoration of earlier or foreign styles; in architecture, for instance, introducing styles into a context in which they do not fit at all, was only a consequence of this fundamental defect. History shows us at the same time that the principles of thought and action do not possess the validity which they claim, that they do not deserve to be regarded as simply true. The only way out seems to be that one turns one's back on this lesson of history, this deathly lesson, that one choose life-giving delusions rather than deadly truth. In words that one fabricates a myth, an ideology--this has in the meantime become very popular, and you are all familiar with that. But this way out is impossible for men of intellectual probity. Because it is a deliberate self-delusion. And this is to say nothing of the fact that a fabricated myth is not a genuine myth. The true solution comes to sight once one realizes the essential limitations of history, of objective history, and of objective knowledge in general. Objective history, which shows us the common coming into being and perishing of all cultures and Weltanschauungen, and that they deserve to perish ultimately--objective history suffices for destroying the illusion of the objective validity of any principle of thought and action. It does not suffice for opening up a genuine understanding of history--the objective scientific historian cannot grasp the substance of the past, because he is a mere spectator, not dedicated or committed, to any substantive principles of thought and actions. And this is the consequence of his having realized that such principles have no objective validity. But committed men, as the men belonging to high culture, can only be understood by committed men, and not by neutral bystanders.

An entirely different conclusion must be drawn from the realization of this objective truth, namely, that there is only a relative validity for all principles of thought and action.

The different values respected in different epochs have no objective support, although they claim to be based on reason, and were claimed to be based on divine revelation at one time or another. But this was a delusion, that they had such support. In fact, they are human creations. They owe their being to a free human project, that formed the horizons within which a culture was born. What man did in the past unconsciously and under the delusion of submitting to what is independent of his creative act, he must now do consciously, which is one can say the final solution. I read to you a statement which shows in a very impressive and clear way how Nietzsche viewed this.

This is taken from Zarathustra, the first part, "Of the Thousand and One Goals."

Zarathustra saw many lands and many peoples: thus he discovered the good and evil of many peoples. And Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than good and evil. meaning: men cannot live without notions of good and evil.

No people could live without first esteeming; but if they want to preserve themselves, then they must not esteem as the neighbor esteems. Because if they agreed in most important respects, then they would not preserve their own being. Much that was good to one people was scorn and infamy to another: thus I found it. Much I found called evil here, and decked out with purple honors there. Never did one neighbor understand the other; ever ~~was~~ his soul amazed at the neighbor's delusion and wickedness. [The tacit implication for the modern historian--he is not amazed. He takes it in his stride that there are n different notions of good and evil.]

A tablet of the good hangs over every people [i.e., the value system appears to be independent.] Behold, it is the tablet of their overcomings; behold, it is the voice of their will to power.

Praiseworthy is whatever seems difficult to a people; whatever seems indispensable and difficult is called good; and whatever liberates even out of the deepest need, the rarest the most difficult--that they call holy.

Verily, my brother, once you have recognized the need and land and sky and neighbor of a people, you may also guess the law of their overcomings, and why they climb to hope on this ladder.

[In other words, there is a partial possibility of understanding a people--namely by considering their need, land, sky and neighbor.]

"You shall always be the first and excel all others: your jealous soul shall love no one, unless it be the friend"--that made the soul of the Greek quiver: thus he walked the path of his greatness.

"To speak the truth and to handle bow and arrow well"--that seemed both dear and difficult to the people who gave my name to me [the Persians.]

"To honor father and mother and to follow their will to the root of one's soul"--this was the tablet of overcoming that another people hung up over themselves and became powerful and eternal thereby. [the Jews]

"To practice loyalty and, for the sake of loyalty, to risk honor and blood even for evil and dangerous things"--with this teaching another people conquered themselves [the Germanic peoples] and through this self-conquest they became pregnant and heavy with great hopes.

...Change of values--that is a change of creators. [Namely, the values are all created, they are not in being by themselves.]

...First, peoples were creators [He has given four examples] and only in later times, individuals. Verily, the individual himself is still the most recent creation. [A radical change has taken place.]

...The delight in the herd is more ancient than the delight in the ego; and as long as the good conscience is identified with the herd, only the bad conscience says: I.

Verily, the clever ego, the loveless ego that desires its own profit in the profit of the many--that is not the origin of the herd, but its going under.

Good and evil have always been created by lovers and creators. The fire of love glows in the names of all the virtues, and the fire of wrath.

Zarathustra saw many lands and many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than the work of the lovers: "good" and "evil" are their names. [In other words, what Nietzsche means by will to power is the same as love and creativity.]

Verily, a monster is the power of this praising and censuring. Tell me, who will conquer it? ...Tell me, who will throw a yoke over the thousand necks of this beast? [A thousand different value systems.]

A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. Humanity still has no goal.

But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal--is humanity itself not still lacking too?

So a universal goal, a goal for humanity, a goal which transcends historical particularity, becomes possible only after the historical insight into the historical relativity of all previous systems. This is what Nietzsche meant by "the transvaluation of all values." It is a radically new project, different from the former projects, not only in its context, but also in its mode. Because it is based on the consciousness that this new goal is due to a human creation--whereas the older goals were all held to be based on objective supports. The transvaluation of all values entails the rejection of all earlier values, for they have become baseless by the realization of the baseless character of their claim, by which they stand or fall, the claim to objective validity. But precisely the realization of the origin of all such principles makes possible a new creation that presupposes that realization and is in agreement with it, and therefore it is intellectually honest. Yet it is not deducible from the historicist insight, for otherwise it would be due to a creative act performed with intellectual probity. Now in Nietzsche's view, these creative acts to which all values owe their being, have the characteristic peculiarity that they transcend reality, reality which is the product or sediment of earlier creative acts. And we can never reach the point where no creative act has occurred. It is of the essence of man to create a world, for the world, which we regard as being in itself, and merely the object of human perception and discovery, is primarily the product of human creation or interpretation. Men create such worlds and yet strive beyond them. And this is what Nietzsche has in mind when he speaks of the will to power, the overcoming of what is, the transcending of what is, and not because of any defects which the actual worlds possess, because then history would be a rational progressive process--that he indicates by the term "will to power."

Nietzsche took a further step. Having believed to have discovered the will to power, the root of all human history, he universalized that. All beings are characterized by the will to power. In other words, he arrived at a metaphysical doctrine, old-style. But here was the great difficulty: what was the status of that metaphysical doctrine?

Is it an interpretation, a subjective act of the thinker Nietzsche? Or is it an historical objective truth? And this is not clear. Nietzsche felt the necessity of having recourse in the last analysis to an objective truth. One can say, Nietzsche relapsed into metaphysics.

Nietzsche's effect on our age is due to the apparent necessity to preserve Nietzsche's understanding of history, without following him in his relapse into metaphysics. The most famous name for that is Existentialism, which preserves Nietzsche's view of the subjectivity of the fundamental truth but frees it from metaphysics. And I can only speak in very general terms of that, otherwise it would lead us too far afield.

The fundamental defect of all metaphysics according to this view is the assumption that there are eternal or sempiternal truths. And from this point of view the significance of history allegedly cannot be understood. The natural sciences create no difficulty, because as Nietzsche has said before, and is now repeated, "every physics depends on a metaphysics." And the question is exactly, what is it that causes these metaphysics? Here cannot be historical objectivity: all understanding of historical phenomena is relative to the standpoint of the present thinker or historian. It is impossible to understand the thought of the past exactly as the thinkers of the past understood it; nor is it possible to understand it better than they. But one can only understand it differently, in such a way that you cannot say that the understanding reached say fifty years from now will be better than the understanding which we now have. All understanding of another's thought means a "melting" as it has been called, I think a rather bad metaphor--of horizons. That of our horizon with the horizon of the Greek thinkers. But since these horizons differ from age to age there can never be the same understanding; there can never be historical objectivity.

Now here there are very great difficulties, which show to me at any rate, most manifestly, the inadequacy of this historical perspective. But before I go on, I will try to make it somewhat clearer by speaking of an English thinker who has presented an approximation to this view, I would like to see whether I have made myself clear enough.

Or rather, I am sure I have not made myself clear enough—where I can best help.Let me repeat the main point: that here in this radical historicist position, as sketched first by Nietzsche, the whole realm of science, of rational knowledge, is understood to be itself dependent on non-rational presuppositions, which belong to a certain historical period, shorter or longer, and having no validity in themselves. The utmost we can reach is an understanding of these ultimate presuppositions which we may also call absolute presuppositions, and their sequence. Or more precisely the realization that this is the character of human thought, of the human condition. Never to reach anything which can be called eternal or sempiternal.

Student: Could you go over again what is the validity then of this historical insight? Where does that validity come from? How is that separated from the other part?

What do you mean by that, how does one establish the fact? ("Yes.") Well, let us take this very simple example we found in Nagel. We found that he said the fundamental principle of modern science was the principle of causality. This principle is not self-evident, but is logically arbitrary. And in addition, it emerged at a certain time, in the seventeenth century. This fact implies, there was a different understanding of causality before. And there is no difficulty in assuming that there were a variety of understandings of causality in different times and different cultures, and also therefore why not in the future? This fundamental contingency of the principles of thought and action—that is the premise which they assume, of course, *that* they have been established. But even a man like Nagel, who is very much opposed to historicism, admits as you see, the great plausibility that this possesses in our age. And then one must think about that, and try to understand all our fundamental concepts in redefinitions, in reinterpretations. Above all, the concept of truth. I mean, truth can no longer simply mean what it had originally meant, if the highest principles have this contingent character. The question would then be to understand what is the root of the creative act, of this act of creating historical worlds. I can say to you, the mere words

in which this question has been formulated, but I do not know whether this will help.

Now this is the following: all beings, I mean the totality of things--with ~~these~~ understanding is in principle concerned. Now the question arises, traditional metaphysics, which is underlying still, according to a well-known view, even our physics, which is allegedly non-metaphysical, was the quest for the most fundamental being or beings--whether it is god or atoms does not affect the character of the questions. But there is a primary question which is not faced by traditional metaphysics: namely, what is a being? What is a being?

Now let me discuss this a bit more. When Aristotle discusses the question regarding numbers, and his difference from Plato in this respect, he says "The issue is not the being of numbers-- (what numbers are)--but the manner of their being." Now what does he mean by that? The primary question for Plato, from Aristotle's point of view, is "What is it?" The so-called essences, like cats, dogs, prime numbers, what have you. But there is a more subtle question, namely the question of the manner of being. For example, a number is not in the manner in which a living being is. Do you see that? So therefore the question of the manner of being is a more fundamental question of course raised by Plato and by Aristotle. But this is now taken in a much more radical sense. And the final formulation is this: to be is not a being. And that to be is the most fundamental question never properly raised in metaphysics. As a matter of fact, that is the definition of metaphysics, that it never raises this question. Now this has become difficult to express in English; in German one may use Sein and Seiendes. It was then also translated into French, être and etant; in English it is hard to say the difference. But still that is the formula which I present to you only as an indication of the problem. Now the key point is this: This to be, this Sein, which is to begin with a wholly mysterious thing, is the ground of history, and only of history, historical work. And therefore only in the light of this

revelation of ~~to be~~ can one understand anything, including the objects of natural science. Forget about these terms which would lead too far, but the creative act, not so much of men but going on somehow through men and within men, these are the ultimate things, beyond which we cannot go, and these the fundamental questions. History is, so to say, the only theme of philosophy--but history understood by itself, not the battle of Waterloo, or something of this kind, but the fundamental changes in human understanding of the world. Also, if you want to use the traditional term, the categories in which men understand change from historical epoch to historical epoch; and this change of the categories and their ground, this is the theme of philosophy; all the traditional themes are mediate ones--relegated to a very secondary or tertiary state by this fundamental change. This is the only way in which the historicist position could be maintained; and all simpler versions are subject to great difficulties.

I may make it a bit clearer if I speak of that English version which is earlier, of historicism and --we can come back to that later. Yes, Mr. Glenn?

MR. GLENN: Earlier you said that a historian truly couldn't understand the past unless he committed himself: why is that?

(Tape is changed) ...philosophy. We can make bibliographies which can be very useful, but you must admit that is not history of philosophy. So that if he is a man who does not have sympathy for political life, for political motivations, can he be a political historian? Again, he can be an excellent bibliographer, no doubt, and typist, and what have you, but he cannot possibly be more. Now the key point that is made here by these people,, is that if you are only a bystander, if you stand outside of the process, you cannot understand the process itself..

STUDENT: To understand the process, you have to understand, means that you understand, that these commitments are purely subjective and your choice--why do you have to choose them to understand that other

people do?

Well, since I am not a historicist, I am perhaps not the best defender of this position. Still, there is some element of truth doubtless in that. There is an old saying, of very early times: Similar things are understood only by similar things. One could make this objection to Nietzsche: these merely objective historians whom he attacks were in all interesting cases not merely objective historians. They were all dedicated to certain ideas, whether that of political progress or of German nationalism, or whatever. The strictly objective historian barely existed, and even today is hard to find. Must he not--is there not a necessity for empathy, in order to be a good historian? If he is entirely indifferent to his subject-matter, can he be a good historian? In other words, if he studies some particular subject, and he could as well study any other subject, is there not a certain deficiency there? Must there not be some reason which makes this particular subject important to him? This is not necessarily true on every level, but can there be a great achievement of a historian, without that?

I do not believe that this concerns a fundamental issue; except in this case, that the question is, is objective knowledge ultimately possible? That is the key point. The traditional view from the Greeks on is that it is possible. It is possible to devote one's life to seeing things as they are. Nietzsche has a very simple but true presentation of the issue. The traditional notion of knowledge--here (goes to board) the pure mind intuits the pure ideas, in spite of many changes, very profound changes, in all respects. The pure mind has been replaced to a certain extent by experience, and of course, who believes in Platonic ideas--but fundamentally, this notion: something in man is open to the truth, in a fundamentally receptive manner. As the tradition has it, the alienation of the intellect to the thing...this is the view of objective truth. And what became doubtful in the nineteenth century, and more so in our age, is whether this is the true view of knowledge, and therewith the true view of the situation. The opposite view would be stated as follows: knowledge is fundamentally spontaneous. Kant says, it is understanding, which prescribes nature its laws. It is not the understanding which perceives, grasps, the laws of nature, but by its spontaneity, the understanding prescribes--it creates a

framework within which we can interpret the sense-data rationally, intelligibly. This framework is not within what we perceive; it is a spontaneous act of the understanding. Now radicalize that *in* the light of the so-called experience of history. These interpreting frameworks change from epoch to epoch; and then you have creative acts, which ultimately cannot be explained, because every explanation is in terms of specific categories of this or that category,-- which categories are now questioned, and not the unquestioned premises. The ultimate supposition, the ultimate fact at which we arrive, is this unaccountable contingent change of these frames of reference. Yes?

STUDENT: I am confused now as to the relationship or the difference between existentialism and historicism.

That is a very long issue; there is a certain arbitrariness of usage. Existentialism in many interpretations which the word has had has nothing to do with historicism--I know that. But in the philosophically most important form which existentialism has taken, it is identical with the most radical historicism. Therefore I prefer to speak of historicism. One must mention the name of Heidegger, by far the greatest thinker of this school, even of our age, but surely he is --in Heidegger's thought existence and historicity are inseparable. In order to keep up the connection with the historical movement of the nineteenth century, and to remind myself in other ways, I prefer to speak of historicism. I quote to you one sentence: Heidegger says somewhere in one of his first great works: It is self-evident, or obvious, that every science of an age, depends on the Weltanschauung of that age. That is crucial--by this very fact, the derivative character of all science, including mathematics and natural science, is admitted. If science, according to the older view, which Heidegger's teacher Husserl maintained--here is science, here is Weltanschauung--and even today that is the common-sense view--Heidegger says from the very beginning, No; that is a dependence of science on Weltanschauung. That means the Weltanschauung rests on acts of the will, and is not merely a theoretical matter. It is clear that knowledge of the most important things is not purely theoretical but at the same time has an element of will in it. I can only remind you

of the simple scheme suggested by Nietzsche, which is historically correct. This was the old view: knowledge is of something independent of the human will, I mean, the highest knowledge--and this knowledge is fundamentally receptive. How much spontaneity might be required for getting into the state of receptiveness; and the opposite view is rejection of that, that the truth is primarily due to such creative acts. Vulgar historicism is traced to man--in the subtle and theoretical historicism of Heidegger, traced to what he calls Sein, which is X, the ground of all history, working in and through man. Yes?

STUDENT: You said that the existentialists could not accept Nietzsche's metaphysics, and I'm not clear as to where Nietzsche presents a metaphysics...

Nietzsche has a doctrine of the will to power; and he saw in the will to power, whatever that may mean, the essence of every being. I mean not only of man, but of every being. Now the starting point of existentialism is that there is a radical difference between man and non-man, so that no such formula applies to both. The manner of being of man differs radically from the manner of being of anything else. This alone would be a reason against Nietzsche. But the will to power has the same status in a way as the pure mind in Hegel, or in a different way in Aristotle--something which is eternal. The key point in this radical historicism is that there is nothing eternal, at least that we do not know of anything eternal, and cannot know of it, and what we can reach is ultimately this ground for the creative acts underlying all historical worlds, which Heidegger calls Sein.

Now I would like to turn here to an English writer, because this is much more simple when we are speaking in English, who I think is the clearest representative of historicism in the English tongue, and that is R.G. Collingwood, who was formerly professor at Oxford. He wrote a book The Idea of History, which is a detailed discussion of the problem of history, but it suffers from the great defect that it was not edited by Collingwood, but by some of his students from his papers, and it is surely not finished, a complete book. But he wrote earlier and published himself an autobiography, which is of course much

more sketchy than that book on history is, but at the same time it is finished and made ready for publication by Collingwood. I will read to you a few passages.

His work in archaeology--Roman Britain was his subject--which he conducted however in a way in which very few archaeologists do, namely reflecting on what he was doing, and reflecting on that in a philosophical manner--this led him to a question of logic.

The Novum Organon of Bacon and the Discourse on Method of Descartes began to have a new significance for me.

They were the classical expressions of a principle of logic which I have found it necessary to re-state: the principle that a body of knowledge consists not of propositions, statements, judgements, or whatever name logicians use in order to designate assertive acts of thought; but of these together with the questions they are meant to answer. And that a logic in which the answers are attended to, and the questions neglected, is false logic.

This is the starting-point of his own turning. Logic must be a logic of question and answer, and the primacy is given to the question. The answer can be understood only in terms of the question. You will see very soon how important that is.

For a logic of propositions [the traditional logic, and in a way, present-day logic too,] I wanted to substitute what I called a logic of question and answer. It seemed to me that truth, if that meant the kind of thing which I was accustomed to pursue in my ordinary work as a philosopher of history, truth in the sense in which a philosophical theory or a historical fact is called true, in the proper sense of the word, was something that belonged not to any single proposition, [like Caesar was killed on the Ides of March] nor even as the coherent theorists maintain, a complex of propositions taken together but a complex consisting of questions and answers. The structure of this complex had of course never been studied by propositional logic, but with help from Bacon, Descartes and others, I could hazard a few statements about it. Each question and each answer in a given complex had to be relevant or appropriate, had to belong, both to the whole and to the place it occupied in the whole. Each question had to arise. There must be that about it whose absence we condemn. And we refuse to answer a question on the ground that it

does not arise. Each answer must be the right answer to the question it proposes to answer. By right I do not mean true, but relevant, pertinent.

Now what has this to do with the question of history? Propositional logic, as he calls it, dealing with true propositions, with that which makes them true, has no obvious relation to history. But if you understand a proposition in terms of the primacy of human questions, things will look different. The question, to what question did so and so intend this proposition for an answer is an historical question, and therefore cannot be settled except by historical methods. Now he was confronted with-- I think the time will be sufficient to read you one passage which indicates to you how much this affects us. We can discuss this at greater length next time. The people whom he opposed, and they were not very impressive men, happened to take the traditional view of knowledge. They thought that the problems with which philosophy is concerned were unchanging. They thought that Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, The Stoics, the Cartesians, etc., had all asked themselves the same set of questions, and had given different answers to them. For example, they thought that the same problems which are discussed in modern ethical theory were discussed in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics. And that it was a man's work to ask himself whether Aristotle or Kant was right on the point over which they disagreed concerning the nature of duty. There are still such people around (laughter) and I would not altogether condemn them, but there is a great difficulty nevertheless.

The first point at which I saw a perfectly clear gleam of daylight was in political theory. Take Plato's Republic, and Hobbes' Leviathan--so far as they are concerned with politics, obviously the political theories they set forth are not the same. But do they represent two different theories of the same thing? can you say that the Republic gives one account of the nature of the state, and the Leviathan another? [the ordinary, vulgar view] No! Because Plato's state is the Greek polis; and Hobbes' is the absolutist state of the seventeenth century. So the vulgar answer is easy. Certainly Plato's state is different from Hobbes; so they are both states. So the theories are theories of the state. Indeed what did you mean by calling them both political, if not that

they are theories of the same thing?
 It was obvious to me, [says Collingwood,] that this was only a piece of logical bluff, and instead of logic-shopping, you got down to brass tacks, and called for definitions of the state, as Plato conceived it and as Hobbes conceived it, you would find that the differences were not superficial, but went to essentials. You can call the two things the same if you insist, but if you did, you must admit that the thing has got diabolical change /oute... has in a devilish way changed on its way, so that the nature of the state in Plato's time was genuinely different from the nature of the state in Hobbes. I do not mean the empirical nature of the state [in other words that they were small in Plato's time and large in Hobbes' time]. I mean the ideal nature of the state, that which they regarded as the best, even the best and wisest of those who engaged in politics are trying to do as ordered. Plato's Republic is an attempt at a theory of one thing, Hobbes' Leviathan is an attempt at a theory of something else. There are no eternal problems, but the problems change from epoch to epoch.

There are no eternal problems, but the problems change from epoch to epoch. This does not mean there is no connection, but as he makes it clear and we will discuss next time, if you have a problem B, B₁, B₂, B₃, and so on, they differ very greatly from each other, and you understand very little and almost nothing, of any--say of Plato or of Hobbes, if you say--well they call it P. Now if the problems differ, then of course the answers must differ. But the fundamental question is, the fundamental point is not the difference of answers, but the difference of questions. And the necessity that the starting-point, i.e., the questions, should differ from epoch to epoch. Collingwood develops this further and we will speak of that later. But let us discuss this quickly in the few minutes we still have. Is there something very important here in what Collingwood says? Is not the vulgar view, the very common view, that all philosophers deal with the same problems, and look in fundamentally the same directions, is there not something objectionable in that?

STUDENT: It seems to trivialize the history of thought. No sense of any continuity.

Oh, continuity is in identity. And in addition, I could say why should not one trivialize the history of thought? Where is it written that the

history of thought is so important? You know, Aristotle and Descartes and quite a few others, didn't give us the history of thought. Yes? I mean, one would have to argue somewhat differently. Mr. Schulsky!

Mr. Schulsky: Well, that particular example was annoying because he didn't make the necessary argument for it. *If he said* that Plato and Hobbes were in disagreement because they thought of different ideal states as being the states, so they could never get together--that would be one thing; but instead he seems to say that they don't contradict each other, whereas if the two came together they would have an argument as to how men should live...

That they contradict each other, everybody would see that. But the question is whether they contradict each other by speaking--by applying as it were different predicates to the same thing. And Collingwood says, is it the same thing? Well, I would say, very simply stated; as a practicing historian, I would say, it is a very grave matter if someone translates polis by the word state. A very grave matter. And sometimes in order to get a better conscience they apply the term city-state. This means there is one universal called state, which consists of a variety of particular city-states, territorial states, empire states and what have you. One doesn't understand state by this. I will take this up at greater length, but when people speak of state as they mean it today in the modern centuries, they mean it in contradistinction to society. Polis excludes this distinction. One has to dig deeper. I think that than his Collingwood has a better understanding of the requirements of history opponents; the question is only whether the conclusions which he draws from that are well-founded. Yes?

Mr. Levy: Couldn't you get out of that difficulty as a vulgar person by saying that the laws laid down by Hobbes that the ruler should give and the laws that Plato lays down that his ruler should give are different, but they are both concerned with laws and rulers; and both mean the same thing by law, namely that.....Well,...

at least, controls that are enforced behind their law--maybe Hobbes had more persuasion behind his law, and Plato had behind his--but force is present in both sets of laws.

Well, there is another way of evading it--I see your point--for example, say, let us not speak of state, but let us speak of commonwealth. And this makes perfect sense, to understand the polis, as commonwealth, and Hobbes speaks specifically of commonwealth, so there is no difficulty. But this does not go to the root of the matter; because^{of} the fact that after the First World War, people thought--and even today--think in terms of states, with its various connotations. There is nothing of this kind in Plato and Aristotle, and this must be faced. I think it can be faced, and can be solved. But if one does not take the additional trouble, one has no right to maintain that the philosophers deal ultimately with the identically same problems. That must be proven, I would say this is a very simple objection to the crude view: How do you know? Only after you have studied them, can we say, in fact, they deal with the same problems. Good.

Now next time I will speak of Collingwood and then gradually turn to the historical question proper.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 7 January 27, 1965

We are discussing now the position called historicism. We can say there were two forms of it: a primary or naive historicism, and a radical historicism. The latter seems started by Nietzsche. The primary or naive historicism asserts that the historian is a spectator of the historical process, who sees that all principles of thought and action come into being and perish. But he exempts himself, his principles of thought and action: he stands on the banks of the river, not in the river. The radical historicist asserts that this is impossible, that there is no place outside the stream. The consequence is that the pride of the naive historian in historical objectivity proves to be unfounded. All knowledge is relative to the historical situation, and this applies to the historicist knowledge as well. There is no objectivity, or what we call objectivity is only a derivative mode of a certain kind of subjectivity. Now I have begun to try to explain historicism in somewhat great detail by beginning to speak of Collingwood. I limited myself to the autobiography, but in the meantime I thought I should say a bit about his Idea of History, his larger work. This is simplified by the fact that many years ago I wrote a long review article on it; and I will quote from that a few passages.

Now what Collingwood tried to do is to develop what he called the philosophy of history; philosophy of history as he understands it necessarily entails a complete philosophy, philosophy ^{conceived} from an historical point of view. For the discovery on which philosophy of history is based concerns the character of all human thought, and not merely of historical thought. It leads therefore to an entirely new understanding of philosophy. In other words, it was always admitted that the central theme of philosophy is the question of what man is. And that history is the knowledge of what men have done. But now it has been realized that man is what he can do; and the only clue to what man can do is what he has done. Therefore the so-called science of human nature, or of the human mind, resolves itself into history. Philosophy of history is identical with philosophy as such, which has become radically historical. Philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being converted into history. There are very extreme, but therefore clarifying, formulae.

One can say historicism is characterized by the fact that the traditional and to common sense so obvious, distinction, between philosophy and history, between philosophy and historical questions, is abandoned; a fusion of philosophy and history, a complete fusion, is intended. Now whether that is feasible remains to be seen. Now the question consists of two parts: why is history necessarily philosophic, and why is philosophy necessarily historical? The first question, why is history necessarily philosophic, Collingwood answers: all history is history of thought, by which he means this: let us take something so simply unphilosophic as the Battle of Trafalgar. But what does it mean to understand the Battle of Trafalgar? Collingwood asks. To understand the thought of Nelson, to understand human thought. In every historical situation, even in archaeology, archaeology of Roman Britain, which was Collingwood's special interest, one has to understand the meaning of fortification; what is this fortification for? i.e., what was the thought of the builder? This is a partial explanation of why history is necessarily philosophic, since it is understanding of human thought. Another conclusion, since all thinking is critical thinking and not a mere surrender to the object of thought, re-thinking of earlier thought is identical with criticism of earlier thought. The point of view from which a scientific historian criticizes the past is that of the present, of his civilization. Scientific history is therefore to see the human past in its entirety, as it appears from the standpoint of the present of the historian's civilization. That is to say, history is self-knowledge; and what is more philosophic than the attempt to know oneself? Yet history will not be self-knowledge if the historian sees the past in the light of the present of his civilization, without making that present his primary theme, he must know what the present of his civilization is, in order to understand it. The scientific historian starts, therefore, to show, how the present of his civilization, or the mind of the present day, or ^{how} that determinate human nature which is his civilization, has come into existence. Philosophy being fundamentally self-knowledge, because what does it mean to raise the question of what

is man? This is not feasible, according to Collingwood, except through history. The consequence of this is that all history and all philosophy, is relative to the present. Now how can this be justified? An analysis would show that two premises are involved: in the first place, the assumption of the superiority of the present. The point of view of the present is the highest point of view that has ever existed, and therefore we don't lose anything by looking at the past from the point of view of the present. The second point of view, the second reason, however, which differs from it, is the equality of all ages.

I read to you:

Augustine looked at Roman history from the point of view of an early Christian. And Gibbon did so from that of an enlightened eighteenth-century Englishman. There is no point in asking, which was the right point of view. Each was the only possible for the man who adopted it. Correspondingly, the present-day historians who look at the past from the present-day point of view cannot help so doing, and in this decisive respect all ages are equal.

There is here a difficulty. If the insight into the equality of all ages is the decisive insight, then our age is nevertheless superior to all other ages; because only our age has that insight. Is this clear? I will state it again as follows: the belief in the equality of all ages is only a more subtle form of the belief in progress. The alleged insight into the equality of all ages, which is said to make possible passionate interest in the thought of the different ages, necessarily conceives of itself as a progress beyond all earlier thought. Every earlier age erroneously absolutized the standpoint from which it looked at things, and therefore was incapable of taking very seriously the thought of other ages. Hence earlier ages were incapable of scientific history.

Now in his Idea of History Collingwood gives us a specimen of his own historical work, in the form itself, because he writes a history of history, of historical understanding throughout the ages. And

what one can say of that history is only that it is extremely poor, as a historical work. Collingwood simply does not take seriously Thucydides, or Tacitus, or Herodotos, and one can see, understand that. Because he is so certain of the progress made by nineteenth and twentieth century scientific history. We draw this conclusion: in order to take the thought of the past seriously, as he wishes to, one must doubt the superiority of present-day thought; otherwise we do not have an incentive for taking seriously the thought of the past. History, in other words, is required not simply for the sake of self-knowledge, but also and above all, for the sake of self-criticism, not only to find out what Plato and Aristotle, for example, contributed their minds, their share, to that beautiful, incomplete wisdom which we possess; but also we have forgotten many things which Plato and Aristotle know, and this is at least as important a function of the historian, to recover that loss.

Now if this is so, if it is necessary for understanding ourselves, and for understanding our limitations, to understand the thought of the past, it follows indeed that a fusion of philosophy is inevitable, and to that extent I would agree with Collingwood. There is a simple indirect proof. When you look at present-day literature, on political and social matters, one observes the shallowness of those present-day thinkers who lack a historical perspective. It is obviously necessary for us to have this historical perspective, and to that extent it is simply true that a fusion of philosophy and history is inevitable. But we must not deceive ourselves about the crucial implications of this seemingly trivial point. In our age the fusion of philosophy and history is necessary, as everyone will see if he begins to think about any question: whether it is democracy or sovereignty, and so on. When he wants to have clarity, he must engage in historical studies. Most^{ly} people do not engage in historical studies but look up the dictionary or encyclopedia, and get their facts, as it were, from there... which are in all cases then simply--very secondary, not to say tertiary, result, reflection, of what some historians, perhaps good

ones, have found out. The mere fact that such a fusion is today practically inevitable, implies a radical break with traditional philosophy, in which such a fusion was inconceivable. Now one could say, and that is the common view, that this is a progress beyond traditional philosophy; traditional philosophy lacked that peculiar reflectiveness which we have and which induces us to engage in historical studies. But this phenomenon can also be viewed from a very different point of view. Let us take the example of Thomas Aquinas. His political thought was based to a considerable extent on Aristotle. It was at his elbow, we may say. But this was not historical study; Aristotle was the Philosopher, the authority for this man. The basis of his thought we can say was contemporary with Aquinas. Whether he read Aristotle in Greek or Latin is very unimportant.

But we in our age are in that situation that the bases of our thought are not contemporary, and the reason for that is the fact and the notion of progress; certain ^{crucial} decisions were made during the seventeenth century, say. This was continued: an enormous structure arose. We are somewhat high up in that structure; but we are not directly confronted with the foundation. The way of progress, we can say, is this (goes to board)...ever higher and higher. But this remains implies blindness about the foundations, if this process is not accompanied by an inverse process, the digging up and the understanding of the hidden foundation. So while we modern men are by virtue of this quote "progress" unquote, in need of historical studies, in order to see again the hidden foundations of our thought, this was not so in all ages. In other words, the fact that we need, we need, this philosophy of history, does not mean by itself that our thought is superior to that of the past, in which such a fusion is not, was not necessary and not even possible.

Now I return to Collingwood's autobiography. I have read you a few passages which Collingwood indicates as a starting-point; namely, revision of logic. A substitution of the logical question and answer for the propositional logic of the past. And I have indicated how this change in logic, the insight into the primacy of questioning is connected with his historicism. I will now continue. This autobiography is a

very spirited book; he was a fighting man, obviously; and the men whom he fought were a school who called themselves quote "Realists". Let us see what these people say about *this*, because the word Realism has infinitely many meanings.

Cook Wilson--by the way, a man well-known in Platonic studies, he is one of these realists--asserted, "Knowing makes no difference to what is known." In other words, this piece of furniture is wholly indifferent to my knowing it. This behind me, he blackboard, is the same blackboard whether I view it or not. Simple proof is that if I turn around I know what I will see. Knowing makes no difference to what is known--a commonsensical view, which makes no difference to what is known. Collingwood regarded this assertion as meaningless.

I argue that anyone who claimed, as Cook Wilson did, to be sure of this, was in effect claiming to know what he was simultaneously defining as unknowable. For if you know that no difference is made to a thing θ , by the presence or absence of a certain condition C, you know what θ is like with C; and also what θ is like without C. And on comparing the two, you find no difference. This is like knowing what θ is like without C. In the present case, knowing what you defined as the now unknown. Is this clear, what the argument means? When you say, knowing makes no difference to what is known, you imply that you know the thing in its status of not-knownness. And this is absurd. For by knowing it, you always know it as known. This is the simple refutation of realism.

This is the simple refutation of realism. And it has crucial implications. Because the view which Collingwood ascribes to these men at Oxford, is the view of the whole pre-modern tradition. The view expressed in the definition of truth as the aliquation of the intellect and the thing. My thoughts are true, if what is in my mind about this furniture, agrees with the thing itself. And that all imperfections of knowledge are those in which my thoughts do not reflect, do not reproduce, the character of the thing. To think truly means to think what is, to look at what is. Knowledge is fundamentally receptive, in spite of all non-receptive spontaneous activities which might be required in a subsidiary fashion. Now what do we say to Collingwood's argument? I would put it this way:

I don't believe that is the issue...precisely if it is impossible to say whether truth stems from the human mind or not. Because that is of course what Collingwood implies. Since we cannot possibly know the thing as it is outside of all relations to the human mind, the truth originates in the human mind. Now precisely if it is impossible to say, one must leave the question open. We find-- everyone of us finds even in the greatest disturbances which we can imagine--an order. Cats are not dogs; trees are not brutes; stones are not trees. And all these things behave in a peculiar manner, to say nothing of man and the various differences among men. The key question is this: does this order, this $\pi\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ originate in the human mind, or does man in the process of learning and knowing, awaken to a $\pi\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, to an order which is independent of man? Differently stated, the latter view is identical with the view that man is a microcosm, that man is a being privileged by nature, to understand or to be open at least to all things. Whereas brutes are incapable of that. The other view is that there is no such privilegedness of man by nature, but man a being among all kinds of beings is the only one capable of producing an intelligible order.

Now Collingwood contends, and this is by no means *so clear*, that the view that nothing is affected by being known, leads to the consequences both regarding human action and regarding political theory in particular. Now he speaks there of certain developments in Oxford at that time, after the First World War, which run parallel to things with which we are now familiar, which is now known in England in various philosophies as the analysis of language. It was not yet called that way at that time; but Lord Russell played a very great role already then, and he is a great living link between that antediluvian era and our age. I read to you just a passage for illustration:

Moral philosophy, from the days of Socrates down to our own lifetime, has been regarded as an attempt to think out more clearly the issues involved in conduct, for the sake of acting better. In 1912, one of these men announced that moral philosophy as so understood was based on a mistake, and advocated a new kind of philosophy, purely theoretical, in which the workings of the moral consciousness should be scientifically studied as if they were the *movements*

of the planets, and no attempt made to interfere with them. And Bertrand Russell at Cambridge proposed in the same spirit, and on grounds whose difference was only superficial, the exclusion of ethics from the body of philosophy.

What has happened of course in the meantime is that what is called ethics has no longer to do with ethics, is no longer a normative discipline, but is ^{merely}_{an} analysis of ethical language.

The realist philosophers who adopted this new program were nearly all teachers of young men and young women. Their pupils, with habits and characters yet unformed, stood on the threshold of life; many of them on the threshold of public life. Half a century earlier, young people in that position had been told that by thinking about what they were doing, or what they were about to do, they would become likely on the whole, to do it better; and that some understanding of the nature of moral or political action, some attempt to formulate ideas and principles, was an indispensable condition of engaging creditably, in these activities themselves. The realist said to his pupils, "If it interests you to study this, do so; but don't think it will be of any use to you. Remember the great principle of realism, that nothing is affected by being known. That is as true of human action as of anything else. Moral philosophy is only the theory of moral action. It cannot therefore make any difference to the practice of moral action.

Now whether this follows truly from the principle of realism I have my doubt, because Aristotle was a realist in that sense, and he was a Platonist too; and yet they have no doubt that knowledge does make a great difference regarding human action. Although it does not affect things which cannot possibly be affected by human action, like the course of the planets, to take a simple example.

The same happened also of course to political theory, that it lost all its use and reasonableness. We come now to a more interesting and more immediate problem, to which I alluded last time. The realists, who were in this matter old-fashioned people, however, strange this may sound in the case of Russell,--for example; they took for granted the distinction between philosophy and history, and denied that there is a fusion between the possible or necessary.

The realists thought that the problems with which philosophy is concerned were unchanging; this is a point which I read to you last time which Collingwood questions radically.

Was it really true, I asked myself, that the problems of philosophy were even in the loosest sense of that word, eternal? Was it really true that different philosophies were different attempts to answer the same questions? I soon discovered that it was not true. It was merely a vulgar error, consequent on the kind of historical myopia, which deceived by superficial resemblances, failed to detect profound differences.

And now there comes a passage which I read to you about the people who say Plato's Republic and Hobbes' Leviathan deal with the same subject...the nature of the state. And one wonders, how can you translate "polis" the subject with which Plato is concerned, by "state"? and there is of course something very important implied.

There is of course a connection between these two things, between the thing about which Plato speaks, and the thing about which Hobbes speaks. But it is not the kind of connection which the realists thought it was. Anybody would admit that Plato's Republic and Hobbes' Leviathan are about two things which are in one way the same and in another way different. This is not in dispute, what is in dispute is the kind of sameness and the kind of difference. The realists thought that the sameness was the sameness of a universal, that is to say, commonwealth. And the difference, the difference between two instances of that universal: the commonwealth understood as polis, the commonwealth understood as a modern state. But this is not so. The sameness is the sameness of an historical process. And the difference is the difference between one thing, which is the cause of that process, has turned into something else, and the other thing into which it has turned. Plato's polis and Hobbes's absolutist state are related by a traceable historical process whereby one has turned into another. Anyones who ignores that process denies the difference between them, and argues that where Plato's political theory contradicts Hobbes, one of them must be wrong, is saying the thing that is not. This is the formula for a lie. Now here of course we come to a point where Collingwood's thesis ceases to be clear, where he is compelled to admit that there is no contradiction between Plato's doctrine and Hobbes's doctrine because they answer entirely different questions. If it were not possible to raise the question, whose question is the more profound one? ---I mean, maybe that given the Hobbes question, it could not be answered in Plato's manner---I gladly grant that---but the question concerns then the rank of--the order of rank, of the questions. Here Collingwood stops. He gives here another example.

It was not difficult to see that just *as a Greek polis*

could not be legitimately translated by the modern word state [which I think is true] except with the warning that the two things are in various essential ways different, and a statement of what these differences are, so in ethics, a Greek word like *δεῖ* cannot be legitimately translated by using the word "ought"--if that word "ought" carries with it the notion of what is sometimes called moral obligation. Was there any Greek word or phrase to express that notion [namely of moral obligation]? the realists said there was, but they stultified themselves by adding, that the theories of moral obligation expounded by Greek writers differed from modern theory such as Kant about the same thing. How did they know that the Greek and the Kantian theories were about the same thing? oh...because *δεῖ*, or whatever Greek word it was...is the Greek word for ought. [This Greek word which has the primary meaning, something is lacking. Is needed. Of course does not in itself mean "ought." But in certain connections it can approach that meaning.]

But the fundamental point which he makes: you have no right to assume that an earlier great thinker must have dealt with what you regard as fundamental considerations, is of course simple common sense. Well, I do not--it is not necessary, I think, to---I will read you the conclusion...

Ideals of personal conduct are just as impermanent as ideals of social organisation. Not only that, but what is meant by calling them ideals is subject to the same change. [Of course. Try to translate the word 'ideal' into classical Greek. You wouldn't succeed. There is an equivalent for it, or a half-equivalent, but that shows the great difference. "Something for which you would wish or pray"--that would be equivalent to some extent, of what we mean by an ideal. But surely there is no connection, as I might mention in passing, between ideal as the word is developed in the 17th century, and the Platonic idea. There is a connection of sorts--without the Platonic conception of idea., people would never have come to speak of ideals, but these are very different things.] The realists knew that different peoples, and the same peoples at different times, held different views, and were quite entitled to hold different views, about how man ought to behave. But they thought that the phrase "ought to behave" had a meaning which was one, unchanging, and eternal. They were wrong. The literature of European moral philosophy from the Greeks onwards was in their hands, and on their shelves, to tell them so. But they evaded the lesson, by systematically mistranslating the passages from which they might have learned it. [And here Collingwood alludes to a very well-known fact, or it should be well-known, that we are the slaves of the translators. The translators are in most cases men of an impossible innocence in these matters; they are not aware of what they are doing by translating an important word by the most convenient equivalent in present-day, everyday usage. And that is the reason why it is necessary if for one reason or another one

wants to see the truth about these things, to learn at least as much of these languages as will allow one to check, with the help of dictionaries, the words of the translators.

We come now to the core of Collingwood's teaching. Traditionally, the central discipline of philosophy was metaphysics. What happened to metaphysics on the basis of the insight into the historicity of all human thought?

It became clear to me that metaphysics, as its very name might show--after-physics--though people still use the word as if it had been "paraphysics" [by the side of, like para-psychology] is no futile attempt at knowing what life is beyond the limits of experience, but is primarily at any given time an attempt to discover what the people of that time believe about the world's general nature such beliefs being the presuppositions of all their physics, that is to say, their inquiries into its detail. Secondly, it is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppositions of other peoples, other times--and to follow the historical process by which one set of suppositions, has turned into another.

In other words, the central and highest philosophic discipline, metaphysics, is nothing but the understanding of our fundamental presupposition--seeing it together with other cultures or other peoples' fundamental presuppositions--and the movement from one set of presuppositions to another. This is indeed a radical statement. Collingwood calls these presuppositions, to make it quite clear, the absolute presuppositions. The question of what presuppositions underlie the physics or natural science of a certain people at a certain time--is as purely historical a question as what kind of clothes they wear. In other words, it is not in any peculiar sense, philosophic-- and this is the question that metaphysicians have to answer. It is not their business to raise the further question, whether, among the various beliefs on this subject various peoples hold and have held, this one or that one is true [whether, say, the Babylonian or Greek or Hebrew absolute presupposition is true or untrue] -- this question when raised, would always be found, as it always has been found, unanswerable. And if there is anything in my logic of question and answer, that is not to be wondered at, for the belief whose history the metaphysician has to study are not answers to questions which therefore can be criticised ["Are they correct answers to the question or not?"] but only presuppositions of questions. And therefore the distinction between what is true and what is false does not apply to them, but only the distinction between what is presupposed and what is not presupposed. The belief which a metaphysician tries to study and qualify, are presuppositions of the questions asked by natural scientists. But are not answers to any questions at all. This might be expressed by calling them "absolute presuppositions."

Now this is of course a crucial point. All human thought rests ultimately on absolute presuppositions, which differ from historical epoch to historical epoch, and regarding which the question of truth or untruth cannot be raised. This does not lead by itself to relativism and nihilism,--that is what Collingwood implies--because we cannot help believing in the absolute presuppositions of our society, And therefore practically the question doesn't arise. But the grave question of whether there are not grave crises in cultures or societies, where the absolute presuppositions become questionable. And

there of course no way out is thinkable. Collingwood has no doubt that this state of affairs affects the possibility of historical objectivity regarding the absolute presuppositions. In other words, historical thought is also human thought. Therefore dependent on absolute presuppositions differing from historical situation to historical situation. Therefore, historical thought is open to the same difficulty that it cannot have objectivity proper. We look at the absolute presuppositions, say, of Plato or Hobbes, from the point of view of our absolute presuppositions. The only objective knowledge of philosophic character is that of the series of absolute presuppositions which we discern in history. Of course, there cannot be an ethics or political theory proper. For they depend on questionable absolute presuppositions. Now let me pursue that.

From all I have said before, it follows that a rapprochement between philosophy and history is absolutely indispensable, in Collingwood's view. A new kind of philosophy--a new kind of philosophy. Now what is that?

Soon after the beginning of the seventeenth century, a number of intelligent people in Western Europe began to see, in a settled and steady manner, what a few here and there had seen by fits and starts for the last hundred years and more: namely, that the problems which ever since the time of early Greek philosophy had gone by the collective name of physics were capable of being restated in a shape in which, with the double weapon of experiment and mathematics, one could now solve them [whereas hitherto they had been insoluble]. What was called nature, they saw, had henceforth no secrets from man, only riddles, which he had learned the trick of answering. Or more accurately, nature was no longer a Sphinx asking man riddles. It was man that did the asking. And nature, now, that he put to the torture, until she gave him the answer to his question.

Now this great change, this great progress made in the 17th century, is the model for that new great change which Collingwood plans to help--to help to bring about. This statement about modern science and the revolution of the 17th century, clearly implies that the absolute presuppositions underlying modern physics are superior to the absolute presuppositions underlying Greek physics. And therefore this contradicts flatly the statement of the equality of the absolute presuppositions, or in other words, that the question of truth cannot arise regarding the absolute presuppositions. Now something analogous to what Bacon and Galileo and Descartes did to nature must now be done with regard to history. That is very urgent. Why?

It seems almost as if man's power to control nature had been increasing pari-passus with a decrease in his power to control human affairs. [In other words, the well-known fact of the complete chaos, moral chaos which has arisen in modern times ... and Collingwood expects that a new philosophy, i.e., a philosophy which is radically historical will solve this problem created by man's increasing his power through modern physics and technology.]

The usual view is well, we only have to develop scientific psychology. That will take care of the problems caused by modern physics and chemistry, by enabling us to manipulate men better, so they will behave more reasonably and so on. Collingwood has very sensible things to say about this point. Psychology cannot do the job. He says in very general but clear terms, psychology deals with the soul in contradistinction to the mind. And since the questions of true and untrue, good and bad, are questions for the mind, psychology is incompetent to deal with them. That is very abstractly stated, but I think fundamentally sound. The question is whether history can do the job, an intelligent or philosophic history, which psychology admittedly cannot do.

Was it possible that men should come to a better understanding of human affairs by studying history? Was history the thing which in future might play a part in civilized life analogous to that of natural science in the past? The historian is a person whose questions are about the past. He is generally supposed to be a person whose questions are exclusively about the past, about a past namely that is dead and gone, and no sense at all living on into the present. [This view he, Collingwood denies.] The past which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past which in some sense is still living in the present. Therefore the historian alone can help us in understanding the present [the present having the past within itself. So long as the past and the present are outside one another, knowledge of the past is not of much use for the problems of the present. But the case is radically different from the other point of view: he gives this example.] Nothing here but trees and grass, says the traveller, and marches on. Look, says the woodsman, there is a tiger in that one. The historian's business is to reveal the less obvious features, hidden from a careless eye in the present situation. What history can bring to modern political life is a trained eye for the situation in which one has to act.

Therefore historical understanding is the only way in which we can get clarity about what we have to do. Acting well means acting according to the situation, especially to such situations as those where we do not have the help of rules, i.e., of universals. If ready-made rules for dealing with situations of specific types are what you want, natural science is the kind of thing which can provide you with them. He gives here an example, where general rules are of no help.

Everyone has certain rules according to which he acts in dealing with his tailor. These rules are, we may grant, soundly based on genuine experience. And by acting on them, a man will deal fairly with his tailor, and help his tailor to deal fairly by him. But so far as he acts according to these rules, he is dealing with his tailor only in his capacity as a tailor, and not as John Robinson, age 60, with a weak heart, and a consumptive daughter, a passion for gardening and an overdraft at the bank. The rules for dealing with tailors

no doubt enable you to cope with the tailor in John Robinson. But they prevent you from getting to grips with whatever else there may be in him. Of course, if you know that he has a weak heart, you will manage your dealings with him by modifying the rules for tailor-situations, in the light of the rules for situations involving people with weak hearts. But at this rate, modifications soon become so complicated that the rules are no longer of any practical use to you. We have got beyond the stage at which rules can govern our actions, and you go back to improvising as best you can a method of handling the situation in which you find yourself.

Now this is a clear example, and therefore we have to look at this. Is it true that only knowledge of the situation replaced the tailor by a complicated political situation--that knowledge of the situation as such, without any universal, can guide us? Well, it may be true that all the rules are insufficient...Mr. Levy?

MR. LEVY: The example I guess would be Montgomery as a general or even maybe Churchill as a leader. Montgomery doesn't know anything about Aristotle to win a battle at (*unclear*) and yet he, he had great practical wisdom as shown by his memoirs, and the description of that battle. And did Churchill have to know anything about Aristotle, he seemed not to know anything about him except for the Ethics--

Yes, well that is an entirely different question, whether rules means rules to be found in this or that book--

MR. LEVY: I was using that as an example of a rule, a rule, any rule, to be compared with practical experience as a--

Yes, but there was one thing which I believe was quite clear in the case of Montgomery. Apart from the situation, although it constituted the situation: namely, that he had to win it. Victory, yes? Now in the case of politics as distinguished from generalship, the end is somewhat more complicated. Complex, you know, because the political good consists of a number of ingredients which cannot be reduced to the simple formula victory, and therefore there are all kinds of considerations: which of these ingredients is at the moment the most important or the most urgent? But if you look at this case of the tailor John Robinson, it is perfectly clear that it is a matter, first of all, of dealing fairly by him, and he should deal fairly by you. A universal fairness is essential for acting properly. And secondly, here much modified, the rule of human kindness, which is not the same as fairness. That also comes in. In other words, every situation demands that it be developed in one or the other direction. The question of the direction in which it should be developed is ultimately a question of universals...Not necessarily universal rules... without which we could not act. The question is simply lost in the historicism of Collingwood as well as in others. For Collingwood, as he makes clear-- to give you one example, the question of what is the summum bonum, the highest good, is for him simply a pseudo-question. As are the questions, what

is knowledge, what is art? Because all questions must be understood situationally.

I must say that in this respect the ordinary positivistic social scientists with their emphasis on the value questions, are preferable in my opinion, to Collingwood. I mean, what speaks against them I try to state, but in Collingwood the question of the ends in their universality simply disappears in the concern for the situation in which you act. The question of the good life cannot be simply replaced by the question of what shall I do here. The question of the good life becomes sterile if it is not specified by me in this situation, in accord with that situation, of course. But perhaps Collingwood would say that the question of the good is a pseudo-question, because it is already answered by the absolute presuppositions of the society to which we belong, and therefore it cannot arise. But there we come up against the great question, what if the culture of society to which we belong is in a state of crisis, and we lose our moorings? This is not in any way faced by Collingwood. He ends the book with a discussion of the political situation at the time of the Spanish Civil War, in which he takes a rather simplistic view of the situation, he takes it for granted that Neville Chamberlain was a crypto-fascist, and other things which ~~mean~~ means he has...the situation alone is a poor and insufficient guide for taking one's bearings, both in private and in public. So I will leave it at these points, (tape is reversed)

...mean the understanding of the human product, thought of the past. That is the common meaning, and why should this--this can be practiced on the basis of various philosophic assumptions. Historicism, no, is something much more specific. Historicism is the assertion that all human thought, rests ultimately on presuppositions which differ from epoch to epoch, and which are not susceptible of any criticism.

STUDENT: Does Collingwood represent both of these two things?

Yes, Collingwood become entangled in this difficulty, that while he has to assert the equality of all absolute presuppositions, he cannot help asserting the supremacy of that absolute presupposition which goes together with historicism. In other words, all other cultures or historical periods depended on such absolute presuppositions; but that his situation goes together with an awareness of this thought, this is a radical change. That is the difficulty which exists from the very beginning. Mr. Schulsky?

Mr. Schulsky: Isn't it true, though, that his awareness of the historicity of thought is in fact a big change, especially when it comes to the actual writing of history, because it would seem that even if a modern historian is aware of historicism, he is just as culture-bound, so to speak, in modern history as anyone else was, so that this progress is in a way external to the actual writing of history, understanding history as a....

That may be so, but still--I mean, let us assume that a historian is not affected by that--although it would be strange if the historicist insight, if it is an insight, did not have an effect on the writing of history (smiling) But the key point is the philosophic question. Can historicism itself, must not historicism be applied to itself? That is to say, historicism too is historical--that is to say, belongs to a specific historical situation. Is it not necessary? That is not in itself of course fatal, if it is properly thought through, provided the situation to which the historicist insight belongs is a privileged moment, let us say the absolute moment, the moment

in which man becomes aware for the first time of the fundamental basis of all human thought and action. And of course, he would have to make this intelligible, the mere assertion would not mean anything. He must show how come that this foundation of all foundations which men never saw as such before became visible in the twentieth century, what is the peculiarity of the twentieth century that it became visible here and now--that he must answer. Yes? Mr. Devereaux?

Mr. Devereaux: As far as I understand, you agreed with Collingwood in saying that it is necessary today that there be a rapprochement between history and philosophy. Do you mean that in contrast to the pre-moderns, we simply have more obstacles to overcome? or did you mean something else?

Well, I meant it in the first place as a strictly empirical assertion, in the old sense of the word. Empirical assertion means I know that it is so, and I do not know the reason. What they call a hard fact. A hard fact is something about which you do not know the reason, because if you know the reason, it is no longer so hard, yes? (laughter) That is so that whenever I read something, an analysis of some of the fundamental concepts with which political scientists are concerned, of course the mere historical knowledge which is thoughtless and undigested is of no value. I am speaking only of the other way around. But if someone does not go into the genesis of these concepts, then he is simply a superficial analyst. One can state it formally and simply as follows: as men of science, we are all concerned with knowledge, about the things of which we have primarily only opinion. And if we want to proceed in a perfectly above-board and clearly manner, we must first make clear to ourselves what our opinions are. We must clarify our opinions. Now if we begin to do that, we see very soon that our opinions are only to a very small part, say, my opinions, are to a very large part opinions which we share with our contemporaries, and even more, inherited opinions. But think of such a thing like political freedom. How much of it--while there are some features which have emerged in the last generation perhaps--but fundamentally that is an inheritance. Now if we want to clarify our opinion, we must therefore go into this whole history of quote "political liberty." So the strictly philosophic concern with clarifying our opinion changes necessarily and even insensibly into historical study. This is I think an empirical fact which every one of us who is doing some thought, reflection about it, simply experiences. Now then we look, say, at Aristotle. And we see he does not engage in such--in order to clarify his opinion, he does not engage in any kind of historical studies. And disregarding all differences of rank between people like ourselves and Aristotle entirely, because even the greatest men now living would have to engage in it, in historical studies whereas Aristotle did not. Then the first impression one gets--this is supported by powerful prejudice--that Aristotle however great he was, lacked the awareness of a certain dimension, of the historical dimension. And which awareness is the preserve of the 19th and 20th century, somehow prepared by men like Vico, and you know some others. Then there is the question, or should be the question, is this interpretation correct? The acquisition of that sixth sense, the historical sense, is this enrichment of man's understanding or a corrective to peculiar defects of modern thought? That is the question. And I think however we will answer it, we are wiser if we have raised that question, and not simply accepted the view now prevailing. Because when we accept the view now prevailing, we simply accept the prejudice. Now a prejudice may be true. But if I realize that it is true, it is no

longer a prejudice. Accepting prejudice as such is a questionable thing for academic people, at least. Yes?

Mr. Devereaux: You say--must one continue, in order to investigate our opinions, going to the origins, and so on--does one ever get to the end of this, or are you constantly in this historical inquiry?

Well, that is a very difficult question, we also must never lose a certain common sense. In other words, for a given purpose it may be perfectly sufficient to stop at a certain point, and it may be relatively easy, but other questions are --I could tell you some stories from my private experience where I was sure I had clarified something wonderful which I thought was relatively important, and then I found that further studies contraindicated it. But it all depends what the immediate purpose of the study is, if one is--that is exactly the point with which we are confronted when we advise students regarding doctor's theses. Let us assume that the subject is of interest, and then the question arises, is it manageable? Now what is true of students is true in a modified way also of professors and even of all professors, who are suppose to be able to manage problems which a doctoral candidate cannot manage--but even they, and precisely they, will also come across questions which cannot be managed, and therefore they have to find some defensible and not arbitrary division. Whether a full clarification is in fact possible, that is a very long question. And to the extent to which historicism means only this: that a full clarification is not possible, to that extent it has a point. But does one have to be a historicist in order to admit the infinity and the elusiveness of the truth? I mean, this --do you see how this applies? Yes?

STUDENT: If I understood what you said about Collingwood correctly, he said you can't say whether Plato or Hobbes for example which one was right, because each one asked essentially different questions. Then you said, but you can still ask which question is higher or more worthy. But Collingwood would then say, this doesn't work because the worth of a particular question is only relative to the particular age in which it was asked.

Then Collingwood goes on to say that there is something more fundamental than all questions, yes? what he calls the absolute presuppositions, on the basis of which questions arise. And he says these absolute presuppositions regarding them you cannot say whether the absolute presupposition of Plato or of Hobbes is true or not. It is still simple enough. But then he discusses the question of modern physics. 17th century, and so on, which is based on absolute presuppositions. But here the very strange fact: that modern science represents a progress beyond earlier science, in so far as it can solve all kinds of questions, which were insoluble in the past. Or nearer home--the most fundamental insight possible on the basis of politics, is the insight into the historical character of all human thought, the insight that all human thought is based on absolute presuppositions, I would say, this is the absolute presupposition of absolute presuppositions. It means that those of the first order cannot be said to be true or false, but the one itself is true. What do you care about the absolute presuppositions of the first order, if you have a much more fundamental insight of which you can be sure it is true. I think the position as Collingwood stated it is not tenable. It was developed much more subtly, and profoundly, on the basis

of Nietzsche, by Heidegger, and here the difficulties also appear in a peculiar way. Well, I would like to mention only one point. Fundamentally, this -- what Collingwood says about absolute presuppositions would be accepted by Heidegger. But there is--Heidegger is much more concerned with the phenomenon of the connection between thought and language. Language is of course always the language of this or that people, with this or that peculiar tradition. Therefore when we think traditionally of truth, we mean the universality of truth, say today in mathematics, this is a universal language. But philosophy as philosophy can of course never take on this mathematical character. It is always linked with--to a specific language, whether it is German or Greek or English, so on and so on--necessarily particular. Now today we are for the first time--all inhabitants of this globe--are brought into contact with one another. The question of the universalism of thought which always concerned philosophers and scientists, has now become a great practical problem. Now therefore--I would like to state it as simply as possible, since it is a very complex thing. In brief, what Heidegger is trying to--he links up the historicist insight with an insight into the essential defect of all previous philosophy, all origins of philosophy. There was something fundamentally narrow about the traditional view which implies history is philosophically irrelevant. Now this enlargement is somehow connected in Heidegger's view with the need today to start an intellectual meeting with the Far East. I mean not Mao--but with the Chinese tradition. And of course not those people in America who rattle around and say, what Confucius say is what Thomas Jefferson say. And not these, but the people who really understand that tradition know what nonsense this is. Now that a dialogue between Westerners of great depth and thoughtfulness with Easterners of the same character could contribute to enlarge, to free the West from its peculiar defects, on a very low level that is suggested by Northrop; but there is no comparison between the two. Here is the interesting point: you could say, then you reach here at the end a truly universal understanding, where Westerners and Easterners see the same thing in the same manner. But here is the point: the difference in the dialogue between the Westerner and the Easterner is an understanding, they understand each other. But in a way, they are of course the same. Each is enlarged, one by the other. But the starting point remains. The universal regarding which they agreed still looks different, from their points of view. See the difference?

That is the extreme attempt of which I am aware of trying to reconcile historicism with this universalism without which universalism is not possible.

STUDENT: It is true that Hobbes's state would not be the same thing. Yet it seems as though they were both notions telling you not only what the state was, but what people were, human nature is. And surely human nature was not fundamentally different, only their understanding was. How would Collingwood explain that problem? Is man fundamentally seeking his own self-preservation?

No, no. That is much too superficial from Collingwood's point of view. Man is a being who is essentially historical. Man has always as he puts it a determinate nature. You don't find man---nude, so to speak. Man without having interpreted himself and the world. Group language. On

every stage of existence man has a complete interpretation, a language, on whichever level. Behind that you cannot go, you know. You cannot ever find the naked human nature, so to speak. That is radically inaccessible. Therefore all general science, like biology or psychology, would remain below the level of philosophy. The argument would be that biology and psychology themselves always rest on premises, which they cannot substantiate. And which are somehow dependent on what he calls the absolute presuppositions. (end of tape)

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 8 February 1, 1965

Another announcement. Wednesday of this week, my class, Political Science 351, is to move to Swift 106, once more. After that, return to SS 102. The reason is purely technical, not even administrative.

At the beginning of this course I said I would try to make visible to you the air which we all breathe, whether we know it or not. And I believe I did that by presenting to you the issue of positivism on the one hand, and historicism on the other. This was necessary because political philosophy as the quest for the just or the good society, has become incredible in our age owing to positivism and to historicism. Probably I cannot repeat what I said in these 7 long sessions. Positivism leads to contempt or neglect of the political philosophies of the past. Historicism, on the other hand, must cultivate the history of political philosophy, although it can no longer recognize the possibility of political philosophy proper. Yet closer inspection shows that even positivism cannot leave it at that contempt, if it wants to fulfill its self-imposed duty. For the study of human societies, political society, cannot limit itself to the study of institutions, it must also take into consideration the ideologies, and within this context it is compelled to discuss the political philosophy of the past. To take a simple example, which I just used before, in order to understand the United States Constitution as it is now, one must of course understand it as it was understood by its framers, its original framers. And to do that one must go back in the first place to Montesquieu, the theoretical authority for Hamilton and Madison, and Montesquieu himself did not reveal his full message, if we do not contrast his teaching with that of certain ancient thinkers, among them the historian Polybius. More generally stated, every attempt at rational knowledge, philosophical or scientific, consists in replacing opinions by knowledge. This cannot be conscientiously done if one does not first know the opinions from which one starts. Now these opinions are only partly our opinions. Their most important part, or their largest part at least, is inherited.

What we regard as our opinions consists to a great extent of the sediments of past discussions, discussions which were conscious, which

were the focus of attention in earlier centuries, and now we live on their results. Hence the non-historical concern with the clarification of our opinions insensibly shifts into historical studies. And to that extent historicism is right in the assertion that philosophic or scientific questions cannot be separated from the historical questions. Or that a fusion of philosophy and history is indispensable. Historicism is superior to positivism, owing to this awareness. In fairness to the founder of positivism, Comte, one must say that Comte was perfectly clear on this point. According to Comte, one cannot make clear what the scientific spirit is, except by means of a history of the human mind. One must see the earlier alternatives of the theological and the metaphysical mind, if one wants to see the scientific mind in its peculiarity and the superiority of the scientific spirit to the spirit of theology and metaphysics. There is an external sign of the fact that this need for historical studies is felt more and more within science; I have not made any statistical studies but from time to time it has come to my attention that it seems that this history of science, in the study of modern science, is now much greater than it was say sixty years ago. That a physicist of the rank of Einstein takes the trouble of writing a history of physics is I think one of the strong signs of that.

Now regarding historicism we have seen according to the fundamental fact a change in the absolute presuppositions. To use the term coined by Collingwood, we can say a change in the categories. That change cannot be explained; that is the reason why it is a fundamental fact. For any explanation we have to use categories, specific categories, and the validity of these categories is exactly the problem, on the basis of historicism. You remember what I said, what I quoted to you from Nagel about the logically arbitrary and historically contingent character of the principle of causality, as understood by modern science. Marxism, for instance, believes it is able to explain the change of categories, of the principles of understanding and action, by tracing them ultimately to changes in means of production. But the question is whether the assumption of the primacy, of the fundamental character of the relations of production, is not itself historically relative, i.e., plausible, under the conditions of the nineteenth

and twentieth century, but not simply true. The difficulty regarding historicism is this: that ~~the~~ despite the fact that the change of absolute presuppositions is not a rational progress, a progress from lesser to greater rationality, yet our absolute presuppositions which include and which consist of the historical awareness, are of course said to be superior to all earlier forms. Now that superiority is identical with the discovery of the historical character of all human thought, or as people say, with the experience of history, or as they say, of historicity. This experience, whatever that may mean, is based somehow on historical evidence, and here we see again the fusion of philosophy and history. Historicism cannot clarify itself except to clarify the position which it has replaced--the non-historicist position. At any rate, with this agreement to day as to the necessity of the history of political philosophy, on the basis of the possibility of political philosophy proper, in order to be reasonably moderate, not extremist, or however you would like to call it, it is safest to begin with the history of political philosophy, a subject the legitimacy of which is not denied by anyone today, except by people who are very obviously lacking the-in simple coherence of thought. But still there will be one difference in the way we--we is not pluralis maiestatis--I mean, I and some people who think like this--we in contradistinction to the positivists and historicists, approach the history of philosophy while we are open to the possibility that political philosophy is not as such impossible. I believe that this approach is less prejudiced, more openminded, than the positivists and historicists.

Now let us proceed in an orderly manner. We want to turn to the history of political philosophy, to the whole history in principle. The first thing you have to do in such an enterprise is to divide it into periods. Otherwise, how can we find our bearings, in this infinite mass of material? The initial division into periods must not be arbitrary. How can we make it not arbitrary? I would suggest, if we do not rely on our own prior judgement, but follow the views, the consciousness, of the actors--in this case, of the great political philosophers. Now if we turn to that, we learn as good children we have first to be docile,

and later on we of course may also criticize them.

Now we learn from Cicero that the founder of political philosophy was Socrates. Socrates was the one, who according to Cicero, brought down philosophy from heaven, brought it down to earth, and introduced it to the cities and houses of man, and compelled it to think about good and bad, and so on. So the story seems to begin with Socrates.

But here we are in an embarrassing situation because Socrates did not write. The only things which he did write, as far as our knowledge goes, were two letters. When he held a discussion about justice and injustice, he drew up a list, and wrote out, in Greek letters of course, (going to board) Justice and Injustice. Then he asked the interlocutor to enumerate the points. But at any rate, Socrates did not write books. So the oldest books available are those by Plato, by Aristotle. After Aristotle's time, almost within his lifetime, a new school emerged. Because Plato founded a school, the Academy, whereas Plato founded a school called the Lyceum. And the third, later school, is the so-called Stoic school. From this we have only fragments, and we have to rely chiefly on Cicero, who gives us coherent presentations, if very summary presentations, of the third moral-political doctrine. Now all these developments, from Socrates to the Stoics, this I propose to call classical political philosophy. By this I do not wish to minimize the difference between Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics, but they have something fundamentally in common; they all build on a foundation laid by Socrates.

This classical political philosophy is the only political philosophy prior to the modern age. As for medieval political philosophy, we must distinguish within it between political theology--a political teaching based on revelation, which as such does not fall within the province of political philosophy, and political philosophy proper. Now the political philosophy proper of the Middle Ages is fundamentally based on classical political philosophy, especially Aristotle. What the boldest medieval thinkers--Dante in his Monarchy--speaks of the absolute novelty of his enterprise in that work. One has only to begin to read it to see, however, that it is based on Aristotle. Aristotle is the philosopher for Dante. And however original the

proposal made in the Monarchy may be, the foundations are Aristotelian.

At a certain moment a break occurred. Again, we do not trust our own impression, but look around and listen to these voices of the men of the past: who of them claimed to have broken completely with the political philosophy founded by Socrates, root and branch? And the loudest and clearest voice, there cannot be the slightest doubt about that, is that of Thomas Hobbes. And so until further notice, we will assume that the break with classical political philosophy occurred in the work of Hobbes. And as I will say now, further study would show that the break had occurred prior to Hobbes in the work of Machiavelli. But in Machiavelli the claim to a radical break is by far not as audible and powerful as Hobbes. So we have then this very simple division with which to start. Classical political philosophy, or pre-modern political philosophy, and modern political philosophy. And the question which concerns us, since we are not merely historians, we cannot afford to be merely historians, this question is for us a quarrel: which of the two is right? And this is a quarrel of the ancients and the moderns: *La querelle des anciennes et des modernes*, as it was called in the seventeenth century. At that time the famous quarrel was the one about whether, say, Dryden or Corneille, were as good dramatists as Sophocles and Euripides, or Moliere as good a comedian as Aristophanes. In other words, it appears to be primarily a literary question. It is much more than that. The fundamental quarrel was between modern philosophy, which includes modern natural science, and classical philosophy, and classical science. The most famous document in the English language of that quarrel is Swift's Battle of the Books, and for those who read things more carefully, Gulliver's Travels.

... Now Hobbes questions all preceding political philosophy. They all were wrong and worse than wrong—*Sophists*. In the present-day textbook version, which is of course not entirely unreasonable—it is very hard to say something which is entirely unreasonable, but nevertheless it is misleading—there was another tradition stemming from the sophists, via the Epicureans and so on—this didn't exist for

Hobbes. That was not political philosophy, that was a teaching which destroyed civil society, and not one which tried to show a way for just civil society, let alone to be a political philosophy in Hobbes' sense. Now Hobbes gives the known list at various places of these men, and Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are of course the greatest names. He doesn't say anything about the Scholastics, because he wrote in a Protestant country, and you can say the Reformation had taken away this problem for him. That wasn't quite true, because Richard Hooker was also an Anglican, and he made a great use of Thomas Aquinas. But he has a discussion of Cardinal Bellamy, but in a very special context, the context of ecclesiastical power, where he has to take issue with the claim of the Catholic Church as stated by Bellamy, that all ecclesiastical power is concentrated in the hands of the Pope. Now what is wrong with these people? Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and so on. Hobbes says they are teachers of anarchy, anarchists, a very strange assertion it seems. What does Hobbes mean by that? They laid the foundation for criticising their governments. From the point of view of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, it is legitimate to criticize the governments if they misbehave. This doesn't necessarily mean that they justify rebellion. But they made it possible theoretically to criticize the government: think only in this context of tyrant. In other words, they laid the foundations for an appeal from the law laid down by government, positive law, to natural law.

That is historically correct. But Hobbes says, opposing them, that the command of natural law is to obey positive law. Therefore there is no possibility of appealing from the positive law to the natural law. And the particular form which Hobbes gave this thought, it means, and this is in a way implied in what I said: Government must be absolute, in order to be government. And an absolute government is as such uncriticizable. Now this criticism of Hobbes' is crude, but not groundless criticism, and it has an important implication: namely that Hobbes to a considerable extent agrees with the tradition which he attacks. Namely, just as the tradition he recognizes natural law: for how otherwise could he say the command of natural law is to obey the positive law?

So the difference between Hobbes and the tradition comes first to sight as a difference within the context of natural law: now what is that difference? In the Epistle Dedicatory of his Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, Hobbes says,

From the two principle parts of our nature, reason and passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, mathematical and dogmatic.

It is obvious that mathematics comes from reason and dogmatics from passion.

The former is free from controversies and disputes, because it consists in comparing figures and motion only, in which things truth and the interests of men, oppose not each other. But later in dogmatic learning there is nothing not disputable, because it compares men and matters with their right and profit: in which, as often as reason is against the man, so oft will a man be against reason. And from hence it cometh that they that have written against justice and policy in general [i.e., the political philosophers] do all inveigh themselves with contradictions.

In other words, there doesn't exist any political philosophy worthy of the name.

To reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way but first to put such principles down for a foundation as passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace; and afterward, to build thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature, which hitherto have been built in the air by the Greeks.

So what is the difference? Traditional doctrine, political philosophy, was under the spell of passion, therefore not rational. Well, as they say today, it was ideological. But the reasons were slightly different: the foundations were wrongly laid, because the principles laid down by Socrates and his successors were distrusted by passion. And Hobbes wants to reform, to revolutionize, natural law doctrine, and thus make it a scientific doctrine for the first time, by laying down foundations which are agreeable to passion, in harmony with passion. Natural law must be in harmony with the passions, not against them. That is the first, of course, very insufficient statement; Hobbes will be compelled to make a distinction between passions with which one must be in harmony and passions which must be fought. The first point is, the foundation

must be a passion. I would like just to read this statement from the same work, Elements of Law, part II, Chapter 9, heading of section 8, where he speaks of the duties of government.

The institution of youth in true morality and politics is necessary for keeping the subjects in peace.

The subjects must be taught true morality. That is very traditional. But this Elements of Law, as I said earlier, is the most traditional work. Let us see how he speaks in a later work Of the Citizen, how he calls it there. Chapter 14, sect. 9:

The correct institution of the citizens in political doctrine is necessary for the preservation of peace.

Here he does not speak any more of true morality. Shortly after him a very great political thinker, of whom you have heard, John Locke, said, "However strange it may seem, the lawmaker hath nothing to do with moral virtues and vices, but only with security of life, liberty, and property." Now this is clearly implied already in Hobbes, and even stated to some extent. The government is concerned with nothing but the preservation of peace. Accordingly moral virtue in Hobbes' sense is nothing but the human habit conducive to peace. Peaceableness in all its implications. Virtues which have no direct relation to peace, such as courage, intelligence, wisdom, even temperance, are not strictly speaking moral virtues from Hobbes' point of view. Now if we take these two points I mentioned together, building on the passions, narrowing down the sphere of moral virtue, so that moral virtue is nothing but the habits conducive to peace, we can say that what Hobbes achieved and wished to achieve was a lowering of the standards set up by Socrates and his successors. Of course he believed that the older standards were foolish; but that is part of the quarrel. If we take--at first glance, we see that the standards are much lower, more pedestrian. Winston Churchill somewhere speaks of low but solid grounds. This is a clear formulation of what was in the minds of men such as Hobbes and Locke, though Churchill didn't mean this. "Low but solid," vs. high but unsolid...in the air, as Hobbes said.

This is a crucial part of the fundamental layer of modern political philosophy. Now why is it necessary to lower the standards, as they call it? Let us consider a few remarks of Hobbes. In the Citizen, chapter 1, section 2:

Of those who have written something about states, the majority presuppose or assume or postulate, that man is an animal born apt to society. The Greeks say, ζῷον πολιτικόν, the political animal, and built on that foundation the civic doctrine...

and so on. And Hobbes tries to show that this is absurd--that man is by nature not apt for peace, and peaceful living together, but rather the opposite. And he concludes this paragraph with the remark: the origin of great and lasting society cannot be sought in men's dutiful benevolence or friendliness; as Cicero for example expresses it, but only in dutiful fear. Man is by nature anti-social, which Hobbes identifies with asocial. As he puts it, Nature dissociates man. And the fundamental error of the tradition was that it believed that nature made men by nature social. Nature is not a kind mother, but a step-mother, even an enemy. This is quite obvious when you think of Hobbes' famous doctrine of the state of nature. Everyone has heard these four adjectives; the state of nature is characterised by the fact that man's life is solitary, nasty, brutish and short. This is the condition in which nature has placed him. All blessings of life we owe to actions against nature, human action against nature.

Now another point connected with that is the following, one which Hobbes says most clearly in chapter 2 of the Citizen, par. 1:

When he speaks about how authors define the law of nature, there he says, in most people, assume that the law of nature is identical with the common opinion of mankind, or at least of the wisest and most civilized nations. In other words, there is a natural understanding, a natural awareness of right and wrong, and this shows itself even in savage nations to some degree. Hobbes simply rejects that: no trust whatever in common opinion, in the common sayings of the human race. Here we must remind ourselves that Hobbes was a contemporary, and in

rejection of
the consensus
omnium

a way a competitor, with Descartes. Now Descartes laid the foundation for the enterprise of modern philosophy, with his famous universal doubt, his doubt of everything. Hobbes absolutely agrees with this point of Descartes, that one must begin with universal doubt; he even says, in a somewhat unfriendly, non-magnanimous manner, that this is elementary, everyone knows that. (Spoken with the intonation of Mr. Kennington) Now what is the meaning of that? There have been doubters all the time, they were called skeptics. The difference between Descartes and the skeptics is this: the skeptics drew the inference that human knowledge is not possible. And we have to live with these probabilities, with these guesses, as Mr. Popper seems to say. But Descartes was the opposite of a skeptic. He believed that if we want to have a solid foundation for science or philosophy, we must build on a foundation which is not exposed to any possible doubt. In other words, extreme skepticism is the foundation for an absolutely water-tight dogmatism. In this point Hobbes is in fundamental agreement with Descartes. Now among the arguments which Descartes uses in order to justify the universal doubt, the following is most revealing. He says there might be a very powerful evil genius who wishes to deceive us. Now this might be the situation of our intellect, the situation of man; and therefore we must think as if this were the case, in order to be free even from the power of such a very powerful evil demon. And when someone says, there is no such evil demon, that is nonsense, Descartes says that doesn't make any difference, because if you speak of natural causes, natural causes in the sense in which we now speak of it, of our perceptions and conceptions, they are as little concerned with our realizing truth as this evil demon would be. No trust in our natural faculties; we have to find a new foundation. In some respect Hobbes is even clearer here than Descartes. But the point I wanted to make is that the lowering of the standards has to do with a profound change of their view toward, their posture toward, nature. No trust in nature. Now if we want to understand Hobbes somewhat better, we have to consider an earlier thinker, to whom I have already referred, who stated a crucial point before Hobbes. As far as I remember, Hobbes never mentions him, and this is in itself quite interesting. You know today it is customary to quote

or mention names, but in the past this was, in some writers at least, a very great art--whom to mention, whom to honor by mentioning, and who not to mention. The man I mean is Machiavelli. And the fundamental text regarding modern political philosophy occurs in his Prince, Chapter XV.

It now remains to be seen what are the ways and rules for a prince regarding his subjects and friends, as distinguished from his enemies, that we have discussed before. And as I know that many have written of this, I fear that my writing about it may be deemed presumptuous...

You see, he is not more modest than Hobbes is.

differing as I do especially in this matter from the opinion of others--~~He doesn't say, of all others.~~ *]* --But my intention *being* to write something of use for those who understand, it appears to be more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to the imagination thereof. And many *[he doesn't say all]* have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality. For how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done, in ordinary practice, for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good. Therefore it is necessary for a prince who wishes to preserve himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not to use it according to the necessity of the case.

In other words, the Prince must use virtue and vice according to the circumstances. Good action is no longer virtuous action but shrewd action. Here we have a decisive opposition of two considerations. A political teaching which takes its bearings by how men ought to live, and a teaching which takes its bearings by how men do live. This is not the same as our present fact-value distinction, because Machiavelli's teaching is as normative as that of Plato. Only the norms are very different, because according to him the Platonic or other norms are based on the assumption that men are good and he starts from the opposite assumption, that most men are bad. Which is a very inadequate analysis, of course, but I leave it at this for the time being.

Now in the Discourses, Book II, Chapter 46, he quotes from a Roman

historian, Sallustius. And in quoting Sallustius he changes somewhat the text. And the prevalent view today is that he wrote it from memory and that is of no importance. I have come to doubt this assumption; at any rate the passage as misquoted or amended by Machiavelli is:

All evil stems from good beginnings.

All evil stems from good beginnings: now surely the Biblical view says that the beginnings were good. And the relation to classical philosophy is somewhat more complicated. All evil stems from good beginnings, i.e., we must start from bad beginnings, if we want to build up a stable society. Well this has become elementary in modern thought--the beginnings are bad, savage, pre-literate, underdeveloped, and what have you. At the beginning there was not love, we can state Machiavelli's thought--but terror. And by opposing that fundamental terror, the terror of the state of nature, in Hobbes' language, men build up civil society, and they will do it better the better they know that they have to count on themselves. Since he speaks of evil examples, I would like to remind you of what Machiavelli says about good examples. Good examples, he says, arise from education, and good education is a consequence of good laws; and good laws immediately go back to good founders, of societies, or legislators. But who are these model founders? Well, men like Cesare Borgia, if this name means anything to you, or the Roman emperor Septimus^{Se} Verus, whom Machiavelli himself calls a criminal, and a mixture of a fox and a lion. So in other words the roots of goodness, of that kind of goodness of which man is capable, are left by people who are the very opposite of good. Now incidentally the passage which I read to you from the Prince Chapter 15, is used in Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, chapter 1. Here that is very interesting, because Machiavelli is not according to the official cataloging a philosopher, but Spinoza is; yet Spinoza takes over this whole statement about the errors of the past and in what they consist. You have to take men as they are and take our bearings from that. Now colloquially or vulgarly what is characteristic of men like Machiavelli and Hobbes is that they claim

to oppose a realistic teaching to the idealistic teaching of the past. And I think, as a provisional formulation, this is indispensable. But we must not forget for one moment, that what they tried to do was to erect on this so-called realistic basis an ideal order. So much so that Hobbes at the end of chapter 31 of the *Leviathan* compares his *Leviathan* in a certain respect to Plato's Republic. It has this in common with Plato's Republic, that it is a blueprint of a perfect society. The perfection is much lower than that aspired to by Plato; but perfection it is. According to a very common view, this modern development was an idealistic development; Karl Becker wrote a book The Heavenly City, in the eighteenth century. But what is forgotten here is that the difference between the heavenly city of the eighteenth century and the heavenly city of Plato and Aristotle--that the foundations of the 18th century one were lower, and the foundations of Plato and Aristotle were higher. Plato and Aristotle, we may say, took--wanted to delineate the character of the just society by taking their bearings by men's perfection, by the highest things. And these modern thinkers trying to think in low but solid terms, took their bearings by the lowest, but for this very reason, the most powerful in man. The perfection in man, the highest perfection of man, is very rare, as everyone has admitted at all times. Therefore you cannot found on it. Can you not find something which is very common, which you can find in every man or almost every man very powerful? If you build on that a civil society, then you have built upon a solid foundation. Now this solid foundation is according to Hobbes man's urge, necessity, to preserve himself, meaning the individual's urge to preserve himself. In other words, his fear of death, and more specifically since we are speaking of social matters, his fear of violent death, of death at the hands of other men. Hobbes is not particularly interested in death due to disease or illness; there are some amusing documents of that. The only violent death which interests him is that coming from the hands of other man. Now--and Hobbes waxes poetic when he begins to speak of this desire of the fear of death and its majesty as the solid foundation of civil life.

But speaking now wholly unpoetically, the fear of death is only the worst side of the desire for self-preservation. In the traditional scheme, most clearly presented in this point by Thomas Aquinas, the desire for self-preservation is of course recognized as a fundamental inclination of man. But there is another one, the inclination towards society, which occupies a higher level, and the third and highest is the desire for knowledge of God, or desire for knowledge generally speaking. These higher stories are out--they do not play any role in Hobbes' construction of civil society. This only confirms what I said before, the lowering of the standards. The higher ones must somehow shift for themselves. There is another indication which I can only mention here, but I think I must mention it. In the traditional doctrine, especially as presented by Thomas Aquinas, these natural inclinations of man, give rise primarily to duties.

I mean it goes without saying that self-preservation is a duty, as is shown by the fact that suicide is a sin. The rights are somehow derivative from the duties. This is radically changed in Hobbes. The fundamental phenomenon is not any duty, but the right to preserve myself, and any duty which comes in is derivative from the fundamental rights. And this we find nowhere with such fundamental clarity as in Hobbes. Here you can also see the "realistic"(quote) character of this modern doctrine. That people should do their duties, one can only hope. But that they should be concerned with their rights, and fight for them, this is a much safer, more realistic assumption.

In Edmund Burke you find very beautiful remarks about this philosophy of the rights of man, as I will quote from memory: "The catechism of the rights of man is easily learned; the conclusions are in the passions." You don't have to think about it. But it would be more precise to say, the premises are in the passions, and the passion of fear primarily.

I must say something, although very few things, about the development after Hobbes; otherwise we will not understand the whole issue of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, and what is its subject. I must of course limit myself to the most telling and striking facts; therefore I will not speak now of Locke, but go

immediately to Rousseau. Because Locke, however important he is, in many respects has a fundamental scheme not so different from that of Hobbes as one would assume. The practical consequences which Locke drew from them are totally different we can say from those which Hobbes drew from them. But the theoretical differences are not so great. I would like now to make a pause and see whether you would like to take up anything at this point. It might help me to clarify and it might also help you if I did. ..yes, Mr. Levy.

MR. LEVY: Could you just repeat once more the reason why scientists want to know the history of science as shown by Einstein writing that book?

I said the mere fact, the brute fact, that there is today a much greater interest in the history of science. In Wisconsin there is an institute for the history of science; I do not know when that started, but rather recently founded.

MR. LEVY: I'd just like to know what the reason for that is.

I believe it has something to do with a so-called crisis of modern thought, that certain things which were indubitable and a matter of course are no longer so. Whether that is a conscious motivation in every historian of science, I do not know. Yes?

STUDENT: How is it that..(tape is reversed)

...which would compel us to qualify this statement. There was a tendency that still exists, I believe--you know there are people today who have no knowledge of earlier thought. Say, they know nineteenth and twentieth century thought to some extent. And they read Hobbes for the first time. And that is of course very outlandish, very medieval. And now they look at a medieval text and say, Oh, yes, there is much more medieval stuff than one would think. In the case of Spinoza, who was also a very revolutionary thinker, a very competent and very learned man has presented him as the last of the medievals. .. Why did these

people make these mistakes? Because they didn't listen to what Hobbes and Spinoza themselves said about what they were doing.

STUDENT: That's why you use this standard provisionally.

Yes, sure, but I must say, I believed Hobbes for quite some years, until I began to understand Machiavelli. And then I saw that the fundamental step was taken by Machiavelli. With this not unimportant difference: that Machiavelli simply was uninterested in the whole issue of natural law and natural right, whereas Hobbes was. And therefore Hobbes as it were tried to apply Machiavelli's insight stated in this chapter 15 of the Prince: to take our bearings by how men lived, and not by how they ought to live. Hobbes tried to apply this Machiavellian insight to natural law. That is the peculiarity of Hobbes. But the first decisive step was taken by Machiavelli. But that took some time, and that would be better discussed in the seminar on Machiavelli.

Now then I will turn to Rousseau, because in Rousseau this kind of political philosophy, which Hobbes had started, reached its first crisis. It is in a way very simple. Hobbes had said, man is by nature asocial. pre-social. And yet Hobbes took it for granted that these pre-social men, who led the life that was solitary, nasty, brutish and short, were able to enter civil society, by making the social contract with one another. And Rousseau as it were says to Hobbes: Look, if man is by nature pre-social, then he is by nature pre-rational. He cannot have reason because he doesn't use language. And these people in the state of nature, each with no communication with the others, could not have a common language. They might have sounds in common, but not language. Therefore Rousseau takes this great step that he questions, what Hobbes did not do, the traditional definition of man as a rational animal. Rationality is an acquisition of man, it does not belong to his nature, and he suggests provisionally, but nevertheless importantly, that the true definition of man is that man is a being endowed with freedom, as distinguished from rationality. We will come later on to see that this was a very important and powerful change. But if the

state of nature is a state in which pre-social and pre-rational men, — that means, in which man is a stupid animal, as Rousseau himself says, — how can one gain a standard of human conduct by looking at man in the state of nature? That seems to be absurd.

Furthermore, according to Hobbes, man has no natural end. That was understood in the old tradition. In spite of certain differences of opinion, the whole tradition held that man had a natural end, or rather a variety of ends, which however lead up to one highest end or highest good. Now I read to you what Hobbes says about this matter. Leviathan, Chapter 11, "Of the Difference of Manners."

By manners I mean not here decency of behavior, as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or *(laughter)* — or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the small morals...but those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.

In other words, I think Hobbes underestimates the importance of decent behavior for men living together in peace and unity. *(laughter)* You easily know the examples, I don't want to... what men could do in company which would make their company unbearable.

To which end we are to consider that the felicity of this life consists not in the repose of the mind satisfied, for there is no such finis ultimus, utmost *aim*, nor summum bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in books of the old moral philosophers.

These keystones in the older tradition are taken out.

Nor can a man any more live whose desires are at an end, than he whose senses and imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former *being still* but the way to the latter. So that, in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, which ceases only in death.

I think we can leave it at that. ...There is no highest good, there is nothing in which men's desire could find repose, could come to an end. But this desire for power after power is of course infinite, and only externally cut off by death. So...but we must have some fixed point to take our bearings. Since we cannot find it in the end of man, Hobbes finds it in the beginning. I do not mean by that a baby now-born, but men at the beginning, man in the state of nature. This beginning is in a way the end, because by being so abysmally bad, it points away from itself to civil society, in a negative way surely it is an end.

Now Rousseau goes much beyond this than Hobbes in this direction. For as I said in Hobbes the state of nature points toward civil society. But not in Rousseau. According to Rousseau, the state of nature is good; and why should any sane individual wish to leave it? On the contrary, since the state of nature is good, and we do no longer live in the state of nature, the formula would rather be, let us return to the state of nature, which formula is used by Rousseau, and it needs a long commentary, but it is not entirely wrong. When Rousseau treats childhood with unusual respect in this pedagogical work Emile, that has also to do with the questioning of teleology. From the traditional point of view, childhood is the preparation for other things; childhood is teleologically ordered. But if there is no teleology, childhood is as perfect as Adam. And therefore childhood has a value for itself, and not merely a preparation.

Now the state of nature in Rousseau undergoes a variety of modifications of a fundamentally accidental character, with the consequence that the state of nature becomes eventually like Hobbes' state of nature, and therefore must be abandoned. To that extent he rejoins Hobbes at this point. Yet in spite of that, the state of nature is the standard in Rousseau, since just civil society comes as close to the state of nature as civil society possibly can. Now what is the peculiarity of the state of nature? that man is not subject to any authority, that he is free in this sense. Now Rousseau's formula is that by entering civil society man must remain as free as he was theretofore, i.e., in the state of nature.

Now let us consider this somewhat more closely to understand it better. The construction of Hobbes was this: Man has by nature the right to self-preservation. Therefore he must have a right to the means of self-preservation, say a stick, or a gun, or for that matter, also food-- which was less important for Hobbes than it was for Locke, one of the great differences between the two men. Locke also is the more realistic one, as you will see. What is the use of all the sticks in the world, if you don't have food and water?

This is then the key question in this argument: means may be apt or inept. And a reasonable man would say, if men have a right to self-preservation, it is a right to apt means of self-preservation. But here judgement comes in: who is going to judge the apt means of self-preservation? Some people are good judges and some are bad. The answer Hobbes gives is, everyone must be a judge. And the reason-- not merely the wise man is to be judge--can be stated simply as follows: the wise man has better judgement, but he has much less interest in the self-preservation of the fool, than the fool. Therefore let the fool be the judge. Everyone is the judge. Now starting from this Rousseau makes this crucial step beyond Hobbes and Locke.

This right of the judgement of self-preservation must be preserved within civil society; whereas Hobbes and Locke have said or implied this right to judge ceases the moment men enter civil society. Now what are these judgements of the means of self-preservation in civil society? What is their popular name? Laws. Therefore according to Rousseau justice demands that in civil society everyone subject to the law must have had a say in the making of the law. That is a strictly necessary consequence. This may be very just; but still, if everyone, if the majority are fools, as Rousseau would have admitted, and would even emphasize, what kind of laws will we get? If everyone has the same say as everyone else? Mind you, there is no representative of parliamentary democracy, but direct democracy. Rousseau must therefore say that if this provision is accepted, the justice or reasonableness of the positive law is guaranteed. If no one is subject to the law who did not have a say in the making of the law, then the justice or reasonable-

ness of the law is guaranteed. In his terms, the general will, the will of the legislator, cannot err; for the sovereign is always what he ought to be. A sovereign can only be the community in the strict sense consisting of citizen members; otherwise it wouldn't be sovereign but a tyrant, according to Rousseau. Now if this is so, if the general will cannot err, it follows that there is no possibility or need for ever appealing from the positive law to the natural, obviously. If you have a mechanism which produces invariably just and wise laws you don't have to appeal from these laws ever to higher laws.

A society ^{constructed} according to natural law--that is what Rousseau wants to say--never has to appeal to natural law. And this of course gives a high degree of legal clarity. The positive law is unquestioned from any consideration of justice. Here we see again in a different way what I called the "realist," in quotations: the coincidence of the is and the ought. The sovereign is always what he ought to be--which when you hear it first sounds sheer insanity. According to the traditional view, men's desire must be subject to a vertical limitation (goes to board).

Here is men's desire--and here comes a limitation from above, either from the divine will, or from man's perfection. What Rousseau and by implication Hobbes and Locke, had in mind is... How did Machiavelli put it? This is the notion of imaginary principalities and imaginary commonwealths. For Machiavelli the kingdom of God would also be an imaginary kingdom. The only limitation which we can trust is the horizontal: the will of others. They will re-act and prevent us from our desires...here. (laughter) I am reduced to the status of certain animals (apparently means gesturing.) (Further laughter.) In other words, the vertical limitation is only an ought, and as powerless as oughts are. The vertical limitation, consisting in man's desire limited by the desires of his fellows, this is in principle sensible. But of course, this can also be --lead in itself to chaos. My desires are thwarted by others, and I thwart those of others, etc. How can this be done rationally? that is Rousseau's question. Or, this is another formulation, why is the general will beyond error? The answer of Rousseau is this: by generalization. That I have to explain. I have desires, all kinds

of silly, foolish, irrational desires. The same is true of my fellows. But then we introduce a mechanism. We say, the ultimate judgement of which desires are legitimate and which are illegitimate depends on the law--on the law the making of which will depend on your vote as much as anybody else's. Simple example. I enter the assembly, the town-meeting, with the irrational desire not to pay any taxes. I can't stand up and say, "I don't want to pay no taxes." (laughter) I have to say, "There ought to be a law that no one should pay any taxes." The moment I conceive of my desire in terms of a law, the moment I express my desire in terms of a law, I become already more reasonable, to say the least, than I was before. So the generalization of my particular foolish vicious will, is almost the opposite--the fully sufficient remedy for my antisociability.

You see, here again in this very simple example, I do not hold my desire against a natural law, an unwritten eternal law. What is sufficient to bring about justice, rationality, is the mere form, generality, which is of course rationality: reason always speaks in general or universal terms. In other words, the rational order, the order of the just society, is not the order according to nature, in any sense. The natural order as Rousseau understood it is radically conventional and counter-rational. By nature men are unequal; but the social contract replaces that. From natural inequality comes conventional equality--and that is just.

You remember what I said before about certain changes regarding the concept of nature. Keep this in mind. I will later bring it together.

Now if this is so, if my will, my desire, becomes rational, by taking on the form of a law, then I may say that by obeying the law everyone obeys himself. He obeys the law which he has imposed on himself. He is free, because he does not obey any other man. Freedom, obeying the law which one has imposed on oneself, is self-determination. There is no reference to something outside of man in any manner or form. But there is a difficulty here which I would like to present to you in Rousseau's own words. The Social Contract, book One, Chapter 8.

The transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society produces in man a most remarkable change. It substitutes in his conduct justice for instinct, and gives to his actions the morality which they previously lacked. [In the state of nature, there was no morality.] Only at that moment does the voice of duty replace the physical impasse, and right replace the arbitrary. And hence man, who had hitherto only been self-regarding, finds himself compelled to act on other principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.

The state of civil society is a state of reason, as Hobbes has said before.

Although he deprives himself in this state of many advantages which he had from nature, [against Hobbes] he regains therein so great ones his faculties exercise themselves and develop themselves. His ideas extend, his sentiments become ennobled, his whole soul raises to such a point, that if the misuses of that noble condition did not degrade man often beyond that state which he left, he would bless unceasingly the moment which liberated him forever, and which from a stupid and narrow animal, made him an intelligent being and a man [a human being.]

In other words, pre-social man, pre-political man, is not truly a man. Let us reduce this whole balance to terms easy to compare. What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom, and an unlimited right to everything which tempts him and on which he can lay his hands. What he gains is civil freedom, and the property, the true ownership, of that which he possesses. In order not to deceive oneself in this point, one must well distinguish the natural liberty which has no limits except the forces of the individual, from the civil liberties which are limited by the general will, i.e., by law. One could add to the acquisitions of the civil state a third point, a second point rather: moral liberty, which alone makes man truly master of himself, is more than civil liberty. For the impulse of appetite alone is slavery; and the obedience to the law which one has prescribed to oneself is liberty. I have probably said enough on this point, and the philosophic sense of the word liberty is not here my subject. The difficulty is this: moral liberty is

something apparently very different from civil liberty. Civil liberty can be understood fundamentally in Hobbesian terms, as derivative from self-preservation. Can this be done regarding moral liberty?

In an important part of his Emile, the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar, Rousseau has presented this issue of moral liberty in terms of a traditional spiritualistic, or dualistic metaphysics. In other words, God and the soul as a substance different or radically distinguished from body or matter. The question is, or concerns, the status of this metaphysics. According to Rousseau himself, this metaphysics is exposed to insoluble objections. What is the tenable basis of moral freedom if it cannot be found in traditional dualistic metaphysics? That is the question. Rousseau has not developed this theme sufficiently, and one reason, in fact the decisive reason, is this: because Rousseau saw a moral alternative, if we may say so, to moral liberty, to the life of duty, or of virtue. And this he called goodness. Goodness as he understands it is strictly natural, i.e., not acquired by human effort, and something fundamentally different from virtue and duty. I could elaborate that, but it would take infinite time.

By virtue of his doctrine of goodness which one can call a very sentimental doctrine--this kind of goodness which is perfectly compatible with doing rather terrible things, as Rousseau himself did. I mean, that he sent his children away to an orphanage, was surely not a virtuous action, as he admitted; but it was perfectly compatible with his goodness. That gives you an idea of how far his goodness can lead. But however this may be, Rousseau's concern with this difference between goodness and virtue is the explanation, I believe, why he did not elaborate, try to find, a new basis for moral liberty as distinguished from civil liberty and a basis different from traditional metaphysics. The man who did this, on the basis of Rousseau, was Kant. We cannot understand the whole issue if we do not consider briefly at least, Kant's solution to that problem. I see it is now time to end. I would like to mention only one point regarding Rousseau, which may explain the situation somewhat better. Hobbes had started from self-

preservation, preservation of the existence of each, as the fundamental point. Again, Rousseau thinks here more deeply than Hobbes does on the Hobbesian basis. He raises this question: Must you not presuppose that life or existence is good, if you attach to self-preservation, to preservation of life, the importance which you do attach to it? How do you know that life, mere life, mere existence is good? Rousseau says, I know it. And he refers to something which he calls the sentiment of existence, in which man becomes aware, senses directly, the goodness of life as life. It is possible that this is the first reference to the whole question of existence which is now in the center of discussion. At any rate, it remains the key to the issue of greatest concern to us; we shall follow up next time the problem of Rousseau by seeing in a very provisional manner how Kant solved Rousseau's problem, and put therewith moral philosophy and political philosophy on an entirely new basis. And the net result of this will be--I think that I should not keep you in unnecessary tension-- the key point I have in mind is this. The net result of Kant's work is this, that from Kant on the moral law is no longer a natural law, what it still was up to Kant. Nature has nothing whatever to do with morality, in an exaggerated statement, but sufficient. To live according to nature, which was the formula of the ancients, becomes a meaningless phrase. The depreciation of nature, which is already visible in Hobbes, as seen in the very notion of state of nature, as used by him, becomes decisive for modern thinking; and this is the substantive reason why political philosophy as originally understood by the classics, has become incredible. So in other words after I have presented some important stages ^{of} modern thought, we are somewhat better prepared for understanding the beginning of classical political philosophy.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 9 February 3, 1965

Now I have led up to the point that the possibility of political philosophy is today controversial; but on the other hand, the possibility and the necessity of the history of political philosophy is generally admitted. I showed then that the primary theme of the history of political philosophy is the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. This issue, the quarrel, is necessarily seen from the modern point of view, for the ancients could not possibly know the quarrel the moderns would raise. In the first place, indicated by the names of Hobbes and Machiavelli in particular, we find what we provisionally and colloquially call, realism, opposing itself to the imagined or imaginary principalities and republics of the classics. We might say, men like Hobbes and Machiavelli and many in alliance with them, oppose the utopianism of the classics. The term utopia was coined in 1516 by Sir Thomas More in his Utopia, and More is on the side of the classics. That was an act of irony, to speak of utopia, but not an act of rebellion against the classical tradition. The meaning of that attack was that the classics aimed too high, ultimately, because they had an unfounded trust in human nature and in nature in general. It suffices to remind you again of Hobbes' expression the state of nature, the state in which nature puts man, a most undesirable state. In his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality among Men,

Rousseau uses as a motto a statement from Aristotle's Politics, "What is natural must be viewed not in depraved things, but in ~~those~~ which are according to nature." Now he quotes it in Latin translation. One could as well have said, in Latin, not in depraved things, but in those which are in their natural state, in status naturalis, the state of nature. This is the old meaning of the state of nature, according to which the state of nature is the state of health or perfection. Even in Hobbes, the state of nature has sometimes this meaning. But this was the old meaning, not the meaning peculiar to Hobbes and also to Rousseau.

Let us keep this in mind. Ultimately at the root of the whole dissent we find a radical change regarding nature.

I spoke last time especially of Rousseau's critique of Hobbes. In this critique, the project of Hobbes and Locke and other men of that generation, experience is first crisis. Rousseau argues that precisely if the state of nature is pre-social or asocial as Hobbes asserted, it must be pre-rational. Hence man in the state of nature strictly understood must have been not yet a full human being but a stupid animal. Here the question arises immediately, how can the state of nature be any more used as a standard, if the state of nature is subhuman?

The state of nature was a kind of standard for Hobbes; for Locke too, but negatively. Since it was so terrible--nasty, brutish and short--let's get out of it as fast as we can. It pointed away from itself to civil society. Furthermore, according to Rousseau, the just or healthy society does no longer need or permit an appeal from the positive law to the natural law. The natural law is another sign of the depreciation of nature. The appeal to the natural law is no longer possible, or is unnecessary. But still we want to have just positive laws, not unjust ones. Now the justice of the positive laws is guaranteed according to Rousseau, by the mere form of law. The law is made by the citizen body; everyone subject to the law must have had a say in the making of the law; and the law pronounces only on general subjects. This guarantees the justice of the positive laws. So the form of law, the mere fact that it is general, is sufficient--you do not have to have recourse to human nature, and to a natural law.

But there is great obscurity in Rousseau, regarding the relation between political liberty and moral liberty; or between law and morality in general. Morality proper, according to Rousseau, is based on dualistic metaphysics--a metaphysics which distinguishes between corporeal and incorporeal substances, the latter being God and the soul. But that dualistic metaphysics, according to Rousseau, is exposed to insoluble objections. Now these difficulties which Rousseau encountered but did

not solve, were solved by Kant. Kant is the greatest pupil of Rousseau. There is an autobiographic diary utterance of Kant to the effect that it was Rousseau who brought him in to the right shape--a statement which he has not made about any other man. A very famous statement of Kant about what he owed to Hume--Hume awakened him from the dogmatic slumber, Kant said--but this is not comparable in breadth to what Kant says about what he owed to Rousseau. Now we have therefore to turn to Kant and mention the bare minimum without which we cannot understand anything.

Now according to Kant morality cannot be based on this dualistic metaphysics, which according to Rousseau is exposed to historical objections. God and the soul are unknowable. This does not mean that the opposite view, say, materialism, the view that everything that is is corporeal, is true. Materialism, or the view underlying modern physics, has as its premise, the principle of causality. And this principle of causality, on which the whole edifice rests, had been subjected to a radical critique by David Hume. One can reduce the gist of Hume's critique to this formula. Science, rationality in the the ^{highest} sense, rests on an irrational foundation. Custom, mere custom, not rationality, is underlying our thinking in terms of causality.

Kant opposed this view, trying to save the dignity of science, and asserts, "Science is rational; but it is limited to the phenomenal world," which Kant distinguished from what he called, with a strange expression, the thing in itself...meaning, beings as we cannot know them, but which must be supposed to underlie the things which we know, the phenomenal things. Reason supplies only the form of knowledge; for its content it depends on sense-experience. Hence there cannot be knowledge of non-sensible things; because we do not have sense-data regarding God and the soul. More precisely, that which makes possible knowledge of the phenomenal world, is the understanding, in contradistinction to reason. It is the understanding which prescribes nature its laws. By nature Kant understands here the totality of phenomena, things of which we can have, directly or indirectly, sense-experience. Reason proper, that in man which is not and cannot be dependent or cooperative

with, sense-experience proper, supplies only so-called regulative principles, not the constitutive principles, not the principles underlying the understanding of phenomena in common sense or in science. Now while reason has--pure reason, the title of Kant's book was The Critique of Pure Reason--while pure reason is so weak, in the sphere of theory, it is sufficient for man's guidance in the sphere of the practical. Reason as *practical* depends in no way on experience, whereas all theoretical knowledge depends directly or indirectly on experience. Practical reason describes, without any borrowings whatever from experience, universally valid laws of action. The only access to the absolute, one could say, the *infinite*, you have, according to Kant, is through the moral law, not through science. Now this implies that the laws prescribed by practical reason, think of such laws as "Thou shalt not lie"--the moral laws-- are not based in any way on knowledge of nature, and in particular of human nature. Hence the moral law can no longer be called as it has been called before, the natural law. The natural laws are laws from now on like the Newtonian laws; whereas in the old usage, the moral law was called positive or natural law. Now what is this?

The moral law must be valid, not only for man, but for all intelligent beings. That is to say, for God too. And hence how can it be based on the understanding of human nature? And the reason which Kant would give is this: if God's actions are not to be understood in terms of the moral law, then God might conceivably do things which are unjust. Think of the great difficulties regarding the sacrifice of Isaac, or any other problems of this kind. This tendency of the whole 18th century to subject God to the moral law reaches its climax in Kant's teaching. Furthermore, the moral law must be universally valid, without any ifs and buts. For example, thou shalt not murder--no ifs and buts. Thou shalt not lie--no ifs and buts. But knowledge of human nature is based on experience; and experience cannot supply universally valid or apodeictic laws.

Experience can tell us only, this was so always hitherto. But that doesn't tell us anything about the future. And if you think of the importance of the future, especially the social future, for moral orientation--that is of course an enormous liberation for all kinds of things which seem to be denied by any previous experience of men. The moral law cannot be based on anything else, or cannot be deduced from anything else. It cannot be derived from nature or from God. Not from nature, because we have only empirical knowledge of nature; nor from God, because we do not have any theoretical knowledge of God. The moral law, therefore, liberates man from the tutelage of nature, which includes here also previous custom. If the moral law were a natural law, nature would impose a law on man. Therefore there would be what Kant calls heteronomy of the will. The will dependent on something outside of the will. The will would not give a law to itself; nature would give it law. And therefore there would not be self-legislation strictly understood--or autonomy. If freedom is autonomy, will must give a law to itself and must not borrow it or take it over from any other source.

Now how is such a moral law possible? The moral law is the law of reason, of pure reason in no way dependent on experience in any shape or form. Where does it get its content? Kant's answer is this: the form of reason supplies the content. The form of law, and law means generality, universality, rationality--is sufficient to supply the moral law. And this is formulated by Kant in what he calls the Categorical imperative, which claims to be an authentic interpretation of what we all experience when we have a bad conscience, for example. It is that in us which reminds us of our duty. Now the categorical imperative says, act in such a way that the maxim of your action can be made, and be understood, as universally valid laws binding all intelligent beings.

That reminds of Rousseau's more narrow consideration regarding the positive law. I give you an example. I enter the assembly with the desire not to pay any taxes. And then I have to express this desire in the form of a law: from now on, no one has to pay any taxes. I am replaced by anyone. And then I can see that my desire is foolish--

because if no one pays any taxes then there will be no roads, no taxes, and what have you.

Now Kant radicalizes this profoundly--he speaks not of my desire but of my maxim...implying that in all our actions, we ~~wake~~ use of general principles, whether we are aware of it or not. Maxims.. of the syllogism. For example, some people act on the maxim, I want to get along in the world by hook and by crook. They may not even know that they are acting on that. But they could know. And now we try--Kant says we make an experiment. Let us conceive of this or any maxim as a universally binding law. Every man is morally obliged to get ahead in the world, by hook and by crook. Not only permitted but obliged, that is the meaning of law. And then we can see, Kant asserts, that this is impossible as universal law. Men could not live if they were all obliged to act in this manner.

If this is the character of the moral law, which has infinite political implications, it is impossible to criticize political proposals, such as universal peace, United Nations, or in whichever form it may appear, on the grounds that they disagree with human nature. Or with experience. Because this means previous experience. And what can you possibly know of what man is capable in the future? Thus morality as Kant understands it liberates man from the tutelage of nature. That man is able to do what *he* is obliged to do, goes for Kant without saying. Thou canst what thou oughtst. Man is capable therefore, for example, of establishing perpetual peace. The only criterion which remains here since no recourse to human nature is possible is that of sheer self-contradiction. In other words, sheer self-contradiction, i.e., formal irrationality, this is a clear sign that the moral law in question cannot be a moral law. The fundamental concern is with the moral law. That means also it is not with the good, or in particular with the highest good, or the end. I read to you a passage last time from Hobbes where he rejects the notion of the summum bonum, in Leviathan chapter 11. In a different way, in a very different way but still not entirely unconnected, Kant rejects the starting of moral reflections from the good. No concept of the good, including the highest good, as an object, must determine the moral law. But the moral law determines the concept of the good.

The traditional view from classical antiquity was: to live well means to live according to nature. In order to understand Kant's reasoning, we raise this simple question: why is this so? Why is living well, living according to nature? Why is the natural order, granted we know it, in a way, good? Which is after all presupposed. Are not the basest and most destructive passions as natural as the noblest sorts?

In other words, we would have to raise the question, which natural inclinations are to be respected, and which are to be rejected? This question is answered by Kant's categorical imperative. The natural is to be rejected. It is good to the extent to which by transgressing it I will something which I cannot will to be a universal law. For example, if I desire food, what food I need for the sustenance of my life, I can easily see a moral law commanding everyone to seek food for the sustenance of his body is compatible, is thinkable as a law obliging all men. But if I desire to be superior to others, and transform this into a universal law, everyone should strive to outdo everyone else, I see chaos. The only thing which we know to be irreducible to anything else, or to be of absolute worth, is the moral law, or a will agreeing with the moral law, a good will. Kant believes to act in agreement with our ordinary everyday, prephilosophic moral understanding. We take it for granted that we should be decent. But if someone raises the question, why should I be decent? he has already ceased to be decent. This makes sense. And if this is properly elaborated, we arrive at the view that the law that we ought to be decent does not have a why, it cannot be reduced to anything else. Man owes his dignity to the moral law alone. From this one can draw the conclusion, which Kant himself did not draw, but a famous successor did: Man's duty consists in subjugating everything else, in him and without him, to the moral law. Because everything else has no intrinsic worth. Let us assume that the moral law demands from everyone virtuous activity, in the sense of full and uniform development of all his faculties and the exercise of the faculties jointly with others, which would be compatible, which would be susceptible of the universalization spoken of. But is such a development possible? As long as

everyone is crippled, as a consequence of the division of labor, or of social inequality? How can he develop all his faculties jointly with others in such a condition? A difficulty raised by Ficht But from here there is only one step to what one can call Marx's moral principles. Marx speaks very emphatically of the pushing back of nature's limits. Nature is only an obstacle to be overcome, or a thing to be used to man's moral purposes--nature does not supply guidance in any way. This is--the foundation for that was laid by Kant more than by any other one.

I would like to mention only a few points regarding the later development. In the eighteenth century, prior to Kant, a new discipline of philosophy emerged--aesthetics. This thing did not exist in the past. There are discussions, and that was a very important theme in the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, of the beautiful. But now a new science emerges which deals with--not metaphysics--which deals with the beautiful, which is aesthetics. The name comes from the Greek word aisthesis, sense-perception, and it is indicated that the beautiful is the sensuously beautiful. In the Platonic tradition it was understood that you cannot understand the sensuously beautiful except in the light of the intellectually, or let us say, ideally beautiful. This connection is divorced; the sensuously beautiful, sounds, colors, and so on--are ^{to be} understood on their own terms--the theme of aesthetics.

Now in the post-Kantian development of aesthetics, and the greatest of them is probably Hegel's aesthetics--it is still admitted that there are things by nature beautiful. Say, human bodies, horses, certain breeds of dogs, and so forth. But all natural things by nature beautiful are infinitely less important from the point of view of beauty than works of art. It is for this reason that today aesthetics means for all practical purposes, the philosophy of fine art, and has no longer anything whatever to do with that which is by nature beautiful.

I will read to you a few more passages from a much later thinker, but belonging to the same tradition. Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, number 9.

"According to nature" you wish to live? O, noble Stoics, how your words deceive! Think of a being like nature, immoderately wasteful, immoderately indifferent, devoid of intentions and considerateness, desolate and uncertain at the same time. Think of indifference enthroned: how could you live in accordance with this indifference?

In other words, the thought of living according to nature is based on a total misunderstanding of how nature truly is. There is another paragraph in the same work of Nietzsche, paragraph 188:

Every morality, in contrast to *laissez aller*, is a work of tyranny against "nature," also against "reason"; but this is not an objection to it, not unless one wished to decree, proceeding from some kind of morality, that all types of tyranny and irrationality are to be forbidden. What is essential and of inestimable value in each morality is that it is a long-lasting restraint. To understand Stoicism or Port-Royal or Puritanism, it is well to remember the restraints under which any language hitherto has reached its peak of power and subtlety--the restraints of metrics, the tyranny of rhyme and rhythm.

How much trouble the poets and orators of all peoples have taken--not excepting several of today's prose writers with an inexorable conscience in their ear--"for the sake of a folly," say the utilitarian fools, who think they are clever. "In deference to arbitrary laws," say the anarchists, who imagine they are free, in fact free-thinkers. The strange fact however is that everything of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and craftsmanlike certainty that one can find on earth, whether it applies to thinking or ruling or speaking or persuading, in the arts as well as in codes of conduct, would never have developed, save through the tyranny of such arbitrary laws. Indeed the probability is strong that this is "nature" and "natural"--and not *laissez aller* [to let things go].

And so he develops it at rather great length in this paragraph. And then toward the end:

Look at any morality, you will see that it is its nature to teach hatred of *laissez aller*, of too much freedom, and to implant the need for limited horizons, for the nearest task. It teaches the narrowing of perspective--in other words, stupidity in a certain sense, as a condition necessary for life and growth.

"Thou shalt obey--someone and for a long time: if not, you perish and you lose the last self-respect"--this seems to be the moral imperative of nature. It is neither "categorical" Δ the categorical imperative does not say "if not" ∇ as old Kant demanded (observe the "if not") not is it directed to any individual (but what does nature care about an individual?) But it is directed to peoples, races, ages, classes--and above all to the whole animal known as man, to mankind.

Now this paragraph is remarkable for other reasons as well, not directly connected with what I am discussing now. But the remarkable thing is this: throughout the paragraph, Nietzsche uses the word nature in quotation marks, except in the last statement, we have mentioned that. Nietzsche was an extremely careful writer, and this is not an accident. In this strange use or non-use of quotation marks, a profound difficulty reveals itself. Nietzsche cannot strictly speak any more of nature--therefore the quotations. And yet he needs nature. He cannot speak of nature anymore, nature has become for him radically problematic; that which for Kant was the justification of nature, namely that nature is the only rational interpretation of sense-data, of the phenomenal world--this has become doubtful for Nietzsche. We can say, the understanding of things in terms of modern science, or for that matter, in terms of Greek or Babylonian science, is a historically contingent way of interpreting things--to use the most general term we can use here. In other words, the phenomenon we have discussed under the heading historicism. Now if we draw a conclusion from these remarks and from the examples which could be considerably enlarged, we may make this tentative suggestion, I believe surely a worthwhile suggestion: that what is characteristic of modernity from its beginning and to the present day is the questioning of nature as it was understood in classical and premodern times in general.

Now this seems to be an absurd, not to say idiotic statement: who does not know *of* the immense importance of natural science, the science of nature, in the modern world? But the question is, on what is the emphasis, when we speak of natural science in modern times, and in pre-modern times? Natural science is used by the Greeks as well as by the moderns. But in pre-modern times, the emphasis is of course, it is the science of nature. In modern times, the emphasis is altogether on science, so much so that we don't even bother to add, natural science. We say a man is a scientist, that is of course a natural scientist; when he is a scientist of another kind, then we say, a social scientist. This is a qualified scientist, not a scientist simply. In other words, reminding you of something which I have alluded to before, the great questionings of nature, whether

nature is the concern of modern natural science, is not a human construct--and by this very fact, not nature proper. I am aware of the fact that there is or at least was a school in this country which called itself Naturalism. Naturalism. Now this seems to show that nature is very important and crucial, also for moral orientation, in our time. But this can easily be shown to be incorrect. Because the characteristic thesis of Naturalism is, nature is not a term of distinction. In plain English, everything that is, is natural. But if everything that is, is natural, that makes nature questionable the other way around, which we can see very soon when we consider the rudiments of the original conception of nature.

This was indeed an important, a most important ingredient, of the whole modern development. I quote to you a sentence from Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, Chapter 4:

All things are determined by the laws of universal nature, both regarding existence and operation, in a certain and determined manner.

In other words, every event whether it is a human action, or lightning, or whatever you have, is determined, must be understood ultimately in terms of the universal laws of nature. This is the formulation of naturalism; nature is not a term of distinction. And we will see later on, as I indicated, that we cannot understand--when we turn to the Greek notion of nature, the pre-modern notion, we shall see immediately that even for so-called materialists, nature is a term of distinction. Not all things are natural. We are of course familiar with that fact--without any learning, from an ordinary understanding, this is not a natural thing proper--it is an artifact. But I will have to take this up in a broader context.

Now after this general remark, necessary for the reason indicated about the modern development, I would now like to turn to the beginning, to Greek or classical political philosophy. But before I do that, I would like to find out whether there is any point you would like to raise now. Mr. Glenn?

MR. GLENN: From the little that I know of John Dewey, I don't think he fits into the modern naturalism...

I think he does. Well, I don't claim to be an expert in that matter, but the sentence which I quoted, I found in a book Naturalism, edited by people who were affiliated with Dewey.

MR. GLENN: I think he still looks to nature for a guide to moral activity.

Yes, that is quite true, and I see now what you mean. There is, at least in Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, which is I suppose his most important ethical work--this has a formal character which reminds of Aristotelian ethics. To that extent he indeed uses nature as a guide. The content, the substance, is wholly un-Aristotelian. It is briefly what he says about the cooperation of impulse and custom, or rather custom and impulse. How they must cooperate and how they must be balanced to one another. This is somehow based on the nature of man or the nature of human society. But *then* we *must* reconcile this with his general historicism or relativism by leaving it entirely open as to what kind of custom or what kind of impulse it is--in every stage of human development, except in very stationary society, perhaps, there is custom. And there is also impulse, individual impulse, partly generated by the custom, which rebels against it. And now what is necessary is to strike a reasonable balance between the two, which would make possible the highest growth of the individual and of the society. But we would have...Mr. Glenn, all my statements are in need of long footnotes. You know?

I am familiar with the fact that the Aristotelian tradition, the same as the Thomistic tradition; lasted very long into modern times. I *mean*, I am not speaking now of Catholic universities, but even in the Protestant universities of Germany, the prevalent view in the eighteenth century, prior to Kant, was a modified Thomistic *view*.

I am not speaking now of the theological teaching proper, but the philosophic teaching. The orientation by the natural perfection of man. But these men were--the most famous name is that of Christian Wolff--but these men are practically forgotten. I mean the men who molded modernity, they are those who opposed the classical tradition. And only in very rare cases are these reactionaries remembered. I think the most famous case is that of Swift, at least in the English-speaking countries. ...Is there any other point you would like to raise?

STUDENT: How would Aristotle, and maybe you're going to come to this, but how would Aristotle respond to the view, to the modern view of nature? He surely must have recognized these....

Not quite. No. I mean, Aristotle...well, let me state it as simply as I can. Such a thing as the view that there are only bodies or bodily things, was of course known to Aristotle. Let us call this view materialism, as it is ordinarily called. That he knew. Furthermore, he knew of philosophies which try to understand the whole somehow in mathematical terms--the Pythagoreans are the most well-known example. But the combination of corporealism with mathematics, and in addition, something which did not exist in classical antiquity, the modern experiment, namely the experiment which is artificial, planned,...The word experiment means originally simply an experience. I go around and see a strange animal and describe it--that is an experimentum. But this is of course not the modern experiment. The modern experiment is what Bacon called something which comes out when you torture nature, put her to the test. That is to say, you try to bring about conditions which never or very rarely are to be found in nature--say, a completely airless movement--motion without any air, fall without any air--and using these extreme cases, which strictly speaking, occur never, as the key to everything. This would have been the Aristotelian reaction. How can you make an impossibility the key to what is actual? And that is roughly--the resistance of the Aristotelians to what is modern, the primary resistance, had to do

with that.

STUDENT: On a lower level, though, Aristotle must have known that nature was not simply teleological, that there was a lot of needless waste--

Aristotle would not have granted that. I am sure that he would have tried to show that what we call waste is based on a very superficial understanding. Take one example, which is quite well-known, the enormous waste of human sperma for the generation of a single child. And it may not even lead to that intended result. I think Aristotle would say, "How could it be otherwise, given the situation in the uterus, and so on, that you have to waste very very much in order to give a single sperma the chance to fertilize an egg?" He would not have admitted that. But you have to ask someone who knows much more modern science, and understands Aristotle, Aristotle's Physics and biological works, to see--to answer that question properly.

I will now begin with my discussion of the classical thought. And I begin from the beginning. Since we seem to have observed that the key question concerns nature, we begin with the very first mention of the word nature in available Greek literature. And this is in Homer, The Odyssey, book 10--the only mention of nature in Homer. The story is told not by Homer himself, but by Odysseus. And Odysseus' comrades had been captured by this goddess-witch Circe. And Odysseus tried to liberate them. But then a divine helper, the god Hermes, comes and warns him of the terrific powers of that witch, and wishes to protect him. Hermes says to Odysseus, but we know it of course only through Odysseus: "I can keep you clear of harm, and give you safety. Here, take this potent herb and go to Circe's house. This shall protect your lives against the evil day. And I will tell you all the magic arts of Circe. She will prepare for you a potion and cast drugs into your food. But even so she cannot harm you, because the potent herb which I shall give you will not permit it. And let

me tell you more. When Circe turns against you her long band, then draw the sharp sword from your thigh and spring upon Circe as if you meant to slay her. She then will cower and bid you to her bed. And do not refuse the goddess's bed. But that so she may release your men and care for you."

[Odysseus was a married man, and this is not unimportant.]
 "But bid her swear the blessed ones' great oath, that she is not meaning now to blot you a new bow, nor when she has stripped, to leave you feeble and unmanned." As he thus spoke, Hermes gave the herb, drawing it from the ground, and pointed out its nature. "Black at the root it is, like milk its blossom; and the gods, who have a different language, call it Moly. Hard it is for a mortal man to dig; but the gods can do everything."

Now this is a remarkable story. The gods can do everything, the gods are omnipotent. But this is obviously not meant, because the gods are omnipotent as a consequence of their knowledge of their natures of things. And over these natures, they do not have any control. This is the first statement, and it is rich in implications--some of which we will gradually make clear.

Things have their natures, which means here they have certain looks--and they have certain powers. This one has the power to protect one against Circe's charm. Looks and powers. In Greek, *εἶδος* and *δυναμῖς* are already here implied.

I give you another *wholly* unscientific, or unphilosophic statement about nature, which is much later, but still relatively early. Thucydides speaks somewhere in his history of the nature of a locality or place--by which he means: the nature of a place--they landed in enemy territory and it is important for them how the nature of the place is--whether it is a jungle or it is a place that you can see, etc. Now then he changes the expression, and instead of speaking of the nature of the place, he says, the place itself. As distinguished from something which is not the place itself, but something added to it. Now this is clear: fortifications, which they built, in order to strengthen the place still more. More generally stated, the nature

of the things, the thing in itself is understood in contradistinction to human art, to techne. From which such words as technical and technology are derived. (tape is reversed)

...He is a just man, in addition he is a human being, and he has this and this color hair, and so on. But justice itself, nothing added to it--and nothing lacking. Because the just man may not be of perfect justice. That is the same as nature. Therefore, for Plato the ideas are the natures, however unintelligible that may seem at first hearing. But let us only keep this simple passage of Thucydides in mind, where it is clear the nature of the thing is understood in contradistinction to what men make of it, to human art.

Now we may say that thus far the notion of nature is commonsensical, pre-philosophic or prescientific. But here we must remind ourselves for a moment of our historical friends who say, this was Greek common sense, not common sense without qualification, because not all languages, even of very highly civilized peoples, have a word for nature. My favorite example is the Old Testament, where there is no such word. So there is--still, the point is, nevertheless, that the distinction is immediately intelligible to us today, I take it, and it was also without great difficulty intelligible to other nations who did not know Greek. The thought was easily translatable with the help of artificially coined words, for example into Hebrew and Arabic. Now let us--but still, up to this point, there is nothing particularly striking.

I remind you again of the fact that we owe this interesting story to Odysseus. Now Odysseus is one of the many Homeric heroes, but he is a peculiar man. He is very wily, as we know. But I am now concerned with another characteristic; he is the greatest traveler among the Homeric heroes. You know what happened to him on his way back; and he stayed longer away from home than anybody else. And there is, there were other Greek travellers on other kinds of levels; but the most famous of them after Odysseus probably is the historian Herodotus.

Now let us see how nature appears in the light of traveller's experiences. I am speaking of very simple ones. The traveller,

let us say, goes to Persia. And there he makes the observation that fire burns in Persia just as it burns in Greece. The example is taken literally from Aristotle, yes? But why is this so strange? Because so many things in Persia are so different from the way they are in Greece. For take the laws regarding inheritance. I know nothing about them, but I suppose they were different in Persia from those in Greece. (laughter) ..Surely the forms of government were manifestly different; and last but not least the gods worshipped by the Persians differed from the gods worshipped by the Greeks. All these things, if we generalize, differ from country to country; whereas the fact that the characteristics of water, fire and so on, do not differ--I hope you will not hold against me that there might be hot springs in a given country and none in another--but that doesn't affect the fundamental things. Now this leads to another distinction which is much more fertile in consequence--the distinction not between nature and art, which is elementary: the leather, or the skin, and then the shoe. That is a distinction between nature and (goes to board)...and nomos. One can translate it to begin with by law, custom, convention. The meaning is this: there are things which are by nature. Say dogs, lightning, and what have you, Then there are things which are by virtue of human making: shoes, chairs. But there is a third kind of thing: things which are only by virtue of being held in reverence. Or more generally stated, and perhaps more precisely stated, by virtue of being held. Using holding here in the sense in which it is used of judges, holding or judging. But not quite the same. Of being held. Of being believed in, In the charge, the accusation of Socrates, it is called, Socrates commits an unjust act, by not believing in, by not holding in reverence, by not holding the gods held by the city. This is--at this point we go beyond that which is the merely prephilosophic and prescientific understanding of nature. And this is decisive for the emergence of political philosophy. I will give you an example of that distinction which is at first glance not recognizeable.

At the beginning of the seventh book of Plato's Republic you find the simile of the cave, a simile which is meant to show man what his situation is in regard to true education, i.e., philosophy. Men are primarily cave-dwellers, not in the sense of what modern pre-history tells us, but we, here, in a civilized country, or wherever, we are cave-dwellers. We see nothing that is natural light, we don't see the light of the sun. We see nothing but the shadows of artifacts, and this we do only because there is an artificial light. Nothing but the shadows of artifacts. Artifacts remind us of course of the distinction between nature and techne. But the shadows of artifacts remind us in a way of something that is even less substantial than techne. What Plato means to suggest is that men see primarily everything in the light of authoritative opinions. Authoritative opinions, not just fabricated things. These opinions are in a sense, man-made; therefore Plato speaks of artifacts. But they are not known to be man-made. Now this distinction between physis and nomos is absolutely crucial. According to a well-known textbook version, this is an invention of the sophists, of certain more or less unscrupulous money-makers and prestige-hunters of the fifth century, of whom we have no writings left, by the way, or hardly any--and we know chiefly through Platonic dialogues. But this is *historically* simply not true. This distinction between physis and nomos, between nature and convention, is essential to classical political philosophy. And even to the whole tradition. As long as the classical tradition lasted, a distinction was made between the positive law and the natural law. The natural law which is by itself and the positive law which has its ground in human decisions, human opinions, were crucial. I will indicate this briefly, postponing a development of that until next time.

Once this distinction had sunk in, the question arose, what about morality, as we call it? The Greeks said, what about *the just* and the noble? Is this merely by convention, or is it at least partly natural? And this became to begin with, the key issue. And one can say that classical political philosophy, the political philosophy founded by

Socrates, constituted itself by establishing the view that the *just* and the noble are fundamentally natural and not merely conventional. And the modern view, as we have already indicated, modified that very profoundly, of course not in the sense in which the *Sophists* had understood that.

Before I go on I would like to read to you a remark of Hegel, which is very helpful for clarifying the difference between the ancients and the moderns. Now this sentence reads as follows, and you must listen carefully, because Hegel's sentences are quite complicated, and even the English translation, which I haven't made, has given the Hegelian sentences the simplicity of sentences of Addison.

The manner of studying in ancient times is *distinct* from that of modern times, in that the former [the study in ancient times] consisted in the veritable training and perfecting of the natural consciousness. [Natural consciousness means here the primary consciousness, not yet specialised.] Trying its powers at each part of its life severally, and philosophizing about everything it came across--

In other words, proceeding in a very unsystematic manner.

The natural consciousness transformed itself into a universality of abstract understandings which was active in every matter, and in every respect.

Although it was unsystematic, it was universal; there was no question which it didn't raise.

In modern times, however, the individual finds the abstract form ready-made.

This rightly understood is very true. What happened in classical philosophy, especially political philosophy, is the primary acquisition of concepts, that is to say, of philosophic or scientific concepts, as distinguished from the use of concepts already acquired--not to say, the transformation of concepts already acquired. This is I think the

peculiar charm which everyone experiences when reading a Platonic dialogue, but I think also when reading very important parts of the Aristotelian writings. This way which is not systematic, methodical, in our sense, and yet very open-minded. And starting from scratch. Regarding classical political philosophy in particular, we must say that it is therefore for the reason indicated by Hegel, closer to political life than modern political philosophy. This may seem strange, given the utopianism of the classics and the realism of the moderns, but you have only to make one simple experiment. The most realistic and tough study of political bosses and any other unsavory things, these are written of course in a certain language. I am not speaking now of what someone in a political campaign does, these are not scientific studies. But you must, you have read such studies, and this language is surely not the language of the political arena; whereas the Platonic, Aristotelian analysis, however far away they might lead from what everyone in the political arena knows and admits, are written in a language which is fundamentally that of everyday life. One can say that there is not a single technical term, in the properly political writings, of Plato and Aristotle; whereas surely in modern times, to some extent already in the pre-modern tradition, but surely in modern times, a scientific or philosophic language takes over. If you for example take such distinctions as Hobbes' state of nature, state of civil society, as meant by Hobbes, no one would have ever thought of these things in political debate proper. Whereas all the terms used by Plato and Aristotle for designating political phenomena are everyday terms. What they do, especially Aristotle, is to define them more precisely, and this more precise definition became then the great heritage of the West. But the starting-point is ordinary understanding which we can with not too great difficulty re-activate for ourselves. Partly it is necessary for the purpose to learn something of Greek, so then one is not completely at the mercy of the translators. And then one must make some other efforts. I have indicated the question when I spoke about Collingwood's partly justified criticism of modern philosophers.

After the foundation was laid, fundamentally after Aristotle, the relation of the political philosophers to political life was always mediated by an already existing tradition of political philosophy. No such tradition interfered in the beginning, in the founding epoch. Now this has a broader basis. Classical philosophy in general is not based on that peculiar skepticism on which modern philosophy is fundamentally based, *which* is most clearly shown in the philosophy of Descartes. It is not based on a distrust of our primary awareness of things and people; therefore you can take over these terms. You have to make them clearer, avoid ambiguities, and so on. But fundamentally it is the same way of understanding.

I will give you a simple example of the peculiar artificial character that modern thinking has about these matters as contrasted with the classical. Descartes began to speak of the ego; and in some European languages they use even--not the Latin word ego but le moi, or in German Das Ich; in English you can't use it well because people might think of the eye as part of the body, so we say the ego. But look at the formation from a linguistic point of view. Who speaks in ordinary life, if he is not corrupted, of the ego? (laughter) And even here today, especially in half-psychoanalytic language, "inflated ego," --this has something very strange and surely artificial about it. People know of the ego not from ordinary experience but via science. Their understanding of their fellow humans is mediated by certain sciences, true or pseudo-sciences.

Now people became aware gradually in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that there is something wrong in that Cartesian egocentricism. And people became aware of the fact that I could not know myself as an ego, as an I, except if I recognized another man, at least, whom they called a "Thou." And then they may of course also speak of the "we." Now no one would use these terms in everyday language, and we don't need them. But the phenomenon meant by these people who speak of the ego, thou and we, as the true phenomenon of people living together in trust and intimacy, was of course known to man like Plato and Aristotle

because this is a necessity of human life. But how did they speak about it? They spoke of it as friendship, friendship having here the broad meaning where of course the relation between husband and wife would also be a form of friendship. You^{see} when you speak of friendship, you are much closer to the phenomenon than if you speak of the I, thou and we. Because when you speak of friendship you only continue what you do in everyday life. You say, he is my friend, they are friends. You would never say, except in a very stilted way, he is my alter ego. This can be said, but this is not the ordinary way of talking. When you speak to him, you say, thou. Well, not in present-day English, but in older languages which make a distinction between the second-person plural and singular.

In other words, Aristotle starts, and Plato too, in their philosophic discussions, they continue the way of talking about which is the ordinary way of talking about. He does not even preserve, in philosophic or scientific discussion, the speaking to a friend. That would be absurd, if Aristotle had written his treatises in the form of a letter to Nicomachus or whoever it might be. This I mean by the direct relation to political and ordinary life which is preserved in classical political philosophy and does not exist in modern political philosophy. This is only superficially in conflict with the fact that modern political philosophy is in a way realistic and classical political philosophy is quote *idealistic*. Perhaps the very utopianism of the classics is more in agreement with what is going on in the marketplace than a certain toughness, tough-headedness, aspired to by present-day and earlier academicians. That we must perhaps consider later.

Generally speaking, I would say that the political philosophy of the classics, the point of view which they take is that of ordinary political life, of the citizen or statesman, and they look in the same direction as he looks, the same perspective. They only try to look further afield, much further afield. It is ^{not} a different perspective. They do not have the posture of an outside spectator who sees the political arena as one in which the big fishes swallow the small

ones, for example--looking at it from the outside and then trying to learn something about human beings as one can learn about stones and rats, and then apply it. They have their stand in the political sphere and look at it as political men. This leads eventually to some complications, but this is the starting-point. And we must *keep* this in mind, if we want to understand. This is so to say the matrix of classical political philosophy.

Well, I will say a few more words about this and then pursue the theme of nature and convention more fully. And then I hope we can have a discussion about the classical work of classical political philosophy, Aristotle's Politics, ..and see what kind of a thing that is.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 10

...pre-scientific or pre-philosophic thought. Whereas in modern times, these concepts are inherited, and are ready for use, therefore; and which is more important, transformed, but *they are* no longer originally required. That implies that if we want to understand the modern concepts which came into being through the transformation of those concepts inherited from classical antiquity, that we have to return first to the classical basis if we wish to understand the modern concepts. Classical political philosophy we can also say is related to political life directly, not through a non-political medium as the tradition of political philosophy, or as a non-political science, as in our age. And the simplest sign of that is that in classical political philosophy there are no technical terms to speak of. The terms are terms used in ordinary political life, in the marketplace, in Senates, in Cabinets, but not peculiarly scientific or academic terms. Whereas the opposite is true in modern times, and to some extent already in the Middle Ages. The classical political philosophers tried to understand political life as the citizen and the statesman understand, with this difference, that they tried to look further ahead or afield than the practical men do. Not in a different perspective. They are not as it were, standing outside and observing political life, the big fishes swallowing the small ones, but in the perspective in which they are seen in political life.

One can also say that the method of classical political philosophy is presented by political life itself. In all political life we find conflicts between individuals and groups, conflicting parties asserting opposed claims, in the name of justice. Both sides used arguments in support of their claims. Not all these arguments are solid; but they supply nevertheless the starting-point for any proper understanding of what supports the claim of the opposed parties. The method is therefore to follow up and consider creditable the arguments presented on both sides, and on this basis, there is an impartial decision. Because this

is the primary form, in which the political philosopher appears, as the arbiter, the impartial arbiter, between the groups with opposed claims. He is an arbiter who will give each side its due. So the political philosopher is then primarily the umpire par excellence... the underlying thought being, he is a good citizen, and the duty of the good citizen is to make civil strife cease and to create by persuasion agreement among the citizens. He must not be a partisan.

Now in order to understand more fully the phenomenon of the political philosopher in his original form, we have to understand the fact that as the umpire the political philosopher is a citizen like every other citizen: he belongs to this or that city. As a rule, by birth: son of a citizen father and citizen mother. As such, he cannot fulfill his function in a city other than his own. His world is not transferable from his city to any other city. Yet one observes soon that there are--while this work as such seems to be non-transferable, there are necessarily in political life some skills which are. For example, a general may be lent to an allied city, in ancient times as well as in ours. Or someone may be banished from a city, like Themistocles was from Athens, and he may prove to be an excellent advisor to the enemy of Athens, the king of Persia. Or later on, Alcibiades, who also had to flee from Athens, and yet was the best advisor whom the Spartans could find, since he knew the weaknesses of Athens better than anyone else, he could become an excellent traitor to his fatherland.

So there are skills which are transferable, and to the extent to which they are transferable, they are also teachable, in principle like any other art. The teacher of the political art, developed first one important part of the political art, which is the art of speaking. All political action if it is reasonable is based on deliberation. The deliberation takes place by speech. In a democracy, surely, that means public speech. And the art of public speech was susceptible of being taught by teachers of that art, of the art of *rhetoric*.

And prior to classical political philosophy, one can say, political science as a transferable thing, had emerged as the art of rhetoric. And at the end of his Rhetoric, Aristotle takes issue with those people who say the political art is simply the art of rhetoric—a view which according to Aristotle is very erroneous. But at any rate, it is surely not an accident that the part of the political skill which was originally raised to the level of an art was rhetoric.

Now this is insufficient, from the classical point of view. Deliberation was in the first place with measure, as we might say, with war and peace; but also with things of a more permanent character. War or peace now, at this special moment. And these permanent things are the law. Therefore the more important, the broader object of deliberation is legislation. Political science in the original sense of the term was identical with political skill, the skill of the statesman. It was raised to the level of a transferable teaching when it could be called a teaching of the art of legislation. The highest political art, the architectonic art, related to all of the other arts as that of the architect to the carpenter, in the artisanry connected with building houses. As the net result, the political philosopher then comes to sight not simply as a legislator, but as a teacher of legislation. Every legislator has to do with the particular situation of this city, located here and there with these and these enemies, these and these resources, and so on. But he cannot do this without having implicitly a notion of what is simply good as such for the city— notions which he adapts to this particular city, not necessarily being aware of the universal principles of preference implied in what he is doing here and now. The teacher of legislators, who are supposed to give laws or to elaborate codes for the most different cities, cannot possibly be bound by the requirements of this or that situation in a city. He must think primarily in universal terms. Now these are then the two figures, we can say, in which the political philosopher primarily appeared in Greece: the umpire par excellence, and the teacher of legislators. There is a connection

between these two forms. The umpire has to do with the settlement of controversies. Now the fundamental political controversy concerns, as we may provisionally say, the form of government, i.e., democracy, monarchy, oligarchy and so on. This is the fundamental controversy, and the settlement of this controversy is prior, precedes, legislation proper; for all laws are to be made with a view to the form of government. Inheritance, publicity of speech, whatever you have depends on the form of government. Therefore the teacher of legislators, the political philosopher, is the umpire par excellence.

Now these two considerations of which I remind you: the distinction between physis and nomos and what is implied in Hegel's remark about the difference between ancient and modern times, these general considerations indicate the minimum conditions with which one must comply in order to have access to classical political philosophy. Now this are only the minimum conditions. In order to understand classical political philosophy, or in order to study it properly, we have to wonder where we should begin. My answer would be, with Aristotle's Politics. Not with Plato. For the writings of Plato, the Republic especially, but the others too, are dialogues; whereas Aristotle's Politics is a treatise. In the dialogues Plato never speaks. One could say, while Plato never speaks, Socrates speaks, and Socrates is Plato's mouthpiece. Yet this is not so simple, as is sufficiently indicated by the fact that Socrates is most famous for his irony. Never to speak oneself, but to have a spokesman who is famous for his irony, this is almost the same as never to speak. More specifically of irony--the word has undergone many meanings and changes in the course of centuries,--but the primary meaning, or rather the secondary meaning which is its most important--is to speak with a view to somebody, ad hominem, as Latin puts it. So all remarks which Socrates makes or any other Platonic spokesman, are made with a view to the interlocutors; their situation, permanent or momentary, their character, their ability, their social position. And in order to find out what Socrates would say about the same subject absolutely, not with a

view to this or that type of man, one would have to translate the particular situation into one which would be meant to be absolutely true. We would have to transform the relative statements into absolute statements, and this is not so easy to do. Whereas in Aristotle we hear Aristotle himself talking to us all the time. This difference between Aristotle and Plato is also the reason why it is not wise to begin one's study of classical political thought with the dramatic poets, who of course speak as little by themselves as Plato does. And it would be a great mistake to believe that the choruses present directly the view of Sophocles, for example. Even in the case of the historian Thucydides, the most important long statements are not made by Thucydides himself, but by his characters in speeches. So the question arises, what did Thucydides think of the wisdom and understanding of the particular speaker?

So it is most prudent to begin the study of political thought with Aristotle. As for the so-called pre-Socratic philosophers, we have only fragments of them; and to interpret fragments, to understand them properly is infinitely more difficult than to understand complete books.

Now as for how to study Aristotle's Politics in a very external way, meaning which translation to use, I would think that the best translation available is that by Ernest Barker, in the Oxford edition. The translation is useful especially for this reason, that Barker gives in brackets explanations of the very terse statements which Aristotle makes and which to begin with, seem wholly unintelligible. It is true that in this respect Aristotle becomes much more loquacious or talkative than he in fact is, and this peculiar charm that is characteristic of Aristotle is lost in that way. But you cannot have it both ways; and to begin with, one must be grateful for having all the help one can get. Barker has also written in this book a very useful introduction, in which he takes up an issue which is quite confusing and quite useless, namely the question of the

development of Aristotle's thought from the early time when he was sitting at Plato's feet, until old age, something which some philologists believed they could find out about; and Barker very wisely reaches the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything about that. Since you may be confronted with this issue regarding Aristotle's development, it is quite good to read Barker's argument.

Let us then turn without any further ado to the beginning of Aristotle's Politics. And we will read at the beginning:

Observation shows us, first, that every polis is a species of association, and secondly, that all associations are instituted for the purpose of attaining some good. For all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, good. We may therefore hold that all associations aim at some good; and we may also hold that the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the others, will pursue this aim to the highest degree, and thus will be directed to the most sovereign, the most authoritative, of all goods. This most authoritative and inclusive association is the polis, as it is called, or the political association.

Now Aristotle goes, as we see, immediately into the midst of things; the Politics naturally deals with the polis. Now the first question which arises, to which we have alluded before, is how to translate polis. Barker follows the usual procedure by saying, the polis, polis-state. But we have been reminded by Collingwood, in some passage which I read to you, that there is a grave question as to whether one can translate in this manner. Some people say, in order to avoid the difficulty, the city-state--which doesn't make it better, because then we imply, of course, that we know what the state means, and there is a kind of state called the city-state.

Now let us look at ^a later political thinker's definition of what Aristotle means by the polis; that is Thomas Hobbes. Let us see how he defines the polis.

The multitude so united in one person, is called a commonwealth;
in Latin, civitas.

But civitas was the traditional translation in Latin of the Greek polis.
So a commonwealth would be a tolerably-put translation of polis.
Let us also see another translation by Hobbes of the term, which is
somewhat closer to our concern, in the Elements of Law, part 1, chapt. 19:

This union so made is that which men call nowadays (he doesn't
say state) a body politic, or civil society, and the Greeks
call it polis, that is to say, a city.

So you see, even in the seventeenth century, the word state was not
yet necessary, was not the most natural for a man like Hobbes. Hobbes
identifies --Hobbes translates polis by city, which is the best word
for it in English, and gives the equivalent in English of a body politic
or civil society. Now we shall then not hesitate to translate polis by
city. But we must be aware that this is only replacing one riddle by
another; the first riddle being the polis, and then we replace it by
a riddle in English. For when we speak of city, we surely do not mean
the polis. Think of the city of London, or the city in London, which
has an entirely different connotation.

We have therefore to raise the question, what is the equivalent
of polis, in our words? Surely not the state; for those who use the
term imply a distinction between the state and society. And the very
beginning of the Politics which I read to you shows that this is excluded.
When we speak of state and society, we do not say the state is the all-inclu-
sive society and society is only a partial society. The simple and best
equivalent in English to what the Greeks meant by polis is, the country.
When you speak of the country--"The country is in danger," for example--
you also don't make the distinction between state and society. You mean
a single whole. The polis consists of the town and country; and so does
the country, which consists of towns, cities, and countryside. This is--
country, we may say, is the equivalent of polis, on the level of our

everyday citizen's understanding. But this is not sufficient; because we are not simply thinking on that everyday level. I wonder whether the term the country is ever used in a scientific treatise within political science or sociology...although it will occur frequently in political speeches. This shows the cleavage between pre-scientific understanding and scientific understanding, which is so characteristic of our age.

Now the passage which I read to you at the very beginning of the Politics shows that the polis is concerned with the most comprehensive group; whereas the other association, the association subordinated to the city, are concerned with subordinate parts of it. Now the term which Aristotle uses for this comprehensive good is in Greek, eudaimonia, ordinarily translated into English as happiness. Let us not go into this great question of how to translate eudaimonia, let us simply translate it as happiness for the time being--the complete human good.

Now the polis is concerned with the complete human good. By happiness Aristotle understands above all, virtuous activity. And of course, this means that you *require* the conditions of virtuous activity, so if you are very sick, for example, and for this reason not able to act virtuously in every respect, it shows indirectly that health is a part of happiness. Happiness--of course, different people have different views of happiness, and the same people at different times in their lives. So one can assume, as men were more inclined to assume in modern times than in ancient ones, that happiness is strictly subjective, and then of course it becomes impossible to define the end of the state in terms of happiness. Political society cannot be defined as society devoted to happiness. This is perhaps the best starting-point for *Confronting* the peculiar obstacle which we have in understanding polis. Yet when we look around and admit that there are innumerable varieties of notions of what happiness is, we can nevertheless hold that there is something in common besides this enormous variety, and that is certain conditions of happiness. Whatever you may understand by happiness, you need to be alive to pursue happiness; furthermore, you must have the possibility of circulation.

You must be free; if you are chained or jailed, you are not likely to pursue your happiness. And thirdly, you must have the possibility of pursuing happiness, as you understand happiness. The third formula is known to you by the Declaration of Independence: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. They are understood here in the Declaration as man's natural rights. But one can also look at this from the other point of view, in no way contradicting, that they are the conditions for happiness, however happiness may be understood. Now here we have then this strange situation: men are striving for happiness. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are only in the service of their enjoyment of happiness: happiness is the end. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are means, and therefore lower. But on the other hand, whereas happiness is wholly subjective, and everyone understands something different by it, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are objective. Whatever you understand by happiness, you need life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Now men pursue happiness as each one understands happiness. This takes place partly in cooperation with others, and partly in competition with others. This cooperative, competitive activity, where each aims at his own happiness, produces a kind of web, we can say, and this web is society, in contradistinction to the state. The state only is concerned with the conditions as specified before. Now in this understanding of the relation between state and society, there is a peculiar ambiguity. In one respect, the state is higher; it aims at something which all need, something of objective validity. But these are all only means, and therefore lower. The highest is no longer objective. In order to overcome this difficulty, this dualism where the order of rank between the two, state and society, is ambiguous, one must turn to something broader, of which they, the state and society, as hitherto understood, are parts. And modern man succeeded in discovering such a thing, or in inventing. That is this matrix of which state and society and some other things are a part, which is ordinarily called culture. When you speak of the culture of a tribe or a nation,

or a city, it means the broader thing, the broader association, of which state and society are parts. I would say that the concept of culture, now so widely used, is the equivalent of polis, on the level of theory, on the level of academic thought, as distinguished from citizen thought, on which former level the equivalent of polis is the country.

We would say, for example, that tragedy, dramatic poetry, belongs to culture--belongs to culture, but not the state. Yet according to the classics, poetry has a certain moral function, say the purification of certain passions; and the moral function is inseparable from the political function. Therefore tragedy belongs to the polis, as it in fact did in Athens. Surely tragedy is not exhausted by that moral-political function; but to the extent to which it transcends it, it belongs to the sphere of wisdom, of wisdom which is no longer a part of the polis. So in other words, what we would call culture is from the classical point of view a composite consisting of the polis on the one hand and of wisdom on the other. And we learn from this incidentally, that our concept of culture presupposes a much closer connection between the polis and wisdom, than the classics did. So to speak, every polis has its peculiar wisdom--a thought which the classics implicitly rejected. Wisdom proper is universal, de jure--whether de facto is another question. Now by making this reflection, which could be enlarged, on the modern equivalent of polis, we do justice to the truth of historicism, namely to the fact that radical changes have in fact occurred, so that the understanding of the most important and fundamental terms has changed. Now is there any point which you think needs some further clarification? or which you feel now could be given? The last point is perhaps most difficult to understand, the last which I made, that polis and wisdom are not only distinguishable, but have a fundamentally different character, insofar as the polis is always this or that polis, particular society, whereas wisdom is universal. De jure, as I said, but not necessarily de facto. That is, our modern concept of culture implies assimilation of these two things. Yes?

STUDENT: Doesn't the fact that the Greeks thought of tragedy as having a moral function which was in turn inseparable from a political function-- *imply that they regarded* wisdom, at least in the form of poetry, as being more subordinate to political discussion?

Yes, well, the word wisdom has many meanings; there is a practical wisdom which essentially belongs to practical political life; and now I meant wisdom in a severer and stricter sense, as theoretical wisdom. The understanding of man in tragedy... for example.

STUDENT: Well, the fact that tragedy and the tragic view has some theoretical wisdom in it, and yet the moral function of tragedy in Greece was acceptable on a political level..(remainder lost to machine)

The moral ~~function~~ belongs together with the political function. It is the *purpose of* the city to make the citizens good, and doers of noble deeds, as Aristotle puts it. Aristotle called the whole teaching which includes his Ethics, a kind of political investigation. The difficulty doesn't lie there. ...Well, let me start from another phenomenon which I shall discuss later, without which one cannot understand this whole--the whole of classical thought. Our present-day thought, and already for some centuries, is based on a fundamentally different understanding of the relation between theoretical wisdom and ordinary human life, than the classics had. Especially Aristotle. And the change was effected by that great movement popularly called the Enlightenment, but this was much more than an enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which comprises already the seventeenth century. According to the Enlightenment, wisdom can be spread, can be diffused among the whole population, and therefore the difference between the theoretically wise and the theoretically non-wise ceases to be important.

The very notion of an *Enlightenment* of this kind is absent from classical thought; and therefore there is no simple harmony between philosophy and the polis, between wisdom and the polis, hence wisdom has, is, according to its own intention, universal--the polis is necessarily particular. You see, what we have done in modern times is also shown by the following point: the word culture, which means only cultivation in a sense--say of the soil--but then men speak also of the cultivation of the mind--was also used formerly in the singular *cultura mentis*. But then in the nineteenth century men began to use the term culture in the plural--cultures. That is to say, cultures are now understood to be particular in the same way in which political societies are particular. According to the older notion, however, there is only one culture of the mind or of the heart. This assimilation of the culture of the mind to political life is a modern phenomenon, and underlying our present use of the term culture. Today in the ordinary meaning, even in anthropology, culture has nothing whatever to do with any cultivation of the mind. We speak of the culture of juvenile delinquents of a certain district, we do not mean seriously any cultivation of the mind. That is a further step. But originally in the nineteenth century, even if used in the plural, culture meant high culture. Then it was applied to every culture of every tribe, and finally of course also to the subdivision of any society, however small and deplorable.

Now let us return to Aristotle. Aristotle goes on to prove that the polis is the highest and the most comprehensive association; and he tries to do that by considering the most important among the other associations. These are the family or the household, and the village. And this leads--let us take up the discussion at 1253a27.

Man when perfected is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. Injustice is all the greater when it is armed injustice; man is furnished by nature with arms, which are intended to serve the purpose of prudence and virtue, but which may be used in preference for opposite ends. That is why, if man is without virtue, he is the most unholy and savage being, and worse than all others in the indulgence of lust and gluttony. Justice belongs to the polis, for

justice which is the determination of what is just is an ordering of the political association.

Now what has he in mind here? Let us first take another consideration. The polis comes into being out of natural associations, such as the household. Therefore it is itself natural. In a sense, it is even more natural than the preceding associations. Why? Because all the other associations are in a way imperfect. They do not fulfill all of man's natural needs; being imperfect, they point to the city as its perfection. The end of a natural thing is more emphatically, the nature of the thing. A simple example, we want to know the nature of a horse, we look at a grown-up horse in a good state of health, meaning that a colt, or a sick horse, is a defective horse. The nature of a thing is the thing in its perfection. The point with which Aristotle is here concerned is not only that the polis is natural, but above all that it is natural as city, namely as essentially different from the household. Some other thinkers to whom Aristotle alludes, the most important one is Plato, had asserted there is only a quantitative difference between the household and the city. Aristotle says no, there is a qualitative and essential difference. That is to say, in other words, the polis is natural precisely in its character as polis and not as an overgrown household. The key implication of that is that if the polis is by nature, the thesis with which in a way the whole book begins, then the polis is not by convention. It is not by contract, to use the later term. This being the case, that the polis is by nature, it follows that man is by nature a political animal. And why? Because what is the peculiarity of man? The specific difference, the thing characteristic of man? The fact that man possesses logos, speech or reason. And speech or reason is the reason why man is political. Aristotle says man is more political, more social, than all other social animals. Speech or reason socializes much more than anything else could. For without logos there would be only a sensual awareness, in particular awareness of pleasure and pain. And this does not bind men together to the same degree as other kinds of awareness. Through logos we have also awareness of

just and unjust also. We can go further and say that the perfect union of two human individuals, of two individuals in general is possible only in and through thought...if they think identically the same. Such an identity regarding feelings can never be known; even if they use the same words. If you take the simplest case, where they follow the same demonstration of the same theory, There can be no doubt that their thoughts are fully united--they think exactly the same. The polis is natural to man also in another sense. As Aristotle explains later on in Book 7, more fully, the city is what we would call a very small society--a society in which everyone knows not everybody else, that would be a village--but in which everyone can know an acquaintance of everybody else, so that he can find out about that man, for example, if he is running for office, by direct knowledge. Also, the polis as Aristotle understands it is a society large enough to fulfill all man's essential natural needs, and small enough so that it is commensurate with the limitations of man's natural powers of knowing and of caring. We all know President Johnson and Vice-president Humphrey; but in which way? from the TV. That is not knowledge in the sense in which you know someone with whom you have grown up or who has grown up with your parents, and so on. In other words one can say that a polis is a society small enough so that it can be addressed without the help of any artificial things, by a speaker. They can be assembled in body and addressed by men.

In the passage which I read to you, Aristotle makes this clear, that man to the extent to which he is not political, to which he is pre-political or apolitical, not by accident, but incapable of living with others, is very bad. What Aristotle speaks here about reminds of what Hobbes says of the state of nature. And what Hobbes says of this is that man is by nature, i.e., without social discipline, without being subject to laws, asocial. But what is the precise difference, between Hobbes and Aristotle? That is of some importance. Now why is man such a nasty being, according to Hobbes? What makes him so nasty? What Hobbes calls pride, concern with being superior to others and with being recognized as superior by others. This is the reason

why Hobbes regards him as asocial. Now Aristotle would reply, but what you say proves men's asociality, proves men's sociality. A being who is radically dependent on the opinions of others is a radically social being. In other words, Hobbes has not thought deeply enough. He mistakes antisociality for asociality. But these antisocial people you see and hear a lot these days, are in a very radical sense social; they are so much concerned with being important, as they call it, and since they cannot become important by legal ways, they try to get it by illegal ways. But important means of course being looked up to by others, a radical sociality. Hobbes mistakes sociality for benevolence. But malevolence is also social, by being anti-social. And a radically asocial being would not be in this sense malevolent.

The Aristotelian doctrine that man is by nature social, was, *became the* traditional doctrine throughout the ages until it was attacked, especially by Hobbes, in the seventeenth century. And in that century there was a running controversy between those who said that man is by nature social, and those who denied it. The doctrine asserting man's natural sociality were at that time called the socialist doctrines, and the others the anti-socialists. You see how much the meaning of these terms has changed. By the way, what is true of socialism applies even more to individualism. For example, the Socics are famous for their individualism; but in this sense they are of course socialists, because they do teach the natural sociality of man.

Now when Aristotle says that the polis is by nature, he means more than that it is not by convention. He excludes also the view that another kind of political association is by nature, ^{at least to the same degree as th} and that ^{polis} is the ethnos, which can be translated by tribe or nation; a non-urban association of nomads or tillers of the soil, or what have you. One can explain the exclusion of the ethnos in the following way. Man is born for civilization, which is a derivative of civis, civitas, citizen and state; there is also a Greek equivalent for that, akin to polis. Man is born for civilization; and in a tribal life, he cannot find that.

The proposition that the polis is natural means furthermore that it is not sacred. When Homer and other poets speak of the city, they call it the sacred city; Aristotle calls it natural. This is also an important consideration. It is confirmed by the fact that Aristotle's discussion of the virtues in the Ethics, piety was not a virtue. Aristotle emphasizes in the Politics that the concern with divine things is a part of the concerns of the city, temples, sacrifices, and so on. But he indicates the ambiguous position of this concern by the following remark. In enumerating what the concerns of the city are, one, two, three, four, five, and so on: the fifth and at the first place, the concern with divine things. In other words, from one point of view, this is of course the most important. But from another point of view, it is not. This is a ~~hin~~ which needs thinking through. The concern with the divine things is a part of the concerns of the city, but also it transcends the city, namely in the form of philosophy, which from Aristotle's point of view is the highest part of the concern with the divine things.

This view is by the way confirmed by the Republic. The relatively old man Cephalus the father at the beginning, goes out to sacrifice, while Socrates discusses the best political order with the younger men. One could find other examples. Surely this peculiar secularism must not be identified with the modern secularism, for the simple reason that Aristotle was not a man of the Enlightenment. But the situation is clearly enough indicated at the beginning of Plato's dialogue Timaeus, where a man, an interlocutor, has been reminded by the Republic of Plato of the old Egyptian order, in which the place occupied in Plato's Republic by philosophers is occupied by priests, and he is not aware of the difference, as Socrates or Plato were. It is definitely not a priestly order, the polis, although it necessarily includes priests. Now the bulk of the first book of the Politics is devoted to the household as the most important part of the city, or to the management of the household. In Greek that is oikonomia, from which the English word economics is derived. In a way, Aristotle takes up the economic question, but all within the context of the

management of the household. The question of finance and any public economy is not raised in any way. (tape is reversed) ... *that Aristotle defended Slavery*...now that is true, I shall speak of that in a moment; but it is not sufficient to know only this fact, because then one doesn't know why he defended it and what are the conscious limitations of his defense. Aristotle starts from the fact that slavery is a controversial thing. Some people say, the rule of a master over a slave is against men; or it is merely by nomos *that* one is a slave and the other a freeman, and by nature there is no difference. And since slavery is not by nature, it is unjust; it is merely an act of violence, and nature is violated by that institution.

Aristotle states the proposition in these very simple terms: is slavery natural, or conventional? If it is only convention, it is, as matters stand, unjust. In order to answer this question, he must of course define what is a slave. The answer is, a possession, a piece of property, which is animate--not like a pot, or a hammer. But more specifically an animate tool, not for the purpose of production of things, but for the purpose of life, of use or action. Life is action, not production, action for use, for production. Production is only in the service of life, but not life itself. In other words, slavery is not understood here as a tool of producing mines in the ground or factory-like undertakings, but as a household slave, as a helper for man in his life.

Aristotle asserts that slavery properly understood is natural. In order to show that he starts from the fact that the whole of nature has a hierarchic character. Everywhere we find higher and lower; something which by nature rules, and something which by nature is ruled. The example nearest home is the difference between the mind, the soul and the body. Desire, passions, they belong to the soul in contradistinction to the mind. The mind is by nature the ruler of the desires and passions. And the soul in turn is the ruler of the body. Also the difference between the male and female, not limited to the human race, is a sign of the hierarchic character of nature, the male being the ruling part. The soul rules the body, Aristotle says, like a master;

i.e., as if the body were a slave, namely by sheer command, not by persuasion. We cannot talk to our body as we can talk to our anger, for example. And therefore the mind rules the soul, the passions, politically, by persuasion.

Now the slave participates in speech sufficiently as to be able to listen to speech, but not to have logos within himself; this is Aristotle's definition. And such a man is therefore justly enslaved, and no violence is done to him, on the contrary for him it is useful to be a slave, just as it is useful to his master to have a slave. Now what then is a natural slave? A man who can understand in the way in which an animal can, and yet not sufficiently that he can guide his own life; he needs someone else to guide him. Take an example of someone who can understand the command, "Bring five logs into the house--one, two, three, four, five." He can do that; but on the other hand, he couldn't take care for himself, because he might be wholly incapable of controlling his desire for alcoholic beverages, and for other things. The greatest presentation of what Aristotle understands by a natural slave, on the less amiable side, is the presentation of Caliban in Shakespeare's The Tempest. If you remember Caliban, you thought that Caliban deserves to be controlled by Prospero and tricked by Ariel at Prospero's command; that is not shocking. The question is, how great can the political relevance of this fact be? and Aristotle thought it is very great. So slavery is therefore natural, if applied to people who are by nature slaves. If it is applied to people who are not by nature slaves, it is plainly injustice. So for example, to enslave people merely because they have been taken as prisoners of war, this is unjust.

Now we will see later on that this is not the last word of Aristotle on the subject. Later on in books 7 to 8, where he describes the best commonwealth, he proposes there that the slaves be given the prospect of emancipation. Now this would be clearly impossible in the case of natural slaves, because they are people who cannot be emancipated, because they cannot take care of themselves. Therefore Aristotle must assume that there are slaves who are only slaves by convention, who are unjustly slaves. To reconcile this with what we read in

book one, we must postpone that until later.

Now Aristotle continues the discussion as follows. (1255^b20)

It is clear from this explanation of what the state is that the rule of a master and political rule are not the same as Plato among others says them to be. For the one, political rule, is about free men, the other is about slaves. And the one, the rule within the household is monarchical; while political rule is the rule over free men and equals. The ruler is not called ruler with a view to the knowledge which he possesses, (as we say a man is a physician with a view to the fact that he possesses the knowledge skill, and ability of a physician) but because he is such a one (meaning because he is a master.)

And the same applies also to freemen and slaves; they are not freemen and slaves because of peculiar knowledge which they possess.

Aristotle goes on to say that this does not mean that there is a certain kind of knowledge which slaves must have. There was a man in Syracuse who had a school for slaves, where they learned the kinds of things they had to do in the household....and it is also possible to say there is a kind of knowledge which the master needs, in order to command slaves. But Aristotle says this is not something grand, and he who can afford it will have a bailiff who takes care of this kind of knowledge. And the masters themselves will need a political life or will seek for wisdom. Here you have the simple alternative; the political life or the life of the quest for wisdom, philosophy in Greek. An alternative to which we shall have to come back more than once.

Now the next great theme also belonging to economics, is that part which has to do not with human beings, or with slaves, but with other kinds of property. And the great question here is the relation of money-making to other kinds of human activities. Aristotle asserts that they are two entirely different things. The distinction is based-- the distinction between money-making and management of the household, is based on a distinction between the natural form or acquisition, and those which are not natural. The natural ones are essentially limited, by what a man's understanding and reason can produce. The art of acquiring money is essentially unlimited, and therefore there is something wrong with it, that a finite being should seek for infinite money. And among the natural forms of acquisition, one

of the most important, is agriculture. Agriculture has a much higher status, according to Aristotle and according to Plato, than commerce, industry, and especially, which is the lowest, lending of interest. This from Aristotle's point of view is altogether unjust or immoral.

Now we do not have to go into the details of Aristotle's economic teaching, the teaching regarding the natural and the unnatural forms of occupation. Some points of that have a direct importance, and I will mention only one. The distinction which Marx makes with particular clarity between use-value and exchange-value, is literally taken from Aristotle. Marx has of course a different use for it, and naturally, because for Marx the fundamental phenomenon of economics is production, whereas this is not so in Aristotle. For Aristotle the fundamental thing is the purpose of use, or if you look at the other side, the purpose of nature rather than that which exists by means of production. The main point which is so striking here as elsewhere is the orientation by what is natural and not natural. Without it one cannot understand anything of Aristotle's teachings at any point. There is a natural way of earning a livelihood, and an unnatural. And the criterion is, for example, whether it is determined, has limits, or whether it is unlimited. What is natural is necessarily limited, *has* a specific character. Nature means primarily the nature of particular kinds of things; whether they are men or dogs or horses, i.e., distinguished from others, separate from the others, having a limit. The unlimited is from this point of view, not natural. After having gone through the economic question, of which the issue of slavery is a primary and most difficult part, Aristotle turns in the second book to a new subject.

We have learned in ^{our} way that the polis is natural. Its parts are natural; there is a natural slavery, a natural way of acquiring property, and now we turn to the polis. But in which sense?

Book 2 begins as follows.

Since we have the intention to contemplate regarding the political association, which is the best of all, for those who can live to the highest degree as they would wish, we must consider also the other forms of

government, which some of the cities use, those cities which are reputed to be well-administered, and if there should be any others, which have been said by some people, and which have the reputation of being good, we will see what is correct and useful in them and what is not.

Now Aristotle turns here to considering the best form of government; to leave it at this provisional translation of the Greek word *politeia*. As he turns to this question he looks to what we can learn from what others present us: cities which are reputed to be admirable; blueprints which are reputed to be good. You see, Aristotle proceeds in a strictly commonsensical way. He finds his bearings by reputation, assuming that reputation is not entirely unfounded in reasonably free societies. But the strange thing is, for us it is strange, that he treats the commonwealth, the governments, which exist in fact, say, Sparta, in the same way in which he treats Plato's Republic. In other words, whether this is an actual or a blueprinted government, does not make any difference at all. This is certainly quite remarkable. The procedure is not historical; he begins the discussion of these various regimes with Plato's proposals in the Republic and the Laws, then takes up the proposals of some earlier thinkers, and then he turns to the actual *poleis* which have a good reputation, such as Sparta. Characteristically, not Athens. Athens is, among the people whom Aristotle addresses, not reputed to be a good polity. So he passes over it in silence. We will discuss this next time.

Now the criticism of Plato is ^{of} course most important, because Aristotle does here something which he does not do in book 1, namely show that the household is, the family, as we can also say, is necessary. He only *showed* that the polis is superior, is essentially different from, broader and more comprehensive than, the family. But he did not show that there might be a household-less polis;

that is exactly what Plato does in the Republic. The criticism of Plato's republic shows why the household, private property and private families, *are* necessary. And this is one very important point Aristotle makes; the other is in his discussion of the earliest political philosopher as we can call him, Hippodamus, and I think it would be helpful if you could have read it next Wednesday. Now we have a minute or so left.Yes?

MR. LEVY: What exactly about moneymaking....(unclear)...energy and cleverness of a man.....and eventually, by the nature of a business by law...

No, but a man has, say, acquired a hundred thousand dollars, There is nothing in the nature of the case as far as the economic situation is concerned, that would speak against his making a million dollars, a hundred million dollars, and so on. But if you look at it from the point of view--if you do not absolutize money, if you look at the whole context, and the whole context is human use, use of the property by the property-owner, you will realize the limits, Instead of accumulating money, he will go in for ever more luxury, he will have country-houses; but Aristotle would say, if you look at it again from the point of view of use, of good use, of virtuous use, which would exclude showing off, mere conspicuous consumption, as well as stinginess, of course--then you would see you cannot go beyond a certain point, that it is in itself limited. You can accumulate as many houses or pieces of land, in the same way that you can accumulate dollar bills, that Aristotle knew, although he didn't know of paper money. It is a very great convenience, but it tempts us to forget what it is for...that it is only a convenience. And this is a good example of what the ancients meant by mere convention. Because a mere convention is a convenience, and a convenience which somehow pretends to be independent, and therefore as it were runs away--is this not clear? Mr. Levy?

Mr. Levy: For Hobbes, the pre-political state is one of war.
The pre-political state of man's life as Aristotle saw it was not so;
why is the pre-political state then insufficient?

Well, have you ever lived in a village? ("Yes.") Not Greenwich Village.
(laughter) Well, then you see there are certain things which you cannot
get there easily. The chances that you would meet there someone with
whom you can talk about what interests you are smaller than in a larger
society. Your natural needs, the needs of your mind, cannot be so easily
fulfilled. And one must not forget of course that a village in this
country and for that matter in Europe, is a part of a larger whole and *not*
therefore - disregarding that entirely.

Mr. Levy: The second point (unclear) once you say
Aristotle (unclear)... man would be like a god.

Well, yes, as Aristotle says in the first book of the Politics,
if we want to find out what is natural, we must look at the healthy
and in this sense normal members of the species, and not those who are
in one way or another corrupt or deficient. There are people who are
perfectly happy without any cultivation of their minds, that is
undeniable; but there is something wrong with them.

Mr. Levy: What *you're saying* is...

We call them sometimes dumb, and other terms of this kind, which you
doubtless know as well as I do. And we cannot take our bearings by
them. We should not despise them, but we cannot take our bearings
by them. And if they can be satisfied in a very dull community,
that doesn't mean that we should be satisfied with that.

Mr. Levy: So what you're saying is that if students of political philosophy
lived in two different villages and they married each other's inhabitants,
it would make a city?

Well, no Aristotle would say, if it is truly a village and not a part
of a polis--then there will not be any students of philosophy.

Mr. Levy: Ah, well, where'd the city come from? Who knew to make a city?

How will it come about? Well, strictly speaking, there are two ways of understanding that: that there is a kind of need, say common defense. I mean one of these crude needs that everyone can understand. And then some villages join together, and out of this a polis comes into being, and then once the polis is there, there is at least the chance for the higher things to develop. As Aristotle puts it, the polis comes into being for the sake of life, i.e., of mere life, self-defense and so on; but it is for the sake of living well. Living well not in the sense of what a ~~glutton~~ means by living well, but living nobly. Now ^{whether} this presupposes, this settling together of the city, presupposes men of the greatest stature, surpassing the greatest philosophers, the founders--that is a long question. Say a man like Theseus, the mythical founder of Athens. That is a long question. According to the popular view, of course he was a hero, and not merely a lawgiver. Whether Aristotle would accept that is a long question.

Mr. Levy: Generally was war going on in the world, for Aristotle? ("I beg your pardon?") Was generally war going on in the world pre-politically, according to Aristotle?In the pre-political world ...

I suppose both; there are peaceable and non-peaceable people, and also communities. ~~It depends--~~ there can be war, there will also be peace--that is not the point. But people can defend themselves better by settling together and living together.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
LECTURE II

Political life or political action is concerned with either preservation or change--the preservation of what is good, and change for the better. This implies some opinion of what is good or bad, and opinion as such points to knowledge. The complete knowledge of what is involved in political things would be the knowledge of what constitutes the good society. This is the full political good--the common good--and this was the concern of political philosophy as long as it was recognized. Now we are concerned today with the situation in which political philosophy has lost its plausibility, the belief in its possibility, although the general reasoning which I sketched, now and again, has still its former evidence. Now this is due in the first place to the power of what we call positivism...the view that the highest form of knowledge, nay, the only form of knowledge, is scientific knowledge...the view which we traced to August Comte, who coined the term, positive philosophy. Now in Comte's point of view, the stage in which science is predominant, there must be rule of the men of science, as a kind of spiritual power belonging to the modern world. We all know that this notion has lost all credibility, although it still lingers on in various places. For example, the Supreme Court makes decisions on the basis of pronouncements of social science; then we see something of this kind. It is nominally referred to as the problem of technocracy, which as technocracy is not democracy.

Now the key point concerning Comte's doctrine of the three stages, theological, metaphysical and positive: in the earlier stages, theological and metaphysical, men were concerned primarily with the why, with first causes and ultimate ends. But in scientific study it can be limited to the how. The difficulty here is that the theological and metaphysical questions, while being excluded by science, still remain--they remain questions. To avoid the difficulty one must declare that these questions are not only not answerable, scientifically, but that they are meaningless; as a moment's reflection shows, this fails, however.

This is not the immediate difficulty we have, for it is caused by a development long after Comte--the distinction between fact and value. That no value judgement as such can be a rational judgement. We must take this together with the rejection of metaphysics. The questions which concern men most deeply, the most important questions, are beyond the competence of science, and this leads necessarily to the flight from scientific reason--a triumph of science itself, about which you are aware, if not from books, at least from articles in the most sophisticated magazines. The key consideration, the only one which I would like to repeat, because it goes to the root of the matter, is that according to the strict understanding of positivism, only scientific knowledge is genuine knowledge. This is in blatant contradiction to the fact that science, and especially positivistic science, rests on pre-scientific knowledge, or common-sense knowledge, and this common-sense knowledge can in no way be transformed into scientific knowledge, as can be shown by looking at the most interesting cases. Common-sense knowledge, which is the basis of scientific knowledge, is unaware of facts and values. And here in the matrix of all social (the distinction between) science, one finds no basis for this distinction which is now regarded by many as self-evident. But one can say this is of no importance to political philosophy, because common-sense knowledge, common sense, is variable historically. And so

there was Greek common sense, Babylonian common sense, and so on. If there is no possibility of an invariable answer, an answer for all men at all times, then political philosophy is impossible--what should happen to it is another story, but it is no longer possible. Now this view, that there is no possibility of invariable answers, is called historicism. All thought rests ultimately upon absolute presuppositions, as Comte would put it, which differ from epoch to epoch, and which are not susceptible of rational criticism. As a consequence of the cooperation of positivism and historicism, political philosophy is today radically problematic. There is no longer any possibility of starting with the premises that existed surely up until about two generations ago. There is however some consolation some kind of universal agreement, namely, as regards the possibility and the necessity of studying the history of political philosophy. Therefore we have no choice but to learn to replace for the time being, as it were, political philosophy by its history. The study of the history must be done properly, openmindedly--namely, openminded to the possibility of political philosophy, and not merely closed to it, as is the case in most approaches. Now we turn therefore to the study of the history of political philosophy. And here we observe that the primary issue is the quarrel of the ancients and moderns. Political philosophy emerged in Greece: Socrates appears to be the founder; and this led to the kind of political philosophy we call classical--which includes medieval, to the extent we can call it medieval political philosophy and not theology. The break with this tradition occurred in modern times, most vividly in Hobbes, but if you dig a little bit, you come across Machiavelli, a man who prepared the great changes effected by Hobbes. The theme of the history of political philosophy is to understand this fundamental difference between ancient and modern--the quarrel.

Now then we discussed briefly the grounds on which Machiavelli, Hobbes, and their successors turned against practical political philosophy--and we discussed then the characteristics of classical political philosophy generally, and we turned then to Aristotle's Politics to acquire a more concrete understanding of how--what political philosophy originally meant.

We observed that in Aristotle's Politics there is a two-fold beginning: in the beginnings of books one and three. And this two-fold beginning has substantial reasons. The Politics begins with the discussion of the polis, the city, and its relation to the household, or family. The family needs the polis; and, it is argued by Aristotle against Plato, the polis needs the family, the household. The subject in book three is not the polis, but the politeia, a term which we translate by regime. And we saw from the beginning of the third book that it is the politeia, the regime, and not the polis, which is the theme of Aristotle's Politics. The difference between the discussion in book one and that in book three is simply stated as follows: in the first book the parts of the city, the most comprehensive association, appear to be the smaller associations, among which the family is most important. But in book three, the parts of the city appear to be not any association, but the citizens. We will see immediately what this means.

The theme becomes the regime in contradistinction to the city. This Greek word, politeia, is ordinarily translated by the term constitution. I gave reasons why I think regime is a better translation. Now what is the issue of the politeia?

It is the political issue, meaning the divisive issue; that there should be families is not a political issue--only some crackpots suggest from time to time the abolition of the family. But the regime is always actually or potentially a political issue. Whether or not there should be a political association, is not a political thought; but the regime necessarily is. When Lasswell defines the subject-matter of political science as who gets what, when, one has to say, Yes, one can say that provisionally, but who gets what when depends on who has the power and to what degree or extent--and that is a question of the regime. Obviously in a feudal monarchy, other people get what and when very differently from what they would get in a democracy. So the question of power, as it is ordinarily called, is more precisely stated, the question of the form of power, the question of the regime.

It is immediately intelligible today from the Cold War, with which we are all more or less familiar, that the issue is of course not, this country and Russia, but the difference of regimes. Liberal democracy and communism. I do not deny that the difference between these two enormous territorial areas--one located in Eurasia and one located in this hemisphere--that there might be all kinds of tensions even if they had the same regime. But as it is, the conflict as it actually exists is not understandable without taking into account the difference of regimes. The Cold War shows us directly that Aristotle's question regarding the regime is the question guiding present-day political life--and to some extent even academic political science. For an important part of that, as you know, is comparative government. But what is comparative government? Fundamentally, comparison of the various regimes--or in another respect, a discussion of the "isms." The isms are the justifications of the various regimes. This is quite different from the situation of political science in the nineteenth century, where it could simply be said the subject matter of political science is the state. Which is not in itself divisive. By virtue of the fact that civil wars played and play such a tremendous role in the twentieth century, whereas they played a much smaller role in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, this explains again why we understand Aristotle and Aristotle's Politics in a peculiar light--because we are again in the grip of a radical political crisis.

It is a crisis which was not visible in the nineteenth century for a variety of reasons, the most striking one being belief in progress--the certainty that the most desirable regime, that of maximum freedom and equality, was bound to win. That is no longer such a certainty, and therefore we have to dig somewhat more deeply. Russia, or for that matter, Upper Volta, is a theme for geography and history, or sociology; but the regimes of these countries are the themes of political science. So we see then that what Aristotle regards, and he more emphatically and clearly than any other political writers, as the theme of political science, the regime, is evidently still the theme for us. The fundamental problem is identical. But when one speaks of fundamental and invariable problems one must not assume that they are accessible equally to all times. There are times when the fundamental problems are covered over; perhaps these are the happiest times. But they are also, precisely because they are happy, they are an inducement to falling asleep. And therefore to the extent to which we are theoretical men, men of

science, we must not be concerned primarily with the happiness of the age in which we live but rather with the opportunity or necessity it imposes upon itself to think about the fundamental issues.

Now we turn then to Aristotle's discussion of this key subject in the third book. We have read and discussed the very first lines of the third book--you have the Barker translation. In the first sentence of the third book, Aristotle makes it quite clear that we are interested in the polis only to the extent that we are interested in the politeia, the regime. Here there arises a question: because we are interested in the politeia, we must know what the polis is. Now what does Aristotle mean by raising this question again? He goes on as follows? Is there anyone who could sit and read to the class these passages? Mr. Rankin, who does this excellently, isn't here. Is there anyone who has taken lessons in elocution? Well, then I will simply dictate. Mr. Bruell. Sit down and bring your Barker with you. At the second sentence. To repeat, before we hear Mr. Bruell, the question is, why must we be concerned with what the polis is? After all, we have heard it before.

What is the nature of the polis? In the first place, the nature of the polis, or city, is at present a disputed question...

No, wait, ... "for now they are engaged in controversy. Some say the polis has done the actions, and others say, not the polis, but the oligarchy, or the tyrant." Is this intelligible? Think of what happened in Russia after the Communist revolution. The debts. Not the polis has done it, not the Russian people, but this clique. Who is speaking here? Who makes this argument? Obviously not an adherent of the tyrant--nor of the oligarchy. The speaker is a democrat. What does he imply? Democracy, oligarchy and tyranny are of course examples of regimes. If there is no democracy, if the people do not rule, there is no polis. The polis has been destroyed for the time being. "Forms of government" we say, which is tolerable, as a phrase, but "regime" is clearer, I think you will see for certain reasons.

There is a work of Alexander Pope: "Our forms of government let fools contest/ Whichever is best administered, is best." This much we can discern now, that is not Aristotelian. There are regimes which cannot be well-administered, because nothing would be improved if they were. If a tyrant administers his tyranny well, that might be worse for his subjects than if he were very inefficient. Now what is the next argument he uses?

In the second place, all the activity of the statesman and the lawgiver is obviously concerned with the state ("with the city.") (--"and the regime is some form of order--operational, let us say--of the inhabitants of the city.")

That is the first definition we get. You see, it is an order of the inhabitants of the city. Of the inhabitants of the city, he doesn't say, of the citizens. Why? Because one depends already on the regime or he is not a citizen. And this precisely is the divisive issue, who is or is not a citizen. If there are various degrees

of citizenship, full and not so full, this of course as we know from every daily newspaper is today an issue, from what they say about the goings-on in Alabama and other places. The city consists on the one hand of households, and on the other of citizens. The formal issue is non-divisive; it is politically neutral, we can say; there is no difference between democrats and oligarchs or tyrants, about the fact that there should be families. But the question of who is or is not a citizen is fundamentally controversial. The political par excellence, this one cannot emphasize strongly enough, is what is divisive. The reason is this: there is no city without some order, without a form. The inhabitants are the matter, to use Aristotelian language. The order gives the city its character. When we speak of the state, and forms of the state, we obscure that fact. The question then for Aristotle as it appears immediately, is, who is a citizen? Because we know this much, that who is or is not a citizen differs from regime to regime. Now Aristotle gives a definition of a citizen which is this: he is a citizen who participates in judging and in ruling. Ruling means here giving commands. But Aristotle says, this definition which suggests itself so naturally, so easily, applies primarily to the citizen in a democracy. But why does he come up first with the democratic definition of a citizen? I would say, this is not an accident, just as it is not an accident that political philosophy emerged in democratic Athens. Democracy, debate, public debate, there is some connection between that--as we all know--and political philosophy.

But still, the definition, being tailored to democracy is for this reason too special. We need a generalized version. And then Aristotle says, a citizen is a man who participates in unlimited ruling--literally translated. What does he mean by that? There is no limit, in two respects. No limit regarding time--a citizen is a lifelong participant in ruling--and no limitation regarding subject-matter. A general has his rule limited to war, a treasurer has rule limited to fiscal matters. But there is some man or body of men, as someone said later on, who must have unlimited rule. We will soon see the difference.

The rule is unlimited regarding time. The rule of the citizen is not on the basis of any election, as say a President may be--that is a kind of delegated rule. What Aristotle says here must remind every one of you, I think, of a concept which has become very powerful in modern times--how would this be called, what Aristotle calls here unlimited rule, in modern times?

We find, in the early definitions of rule in modern times, and especially in Hobbes, exactly this unlimitedness. The thing which is in common is this: there are always men who rule in their own right and not by delegation. Since they rule in their own right, there is not necessarily any limitation regarding the yields. It is also implied there is no possibility of appeal from their decision to any higher authority.

Now what is the difference between the modern doctrine of sovereignty and the Aristotteleian doctrine? If you want to simply arrive at an answer which cannot be altogether wrong you may read the classic statement in Hobbes, especially in Leviathan, Chapter 18. We would see then immediately that Hobbesian doctrine--the same is true also of --is a legal doctrine: what are the rights which the sovereign has?

Aristotle's doctrine can negatively be described as not being a legal doctrine, and this has grave implications. Let us turn to 1275b17-21.

But our definition of citizenship can be amended. We have to note that in constitutions other than the democratic, members of the assembly and the courts do not hold that office for an indeterminate period. They hold it for a limited term; and it is to persons with such a tenure (whether they be many or few) that the citizens function of deliberating and judging (whether on all issues or only a few) is assigned in these constitutions.

In other words, the specifically democratic institutions are the jury and the assembly. They would not exist in the same way in an oligarchy. And yet there is citizenship there, obviously; these men have perhaps the political power. There must be a definition of the citizen applicable to them as well as to the democratic citizen.

The nature of citizenship in general emerges clearly from these considerations; and our final definitions will accordingly be: 1) he who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office attains thereby the status of a citizen of his state, and 2) a polis, in its simplest terms, is a body of such persons adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence.

'Office' is of course a slightly misleading translation because the word is archē, which is simply 'ruling,' having the rule, having the initiative. He who has the privilege to participate in deliberative and judging ruling--meaning, giving commands. Obviously a judge gives commands; but the deliberator also gives commands because the deliberation necessarily issues or should issue in a decision, say a law, declaration of war, or whatever it may be--and this is a command, given to others. So in other words in every society there are some men, more or

less, from whom all power of commanding stems, and in such a way that their power is not a delegated power. The individual citizen may be elected to a magistracy, and that of course is a delegated power; but the power he has as member of a sovereign body is not a delegated power; the sovereign, as we say in modern language, cannot be called to account. So we know now what a citizen is: men who participate in three functions above all: the deliberative, which is the same as what we would call today decision-making--it is quite interesting that it is not called decision-making by Aristotle but deliberation. When you speak of decision-making you may forget that the decision is meant to be the outcome of deliberation. When you speak of deliberation, this danger is obviated. Mr. Levy?

Mr. Levy: Mr. Strauss, I'm sorry, but I don't see the difference between Aristotle's first definition, the one that belongs with democracy, and his second definition, the one that's supposed to be general. What would the difference be?

Now let me see this wording, the precise wording. "To participate in judgement and in ruling."

Mr. Levy: Would that be from election--meaning "elected" ?

No, ruling is much larger--you must not forget that there are also what we now call executives, say, a general, and even down to a simple policeman. They also have the right of command. But in this case it is perfectly clear that these rights are all delegated powers. And what we are concerned with is, the non-delegated powers, the original powers.

Mr. Levy: Wouldn't that rather be a right of electing?

Electing magistrates? Sure, but Aristotle sees it concentrated, not in this elective power, but in the deliberative and judging power.

Mr. Levy: The word used for judging in the first definition--could that possibly be translated "electing" instead of judging?

No. It could be stretched, but I don't think it means that. Later on he has long discussions about the order of rank between the various functions which the ruling body has. But the deliberative one, which includes the legislative, is always the most important. Yes?

Student: At the end of the second definition, he said, "The city is a body of such citizens. large enough to be self-sufficient.." But according to the second definition, in a tyranny or an oligarchy you would only have one or a few citizens.

Not only one or a few--that would be very extreme.

Student: Well, in a tyranny the only person who would rule in his own right would be the tyrant.

Mr. Strauss: Yes, but the question is whether that can be called a regime, and we will come to that later. The question would be

the absolute monarchy, a subject so interesting Aristotle devotes to it the second part of book three. Aristotle proceeds step by step. He starts from what everyone knows, from experience in this case, in Athens, in a democracy. Then he sees that this is not sufficient, because there are regimes other than a democracy, therefore this great enlargement is still not broad enough. In what sense you can speak of citizens, in an absolute monarchy, is difficult to say. You know, it was not so very long ago that in a great modern democracy called Great Britain, there were no citizens, but subjects. It happened I think in the last generation that they became citizens. Now this was more a quaint antiquarianism of the British I think than anything of importance politically--but it indicates that for a long time there were no citizens. In an absolute monarchy there is no one who participates by his own right in judging and deliberating. If so, the king has appointed him.

Now let us read the next section, because this shows us--this is a relatively theoretical level on which we speak, but we must never forget the simple level, of which he speaks immediately after.

(1275b21)..For practical purposes ("more literally, that is for use") it is usual to define a citizen as one born of citizen parents on both sides, and not on the father's or mother's side only; but sometimes this requirement is carried still further back, to the length of two, three, or more stages of ancestry.

So in other words, sometimes also the grandparents must have been citizens, and it can go on and on.

This popular and facile definition has induced some thinkers to raise the question, "How did the citizen of the third or fourth stage of ancestry himself come to be a citizen?" Gorgias of Leontini--perhaps partly from a sense of this difficulty and partly in irony--said, "As mortars are things which are made by the craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaens are persons who are made by the 'craftsmen' who are Larissaeans-makers."

Perhaps he means here at the same time the magistrates of Larissa.

But the matter is really simple. If in their day, they enjoyed constitutional rights in the sense of our own definition, they were certainly citizens.

The main point is, if they participated in ruling and in judging, then they are citizens, regardless of whether their parents were. Yes?

It is obviously impossible to apply the requirement of descent from a citizen father or a citizen mother to those who were the first inhabitants or original founders of a state.

Do you see the absurdity which follows from the political definition which Aristotle calls "political and crude"? Everything political is necessarily crude; and therefore Aristotle is compelled, in his deeper discussion, to go beyond

that. But for the crude view, a citizen is a descendant of another citizen. Yet who is a citizen in an oligarchy, differs from the citizen in a liberal democracy. For the notion of what this means, to be a good citizen, differs profoundly. The good citizen is relative to the regime. But this, Aristotle points out, does not change a fundamental non-relativism. There is a kind of goodness which has no relativity to the regime, and that is the goodness of man as man. By a good man, thoughtful, unbiased people mean everywhere the same-- a just man, a moderate man, brave, and the other virtues. And therefore the good man could possibly act as a standard, allowing us to distinguish between preferable and less preferable regimes. Aristotle does not go into this at this point.

He only stresses this identity of the good man compared with the variability of the good citizen. And he gives us an inkling of a solution by saying that the good man and the good citizen coincide only in one case: namely in the citizen of the best regime when he is exercising a ruling function. Because then all the virtues which he has in the highest form come into play when he is politically active.

After these remarks Aristotle turns now to an explicit discussion of the various regimes. He has given us an indication of why the questions of regime are the most important questions, and he has always understood without any proof, because everyone knows it, that there is a variety of regimes. But now it becomes necessary for him to have a comprehensive notion of these varieties--after all we must know how many and what kind these regimes are and how they differ from each other. Aristotle determines the variety of regimes on the basis of two considerations: first, what is the purpose of the city? and second, how many kinds of rule over men do there exist? The purpose of the city is necessary to consider, because otherwise we will have no criterion for distinguishing between good and bad regimes or between better and worse. That regime is better which is more in accordance with the purpose of the city; and this question of better and worse regimes leads of course eventually to the question of the best regime--as I believe I do not have to make clear.

Now what are these purposes for which men live in civil society? There are three: first, man is by nature a political animal. This is here understood in a strict sense. Men love living together as such--independent of considerations of benefits, advantages. I think we can always check that to some extent; only in certain extreme situations would we wish to live in complete solitude and never to see another human being. Ordinarily we like human company.

The second purpose is the common good. And the common good is to live nobly. Without proving it here Aristotle assumes that living nobly is essentially living together. Living nobly means the practice of the virtues and the practice of the virtues requires, not necessarily in all cases of all virtues, but generally speaking, living together. But there is also a third purpose which he mentions and that is mere life, in a word, mere survival. This passage is of some interest to a broader question... (1278b; p. 111, Barker)

The good life is the chief end, both for the community as a whole, and for each of us individually. But men also come together, and form and maintain political associations, merely for the sake of life; for perhaps there is some element of the good even in the simple act of living, so long as the evils of existence do not preponderate too heavily. It is an evident fact that most men cling hard enough to life to be willing to endure a good deal of suffering, which implies that life has in it a sort of healthy happiness and a natural sweetness.

So that is very interesting...that people enter civil society for the sake of mere life, not for the good life. Does this remind you of the argument of another political philosopher? ("Rousseau.") No... ("Hobbes.") Yes, the teacher of self-preservation as best. You are quite right about Rousseau, but this is on a somewhat deeper level than I would like to go at this point. --So what a difference! What does Hobbes say about our clinging to life? Does he speak of a natural sweetness of life? No! The terror of death. That is so characteristic of Hobbes, that he never speaks of the natural sweetness which Achilles for example, when he is in the netherworld, describes-- he says, it is better to be a day-laborer and slave on earth than a king in Hades. This is quite remarkable.

To make this very clear, it is quite necessary for Hobbes to have this teaching. According to Hobbes, there is no summum bonum, no highest good. Whereas Aristotle says, of course, there is a highest good. But Hobbes teaches that on the other hand, there is a summum malum, a highest evil, a very paradoxical expression-- of course, that is death. Here is one beautiful illustration of what happened, and don't think that it is only Hobbes, because what Locke teaches about pleasure and pain is in a milder form of expression, Locke being a much less nasty and naughty man than Hobbes was, the same thing, fundamentally.

What was mentioned with Rousseau a moment ago is correct. It is one of the points where Rousseau returns in a way to the ancients against Hobbes and Locke--Rousseau's argument being that self-preservation would not have this fundamental importance if life itself did not have this natural sweetness. He does not use exactly the same words, but almost--he speaks of the sentiment of existence, which is simply pleasant, and which is the deepest thing in man.

But let us return to Aristotle. We have seen the three reasons, grounds, why man enters society. Now we must consider, how many kinds of rule over men are there? Aristotle gives here three-- the rule of the master over the slave, in Greek despotikē, from which despot is misderived. Despotism and tyranny have totally different meanings, in the classical tradition--and the identification of tyranny and despotism which has taken place in the eighteenth century is a minor historical question.

The despot means simply the rule of master over slave and of course if the man is a natural slave, there is nothing wrong with that, according to Aristotle. Then there is economic rule, rule within the household, that is, which as rule over slaves is fundamentally in the interest of the master. I mean, that this poor fellow is prevented from mischief, from harming himself by his extreme stupidity is accidental. The main point is, the master gets someone who shaves him and takes care of a few other things which are below his dignity. But the rule of a husband over his wife or a father over his children is primarily in the interests of the ruled. Then there is a third kind of rule which is political rule, where there is ruling and being ruled in turn--clearly; the wife is not supposed to rule over the husband the next day. And even less so, the children. But in political rule there is such a thing, the assumption being that the political community is a community of free and equal men. There may be unfree and unequal ones outside. This is indeed for the benefit of the ruled; that is to say, if Vice-President Johnson

is still ruling, it is understood that he will rule for the benefit of the U.S. Of course it is also understood that is for the benefit of President Johnson because he is after all a citizen of the U.S.

Aristotle has a nice comparison. That is, as if someone, a gymnastic trainer, who trains his pupils in the interest of the pupils, that they should become fit bodies,--should himself join in the training by showing the motions which they make, his own body becomes fitter. Accidentally it is in the interest of the trainer; and in this case, of President Johnson. We can say that political rule is rule for the common good.

Now from these characterizations of rule it follows that despotic rule, the rule of master over slave, is always against the character of the political association. But the two others, economic rule, rule of the father, and political rule proper--are in themselves possibly good. The argument leads up to a simple schēma which you must learn by heart if you do not know it--it is very simple, but it turns up again and again, and you need it to see how it is modified by other thinkers (goes to board).

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|------------|--------------|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------|
| | There is | the good | and the bad. | First distinction. |
| | The other is | | | |
| | the number | | | |
| of rulers: | ONE | the good ruler is <u>kingship</u> ; | the bad ruler is <u>tyranny</u> . | |
| | FEW | good rule of few, <u>aristocracy</u> ; | bad rule of few, <u>oligarchy</u> . | |
| | and MANY. | good rule of many, he calls | and here there is | |
| | | <u>polity</u> , with the same word | <u>democracy</u> , the bad rule | |
| | | <u>politeia</u> , which is used for | of many, according to | |
| | | regime in general. | Aristotle. | |

Nothing is here omitted: there are of course mixed forms. This division has been made by Plato in his Statesman before, though there is one difference--and that is that Plato does not make a distinction between a good and bad democracy. Because democracy is a weak regime, and therefore it cannot be too much bad and too much good either way.

But this is of course a merely external schema, and in itself not quite intelligible, because it is this kind of form. And Aristotle has proof for that because he gives a long discussion which we cannot read now on the following consideration. Democracy---well, by oligarchy is understood the rule of the rich, though it is not stated here. Similarly by democracy everyone means the rule of the poor. No one denies that this is the most common problem, especially during the Peloponnesian War. But much beyond that, every city has two kinds of men, the most massively important distinction--the rich and the poor. Machiavelli says the same thing many years later and even today we can still recognize it. Poor, by the way, never means beggars. but people who have to earn their living. Whereas the rich are people who do not have to work. I think we can even today make that distinction. So the practical standpoint is not this schema, although we need this to make sure lest anything has been forgotten.

The practical standpoint is from the difference between democracy and oligarchy, the rule of the rich and the rule of the poor. Aristotle has a very amusing discussion, why should there not be a regime in which the few are poor and the many are rich? Theoretically possible, but not practical to say the least.

But this much is clear: one form is defective because wealth is not the most important consideration for rule--nor freedom, because a freeborn citizen may be very stupid and very wicked, just as a rich

citizen may be very stupid and very wicked. So we wonder whether there is not a kind of mixture of the two which might be superior. Aristotle says there is. You know he first speaks of the politeia, the regime, in which all men able to serve as heavy-armed infantrymen are citizens.

This means, of course, in a word, property qualifications. You know the arms of a light-armed soldier are much less expensive than heavy armor. Therefore, they are more or less substantial citizens. Now you will see the way in which Aristotle argues this out. The principle is to be or have been a heavily-armed soldier. That is to say, not mere wealth, or mere freedom, but the patriotic view which sees that it is the same fatherland despite the changes in regime. From this it follows that he takes a patriotic view of the good citizen.

A good citizen is the man who continues to serve his country despite all changes of regime. You know, in recent times there was some controversy in France, whether those magistrates who served under Vichy loyally, and then under de Gaulle, and so forth, whether they are not after all is said and done, better citizens, better Frenchmen, than those who were loyal to one particular regime.

The democrats and oligarchs are those whom we call partisans, the patriots are not partisans, and the partisan is to that extent not a patriot, because he regards something as more important than the fatherland. The partisan says, there is no polis, if the right kind of regime is not established. The partisans are those who adhere to a particular regime, who say, there is no polis if the right kind of regime is not established. Now people do not necessarily say, as in our case, that "the city didn't do it, the tyrant did it." In our time, I believe the oligarchs would say, "The country is going to pieces." Well, the country if it is going to pieces is no longer in existence, and its final disappearance will follow. This we call the partisan view; and clearly the partisans will call the patriots "turncoats"--because they served the Third Republic, they served Vichy--they were turncoats.

There was a man somehow connected with Athens, Theramenes, who did exactly this. Whether from purity of heart or less pure motives is of course impossible to discern--but he was called a turncoat, whereas people who admired him said no, he is the good citizen, he put a higher value on Athens, the permanent substance than the superficial regime. Do you see how important that issue is, and how it undercuts all other political discussions--and only in very happy times when a regime is firmly established, and there are no considerable clouds on the political horizon does this question not arise.

We see it in the following manner: people like Xenophon, and especially Xenophon, who fought in the Peloponnesian War, on the Spartan side, i.e., on the wrong side, against his father. In the early nineteenth century when political historians influenced by the French Revolution went over these old facts they thought what Xenophon had done was terrible--he fought against his own country! Traitor. This was the first time that Xenophon's wreath was taken off his head--on this ground. If this historian, Niebuhr was his name, had lived a hundred fifty years he would have seen that there were people born in Germany who fought against Hitler's German army, and we do not wish to say they were morally inferior people. Only in simple and quiet times do such questions not come up. Needless to say, that is legally insoluble, because every law will identify itself with some type of regime, but not all legally insoluble questions are for this reason non-existent questions. So the political question as Aristotle presents it, is this: what makes a city the same city?

What makes a country the same country? The patriots are wrong, and the partisans are wrong. The patriots say, there is always the same country; the partisans say, only if that regime we favor is established; the city is what makes the country.

Aristotle says, since the regime is able to change from an oligarchy to a democracy, the city is a place by nature. But to judge one city by another city: this is the apparently paradoxical character of Aristotle's teaching. Or you might say, Aristotle is very precise, and follows what is said in our common way of speaking, sensible judgement. Let us now read further: (1276b, p. 99)

Still assuming a single population inhabiting a single territory shall we say that the state retains its identity as long as the stock of its inhabitants remains the same, although the old members are always dying and new members are always being born...or must we take a different view, and say that while the population remains the same, for the reason already mentioned, the city may none the less change?

If a polis is a form of association, and if this form of association is an association of citizens in a polity or constitution, it would seem to follow inevitably that when the constitution suffers a change in kind, and becomes a different constitution, the polis also will cease to be the same polis, and will change its identity. We may cite an analogy from the drama. We say that a chorus which appears at one time as a comic, and at another as a tragic chorus is not continuously the same, but alters its identity--and this in spite of the fact that the members often remain the same. What is true of a chorus is also true of every other form of association, and of all other compounds generally. If the scheme of composition is different, the compound becomes a different compound. A harmony composed of the same notes will be a different harmony according as the mode is Dorian or Phrygian. If this is the case, it is obvious that the criterion to which we must chiefly look in determining the identity of the state is the criterion of the constitution.

Now this seems a very strange example, but it makes everything quite clear--you have the chorus serving in a tragedy--and then the same chorus serving in a comedy. It is a different chorus, although they are the same individuals, because the principle of composition and the purpose for which they are composed, differs radically. Aristotle says this helps in understanding what constitutes the unity of the city, above all. You see here, when you read especially the last sentence, Aristotle does not deny the continuity which we imply when we speak of the History of the British Constitution from the time of Alfred the Great up to Elizabeth II. But he says, it is the continuity of the matter--the English people generate other Englishmen. Furthermore, he does not say the sameness of the city depends only on the regime. That would be plainly absurd, because if this were so, then all democracies would be a single regime, there wouldn't be n democracies.

Through change of regimes the city becomes another city. Not simply. It also becomes some other things, for example, if all moved out and went to a new land it would also be another city. But through change of regimes the city becomes another city in the most important respect--for it becomes a different regime regarding its end, the purpose to which it is dedicated. That is the most important consideration.

No change is as important as the change from virtue to vice, or the reverse. What change can be compared to that in significance? It is of course not a different city in every respect, for example not regarding treaty obligations, the difference with which he started.

Aristotle does not give the answer explicitly here but it is obvious, for the very same reason that Aristotle was the same man. Since the tyrant made the obligation for the benefit of the city, --after all, he might say, "I want to adorn my capital," and the citizens like these beautiful streets and buildings. But if he incurred the debts in order to maintain a bodyguard which maltreated the citizens, then of course "Let these foreign bastards who gave him the money see how they can get it."

Now we in our discussions today come across this question in a very simple thing, that is the question of loyalty. What does loyalty mean? "To the United States" is not enough. A Communist could say, I am loyal to the people of the United States, I want the best for them, and for this reason, I wish to abolish the liberal democracy. Loyalty simply is loyalty to the established regime, as characterised by the established regime. This question is illustrated in another manner by the question of citizenship. If we consider again the regime in which all men able to serve as heavy-armed infantrymen are citizens, it follows that the consideration of virtue comes in. But military virtue, that of the citizen soldier, while highly respectable is not the complete virtue--and therefore we can visualize a still higher regime between democracy and oligarchy having the advantages of both but avoiding their disadvantages. And that is the rule of the virtuous men simply and this is aristocracy. So this is more, quote "realistic", unquote, at least as revealing Aristotle's intention, than the other one.

This--that the mean, the middle, is higher than the extremes--is characteristic of the Ethics also. From a simple point of view one doesn't see--from our modern point of view--why what is in the middle should be higher than the extremes. The reason being that the mean is not merely the arithmetic average; but it has a different principle than the extremes, the principle of moderation, for example.

Aristotle also says, without contradicting himself, and this had an effect of sorts in the last election, that the mean of any virtue compared to the two opposing vices is in a sense also an extreme--especially (goes to board) because it stands out. Virtue is an excellence, compared with the average it is an extreme. This landed somehow in the acceptance speech of Senator Goldwater and gave people who didn't know Aristotle an occasion to be surprised. Yes?

Student: In what sense is the aristocracy unlike the oligarchy?

Mr. Strauss: Because it avoids the mere principle of wealth and the mere principle of freedom. In other words, they must be between the two, while not deprived of either. But their title derives ultimately not from that great wealth/which the oligarchy relies, on

but from being a model for activity.

Student: In other words, the very fact that virtue is held to be an extreme seems to make aristocracy more than simply in deed, because it would be in deed only to the extent that virtue is dependent upon having to be upheld.

Mr. Strauss: But the point is this, Aristotle does not make this in vain--you cannot understand virtue unless you see that it is essentially opposed to two extremes.

For example, take the simple case of liberality. If you understand liberality as a virtue, only in opposition to profligacy, you do not understand it. You must also see it in relation to, in opposition to, extreme stinginess. I mean, proceeding empirically, you see that. You say, a liberal man, a free spender. But is all free spending virtuous? Then you see some cases of wholly irresponsible playboys, and you say, "No, there is also something in the middle." But the deeper reason why it is in the middle is not merely a statistical average, but because it has a higher principle than the principle of reasonableness, a consideration which is absent from the extremes. Yes, Mr. Wyatt? (phonetic spelling)

Mr. Wyatt: In the other cases the extremes are in some way intentional. Here it doesn't seem in any way that they are, or that aristocracy, while it may be a mean between extremes, is in any way at all a derivative from good influence. Whereas in the case of liberality the beginning is...

S: Well, you see the discussion hitherto is of course provisional and not concrete enough. Look at it this way--what is virtue as Aristotle understands it especially in the political context? Moral virtue as it is described in the Ethics requires equipment--in Greek. Now what does this mean in plain English? You must have some money. For example how can your liberality be visible if you do not have something to spare? You see, Aristotle is in this respect quite tough. He knows that among very poor people there can also be the virtues. But they are immanifest, they don't strike you. As an example of a liberal man, you would not, unless you are a kind of sophisticated novelist, give an example of two inmates of Skid Row. Aristotle does not doubt there is liberality also in Skid Row, but we would not seek our examples there. Just as we would not seek our examples of martial prowess in homes for people older than ninety. So there is a certain equipment needed, and therefore aristocracy requires some wealth, and similarly he must be a free man. Because he wouldn't have a ghost of a chance to be recognized as a ruler if he were a slave or even a freedman.

Student: Is there something behind--besides the mere fact that they are prerequisites, I mean, is there any common characteristic that makes...

S: No, only this, that the matter with which they deal enters into the higher levels, the matter of wealth and the other of freedom. In the lower cases, the matter is not transfigured, from a higher point of view and they remain therefore in simple opposition. Here are the merely free men--here are those who are in addition, also rich. And both considerations are not sufficient.

What the so-called realistic men try to do is of course to get rid of virtue. The word 'virtue' has become so ridiculous that it is a kind of snobbery I believe, to use it--at least in certain circles. But why not forget about it and speak only of the rich and the poor, or with Mr. Lasswell, who gets what and when?

The trouble is, that even if you want to be completely down to earth, you have to bring in, in a strictly subservient fashion, the virtues. I mean, however down to earth you may be, you would prefer in a pinch to be judged by a just jury, by a just judge; and you would like to have civil servants perfectly immune to bribes on the part of these "goof-pill sellers"--is this the proper expression? (laughter) and you know that. Even Lasswell has to bring in such concepts as integrity, and other considerations. That the virtues are needed in a subservient, instrumental fashion if society is not to go to pieces is not too difficult to prove, and I believe it would be readily admitted.

The key question, then is this: can virtue be understood as mere instrumental? That is the divisive issue on the theoretical plane. If virtue is only a means for the well-being of civil society, then the benefit of civil society alone determines the use or non-use of virtue--that was Machiavelli's doctrine. You are virtuous when it is good for your community. But if not, when it is bad, then you are vicious. These considerations, more nobly expressed in the form in which they were by Augustine--is there not a difference between a gang of robbers and civil society? Because you know there is also a certain morality in a gang of robbers. They would not last for one day if there were not a certain trust that each will get his share and that if you have a contract--as I believe they call it--that someone will be transported to a safe place until the whole thing has blown over, and other niceties, it will be kept.

What Augustine means of course by saying that civil society differs from a gang of robbers is that it is more consistent in trying to be virtuous than a gang of robbers, who take very narrow views of the virtue which they demand--but above all, that virtue must be not merely instrumental but the purpose of civil society, this is Aristotle's view.

But there is nothing wrong in starting from the lowest view and simply saying, "Dog eats dog, the rich eat poor and vice-versa, and let us see where we come from there." There is only group politics, no one cares for the common good, the common good is simply the outcome of power relations between the various groups. But you will only be able to account for a limited range of phenomena.

In this respect, the same difficulties come out with the simplest view of citizenship, as defined by birth from citizen parents, and grandparents, and so on. Carried far enough, it would follow that the first citizens, the founding fathers, were not citizens. This is the most absurd thing to imagine--that the parents of George Washington were not American citizens. But when Aristotle points to this, he uses the opportunity to make something else clear--the joke of Gorgias, the famous teacher of rhetoric, he says, is this: that Larissa-makers means in the first place the people who generate citizens, parents. But it has also a double meaning--because in the case of naturalization, for example, there the Larissa-makers are magistrates who naturalize the citizens. So whereas in the first place citizenship seems to be something entirely natural, as natural as generation--being generated by a human father

and a human mother, in the second place we see it can be something entirely dependent on law, entirely conventional. That this view is in a sense more true becomes clear if we reflect about the fact pointed out by Aristotle that who is or is not a citizen depends not on nature simply but on the regime. This throws some light on the character of the city: the city is by nature--yet not simply--and this follows clearly from the fact that every city must have a form, a regime, and the variety of regimes leads him to the question, which of these regimes, if any, can be said to be natural?

In the extreme case, if no regime can be said to be simply natural, then the city is as much conventional as it is natural. But there may be the possibility that there is a single regime, the only one according to nature, which would mean that the others are not natural, that they are forms of political sickness.

Now hitherto we have seen that the regime is a form of the polis. All things have their forms, their shape, their characters; horses, dogs, oak trees, and so on. When they lose their form, they cease to be. If you have ever seen a living being in a state of advanced decay, say a rabbit, you will know what I mean. Furthermore, these forms are not changeable. A horse cannot take on the character of a dog, except in Arabian tales. But here we come to another consideration. The same city can have successively different regimes--in other words, a kind of miracle, that something which has been a cat becomes a dog. These changes of regimes are now popularly called revolutions. The question is, how deep do these changes go?

Let us remind ourselves of the thesis of the democrats, whom we have heard. "Not the polis did it, but the tyrant; while the tyrant ruled, there was no polis." The houses were there; the matter was there, the human beings, but there was not a polis, a commonwealth.

But when we speak today of English constitutional history for instance, we imply, "There always was England." The same substance remained, despite the changes it underwent. It was feudal, absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, with a kind of oligarchy, and then democracy. But the same England, the same substance, remained despite the changes. The same land, the same fatherland--one needs to spell that out. And that you still need a government instead of a computer to do that is quite interesting, and seems to have something to do with the fact that man is still in a sense understood to be a rational animal.

The key point regarding the number of rulers: there is the rule of one, of few, and of many. There is not any rule of all. That has extraordinary implications. There is always the rule of a part, or of a combination of parts. Such a combination is, this kind of rich may go together with that kind of poor, you can easily figure out for yourself. The rule of a combination of parts would be a mixed regime. Aristotle has referred to this already in the second book, when speaking of Sparta and other things. This question of the mixed regime became historically relevant for the United States, as you see from Federalist 10.

What I wish to discuss next time is this question: can we learn anything from Aristotle's schema for the variety of regimes, toward the understanding of modern democracy? That we can learn something in general, namely that the concern of regime, and not the very vague word power, is that which is a peculiarly political phenomenon--this I think I have shown. Because power--there is electrical power, there is the power of the chief rooster in the yard, there is that of a nasty husband over his wife, and vice-versa--

these are all wholly uninteresting politically. The peculiar thing is the regime. This is obviously sound, and very topical.

But if we turn to our more immediate task, that is connected with the question of democracy. So the point which I would like to take up next time is, can we learn from Aristotle something about a democracy?

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE 12

..theoretical knowledge of one kind or another in modern times. Needless to say, in present-day positivistic political science there is such a mediation through positivistically understood science; and therefore, an external sign, the importance of a technical vocabulary, something wholly alien to classical political philosophy.

We turn then to the study of Aristotle's Politics, to the first book, and there we see the importance rather of the first consideration, of the difference between phusis, nature, and nomos, and then their direct relation to political life. How does this come?

Aristotle takes issue there with Plato's assertion that the city and household differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively. In other words, he defends the dignity of the city against an attempt to reduce the city, as it were, to the same status as the household. Furthermore, Aristotle takes issue with those who assert that slavery is only conventional. Here again he defends what he regards as a basic institution of the city. Now this defensive character of the argument is connected with a fundamental problem, which we may state as follows: the whole sphere of political life, or of political understanding, is attacked on theoretical grounds, i.e., on grounds which are outside political life itself, and therefore political life and political understanding is in need of a theoretical defense. To take a present-day example, a defense of political prudence, of the particular ways of understanding peculiar to political life, this is today endangered by Marxism, by the assumed knowledge of the character of the whole historical process. You cannot simply argue prudentially, practically against Marxism--the defence of the sphere of prudence must be theoretical, because the attack is theoretical. Now the concept of phusis, of nature, especially in contradistinction to art, is of course at home in pre-theoretical, pre-philosophic life. But the distinction between phusis and nomos, which plays such a great role in the discussion of theory, arises in theoretical reflection, and therefore this goes beyond the realm of pre-philosophic understanding. Is this point clear? I will try to re-state it: Aristotle, in contradistinction to modern thought, but in particular also to Plato, assumes that the political-moral sphere has a certain independence of all studies of a physical or metaphysical nature; the reason being that the standards in the light of which we judge morally and politically, are accessible directly, without any theoretical deduction. We know, in a sufficient manner, what moderation, magnanimity, and these other things are. Aristotle does not even make the attempt to deduce these various virtues from something more fundamental, as Plato does in the Republic, where he tries to show there are these and these virtues, and only these virtues, with a view to the fact that the soul has these parts, and order. Aristotle doesn't do that, he doesn't give a theoretical deduction, he simply takes for granted that properly-bred men know these virtues from their training, from their life, and what Aristotle does is he spells out what every gentleman would know as a matter of course. Now this sphere/the ceiling of which is the understanding of the noble and the just, of the virtues, is not in need of being deduced from higher principles, or in need of being theoretically justified. But if this whole sphere of practice, of prudence, is as such attacked, then it becomes necessary to defend it; and the attack will of course

be theoretical; and the defense will be theoretical. ..You seem to have some...

Student: Well, can you really say, if in fact it turns out that prudence needs to be defended on theoretical grounds from these theoretical attacks, that ordinary men who have certain opinions of virtues, know them? or can you only say that they have true opinion about them, but that they really don't know...

Yes, but that would be in the main sufficient, true opinion.

Student: But it's only sufficient for practical purposes, they really don't know these the way they ..

But this is a very great question, whether they cease to be more than true opinions within the context of Aristotle's Ethics. Because this would require a theoretical deduction; and the fundamental difficulty can be stated as follows: if you try to deduce morality from something higher, than you believe you can answer the question, why should men be decent? But from the point of view of the decent man, the question must never arise.

Now Plato of course discusses this question: that is the meaning of this famous argument of Socrates against people like Thrasymachos in the Republic and Callicles in the Gorgias, that here are people more or less clever, who refuse to acknowledge the ordinary principles of decency, and Socrates is therefore compelled to defend them. But such a defense you will seek in vain in Aristotle's Ethics. Surely not in the fundamental part, the first five or six books.

Now Aristotle I said looks at the polis in the light of nature. Nature means here something different than the totality of phenomena. Nature is here used as a term of distinction; namely, in contradistinction to art and nomos. Nature is understood in the way in which we found it understood in the passage of the tenth book of the Odyssey, which I read to you; nature is a term susceptible of being used in the plural. There are natures. Each kind of thing, say man or dog or horse, has its nature. The nature of man is something radically different from the oak-tree, for example, and furthermore, it is implied and is stated by Aristotle explicitly, the nature of a thing is the end, telos. For the nature of a thing is as a thing is when its coming-into-being has been completed; completed, the word in Greek is derived from the noun telos. Therefore the polis's naturalness is emphatically, human association, in its completed form. Nature is here understood as it shows itself in living beings, most clearly: we have a beginning, seed, toward a peak, and then decay. But the end is the peak; in other words, the end does not mean the sense in which death is the end of human life.

Just as there is a nature of a horse, there is a nature of man, that which makes man man, which determines the nature of man, is logos. speech or reason. Hence the perfection of man is above all, the perfection of his speech or reason, more so than the perfection of his body, although that is also important. Man has a variety of such perfections, and this is one of the most striking differences between man and the brutes; a variety of excellences or virtues. The most important here is a distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom. There is a great difference among men in regard to reasoning, and these differences are due not only to differences

in training and exercise, but also to nature. There are, as the classics say, good natures and bad natures: that doesn't mean good-natured and bad-natured people, but gifted and non-gifted people. We notice even today, when people speak of I.Q.'s, which is one part of this story. But also something else, which is not considered an I.Q., if someone has by nature a very small power over his desires, for example, if he is what is called "oversexed," this is also part of a bad nature from this point of view. So a well-tempered mixture of the temperaments is also important, and in a way more important, than the mere I.Q. Now once we understand this difference of natures, we see what the difference regarding the natural slave is. This is the extreme case, the flooring as it were, a human being who is as strong and as stupid as an ox. But still he is not quite as stupid, because otherwise he would be unable to understand one, two, three, four, which obviously the ox cannot understand. Now Aristotle turns in the second half of the first book to the investigation of property and wealth, also from the point of view of nature. True wealth is wealth according to nature. Things are--true wealth consists of things which by their nature are capable of being used, for what they are. Food, for example, in contradistinction to money, as one sees clearly in times of scarcity or especially of famine, when you cannot eat the money but you can eat the food. Now let us see here a remark of Aristotle: "Of every piece of property there is a two-fold use; and both uses belong essentially to the thing, but not in the same manner. For the one use is peculiar to the thing concerned, and the other is not. For example a shoe--you can use it for wearing it, and you can use it for bartering it, or selling it. For both are uses of the shoe. Because even the man who gives the shoe to somebody else for money or for food, uses the shoe as shoe, because the other man, the buyer, wants to have a shoe and not something else. But this bartering is not the proper use of it; for the shoe has not come into being for the sake of exchange. This is the distinction between use-value and exchange-value which has become so famous by Karl Marx. But what is the difference for Marx? Let us see what Aristotle says about that.

Property of this kind, i.e. for the purpose of subsistence, is evidently given by nature to all living beings: from the instant of their first birth to the days that their growth is finished. There are animals which when their offspring is born, bring forth along with it food, enough to support it, until the animal can provide for itself. This is the case with insects, which reproduce themselves by grubs, and of animals, which do so by eggs. Animals which are viviparous have food for their offspring and themselves for a certain time; of the nature of what is called milk. If it is evident that there is such a natural provision for food for growth from birth (i.e., by nature) it is equally evident that we must believe that similar provision is made for others. Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and animals to give subsistence to men. Animals when they are domesticated serve for use as well as for food. Wild animals too in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish men not only with food, but also with other comforts, such as clothing and similar aids to life. Accordingly as nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all the aforesaid animals must have been made by nature for the sake of man.

That is the passage I had in mind.

Now what can this tell us about the difference between Marx and Aristotle? According to Aristotle, the origin of true wealth is nature: nature supplies these things to us, which we modify, naturally, but the origin is nature. What is the Marxist view? not only the Marxist view, Marx only radicalized it. The very clear statement, much prior to Marx, is Locke's. The origin of all wealth is labor. And Locke makes clear the implication of that: nature supplies us only with the almost worthless materials. We cannot deny that we need some gifts of nature, but there are so to speak, nothing, they are almost worthless materials. In other words, according to that Lockean-Marxian view, the origin of true wealth is human production, this is not a doctrine limited to the sphere of property, but has universal significance. From the Aristotelian point of view, knowledge is the aliquation of the intellect to the thing to be understood, i.e., knowledge is fundamentally receptive, dependent. According to the modern view, knowledge is something like organization of sense-data. Knowledge is fundamentally constructive, not receptive. In other words, there is a strict parallel here to what we have observed regarding wealth. Now you see here also in this passage that here nature is used in the singular. It is the same nature which supplies food to men, beasts, etc.

Nature is the source of everything which is not made by man. You may, in order to bring out the relation between nature understood in the plural, and nature in the singular, you may say nature is the source of the natures. Now in this passage which I read to you--this is a most striking and extraordinary passage--nature is presented as very friendly to man. Aristotle seems to express a very optimistic view, a naively optimistic view. Let us leave it at this appearance for the moment, and consider only the modern alternative, which is beautifully expressed in the very frequently-used phrase, conquest of nature. You don't conquer something kind to you. Nature is here understood as enemy, by implication. The difficulty which is faced by the modern view of course is that the fact that man can conquer nature, that he has this in himself, he does not owe to himself, but to nature: that he is so equipped, if only with a potentiality, that he can become the master and owner of nature, in the words of Descartes.

Now if we look at the third book of the Politics as a whole, and the selection of the themes therein, we find first the proof that the polis is by nature, that is to say, that the polis is a natural perfection of the natural associations--of the associations which are parts of the polis, and the most important of these parts is the family, or household. And secondly we find a discussion of the household, very reasonably, because it is the most important part of the city. In the household as Aristotle understands it, three associations are united: male-female, or husband-wife association; parent-children association, and the master-slave association. But only slavery is discussed here in the first book, the reason being that any relevant details regarding the parent-child and husband-wife relation depend on the peculiar character of the political society. Say in a stern Puritan society, these relations differ very much from what they would be in a very permissive society. So you have to consider the society within which they occur, whereas the master-slave relation is relatively independent of this whole, as Aristotle implies.

Aristotle discusses there also the art or skill of acquisition, and especially the acquisition of money. In the first book he shows

that the family needs the city, that it is incomplete without the city. But this leads to a new question, what is the other way around? Once you have this city, a society large enough to defend itself, do you still need the family, the smaller association? This is the issue of communism, in the way in which it is a concern to Aristotle, and is taken up by Aristotle in the second book.

The second book is devoted to the examination of those political associations or communities which were regarded to be outstanding. For the fact that the city is natural does not mean of course that every city is in every respect according to nature. This is true even of a horse. A horse is a natural being, but it may be crippled by disease or by accident, so not every natural being is in every respect according to nature. And therefore we have to find out precisely what would be a city which is in every respect according to nature, according to the nature of the city. Aristotle pays equal attention to those which are famous, and reputed to be good, and to those which are as he puts it, merely written, or as we would call it, blueprinted. You see how little Aristotle is quite a "realist" in the colloquial sense of the term. And the reason is, it is by no means certain that any actual political order is simply good. Therefore we have also to consider the blueprinted ones, maybe they are superior in one respect or another.

Now Aristotle has however a special reason for the examination of the available political orders, and this he states at the beginning. "We will engage in this examination in order to see what is correct and useful of the various institutions, and furthermore to avoid the impression that we are trying to show off our wisdom by presenting some other proposal." By showing that the now available political orders in fact or in blueprint are not good enough, Aristotle justifies that he engages in an investigation of his own. He excuses himself for his work, a thing which he does not do in his other writings: for example, when he ~~begins to set forth~~ his physics where he discusses also the views of other people, he does not go on with fear that he might be misunderstood as someone who will show off his wisdom. The appearance of ambition, of the desire to show off, is more likely, from Aristotle's point of view, in political matters than in other matters. Among purely theoretical men, this is the tacit assumption of Aristotle; this motive is not so powerful as in a sphere which at least borders on the marketplace.

Now the question guiding Aristotle's examination of the available reputedly good associations is this: does political association mean a community of everything, or only of some things? Of course, it cannot be communion in nothing, being a community. Now the maximum which is possible would be the community of women, children and property--there could not possibly be a community of bodies. It is absolutely impossible to socialize a toothache, or any other bodily affection. This is by nature private and can never be collectivized. But things which are not as much one's own, as he puts it, things like women, wives, children and property, can be collectivized. Now this of course is a proposal made in Plato's Republic by Socrates, and it is the first theme of Aristotle's criticism. The reason why Socrates tries to socialize or collectivize everything, going much of course beyond present-day communism, is that the city should be one, to the greatest possible degree. Aristotle questions this attempt, because a certain multiplicity is essential to the polis; if one makes it one too much, it will no longer

be a city. The city consists not only--the city is by nature a multitude, and this means there is an absolute limit to unification. The city consists not only of many human beings, which no one denies, but of essentially different human beings, and different members of the political association fulfill different functions. If they all had the same function, it would no longer be a polis. This of course is admitted by Plato. As you know in Plato's Republic everyone is supposed to have an art, and accordingly there is a great variety of arts. The criterion for the goodness of a city is not, according to Aristotle, unity in any way, but self-sufficiency. More particularly, Aristotle objects to communism on the grounds, that as experience shows, common things are neglected. Everyone will think that somebody else will take care of it; in other words, there will be no individual responsibility. The trust that "George will do it" will lead to none doing it. Or, in regard to the family, to be the son of all citizens, as in Plato's Republic the children will be, means to be no one's son. The affection, friendship, of parents and children which becomes so universal becomes very watery, as Aristotle puts it. To say nothing of the fact that the communistic scheme as developed by Socrates wouldn't work, because people will recognize their own children and then it will be impossible to maintain the universal relation.

Now it is unnecessary and unimportant to discuss all the Aristotelian arguments here, so I select some which are particularly characteristic. Now let me see. There are also other difficulties regarding a community of wives and children which its advocates will not find it easy to meet by any precautions. We may take for example a case of assault, unintentional or intentional homicide, fighting and slander. All these offenses, when they are committed against father or mother, or a near relative, differ from offenses against human beings who are not so related, in being breaches of piety. Such offenses must happen more frequently when men are ignorant of their relatives than when they know who they are. And when they do happen, the customary penance can be made when men know their relatives, but none can be made when they do not. It is also surprising that Plato, after having made all the younger men of the polis the common sons of the citizens, should content himself with debarring older men who are lovers of the young from carnal intercourse with them, and should not debar them from other familiarities, or from behaving as lovers. Such familiarities, if practiced between son and father, or brother and brother, are the very height of indecency. All the more the mere cherishing of this form of love, without giving it actual expression, is in itself indecent. Now this is a very characteristic argument of Aristotle: he appeals here to the accepted notion of decency, without in any way making an attempt to prove them to people, these sound notions. In connection with what I said before, about the fact that decency and its specific meaning in various respects, is simply taken for granted and not deduced, by Aristotle.

To come to a broader argument, what makes men care for other men to the highest degree, is the private--one's own, and preciousness. But these two conditions will not be fulfilled if women and children are in common--they will be no one's wives or children, and since there are innumerable females who are called his wives, and innumerable children who are called his children, they lack the quality of preciousness. Aristotle also refers to a great difficulty in Plato's Republic, namely that the gifted children of the lower class will be

transferred to the upper class, and they of course would know their natural parents and might even become attached to them, because this is not recognizable at the moment of their birth, whether they have a high I.Q. or other important qualities or not.

Regarding property, Aristotle points out the great nuisances which result if men have everything in common. He refers to the experiences of fellow-travellers: not in the metaphorical sense, of course, but in the simple sense. The collisions with one another on trifling matters, when you are in a small space and together all the time. So without private property, without a private sphere, human life would be absolutely unbearable; but there is something true in communism, which however cannot be brought about by communism, namely, that what belongs to friends is absolutely common. In other words, this precisely means that everyone has his own which he shares with his friends. Now let us see...

It is clear from what has been said that the better system is that under which property is privately owned, but is put to common use, and the function proper to the legislator is to make men so disposed, to educate them in such a manner that they will treat property in this way. There is a further consideration, namely that of pleasure: here too to think of a thing as your own makes an unsayable difference. The satisfaction of a natural feeling is pleasure; and it may well be that regard for one's self, or self-love, and by extension, for what is one's own, is a feeling implanted by nature and not a mere impulse. Self-love is rightly censored; but what is truly censored is not so much love of oneself as excessive love of oneself, just as we also blame the lover of money, not so much for loving money as for loving it in excess. The simple feeling of love for any of these things is more or less universal. We may add that a very great pleasure is to be found in doing an act of kindness, in giving help to friends or guests or comrades; and such kindness and help become possible only when property is privately owned. But not only are these pleasures impossible under a system of excessive unification of the city, the activities of two forms of virtue are also obviously destroyed. The first of these is temperance in the matter of sexual relations. It is an act of decency and virtue to refrain from loving the wife of another; and the second is liberality in the use of property.

So you see here the kind of argument. We know by virtue of being properly brought up, that temperance and self-control on the one hand, and liberality on the other, are virtues. The practice of these virtues becomes impossible if there is no private property, and if there is no privacy of wives; and therefore communism contradicts the fundamental requirements of morality.

Now what is the overall impression which Aristotle has of Plato's Republic? He is very much impressed by the attractiveness of the Republic. I believe for quite a few modern readers, whatever they may think about the wisdom of the proposition, it is attractive. What is the secret of that attractiveness, according to Aristotle? If I could elicit from you a reaction, what you find attractive in the Republic would be quite helpful and illuminating. . . . But I expected not to get an answer (laughter).

Aristotle says that this arrangement as suggested by Socrates in the Republic is beautiful to look at, and the hearer accepts it gladly:

Why? because he thinks there will be a wonderful friendship toward all human beings in such a society. Especially when someone criticizes things as they are now, and says they are so bad now because of the lack of the community of property, meaning lawsuits and false witnesses, and flattery of the rich, all these kinds of things which we have in our society and all societies which ever were; they will be absent from such a society. But Aristotle says, these vices, these things which are truly ugly, are caused not by the absence of community of property, but by human wickedness. Therefore the way of curing these ills, to the extent that they can be cured, is good upbringing and not communism.

Aristotle gives an additional reason against Plato's Republic. He says, if these proposals were sound, then people would have become aware of them before. Because everything has been discovered already, in a manner, but some of the things have not been brought together, and others, things which are known, which in fact are not used. So you see the claim to novelty which Aristotle can raise, that he may be able to bring together institutions which have hitherto not been brought together; but he denies that there are any institutions which as such have not become known. Aristotle does not say that everything that is, is reasonable. But he says what is reasonable is somehow known; which is obviously not the same.

Finally he gives the following broad argument: the recommendation of the scheme of the Republic is that it contributes most to the happiness of the citizens. Then somewhere in the Republic the question is raised, who is happy there? The answer is roughly, well, no one in particular, but the city as a whole. Aristotle says, well, happiness is not of the nature of such things as odd numbers, or for that matter, even numbers. You can easily get an even number by adding two odd numbers. You cannot get a happy society by adding together unhappy individuals. So this much about...this only shows again the crucial importance of the individual and his satisfaction, which is the argument of Aristotle against Plato's communism. Aristotle does not speak of the right of individuals; one could say on the one hand he speaks of the responsibility of the citizen, of the good man, of the virtue of the individuals, and on the other hand, of the pleasures which the individual needs for feeling well. The concept of right in our sense is absent from here.

We now turn to a discussion of another blueprint, which is the most important of these apart from the Platonic ones, which Aristotle discusses. I will begin to read it. This is the scheme of a man called Hippodamus. (writes on board) You may not have heard his name; almost nothing is known of him except what Aristotle tells us here in the second book of the Politics; but he is nevertheless, obviously not a great man, as you will soon see, but a remarkable man. Now what does Aristotle tell us about him? He begins as follows.

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, citizen of Miletus, was the first man without having engaged in politics, who attempted to handle the theme of the best constitution. He was a man who invented the planning of towns in separate quarters, and laid out the Piraeus with regular roads. In his general life, too, he was led into some eccentricity by a desire to attract attention; and this made a number of people feel that he lived in too studied and overdone a manner.

He wore his hair long and expensively adorned; he had flowing robes, expensively decorated, made from a cheap but warm material (laughter), which he wore in summer time as well as in winter; and he aspired to be learned about nature generally.

Now this is not Aristotle's way to speak about other people. That sounds like rather malicious gossip (laughter). So he must have another reason. For example, when he discussed Plato or Socrates, he said something about the Socratic speeches: their peculiar charm, attractiveness, and gracefulness. And he said, well it is too much to expect that in addition they should be true! That is obviously something quite different.

In order to understand, appreciate fully this remark, we must give proper weight to what Aristotle said, that he was the first man not engaged in politics who attempted to discuss the best political order. A man not engaged in politics who attempts to discuss the best political order, one can say that is Aristotle's definition of the political philosopher. Therefore we can say Hippodamus was the first political philosopher. But what a terrible thing, that the first political philosopher cut such an atrocious figure. That has something to do with this problematic character of politics, to which we have already alluded, and to which we will come back very soon. Now a scheme of Hippodamus, with which I will not bore you, consists of dividing everything, citizen body, laws, etc., into three. The number three is apparently supplied by a certain philosophy of nature, on which he drew. The consequence is of course that everything is very simple and clear. Everywhere you find three. But as Aristotle makes tacitly clear, precisely for this reason, because of its extreme simplicity, very great confusion follows. That is to say, Hippodamus doesn't give attention to what is peculiar to the political, that this doesn't have the clarity and simplicity which the starred heaven, at least to the unarmed eye, possesses. In other words, no understanding of the fact that the political is in a class by itself, and cannot be interpreted on the basis of concepts supplied by science, dealing with the subhuman. There is one proposal of Hippodamus, which is especially important for Aristotle, one among many, only Aristotle thinks that it is crucial. Hippodamus proposed that those who invent something useful for the city should receive some honor. Well, we take this for granted, that it is a wise practice, but for Aristotle that is questionable. Aristotle discusses this proposal at great length, because this proposal which seems to be trivial, goes in his opinion to the root of things. I read to you:

In regard to the further question raised by Hippodamus --whether some honor ought not to be conferred on those who suggest an improvement which is of benefit to the city--we may argue that legislation in such a sense cannot be safely enacted, and has only a specious sound. It might encourage false accusations against the reformers, and perhaps lead to political disturbances. But the proposal also involves another problem, and suggests a further argument. There are some thinkers who raise a doubt whether states lose or gain by changing their traditional laws when some other and better law is possible. If on this issue we take the line that change

is not a gain, it is difficult to agree readily with the proposal made by Hippodamus; for changes which are in fact subversive of the laws, or of the whole political order, may be proposed on the plea that they tend to the common good. However, as the issue has now been mentioned it will be as well to define our views about it a little further. It is as we have said, an issue which we can debate; and a case can be made for the view that change is the better policy. Certainly in other branches of knowledge change has proved beneficial. We may cite in evidence the changes from traditional practice which have been made in medicine, in physical training, and generally in all the forms and arts of human skill; and since politics has to be counted as an art or form of human skill, it can be reasonably argued that the same must be true of politics. It can also be argued that the actual facts provide an indication of the benefits of change. The usages of old times were exceedingly simple and uncivilized: Greeks went about armed, and bought their brides from each other. (Imagine.) Indeed, the relics of ancient customs which are still in existence, here and there, are utterly absurd; there is, for example, a law at Cyme, relating to homicide, that if an accuser can produce a definite number of witnesses from his own kinsmen, the accused shall be liable to the charge of murder. (laughter) All men, as a rule, seek to follow, not the ancestral, but the good; and the earliest known human beings, whether they were 'earth-born' or survivors of some cataclysm, were in all probability similar to ordinary or even foolish people today. It would therefore be an absurdity always to stick to their notions. (1268b23-69a28)

I think I will leave it at that. What is the point which Aristotle makes? ...Aristotle does not deny that in the arts, medicine, etc., progress has been made. On the contrary, in parallel passages you will find he has said that progress is of the essence of the arts. There are always greater refinements possible; and that is the law of an art or skill, to progress indefinitely. But the question is, is what is true of the arts true of laws or politics? The first argument is, why not? because politics is too a form of art or skill. But the difficulties to which he alludes at the beginning, I must not forget. Technological changes, he will say, may very well lead to political changes. Therefore you cannot simply approve of technological change, you must have your eyes open regarding possible political change. And if the political change is desirable, change for the better, then all right; but if the political change is not a change for the better, then you have to wonder whether technological progress should be promoted. You have to take first the simpler view, the view held by Hippodamus: it is obviously sound to change laws, because the laws stem from the olden time, from a time when men were less enlightened and less civilized than now, naturally. And especially the principle: we--all men--who know, who have any understanding, seek not the ancestral as ancestral, the traditional as traditional, but the good. And if there is a difference between the traditional or ancestral and the good, we will choose the good.

Now there is a connection between this view and Hippodamus' simple and clear proposal regarding the number three. As we easily can see, this phenomenon of Hippodamus has in a somewhat modified form, renewed itself in modern times: a phenomenon called "political

radicalism." It has a different name in this country, I believe it is called liberalism. It is characterized by reliance on simple proposals; and what is true of technological change is also true of political change. Now after having stated the point for Hippodamus and his life, he states the case for the other point of view, what we can call the conservative argument, to the extent to which we can apply this notion to ancient discussions.

Now while these arguments go to show that in some cases and at some times law ought to be changed, there is another point of view from which it would appear that change is a matter which needs great caution. When we reflect that the improvements likely to be effected may be small, and that it is a bad thing to accustom men to abrogate laws lightly..(tape reversed)..to change the practice of an art is not the same as to change the practice of law. It is from habit, and only from habit, that law derives the validity which ensures obedience. But habit can be created only by the passage of time: and the readiness to change from actually existing to new laws, will accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law.

This is not so easy for us to understand, because in modern times generally, owing to the concept of the sovereign and sovereignty, law-making and quick changes of law have become more or less a matter of course. We need therefore some effort of imagination to understand the older point of view. The key point which Aristotle makes is I think directly intelligible: the analogy of art and law, of art and politics, of art and the polis, is questioned, because while the arts owe their power to their evident reasonableness, that this manipulation, this operation, is manifestly conducive to bring about the desired result, law owes its power to custom, or habit, alone, as Aristotle says here. ...not to its intrinsic reasonableness. And therefore it must be treated in a radically different way from the arts. This is an issue which is of course still with us. One may speak--what Aristotle has in mind may be developed along these lines, that the polis as polis, in contradistinction to the arts as arts, has a recalcitrance to reason, a recalcitrance which cannot be overcome--a thought which is expressed by Plato in his simile of the cave. The cave is a sphere beneath the earth. Political man as political man lives in that cave, and he can never leave it and live in the light of the sun. I read to you from a Federalist paper of uncertain origin, at least as my edition says: it is number 49.

If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous, they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. (because neither the antiquity of the opinion, or the number of people holding it, is of course of any relevance philosophically) Reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational govern-

will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side.

There are many other statements, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, of this kind. I remind you of Edmund Burke's saying, a very extreme statement: "In proportion as the primitive rights of man are metaphysically true--meaning theoretically true--"they are morally and politically false." A very strong statement, in proportion... But the most amusing formulation of this which I know, you will find in some passages in Macauley's History of England, from which I will read. It deals with something recognized by present-day political science, but I believe not properly interpreted. Speaking of the abdication of James II, Macauley says:

It was not easy to draw up any form of words which would please all whose assent it was important to obtain. But at length out of many suggestions offered from different quarters a resolution was framed which gave general satisfaction. This resolution has been many times subjected to criticism as minute and severe as was ever applied to any sentence ever written by man. (That is a typical exaggeration of Macauley's.) And there perhaps never was a sentence written by man which would bear such criticism less. (Then he gives some examples of that.) It is idle, however, to examine these memorable words as we should examine a chapter of Aristotle or Hobbes. Such words are to be considered not as words, but as deeds. If they effect that which they are intended to effect, they are rational, though they may be contradictory. If they fail of attaining their ends, they are absurd, though they carry demonstration with them. Logic admits of no compromise: the essence of politics is compromise.

I will look at a few others in the same History.. Here he speaks of the Toleration Act, passed by Parliament shortly after the Revolution:

Of all the acts that have ever been passed by Parliament, the Toleration Act is perhaps that which most strikingly illustrates the peculiar vices and the peculiar excellences of English legislation.The perfect lawgiver is a just temper between the mere man of theory, who can see nothing but general principles, and the man of business, who can see nothing but particular circumstances. In English legislation, the practical sentiment has always predominated, and not seldom unduly predominated, over the theoretical. To think nothing of symmetry, and much of convenience; never to remove an anomaly merely because it is an anomaly; never to innovate except when some grievance is felt; never to innovate except insofar as to get rid of the grievance; never to lay down any proposition of wider extent than the particular case for which it is necessary to provide. These are the rules which have from the age of John to the age of Victoria generally guided the deliberations of our two hundred fifty Parliaments. Our national distaste for whatever is abstract in political science, amounts undoubtedly to a fault. (He does not think of Lord Bernard Russell here, of course.) That it is perhaps a fault on the right side, that we have been far too slow to improve our laws, must be admitted. But though in other countries there may occasionally have been more rapid progress, it would not be easy to name any other

which has had so little oppression. The Toleration Act approaches very near to the idea of a great English law. To a jurist versed in the theory of legislation, but not intimately acquainted with the temper of the sects and parties in which the nation was divided in the time of revolution, that act would seem to be a mere chaos and contradiction. It will not bear to be tried by sound general principles; nay, it will not bear to be tried by any principles, sound or unsound. But these very faults may appear to be merits when we take into account the passions and prejudices of those for whom the Toleration Act was framed.

I do not wish to continue this now, but there is another discussion of a British measure of the late seventeenth century, where he argues as follows: "The major--(there is of course a syllogism there, the major and minor and conclusion)--"The major did not fit the minor, and the conclusion did not follow from the major and the minor. But the major brought two hundred votes, and the minor two hundred, and the conclusion, the same." Therefore the thing passed. This he thinks is characteristic of political arguments, as distinguished from theoretical arguments. This goes of course--also what Burke says--much beyond what Aristotle says, but there is something important in common, which one can call in general terms, fundamental recalcitrance of the polis to strictly theoretical reasoning. Aristotle says here in the Hippodamus section that the law's power is due entirely to custom or habit, not to its intrinsic reasonableness. This seems to contradict another statement of his, according to which the law is a dictate of reason. As he puts it, it is a speech or pronouncement, stemming some practical wisdom and understanding. Law is a dictate of reason: classical and Thomistic definition. But Aristotle says, you will note in the Ethics, speech derivative from some practical wisdom. But another reason why there is a difference between the Thomistic and the Aristotelian teaching, is this: according to Aristotle laws--that is all interesting laws--must be given with a view to the political order. Democratic laws differ from monarchic laws, oligarchic laws differ from democratic, et cetera. But most political orders : you will find in effect are more or less defective, hence the laws given for them, to the extent to which they are given for them, cannot be simply reasonable. A certain adaptation to the political order, that is to say, to the opinions regarding justice which were known to these orders, is necessary. Now this leads me to the discussion given by Aristotle in book III, to which I will turn after mentioning only one point regarding Aristotle's discussion of the actual regimes which are supposed to be good: namely, Sparta, Crete and Carthage. Now only one point must I mention: that one of these beautiful cities was Carthage, not a Greek city. This alone suffices to prove that the translation of polis by "Greek city-state" is impossible. "City," yes, but not "Greek." It is an accident that there are more Greek cities than non-Greek cities. The city is not as such a Greek institution.

Book III, to which I will turn now, contains the fundamental discussion of Aristotle's Politics. Of course one should read if one can the whole Politics. But precisely if one does so, one will find that the fundamental discussions are those in the third book. Let us read the beginning.

He who makes inquiries about the politeiai, which each of them is and what their character is, for him about the first inquiry is regarding the polis, what then a polis is.

Now this is a very strange beginning. For we know already what the polis is, don't we? Of course, the polis is the theme of political philosophy; why then does Aristotle raise the question of the polis again?

We learn now from this very beginning--we might have learned before if we had read every passage, but nowhere as visible as here--that the theme of political philosophy for Aristotle is not the polis, but the politeia. I will now just use the Greek term, because the question of how to translate it is not easy to answer. I would like to mention only one fact: that Politeia is the Greek title, the correct title, of Plato's Republic. So not polis, but politeia.

Here Aristotle makes the strange proposal that we are interested in the polis, and must find out what the polis is, only because we are interested in the politeia. In the various forms of politeia. What is the reason? Hitherto we have learned that the polis is by nature, that it is by nature the peak or end of all other associations, that the polis is all-comprehensive, and therefore directed towards the highest good, that it must recognize the independence of the private, namely, of the family or household. Not so much in the sense of a private sphere, in which everyone can do what he lists, but rather in the sphere of individual responsibility. Political is what has to do with the polis. And therefore people can ask, what is the political, and give all kinds of more or less far-fetched answers, which would not be possible if the polis were remembered. Everyone knows of course in a way what the political and non-political are--voting is a political action, buying food is not as such a political action, but it can become by accident, such as if you fetch some sandwiches for a man running for office who has no time to buy them himself. But this is an exception, it proves the rule. Yet the word political has another meaning, with which you are all familiar: this is politics, I don't want to have anything to do with it. Now what does politics mean here? Not simply dirty business, of course, because that you can find in other spheres of life. But the key point is, this is divisive. Say what an internal revenue collector does is not as such political, because this is the law, that you have to pay taxes and that is no longer at least, a political issue.

When we speak of political in a negative way, we mean its divisive character, in the first place. Now this divisive character of politics is taken up by Aristotle; but strangely and remarkably, not as the seamy side of politics, as we would first see it, but as essential to the highest purpose of the polis. Aristotle goes on to say: so why must we ask what the polis is although we are concerned with the politeia? --I believe it would be very unfriendly not to explain what politeia means, very briefly.

The usual translation, I suppose also followed by Barker, is constitution. A translation one could accept if constitution were meant in the way one may speak of a man's strong constitution, for example. In this sense it would be tolerable. But this we do not mean when we speak of constitution. Our understanding of constitution has gone through, presupposes historically, the concept of fundamental laws of the land. A distinction which began to be made in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, I don't remember which one. For example, the king in France had to be a man--no woman could become sovereign--or that the royal domain could not be disposed of by the king, and so on. These were fundamental laws, which would not be changed except by the king. All other laws were non-fundamental, which could be changed. The key

point is that political are not any laws. Politeia is used by Aristotle frequently in contradistinction to laws, fundamental or not fundamental. It would be simpler to say, that politeia designates primarily the factual order of ruling, of power, which is at the very bottom of any legislation and which is in a way the cause of all legislation, because the ruling part of the city gives the laws with a view to its ruling. That does not necessarily mean to its own advantage; that is a nasty interpretation, because it is at least thinkable that a ruling group rules with a view to the interests of the whole. Now if this is so, the key question in any political order is this: what kind of men are preponderant in this political society, rule in their own right, not by any delegation? President Johnson of course doesn't rule in his own right, he rules by elected delegation. In every society we find some man or body of men who rule in their own right. May I ask you who that is in the United States? ("The people.") Yes--some men or body of men who rule in their own right, not by derivation. And the key question for Aristotle is, what kind of men rule in political society?

This question in Aristotle's view is inseparable from the question: to what end is that society dedicated? Decent men, to take a very simple case from a children's book--decent men will be dedicated to decency, and indecent men will be dedicated to various forms of indecency. We can make subdivisions, as we shall see. So the question of the politeia, I translate it by the term regime, the best that has occurred to me, and I shall accept a better one as soon as I learn of it-- the various regimes, the variety of regimes, not the polis as polis, is the subject of Aristotle's political science. The point is this: the political issue is not the polis. People are not concerned politically with whether they should live in political society and have governments or not--but in what kind of society and what kind of government. The practical issue is not the issue which never becomes a political issue, but a divisive issue; namely--well, in happy society it does not become practically divisive--but in principle it is divisive.

We understand this today immediately because we are in the very unfortunate situation of the cold war. And the cold war is of course not merely a conflict between two states, the United States and Russia, but between two kinds of regimes...what we call liberal democracy on the one hand and communism on the other.

In the nineteenth century, and in the halcyon days prior to World War I, this fact was greatly obscured. Men like Plato and Xenophon were severely criticised by modern historians (of Greece) as bad citizens, because they did not simply and unqualifiedly identify themselves with the city of Athens. But after we have seen how many people were compelled to fight on the wrong side from the point of view of simple patriotism, in these last twenty or thirty years, we see again that the simple, unqualified identification with the country of one's birth is possible only in very--or at least in relatively happy times. In the early twentieth century patriotism, or as it was called at that time, nationalism, could be taken for granted, there was no question about that. Most regimes, at least in the Western world, were relatively decent, and no fundamental issue arose. Patriotism and/or nationalism were taken for granted as always a natural basis. The possibility of fundamental dissension, of civil war, was not taken seriously enough--except of course by the Communists. In the English civil war, in the seventeenth century, patriots were a party: the Patriots here, the Royalists there. At that time patriotism was not taken for granted. It meant to take the side of the sovereignty of the people, against the sovereignty of the King. Now the defeat of the doctrine of the divine right of kings, which was completed by the French Revolution,

and its consequences, made the sovereignty of the people the basis of political theory. And this is of course true today everywhere--the Communist doctrine, the Fascist doctrine, are explicitly based on the sovereignty of the people. Only they have some qualifications: that it is best for the sovereignty of the only part of the people that is truly people, that is, the proletariat, that there be a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is only a modification of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. On this basis the doctrines of Aristotle were simply unintelligible. We begin to understand them now, out of our experience.

I will leave it at that. Is there any point which one could take up in the few minutes we still have?

Mr. Bruell: Would you say that the subject of the Republic is more the polis?

That is a long question because politeia has more than one meaning, and the most important one is the one which I sketched, regime; but it can also mean, to lead the life of a citizen--this ambiguity is very important in that case.

Student: Could we from a close reading of Aristotle's Politics see that he has seen implications of his teaching for collectivization of thought? as distinguished from collectivization of..

No, in the sense in which we mean it we couldn't, because what we call ideologies did not exist. When you read the discussion of the variety of regimes, in the eighth or ninth book of Plato's Republic that is clearer than in Aristotle's Politics, there are certain opinions which go with different regimes. For example, the opinion going with democracy is that the end of political life is freedom. Whereas oligarchy thinks in terms of wealth.. these are opinions going with certain parts of society. I mean ordinarily a rich man is not democratic, and a poor man is not oligarchic. Aristotle makes very clear that the rivalry between oligarchy and democracy, very crudely speaking, is that of the rich and the poor.

But there is no ideology, for the very simple reason that everyone says in a very straight-forward manner exactly what he is after. Of course, a certain element of hypocrisy, if it was hypocrisy, it can also have been self-deception, naturally went with those things. The honest democrats and the honest oligarchs believe that freedom as the democrats understand it and wealth as the oligarchs understand it, is the best for the polis. But not in the name of some ideology, but simply saying, How can you have a city which defends itself well, which has the proper naval and other equipment, if there are not wealthy people around to pay for that? And similar considerations regarding freedom, of course; and that is not an ideology. An ideology is some form of theoretical thing--I would say pseudo-theoretical. But let us take a more lenient view and say, something which seems to stem from theoretical considerations, and that is absent from these earlier doctrines.

Student: Just straightforward selfishness.

It does not have to be selfishness, but it does not go beyond the political. For example, if say somewhere a tribe in Africa refuses

to be ruled by people wholly alien to them, I would hesitate to call this nationalism. Because nationalism is a certain theory--and you don't need a theory, this grows up with men living together with people whose language they do not understand, they may permit them to live among them, but they don't wish to be ruled by them. Do you see this simple difference--between a natural reaction which doesn't match any elaboration, and theoretical considerations?

Student: There would be for example, rights of Englishmen, but no rights of man.

Yes, you can put it this way. The natural right of man is a doctrine of philosophic origin, in other words. We may have an occasion to speak of that later.

We must now make this deplorable interruption of three meetings, one and a half weeks, after which we will return, if everything goes well, to the question of the politeia, I mean, of the potentiality of civil war. Nothing less than that is implied in the Aristotelian doctrine of politeia.

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 13

(tape begins late)..of which Aristotle did not even dream. Think of communism and fascism. So you had to consider this question for one moment, how far Aristotle's specific analyses of regimes are relevant for our understanding of the regimes with which we are confronted today. And I limit myself to the question of democracy.

Now Aristotle defines democracy as a regime directed toward the benefit of the poor. Poor does not mean here what it means in President Johnson's war against poverty, but it means those who have to earn their living. The distinction is clearly made in Aristophanes comedy Plutos, literally translated wealth. Poverty as a woman appears defending poverty against the claims of wealth, and she emphasizes the fact that the poor are those, who, like the farmers, have to earn their living; and the others, the beggars, are of course not even considered.

To repeat, Aristotle defines democracy as a regime directed toward the benefit of the poor and indifferent to the common good, i.e., the good of all citizens. Now this is quite shocking to us, but on the other hand, not unintelligible. Now we have heard in modern democracies expressions like milking the rich, through inheritance taxes and progressive income taxes; we have heard, although this may very well be apocryphal, we tax, we tax, and we tax; we spend, we spend, and we spend; and we elect, we elect, and we elect. This is ascribed to Harry Hopkins, probably untrue. Now we solve the difficulty by assuming that the common good with which every decent society must be concerned consists in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. And then of course we have the democratic implication immediately. Or, to use the formula well-known from the Communist Manifesto, a movement of the great majority on behalf of the great majority--of course--against the exploiters of the toilers. This is in a way a solution.

Now can this analysis of democracy as Aristotle presents it be of any relevance for a discussion of present-day democracy? Now what do we understand by democracy? We do not take these extreme statements to which I referred. Let us consider Lincoln's: "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Now what is the key point here? "Government for the people"?--that goes without saying here. This is of course also true of absolute monarchy, according to its claim, or enlightened despotism, paternally taking care of the people. Government of the people is entirely different. It implies the ultimate sovereignty of the people, i.e., the exclusion of kingship by the grace of God. Government is not due to an act of divine grace as such, but to the people. The people may delegate government to a king, or to a king and Parliament. This view is familiar to all of you of course from your school-days, because that is the view stated on the first page of the Declaration of Independence. In case anyone has forgotten it, I remind you of it.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, (that is, the same people who originally established it)--laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

Now the implication of the whole attack, of the long list of grievances, is that the British King and Parliament have lost their claim to rule, not because of these terrible things, quartering soldiers, and taxation without representation, and the other points, but it is of course implied that the government itself was legitimate. It became illegitimate by the tyrannical use of the power. The Declaration of Independence is perfectly compatible with constitutional monarchy in the eighteenth century sense--or with King and Parliament. The peculiarly democratic element of Lincoln's famous statement is "government by the people," meaning, the people governs itself...which it wouldn't do in a constitutional monarchy where the King and Parliament govern. In other words, it is implied there is no government distinct from the people. The people governs itself, through men of the people, who come from the people, and return to it after very short tenures of office. There is no one who governs in a democracy in his own right, but only by virtue of delegation and election--in other words, the government is not a different breed from the ruled, as it would be in the case of a nobility, where they are a different breed from the commoners. There is always a difference between the government and the people. There is no self-government of the people strictly understood. *To say there is no government distinct from the people, is a proposition only* literally true if one identifies the government with the legislative, deliberative part of the government, as distinct from the executive or the magistrates, and if the legislative-deliberative part consists of the whole citizen body assembled. Is this clear? In that case, you can say, government of the people, self-government literally understood. No distinction between government and the people, because government by laws is the deliberative part, the legislative part, and this is the people--the town meeting, for example. In contradistinction to any representatives of the people, or in contradistinction to parliamentary democracy, the Lincolnian formula draws our attention to direct democracy, as the democracy par excellence.

From this it follows that modern democracy, even in Lincoln's time of course, is not truly democratic. Now this view of democracy has been attacked frequently and is still being attacked, as misleading, because it is based on what people call a romantic conception of democracy, in contradistinction to a realistic one. The word romantic can here be understood to have precise meaning, because the theorist of direct democracy was Rousseau, and Rousseau is the father of romanticism, one can say.

Now what is the meaning of this criticism of the romantic conception of democracy? A very well-known fact, that people cannot govern themselves but must have leaders. It is added, there are always actual or potential leaders around, elites, and negatively stated, the phenomenon of electoral apathy shows how little you can count on self-government of the people in a strict sense. A very well-known representative of this view, Robert Michals (sp) has spoken of the "iron law" of oligarchy, which means there is never a democracy. So always an oligarchy rules: if you have absolute monarchy there is a clique around the king, because very few things can be done by the king himself; and in democracy there is also an oligarchy, or rather, a number of oligarchies competing with each other.

Now the so-called realistic concept embodies notions which were originally advanced by critics or opponents of democracy, by people who tried to show that democracy in any strict sense, self-government of the people, is impossible. While the romantic notion is based on a fantastic notion of equality, namely that all are equally capable of being leaders, the realistic notion claims to recognize the crucial importance of inequality--for what else does the emphasis on leadership mean but the recognition of the crucial importance of inequality? There is a simple example: one of the best known radical democrats a generation ago was Henry Wallace. And he was particularly concerned with "the common man," a phrase which he liked to use. And his biographer called the story of his life, An Uncommon Man. So in other words, precisely if you want to have the rule of the common man, this rule will not work except through uncommon men. You cannot have equality except via inequality.

Up to this point the present-day view that the Lincolnian conception of democracy is romantic, or fantastic, which is now I take it preponderant for modern political science--up to this point it is sound. Yet one can also not deny the fact that modern democracy is in fact, and not merely in its aspiration or claim, egalitarian--and if one does not consider the other side, the criticism remains wrong. Tocqueville's famous book on Democracy in America has exactly this thesis, as you know, that there is an egalitarian movement from the late Middle Ages on, which is ever increasing in power. A simple example which everyone knows, in a democracy strictly understood there cannot be any hereditary aids, or privileges, to public power. No abridgement of rights on account of birth, and on account of sex, and of race--here we see the clear egalitarian view. To this extent, present-day democracy still asserts, differing from what the Declaration of Independence explicitly says, all men are by nature equal. The differences due to birth, like family, sex, race, are irrelevant. Hence, one man, one vote, which is still admitted today--is a necessary consequence of that egalitarianism. Still in one respect in other words present-day representatives of democracy are much more democratic than the earlier representatives were. But in one respect they are less democratic in the strict sense. This shows itself in the emphasis on political inequalities, meaning the inequalities of the leaders and the led. But this is justified from a democratic point of view by the demand that the political inequalities should correspond to the natural inequalities--say to the inequality of talents, and of course also of the cultivation of the talents.

So it is misleading to contrast the now-prevailing view of democracy as a realistic view--to the older view as a romantic or idealistic one. There is as much idealism in the now prevailing view of democracy as there was in the older one--but a different kind of ideal. The democratic ideal has changed. The present-day radical democrats are not interested in the closest approximation to the rule of the simple people, but rather in a transformation of the simple people making them more educated, and so on. Incidentally the public opinion polls which are apart from the legal institutions which were devised like referendum, is also a means to bring about government of, by and for the people. A government which would listen in all cases to the public opinion polls would truly be government by the people, by the majority. Since the public-opinion polls are a part of present-day democracy as it has developed in the last generation, in this respect the older

view of the approximation to direct democracy, is still very powerful.

Now to return to Aristotle. He surely did not know of modern democracy, in either form; and of the intra-democratic modern controversies. He knew only of the democracy of the Greeks. But modern democracy and Greek democracy have something in common, which is not negligible. In the first place, no property qualifications. And that means, that modern democracy as well as ancient democracy is by itself, rule of the poor in the sense defined. In one respect, classical democracy is more democratic than modern democracy; but in another respect, it is less democratic. That it is less democratic is shown by the institution of slavery; and no one seriously considered political rights for women. But in other respects it was more democratic, as no one made clearer than Aristotle. Aristotle describes as a specific democratic institution, election by lot, in contradistinction to election by raising the hand, as it were. The latter means voting for candidates; whether secret or open doesn't make any difference. Election by lot--why is that more democratic than by raising the hand? Yes?

Student: Because by lot it makes no difference who wins the election, every man in the election is equal.

In other words, the chance of becoming President of the United States, if there were election by lot, is equally great for everyone. People who could not possibly get themselves elected as dogcatchers have as great a chance. That is in one sense very democratic. But if we state it as a principle, election by lot means actual equality, the maximum of equality regarding the occupation of ruling offices. Needless to say, that classical democracy was not absolutely egalitarian in this respect. Two kinds of offices especially--generals and treasurers--had to be voted personally, because if a notorious drifter and wastrel would have become treasurer by virtue of the lot that would be terrible, or if someone completely inept became a general, that would be the same. But wherever feasible, election by lot; whereas in modern times, generally prevailing, election of candidates.

Now the notion underlying election of candidates is simply this: you can look at your man for whom you vote, and if you are public-spirited, you will vote for the man who is most worthy of the position, or is most able. You will consider merit; whereas election by lot does not consider merit, but merely the fact that you are a citizen, a freeman; and therefore, Aristotle says, the election by raising the hands, what we call election, is based on an aristocratic principle, on the principle that the best should rule. Modern democracy is from an Aristotelian point of view a mixture of democracy and aristocracy because of this fact. The elected representatives are supposed to be the elite, the cream of the population. I think it becomes very clear from the Federalist papers that this was the original intention. This has certain implications.

Now modern democracy is, as one says, representative or parliamentary. And the notion developed, with great force and gravity in the Federalist papers, is that this is necessary in large states. Direct democracy belongs to small states and governments. But a

large state in having a representative assembly requires a great improvement in communication, naturally. Or to put it on a somewhat broader basis, enormous technological advances, which did not exist in classical antiquity, and these technological advances were due at least partly to the advance of modern science. So if one would develop this theme fully, we can say that modern democracy belongs to a type of regime wholly unknown to Aristotle because it is based indirectly but importantly, on modern science. But what is true of democracy, modern democracy, is of course also true of modern communism and fascism. So these regimes which we know from our lifetime are fundamentally distinct from the regimes known to Aristotle by the fact that modern science is directly or indirectly presupposed in these specifically modern regimes. So the minimum change which we must make in the Aristotelian arrangement, you remember the six which we had last time, (goes to board) is a new type. For liberal democracy, communism and fascism are radically distinguished from all six--by the power of science and modern technology, a thing which had no direct equivalent in classical antiquity. We will come back to that later. But all the more I emphasize the following: these more complex regimes, which we know from our century, cannot be properly understood except through contrast with the simple forms discussed by Aristotle.

Aristotle's analysis of these simple regimes, these six, must still form the basis of the scientific analysis of all regimes, and in particular of those which we know from the present-day. One historical point I would like to add. Closer inspection might show that classical democracy, Athenian democracy, is not as unqualifiedly democratic as the democracy defined by Aristotle. In other words, Aristotle presents democracy according to what it claims to be, or what it aspires to be, and not as it actually was in Athens. We must therefore make a distinction between what we may call the philosophic concept of democracy, and the historical concept of democracy as it arises from the study of the actual institutions and working of Athenian democracy.

By the philosophic concept I do not mean something like an ideal type, in the sense of Max Weber--an ideal type being an convenient construct, and nothing else. For when Aristotle speaks of democracy he spells out what democracy explicitly intends to be, and whether it achieves it in practice is another story. In other words, it is not a construct of Aristotle, but it is a thinking through of what democracy itself claims to be or to achieve. The philosophic concept of democracy which we find in Aristotle takes democracy as it were by its word. You claim that, this is what you imply. It understands it in terms of what democracy intends or wishes to be. This is not a peculiarity of Aristotle, but simply necessary if one wishes to achieve clarity about political things. The historical concept of Athenian democracy is ordinarily based, especially the more popular presentation, on the peak of classical democracy, i.e., democracy under Pericles. And there is one and only one piece of literature to which everyone will turn in order to find out what Periclean democracy is, and as I see from the understanding smile of some of you, I don't have to say what that is...because Mr. Levy will say it.

Mr. Levy: Surely I'm no substitute for you, Mr. Strauss. ("Pardon?")

Mr. Levy: Thucydides' book on The Peloponnesian War.

The funeral speech which occurs in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. But this is not a good procedure. Because Thucydides, after all, who knew best what he understood by the funeral speech, he having composed it, did not think that Periclean Athens was a democracy. He explicitly says it was a democracy only in name; but in fact, the rule of the first man. In other words, Thucydides did not pay too great attention to the fact that democratic institutions of course survived under Pericles, because all substantive decisions were made in fact by the first man, Pericles. If one wants to know what Thucydides understands by a democracy in fact, one has to study his presentation of the post-Periclean democracy. Cleon, and so on--or still better, the speech of a Syracusan leader of democracy, Athenagoras, in the sixth book, chapters 36-40. But this only in order to warn you against a very facile misunderstanding. Let us now continue in our study of Aristotle with book three--which to repeat is the central book of the Politics, and if one has understood the first book, as we cannot even attempt here, one has understood Aristotle's political teaching.

We have learned, to repeat, that the most important consideration concerns the regime, and how many good and bad regimes there are. But there is also a popular opinion, an accepted opinion, according to which the best regime would be mixed. Then the question arises mixed of what kind of simple regimes, and in what proportion or manner should they be mixed? This means that we still stand at the beginning of the whole inquiry. Let us turn to 1281a34.

Is it better than any of the other alternatives that the one best man should rule? This is still more oligarchical (than the rule of the wealthy few or the few of the better sort) because the number of those debarred from honors is even greater. It may perhaps be urged that there is still another alternative; that it is a poor sort of policy to vest sovereignty in any person (or body of persons), subject as persons are to the passions that beset men's souls; and that it is better to vest it in law. (But this does not solve the difficulty.) The law itself may incline towards oligarchy or towards democracy; and what difference will the sovereignty of law then make in the problems which have just been raised? The consequences already stated will follow just the same.

It doesn't come out clear enough in the translation, but the point Aristotle makes might be stated as follows: Someone might say, your whole discussion, Aristotle, is wrong, because you speak of regimes, i.e., the rule of this or that kind of human being. All rule of human beings is wrong: we ought to have rule of laws--a notion with which we are all familiar. Now Aristotle's answer is very simply this: what kind of laws? Laws have to be made, framed, adopted; and which laws you adopt will depend on the regime. A democracy will have different laws from an oligarchy, and so on; and so, it is no use to say, no rule of men but rule of laws. This is a metaphorical expression, which, properly understood, is very sound; but it is a metaphorical expression. Literally, it cannot be true. The fundamental political question cannot be a legal question. Laws are secondary. We have heard in Aristotle's critique of Hippodamus,

in the second book, that laws lack the evidence, or the rationality, of the arts and sciences. We may suggest this connection between the remark here, and what we read in book two: since most regimes are in fact defective, and hence based on untrue assumptions of one kind or another, most laws, being dependent on the regime, lack evidence. If the basis is questionable, what is derivative of it will also be questionable. Now Aristotle begins the inquiry proper with these words, in 1280a5 or so (book III, chapter 9).

We must next ascertain what are the distinctive principles attributed by their advocates to oligarchy and democracy, and what are the oligarchical and democratic conceptions of justice.

Now Barker is again for very respectable reasons, because he wants to help the reader, avoiding Aristotle's terseness. One can also become too talkative, and miss the clear lines. Let us take first what limits they give, what characterizations they give, of oligarchy and democracy. He doesn't necessarily mean what the advocates of either say, but only what people say. And what the oligarchic and the democratic justice is. Again understood, just as oligarchic laws are not democratic laws, there is also a democratic notion of justice, which is not the oligarchic notion. We cannot assume that people always agree in political matters, as to what justice is. But this most obvious beginning, is that he speaks only of oligarchy and democracy. Why does he do that? Because oligarchy and democracy are the most common forms of regime: and Aristotle does not regard this as any accident: he bows to that. Go on now.

For all have a hold on a sort of conception of justice; but they both fail to carry it far enough, and neither of them expresses the true conception of justice in the whole of its range.

In other words, each of them has some understanding of justice, it is not simply fiction what they say about justice. But they don't go far enough. Each concept of justice is one-sided. And Aristotle claims that if one goes the whole way, then one gets a full concept of justice in which justice is done to both the democratic and oligarchic concepts. Aristotle does not begin as you see with the institutional or social basis, but with their claim. And the claim means, what they understand by justice. For we are concerned with the best regime; and even the defective regimes claim to be the best. This claim must be met.

In democracies for example, justice is considered to mean equality (in the distribution of office). It does mean equality--but equality for those who are equal, and not for all. In oligarchies, again, inequality in the distribution of office is considered to be just; and indeed it is--but only for those who are unequal, and not for all. The advocates of oligarchy and democracy both refuse to consider this factor--who are the persons to whom their principles properly apply--and they both make erroneous judgements. The reason is that they are judging in their own case; and most men, as a rule, are bad judges where their own interests are involved. Justice is relative to persons; and a just distribution is one in which the

relative values of the things given correspond to those of the persons receiving--a point which has already been made in the Ethics. But the advocates of oligarchy and democracy, while they agree about what constitutes equality in the thing, disagree about what constitutes it in persons. The main reason for this is the reason just stated: they are judging, and judging erroneously, in their own case; but there is also another reason--they are misled by the fact that they are professing a sort of conception of justice, and professing it up to a point, into thinking that they profess one which is absolute and complete. The oligarchs think that superiority on one point--in their case wealth--means superiority on all: the democrats believe that equality in one respect--for instance, that of free birth--means equality all around. (1280a26)

In other words, the insufficiency of both the democratic and the oligarchic view of justice is obvious, according to Aristotle, because equality in some respects does not mean equality in all respects. Inequality in some respects does not mean inequality in all respects. The two respects here are free birth and wealth. Now how can you decide between these two? And how can we discover that overriding consideration which is neither wealth as such nor free birth as such? That is made clear in the immediate sequel. The most important thing these people do not say. For if men had come together for the sake of property--do you have that?

If property were the end for which men came together and formed an association, men's share (in the offices and honors) of the city would be proportional to their share of property; and in that case the argument of the oligarchical side--that it is not just for a man who has contributed one pound to share equally in a sum of a hundred pounds (or, for that matter, in the interest accruing upon that sum) with the man who has contributed all the rest--

In other words, if civil society were a trade or money-making arrangement of sorts, then the oligarchs would be perfectly right. But that is not the purpose of the polis. Similar considerations apply to the democratic argument--we do not have to read that. Both democrats and oligarchs forget the purpose of political life, which is not acquisition, nor mere life, or self-defense, but the good life, the noble life, the life of human excellence. A city is not a city, it is only a defective city, if it is not concerned with the moral character of its associates. And from this crucial consequences follow. Let us turn to p. 120, 1280b35.

The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of social life are means to that end. A polis is constituted by the association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in a life of true felicity and goodness.

It is therefore for the sake of good actions, and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be said to exist.

Yes. More precisely for the sake of noble actions. There is a certain difference between good and noble of which we may have occasion to speak.

Those who contribute most to an association of this character have a greater share in the polis than those who are equal to them, or even greater (in free birth and descent), but unequal in civic excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence.

So in other words the claim of the oligarchy and democracy is ruled out here very simply, but provisionally on this ground. The city's highest purpose is the good life, i.e., the noble life. Hence the men of noble deeds and noble character have much more claim to rule than the rich as rich and the freemen as freemen. But can these men of virtue have the sole claim, or is this not precisely the predicament of the city, that it must give way to the claims of those who from the highest point of view do not deserve them. This may be a very bad necessity, but it is a necessity. Let us read on from where we were.

From what has been said it is plain that both sides to the dispute about constitutions (i.e., both the democratic and and the oligarchical side) profess only a partial conception of justice.

A difficulty arises when we turn to consider what body of men should be sovereign in the polis: the people at large; the wealthy; the better sort of men; the one man who is best of all; the tyrant. But all these alternatives appear to involve unpleasant results; indeed, how can it be otherwise? What if the poor, on the ground of their being a majority, proceed to divide among themselves the possessions of the wealthy--will not this be unjust? "No, by Zeus," a democrat may reply--

"Democrat" is of course not in Aristotle. "Of, course, by Zeus, the sovereign, the ruler, decided it justly"--justly meaning in due form. The people assembled decided to confiscate the property of the rich. That is extremely--the quotation marks, which you find here, are of course not in Aristotle. But the oath, which is in the text, is quite striking. This is one of the two cases in which you find an oath in Aristotle: and the other comes very soon. That is quite interesting.

In order to make this clear, in passing, in Plato's dialogues there are many oaths. And even various oaths: by Zeus, by Hera--Socrates likes to vow by a woman, or by a goddess--or by Apollo and others. In Aristotle, so to speak, never--except in the Politics. How would you explain that? Well, let us take the simplest example: a demonstration of a mathematical proposition. Do you use oaths there? I mean, the demonstration is in no way affected by the addition of an oath. Either it is demonstrated or it is not demonstrated. But if it is matter of fact, and especially of controversial fact, oaths are of some importance. It shows at least at first glance that the man who says, by Zeus, believes it very strongly. Not necessarily, because he may be a liar. But still there is some presumption. So in other words when things are controversial and human passions are involved,

they swear.

And political debate is passionate debate. It is quite interesting then that only in Aristotle's Politics among all his works do we find oaths.

But if this is not the extreme of injustice, what is?

Now Aristotle develops this at great length. All these kinds of men, the multitude, the wealthy, the gentlemen, the single man who surpasses all others in goodness, and the tyrant--they all raise claims. And each is convinced that his claim is obviously reasonable. The people confiscate the property of the rich--of course it is right. The dēmos, the sovereign, decided it in a legal manner. But Aristotle says, look, that means they take away property, merely on the basis of the fact that they have the power. What does the tyrant do? Is this--can you leave it at that? Now what is the outcome of all this? Democracy, tyranny and oligarchy are all bad because they absolutize the right of a part, whose interests are not identical with the interests of the whole. The dēmos, by destroying the wealth, destroys itself, and the polis--and therefore it cannot be good. The action of the dēmos against the rich is as coercive as that of the tyrant. But what about the gentleman, the good man? (p.122)

Should the better sort of men have authority and be sovereign in all matters? In that case, the rest of the citizens will necessarily be debarred from honours, since they will not enjoy the honour of holding civic office. We speak of offices as honors; and when a single set of persons hold office permanently, the rest of the community must necessarily be debarred from all honours.

So in other words the people of defective decency, those who are not gentlemen, are debarred from honours if only the gentlemen rule. But do they deserve honour? At first glance, of course not. But what is Aristotle's point? Why must they be given some power in spite of that? Let us go on.

It is better than any of the other alternatives that the one best man should rule? This is still more oligarchical, because the number of those debarred from office is greater--

In other words, all others are dishonored. They have no access to honor by position.

It may perhaps be urged that there is still another alternative--that it is a poor sort of policy to vest sovereignty in one person (or body of persons), subject as persons are to the passions that beset men's souls; and that it is better to vest it in law. The law itself may incline either toward oligarchy or toward democracy; and what difference will the sovereignty of law then make in the problems which have just been raised? The consequences already stated will follow just the same.

The other alternatives may be reserved for a later inquiry. But the first of the alternatives suggested--that the people at large should be sovereign rather than the few best--would appear to be defensible, and while it presents some difficulty

it perhaps also contains some truth.

Now what Aristotle means by the rule of laws, we have discussed before. The laws are in a way even more virtuous than the gentleman because there is no gentleman who doesn't make some mistake from time to time. But the laws have no passion, therefore should they not rule? But we know why they cannot, because they have no power. This applies retroactively also to the gentlemen, whose power is too small to rule the city. We have to make this disgraceful concession, because we have to make concessions to sheer power. That is the argument up to this point. Now Aristotle must change the argument radically. And since, from the point of view of sheer brachial power, the many are much more powerful than the few rich, we have to consider much more seriously the claims of democracy. And therefore the ensuing discussion leads up to a qualified argument in favor of democracy.

It is very interesting: we have here a case made for democracy, not for oligarchy, although from a formal point of view they seem to be equally bad. Aristotle develops here at length that the many may be superior to the few gentlemen in virtue and understanding, by virtue of a kind of summative process--they are assembled in meeting and each gives his might, each hears the arguments and the net result may be a higher collective wisdom than the wisdom of any individual by himself. Aristotle makes here a qualification in the sequel: 1280b15.

It is not clear, however, that this combination of qualities that we have made the ground of distinction between the many and the few best, is true of all popular bodies and all large masses of men. Perhaps it may be said, "By Zeus, it is clear that there are some bodies of which it cannot possibly be true; for if you included them,--

Yes again another sermon where we do not know --surely not the democrat because there is an anti-democratic bent. Either by the oligarch or by Aristotle; this is a nice ambiguity here.

For if you included them, you would by necessity be bound to include a herd of beasts.

The argument in favor of the dēmos, its collective virtue and wisdom may be superior to the virtue of any individual, however virtuous and wise, cannot be true of every dēmos. It must be a specially educated one. Aristotle leads then up to a conclusion, yes that is all right, that makes sense. But on one thing he must insist: the many may, if they are of this good kind of dēmos, they must fully participate in deliberating and judging--that is democracy--but they cannot be admitted to the ruling magistrates, because here not the dēmos assembled, with its collective wisdom, but only the individual, with his very poor judgement, enters. Yet a new difficulty arises. The many are understood to be as individuals, ignoramuses, non-knowers. Can the non-knowers be judges of the knowers? For example, a physician is to be appointed--who can judge of his competence? Only physicians--engineers-- fortification experts--same story. But this speaks against democracy--democracy must then delegate an enormous part of its power to a non-democratic body. Aristotle gives this way out: on certain things the non-knowers are as good judges or even better judges than the experts--namely insofar as the user is a better

judge than the maker. Whatever a carpenter may tell you about the--or a collegium of carpenters may tell you about the excellence of a bed, if when you lie on it you can't find sleep because of the unevenness, this laymen's judgement is better than what the experts say. So in other words there is a large region in which everyone with his ordinary common sense is as good a judge as any expert.

(tape reversed)..under certain conditions, if you have a dēmos of a certain character, democracy is perfectly all right, as all the arguments taken from wisdom and virtue, which at first glance seem to speak against democracy, speak in favor of democracy. Reasonable lovers of democracy must be perfectly satisfied; that is one crucial point in the Aristotelian argument. Now he begins a new discussion of the same subject, in 1282b14 (III. xii).

In all arts and sciences the end in view is some good. In the most sovereign of all the arts and sciences--and this is the art and science of politics--the end in view is the greatest good and the good which is most pursued. The good in the sphere of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends to promote the common interest. General opinion makes it consist in some sort of equality. Up to a point this general opinion agrees with the philosophical inquiries which contain our conclusions of ethics. In other words, it holds that justice involves two factors--things, and the persons to whom things are assigned--and it considers that persons who are equal should have assigned to them equal things. But here there arises a question which must not be overlooked. Equals and unequals--yes; but equals and unequals in what? This is a question which raises difficulties, and involves us in philosophical speculation on politics.

I will not discuss this translation except to say that these two references to philosophy occur in the original, and that is very rare in such a book as the Politics. There is one point to be corrected: when he says, of all arts and sciences, the end is some good, and to the highest degree in the most authoritative of the sciences, but this is the political faculty--not as he translates it--more literally, in Greek politikē dunamis--political power. That is a kind of joke Aristotle makes. Dunamis has this double meaning, that of power but it can also mean the faculty of doing things political. Then it would be the political art or science. The joke consists in the fact that political power is here treated somewhat for a moment as an art or science, which makes us forget the harsh aspect of political power, you know, the more practical power. For the meaning of this, and also of the two-fold reference to philosophy, the question of wisdom comes now to the fore.

Hitherto we have seen that what we ordinarily meet in the form of wisdom we can have in a properly constituted and balanced democracy. But there is another problem of wisdom which we have to face. Now what is that, how does this problem appear? The question concerns the various forms of excellences, as he makes clear. Now excellence is taken in this sense: that if some man excels, he excels over others, he is superior to them: the inequality of excellence, which sometimes when we use the word we do not remember. When we

use the word virtue, we do not think of the inequality it necessarily implies. Aristotle stresses this point here now.

The implication is that the greatest of all excellences by virtue of which men can surpass one another, is that of wisdom. But this is not yet developed. Aristotle makes first clear, starting from the political fact, that while excellences are at the bottom of every political claim, not every excellence is of political relevance. Well, we all know that. Someone may be an excellent tightrope dancer, or a ballerina, or a dogcatcher, or a chessplayer, this is not an excellence in itself of any political relevance. But always there are excellences, superiorities involved.

Now here we have the claims of these various excellences: wealth, wisdom, free birth, and so on. How do we settle the claim between these various claimants? And Aristotle takes here an example: if the things to be distributed were flutes, what would a sensible distributor do? Would he give the best flutes to the rich, or the most handsome, or to the best flute-players? And Aristotle says if he had a free hand, he would give them to the best flute-players, i.e., the best knowers. The application is clear: if political office is to be distributed, it is possible they should be given to the best knowers, to the men who understand political things best. Now this leads to the consequence, that one must accept the rule of a single outstandingly virtuous man, even if he is poor--because what has absence of money or wealth to do with ability to judge wisely? One could go a step further, though Aristotle only implies it here: if this is so, why not give the sovereign power to a man who is a conventional slave, if he is must wiser than all the masters' class? If he is supremely wise, why should he not rule? This whole argument leads to the conclusion that the best regime would be the absolute rule of the absolutely superior man. Let us read that, 1284a4.

If there is one person (or several persons, but yet not enough to form the full measure of a state) so pre-eminently superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows (or several show, when there is more than one), and what is shown by the rest, such a person, or such persons, can no longer be treated as part of a city. Being so greatly superior to others in goodness and political capacity, they will suffer injustice if they are treated as worthy only of an equal share; for a person of this order may very well be like a god among men. This being the case, it is clear that law generally is necessarily limited to those who are equal in birth and capacity. There can be no law which runs against men who are utterly superior to others. They are a law in themselves. It would be a folly to attempt to legislate for them--

Let us leave it at here. And that is the conclusion: if a man is of truly superior wisdom and virtue, surpassing all others in virtue and wisdom, then he cannot possibly be treated as an equal because he is manifestly superior, i.e., unequal, and since wisdom and virtue are those qualifications which are as important for government as the art of flute-playing is for flute-playing, there is no way out but to give him this power. Now this leads to a longer discussion

which we cannot follow here: a discussion of the democratic alternative to this treatment, and that is ostracism, which was as a legal institution in Athens, that an innocent citizen could be banished from the city, merely because his mere existence or presence endangered the equality of others. He was a living challenge to the equality before all, because of his manifest superiority. Aristotle says that this institution of ostracism has some political justice. Political justice means here justice with a view to the requirements of the city. This incidentally is a passage which one should consider when studying Aristotle's teaching regarding natural justice or natural right in the fifth book of the Ethics, where he finds the paradoxical thesis that all right, natural or conventional, is changeable. This passage is usually not taken seriously. Here we see what Aristotle means by that: a man who has done no wrong, who is superior to all others, is apparently punished, deprived of his right, because he in fact constitutes a danger to the democracy, as established. So the strict rule, you must never punish or deprive of good things a just man is here justly transgressed because of the overwhelming interests of the established regimes. This only in passing.

But Aristotle does not think this is defensible and understandable that democracy strives to protect itself from such a quote danger, unquote, but the true solution would of course be to hand over the whole power in the city to this superior man. The man of outstanding virtue ought to be lifelong king, and that is the only solution. Now this is a very strange argument; we have first the most powerful argument ever made by Aristotle, to say nothing of Plato, in favor of democracy. A democracy qualified in certain matters, satisfies all reasonable political demands. And then we suddenly are confronted with the most anti-democratic thing, namely the rule of an absolute king, who has all powers, and we must understand what Aristotle means by that. In the later book, neither democracy as described in book III nor the kingship, as we mentioned here, are discussed, but much more sober, much more practical, solutions, are discussed. In other words, for the fundamental political considerations, the understanding of these two fundamental possibilities, that good democracy as sketched here, and absolute monarchy, is absolutely essential from Aristotle's point of view. Now after having gone so far, Aristotle goes over without giving any reason to a discussion of one kind of regime, namely kingship--you know we must never forget the external scheme, kingship, aristocracy, democracy, and also polity and so on--which is the framework of the Aristotelian discussion. Therefore why should he not speak of kingship now? But it is clear, there is a direct connection with what preceded. The fundamental consideration led up to the problem of the absolutely superior individual; who as such would have to be king; and Aristotle then uses this opportunity to append to that a discussion of the various kinds of kingship, most of which are on a much lower level, of course. He distinguishes five different kinds of kingship, but only two require discussion, since the other three are only in between. And he discusses only the two extreme cases. The one is the absolute king, of whom we have heard before, the other is a king like the Spartan king, practically only a lifelong and hereditary general. And Aristotle says, this question is of no fundamental interest, because the institution of lifelong generalship you can have under any regime; and for one reason or another, a democracy, oligarchy or kingship can have

lifelong generals. Again, a beautiful illustration of the principle that whatever is politically neutral, whatever can occur in every regime, is as such politically uninteresting. A simple example from another scheme: if you live in a country which depends for mere survival on an irrigation system, and this is generally known and admitted, the irrigation system is not a political issue. It is very important, the whole country would be ruined if the irrigation system broke down, but it is unpolitical: a simple example of the fact that something can be very important and politically absolutely unimportant. And there is of course the opposite, which can never be: that something is politically important and otherwise unimportant. Or can you think of an example?

Student: In Gulliver's Travels ..(unclear).. it is obviously very important to the whole question of regimes, but not in itself.

Yes, but from which point of view? only if you transcend the political sphere. In other words, for a philosopher it would be very unimportant. But for Lilliputians it would be very important. Yes to that extent you are right. But since we are ordinary human beings, I believe we can say that whatever is politically important can never be simply unimportant. One would have to raise very high in order to be able to say what you just said. Now in this section about kingship, which is the last part of book III, Aristotle opens up again the question of the universal or absolute king, and defends this institution against anti-royalists. The anti-royalists base their argument on rule of law, rather than rule of men--an argument of which Aristotle had already disposed earlier. The laws themselves depend also on human beings who frame them and who enforce them. Now what is the meaning of this long discussion? After Aristotle has solved the problem of the best political regime, as far as it is possible to do so in a general discussion, in favor of a moderate acceptance of democracy, which is perfectly satisfactory, at least to us, that he takes up then such an extreme possibility, this absolute king, what is the reason for that? A stupid answer, but in a way a learned answer, because something can be both stupid and learned, is to say that Aristotle follows Plato, who had said in his Laws there are two models of regimes: democracy and monarchy. Aristotle tries to do justice to this Platonic observation.

But that only pushes the question back: why did Plato make this remark, and what does it mean for Plato? In the third book of the Politics we recall Aristotle started in the concrete discussion of an entirely different dualism, the dualism of democracy and oligarchy, which politically was obvious everywhere: rule of the rich, rule of the poor. And he decided, one can say, rather in favor of democracy than in favor of oligarchy. But now we have an entirely different polarity--not democracy or oligarchy, but democracy--absolute kingship. Now what is behind that? The question has to do with the problem of laws. Democracy, while it makes the democratic laws, necessarily acts through laws. In every regime where more than one man rules, there must be some legal order. I mean you must have arrangements for how to reach decisions, and who should preside--a question which doesn't arise as such in a monarchy, where the king is the presiding officer as a matter of course, and all these formalities aren't as

necessary in a kingship as they are in a democracy.

Now what is this point? I make this suggestion, that this absolute marvel of a king, surpassing everyone in wisdom and virtue, is the political reflection of the philosopher-king in Plato's sense. Aristotle does not speak of the philosopher king, but it is the philosopher king who is visible only in his kingly function. So the question of democracy and absolute kingship would be a reflection of the whole question regarding the relation of the city and philosophy. Democracies of course stand for the city, and the king stands for philosophy. The fact that there is such an issue has its root in a fundamental disproportion between philosophy and the city. For the time being I remind you of what is implied by Aristotle's criticism of Hippodamus in the second book, namely, the fundamental difference between the arts, intellectual arts, and the laws. There is a fundamental recalcitrance of the city to philosophy, which could be overcome theoretically, if there were philosopher kings. The reason for this disharmony is that the ends of the philosophers and of the non-philosophers are radically different. Philosophy is concerned with understanding, with contemplation, we may call it; the non-philosophers are not concerned with this, with whatever else they may be concerned. Now here we touch on the fundamental difference between modern and pre-modern philosophy and in particular, political philosophy. We do not understand this side of classical political philosophy, in Plato and Aristotle, because we are sons or daughters of the modern age. In modern times from the very beginning, the leading philosophers were of the opinion that philosophy itself will bring about, and not accidentally, a harmony between philosophy and the city. And how could this be? If the end of philosophy were the same as the end of the non-philosophers. Let us assume that the end of the non-philosophers is something like terrestrial, earthly happiness--housing, health, clothing, and so on--and that philosophy or science--that means almost the same in earlier times--is there for the sake of making possible the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Then the end of philosophy and the end of the non-philosophers would be identical, the gulf between them would be bridged. To this we add another consideration, linked to the first, and that is that owing to the view which emerged in the seventeenth century, and then prevailed, philosophy or science necessarily brings about enlightenment of the non-philosophers or scientists. And therefore revolutionizes the opinion of the citizen body, public opinion, political opinion, and therewith revolutionizes political society. Therefore there is no problem regarding its influence--the positive influence of philosophy on society regarding the harmony between philosophy and society.

This I link with what I said earlier--the new kind of regimes, which Aristotle did not consider, like liberal democracy, communism, and fascism, these new kinds of regimes must be traced to their theoretical principle, which is not necessarily visible at the first glance. Not very recondite, but still it needs some analysis; and then I think you will come back--surely in the case of liberal democracy and communism--in the case of Russia it is a bit more complicated--you will come back to the fact that in these modern doctrines the enlightenment of the citizen body--and enlightenment means here not merely enlightenment about their rights and duties, but a general kind of enlightenment, Enlightenment as the spreading of scientific information, of scientific understanding, is the condition for the establishment of the best order of society.

I can illustrate it by one extreme example, but it has a great merit. Extreme examples can be very helpful when they show the simple lines very clearly--and that is Thomas Hobbes, who plays a crucial role for modern political thought. Hobbes built his whole doctrine on the view that there is one and only one natural right, fundamental right--self-preservation, based on the inescapable character of the fear of death, in particular of violent death. And this he built up. There are many difficulties, some very striking; for example, that in Hobbes' time there were many examples of people who were not afraid of violent death at all; and especially in the religious wars, people who were prepared to die for what they regarded as a true faith. Now Hobbes has to face this question, because if these people are right, Hobbes is entirely wrong: you cannot build a political doctrine on the fear of violent death. Hobbes called religion "fear of powers invisible." And he raises the question, which is the greater fear, that of violent death, or that of powers invisible? And then he says, while the power of the powers invisible is greater than that of the powers visible, speaking from the point of view of religion, the fear of death is stronger than the fear of powers invisible.

But this seems to be absurd. What is behind Hobbes' argument, which is in a sense self-contradictory, is this: by nature, according to truth and nature, the fear of violent death is the greatest force, the rock-bottom, of society. This is endangered by the fear of powers invisible. Therefore the rational and natural order will not work if the fear of powers invisible is not taken away. In other words, if the people are not enlightened.

Hobbes' political schema is the first which exists which requires for its working, on any level, popular enlightenment. Hobbes even speaks of popular enlightenment. He says somewhere "gradually the vulgar becomes educated." -- "Gradatim eruditur vulgus." Now what in Hobbes is only discernible if you follow strictly the theoretical argument became quite visible in the eighteenth century, in the Age of Enlightenment per excellence. Here we find more and more doctrines which demand for their political efficacy popular enlightenment. There is nothing of this kind in Plato and Aristotle. That a certain degree of theoretical understanding is necessary for the rulers in an aristocratic regime, that was of course admitted, and there is a discussion of that in the first book of Cicero's Republic. But not this notion. The notion of enlightenment is a peculiarly modern notion, and it gives modern politics its peculiar character. The propaganda of which we hear so much--Marx's propaganda--is primarily meant to be of course enlightenment about the true character of the social forces. That this has long been abandoned, especially since Stalin's time, is another matter. (end of class meeting)

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 14 March 18, 1965

I remind you again of the main topic of Aristotle's Politics, the regime, which means the variety of regimes. In order to study them properly, we are in need of a comprehensive view of all possible regimes. Aristotle provides us with such a schēma in his enumeration of the six regimes which I outlined sometime ago. You remember these: from the point of view of number, and from the point of view of goodness and badness. There is a complete enumeration, nothing is left out. But there is this disjunction: these are merely numerical or formal distinctions, which is good enough for guaranteeing comprehensiveness, but not good enough for understanding certain things. We must replace the few and the many if we want to understand the political things, by the rich and the poor. And hence by the two regimes in which either the rich or the poor prevail, oligarchy or democracy. This leads naturally to the consideration, since both oligarchy and democracy are defective, of whether there is not a mean between them which has the advantages of each, while avoiding the disadvantages. These are on the lower level the polity, and on the higher level, aristocracy. Oligarchy, democracy, polity and aristocracy. In the comprehensive scheme we have six. Which are missing? ("Monarchy and tyranny.") Yes, and what do they have in common? ("There's only one person who chairs the government.") Who rules. So in other words, these four regimes have this in common, that they are all republican regimes. Tyranny can be simply disregarded, and as for kingship, it is no longer possible, according to Aristotle, once cities have reached a certain size or maturity.

Now the beginning of the political, practical inquiry is from democracy and oligarchy--just as we today would begin with democracy and communism, whatever phenomenon we might take in later, Franco's Spain, or Salazar's Portugal--but they are not in the foreground, the way in which democracy and communism are in the foreground. Now the difficulty which Aristotle confronts is this: both democracy and oligarchy are bad for different reasons. One can state a common reason: the principle of neither democracy or oligarchy is virtue. The good regimes are those in which the virtuous and the wise, and only the virtuous and the wise, rule. The first reaction of such hardheaded people as we are, is--fairy tales. And this is I'm sure the reaction of the large majority of the profession. Nevertheless we hear political men even today speak of the pursuit of excellence. And excellence one can say is a translation of virtue. Or of high culture. People are concerned with culture on all levels, but I believe if confronted with a choice, between low and high culture, they would not dare to come out for low culture in preference to the high. Far from being extraneous to the city, excellence is its highest end. The greatest error which any student of political science can make is to forget or to minimize this end, the need for which will assert itself in unexpected quarters. To understand this fact properly, we must remember something which is easily forgotten--that the highest is not necessarily the most urgent. I mean, the fantastic people, the so-called idealists, or however they call them, the missionaries--they forget that the highest is not necessarily the most urgent. Aristotle never forgets this. The simplest example from everyday life: appendectomy may be the most urgent thing for a man, but it can never be the highest for him. The pragmatic proof is, when you meet a man who has undergone an appendectomy, you never admire him for it (laughter) You may envy him that he survived it, but you do not admire him.

The highest end of the city is not its sole end.

In other words, as Aristotle puts it, the city comes into being for the sake of life, but it exists for the sake of the good life. And this primary end, the mere life, of course subsists all the time. Every man is always concerned with his sheer self-preservation, apart from any concern with reform, with improvement, or whatever else. Since the highest end of the city is not its sole end, the claims of those men who are not virtuous or wise, must always be considered. After all, they too want to live, although they are unwilling and unable to live virtuously. In other words, if we consider only the highest end of the city, we arrive at the conclusion that the only legitimate claim to rule is that of the virtuous and wise, ruling in their own right, not by virtue of delegation or election. That is an absurdity from Aristotle's point of view, that the virtuous and wise should rule by delegation: how can the lower give the title to the higher?

Yet this view, that the only legitimate rule is aristocracy in this sense, suffers from an obvious flaw, because it abstracts from something of the utmost importance; and we all know today what it is from which this view mistakenly abstracts. It is now called power, a very loose word--we mean here of course political power. But this means primarily brachial power, the power of muscle. From which such beautiful expressions as "muscling in" are derived. This can never be forgotten. But not under all conditions is mere brachial power sufficient. In the case of very simple armaments, it is so; but if the armaments become more complex--think of armored knights versus very strong blacksmiths--then the armored knights are likely to beat the blacksmiths. There came a well-known equalizer in the nineteenth century, which made possible the equal status of all fighters, as everyone could learn to handle rifles. Today as we all know the situation has again radically changed. But it still comes down to this: the power to kill. As therefore the emphasis in Hobbes on violent death. This is therefore an important consideration. I would like to read to you a passage from Plato's Laws from the third book, which might be helpful here.

What and how many are the agreed claims in the matter of ruling and being ruled, alike in cities, large and small, and in households? Is not the right of father and mother one of them? and in general, would not the claim of parents to rule over offspring be a claim universally correct? (Certainly.)

And next to this, the right of the ignoble to rule over the noble? And then, following on these as a third claim, the right of older people to rule and of younger to be ruled? ("Sure.")

The fourth right is that slaves ought to be ruled and masters ought to rule. ("Undoubtedly.")

And the fifth is, I imagine, that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled.

In the four preceding ones strength as strength did not enter.

("A truly compulsory form of rule," says the interlocutor.)

Yes, and one that is very prevalent in all kinds of arguments, being according to nature, as Pindar of Thebes once said.

The most important claim, it would seem, is the sixth, which ordains that the man without understanding should follow, and the wise man rule. Nevertheless, my most wise Pindar, this is a thing that I for one would hardly assert to be against nature, but rather according to nature, the natural rule of law without coercion over willing subjects.

The link being that law, as a product of human wisdom, is ruling wisdom.

("You speak with perfect correctness.")

To be loved by the gods, and to have good luck, marks the seventh form of rule, where we bring a man forward for casting of lots, and declare that if he gains the lot, he will most justly be the ruler, but if he fails, he shall take his place among the ruled.

This is a seemingly disorderly enumeration of seven claims to rule, which all have to be considered, and are considered by Plato in the Laws, but the one to which I particularly wish to draw your attention is that sheer strength, brachial power, is a political consideration. And since the virtuous and wise are not necessarily bodily stronger than the vicious and unwise, there is a fundamental difficulty regarding aristocracy. It is then necessary to pay careful attention to what we will call the submoral claims, the claims not based on virtue, but, say on mere strength. Or on mere old age, because not in all cases are the older the wiser. Strange as it may sound, sometimes the son may be wiser than his father. But political science would be incomplete if it did not also consider the supramoral, not only the submoral...namely, philosophy, or the theoretical understanding. The possibility namely that society receive a decisive direction from the intellectual, spiritual claim beyond the merely moral claim. You all have heard of Plato's philosopher-king, and we have discussed in this class, Comte's proposal regarding the spiritual government of men of science; and there are quite a few other proposals which one may meet in between. Aristotle does not explicitly discuss this very interesting problem: the supra-political. He leaves it at a discussion of the political and the subpolitical. The reason for this is that in his view, the sphere of morality and of the polis is closed--you can find your bearings there without particular attention to what transcends the polis. Nevertheless, Aristotle refers to this problem, because he is a comprehensive thinker, implicitly, or rather allusively.

Now let us first turn to the end of book three, the very end.

After these things have been determined, we must next attempt to treat of the best form of constitution, asking ourselves, "Under what conditions does it tend to arise, and how can it be established?" In order to make a proper inquiry into this subject, it is necessary³

And read the note of Barker: "It is necessary.." What does Barker say here?

³The words at the close of this chapter are repeated at the beginning of Book VII.

Yes. In other words, Book III is obviously followed by Book IV. But there is an indication in the last sentence of Book III that the continuation is in Books VII and VIII. That is one of the most obvious textual difficulties in Aristotle's Politics. What he means I believe is this: we can go on from this broad consideration of regimes which moves ultimately between the poles of absolute kingship and democracy--one can go on from there to books four to six, which do not deal with the best regime. Or one can go on to Books VII and VIII, which contain a detailed discussion of the best regime. Both are possible, but the reasoning is this: one cannot see the more or less imperfect regimes discussed in the central books

without awareness of the best. May I ask why one cannot do that? say in the ordinary democracy or oligarchy? Why one cannot study that without awareness of the best?

Student: One can only see the story--in his Metaphysics--after knowing the truth by nature.

That is very sophisticated. In the simple language which every common-sensical man or woman can understand.

Student: We have to know the good form to know what is perverted or not good.

Yes. And therefore it is important to see a bad or more or less imperfect regime as what it is, if you do not know what the best is. Its imperfection is as much a part of its being as its sensible qualities, red, blue and so on. But on the other hand, one cannot spell out the institutions, the detailed institutions, of the best regimes, without learning something from the actual institutions of the imperfect regimes. This I believe is the simple solution to this textual difficulty.

Now let us then turn first to Books VII and VIII, in which Aristotle discusses the best regime. The best regime requires that we know which way of life is choiceworthy, the most choiceworthy. In order to answer that we must know what the principles of choice are, what the things are we esteem and desire, the good things. There are three of them: external goods, those in the body, health, strength and beauty, and those in the soul. Those in the body belong to us, obviously; they cannot be taken away from us as property or even reputation can be taken away from us. Happiness requires that we have all three kinds. Therefore there is no question regarding the end of human life; in other words, Aristotle does not believe there is a cause for what is now called relativism. Let us now read 1323a27. That is, "All these things must belong to the happy or blessed. For no one would say--call someone blessed..."

No one would call a man happy who had no particle of fortitude, temperance, justice or wisdom (i.e., none of the goods of the soul) who feared the flies buzzing about his head; who abstained from none of the extremest forms of extravagance whenever he felt hungry or thirsty; who would ruin his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing; whose mind was as senseless, and as much astray, as that of a child or a madman. These are all propositions which would be accepted by nearly everyone as soon as they were stated. But differences begin to arise when we ask, "How much of each good should men have? And what is the relative superiority of one good over another?" Any modicum of goodness is regarded as adequate; but wealth and property, power, reputation and all such things, are coveted to an excess which knows no bounds or limits. There is an answer which can be given to men who act in this way. The facts themselves make it easy for you to assure yourselves on these issues. You can see for yourselves that the goods of the soul are not gained or maintained by the external goods. It is the other way around. You can see for yourselves that felicity--no matter whether men find it in pleasure or goodness or both of the two--belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods to moderate

limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can possibly use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul.

This is Aristotle's simple argument: there can be no doubt about that, that the goods of the soul are higher than those of the body, and those of the body higher than these other things, the external goods--but all three are needed. And the question concerns only that regarding which there may very well be controversy, how much of each in a given situation? There is no general answer possible to this question.

Now what do we say about Aristotle's argument? Let us assume that we could have the privilege of having Mr. Giancano (sp?) in our midst. I suppose you know who he is. He is reputed to be a leader of the crime syndicate in this city. What would he say? Assuming we could really bring him down to a theoretical discussion, which I would not take for granted. He might possibly agree with everything for very obvious reasons, in order to present himself as a nice man just as he would do some other things for that reason. But what would he say? Would he not admit that a man who is afraid of every fly or every insect is a miserable man? Because this man would of course be afraid of everything. He would live in constant misery for reasons of fear.

Now what about a man who is very foolish, in the simple sense of the term, that he always makes the wrong choices? I believe again that Giancano would say this is also not a happy man, because how can he stay out of jail, if he is so stupid? (laughter) I cannot develop this point fully, but I will draw your attention to it. In the extreme attacks on ordinary morality you find, say, in Plato's Gorgias, Callicles' famous attack, courage, manliness, on the one hand, and prudence, cleverness on the other, they are admitted to be virtues. They are not controversial. The difficulty would concern the two others in the Platonic scheme, moderation and justice. That leads therefore to a long discussion.

But Aristotle makes clear at the beginning of this whole work--for the Politics is only the second part of the work, the first part being the Nicomachean Ethics--that he is addressing only well-bred men, only gentlemen. They of course will not raise gangster-like objections. But it becomes necessary for us also, no doubt, to consider the phenomenon of the gangster--and then we will have to turn to Plato, who has some arguments or people defending gangsterism, and we must see how we can overcome that.

Now the next point that Aristotle makes which is crucial is that the happiness of the individual and the happiness of the city are the same. So if someone believes that the happiness of man consists in being rich, then he will also say that the happiness of the city consists in being rich. From that it follows of course that the best regime would be directed above all to the goods of the soul, to the virtues of the mind. Although it also leads to bodily goods and external goods. So this is a very strange assertion for us--I will come back to that later---that the end of the city and the end of the individual are identical. Now Aristotle turns first to another controversy. There are two kinds of virtues--the moral virtues, the virtues of character, which are practiced in action, in society--and on the other hand, the virtues of the mind, which can be practiced in solitude. Now it is controversial which of these two kinds of virtues is the highest--in other words,

whether practical or political life is preferred, or rather the contemplative life, that of the philosopher. Now since the end of the city is the same as the end of the individual, this controversy concerns of course the city as well--but how does this alternative look in the case of the city? ...What is the difficulty for you, Mr. Levy?

Mr. Levy: The city doesn't think, Mr. Strauss. ("Pardon?")
The city doesn't think.

Well, that could be perhaps too harsh. The city thinks of course in and through its government. But... it doesn't philosophize. Now how does the alternative look in the case of the city? We can say, following Aristotle's explanation, practical life means going outward, extroverted. And this means, in the case of the city, trying to rule over neighboring cities: expansionism, imperialism. The theoretical argument on the other hand is not going outward, theoretical men are introverted. And therefore the political counterpart, the political reflection on that would be the rejection of imperialism. Aristotle rejects imperialism altogether. The end is peace and not war. In connection with that, not expansion. He admits that happiness consists in action. And to that extent the practical men seem to be wiser than the theoretical men. But--1325bl6..

If we are right in our view, and felicity should be held to consist in well-doing, it follows that the life of action is best, alike for every state as a whole and for each individual in his own conduct. But the life of action need not be, as is sometimes thought, a life which involves relations to others. Nor should our thoughts be held to be active only when they are directed to objects which have to be achieved by action. Thoughts with no object beyond themselves, and speculations and reflections followed purely for their own sake, are far more deserving of the name of active. Action of some sort or other is therefore our end and aim; but, even in the sphere of outward acts, action can also be predicated--and that in the fullest measure and the true sense of the word--of those who, by their thoughts, are the prime authors of such acts. States situated by themselves, and resolved to live in isolation -- ("who cannot have any action on other states." Say, on an island, without any connection with another island or mainland) -- need not be therefore inactive. They can achieve activity by sections; the different sections of such a state will have many mutual connections. This is also, and equally, true of the individual human being. If it were not so, there would be something wrong with God himself, and the whole of the universe, who have no activities other than those of their own internal life. It is therefore clear that the same way of life which is best for the individual must also be best for the state as a whole and for all its members.

It is perhaps not quite so clear for every reason. Now what Aristotle says is: action yes, because it is understood in contradistinction to laziness, to inactivity. But action may remain entirely intrinsic, as in the case of thinking or contemplation, of such thinking as does not

concern itself with external goals. Thinking of the carpenter is not of course, simply intrinsic, because it issues in fabrication; and similarly the action of the statesman. God is essentially active: this Aristotle simply takes over from accepted views. And this activity is according to Aristotle, thinking of thinking--thinking thinking itself, no relation to externals. The Aristotelian God is not the Biblical God. Here he asserts again the supremacy of the theoretical life, even in regard to the city. But what does it mean in the case of the city? this we have still to understand. Not more than the rejection of expansionist or imperialist policy as such. We draw this conclusion: the city is not capable of theoretical life proper--only an analogon of it. And this analogon is the city which has--is entirely concerned with the motions within itself in its own improvement. The end of life of the city is therefore not strictly speaking identical with that of the individual, contrary to Aristotle's explicit assertion. It may be true that a city within which philosophers can live is better than a city within which philosophers cannot live, that may be so. Although this is not quite clear, and the proof that it is not quite clear is this: Aristotle like Plato preferred the Spartan regime to the Athenian regime. But under the Spartan regime, philosophers were impossible. In the Athenian regime they were possible, although with the danger of ending as Socrates ended. But Socrates lived for seventy years in Athens.

The key point is this: however important philosophy may be for Aristotle, and it is of course the most important thing--philosophy or the philosophers are not an essential part of the city. This comes out very beautifully, I think, in the medieval Aristotelian, Marsilius of Padua, who states Aristotle's doctrine as follows: one of the parts of the city are the teachers--something which Aristotle never says. But the teachers are the priests--i.e., not the philosophers. So while it deviates from the letter of Aristotle, something is still in the spirit of Aristotle. Philosophy transcends the city.

Now we will come back to this key question again. Aristotle turns then to starting from scratch, trying to build up a good city with a good regime, and he starts like any other craftsman would, from the material, the matter. Now one of the important considerations regarding the material which the founder of a regime must have is numbers--how many inhabitants, how many citizens. He looks for the optimum number--and the answer he gives, we cannot read everything, so I will mention only the main points--is, not more than mutual trust requires. And mutual trust requires mutual knowledge. In other words, differently stated, a city must not be so large that there is not possible mutual supervision. Perhaps by maiden aunts, it doesn't matter who exercises it in particular--but these big Babylons, where everyone can do as he lists--that is not soil for a good regime. Incidentally, this question of size, which became a matter of ridicule in modern times, for example in Hobbes, who simply says the question of size is irrelevant--that depends on the situation in foreign policy, and other accidents. There is not any meaning in questioning it. But with these big metropoleis, and other phenomena in the mid-twentieth century, it is again shown that the question of an optimal size is a necessary question--naturally, not for the country as a whole so much as for the individual towns. Now as for the internal structure of the best regime, the principle of it is this: not every kind of human being that is indispensable for the city can be a part of the city. For those who cannot participate in the end of the city, but are only means for the city, are not properly parts. Needless to say, the parts proper, let us say the government, are also indispensable--but there is a difference between ingredients of the city which are only indispensable, and those which are truly parts. What then are the indispensable works or functions

of the city, without which there could not be a city? 1328b4.

It remains for us now to enumerate all the necessary elements of the city. Our list of these elements will include what we have called the parts of the city, as well as what we have termed its conditions.

Conditions are what I have termed indispensable.

To make such a list, we must first determine how many services a city performs; and then we shall easily see how many elements it must contain. The first thing to be provided is food; the next is arts and crafts; for life is a business which needs many tools. The third is arms; the members of a state must bear arms in person, partly in order to maintain authority and repress disobedience, and partly in order to meet any threat of external aggression. The fourth thing which has to be provided is a certain supply of property, alike for domestic purposes and for military purposes. The fifth, but in order of merit the first--

That is, the fifth and the first.

is an establishment for the service of the gods, or as it is called, public worship. The sixth thing, and the most vitally necessary, is a method of deciding what is demanded by the public interest and what is just in men's private dealings. These are the services which every city may be said to need.

Services is also not appropriate, but rather the works, the functions, the deeds. A service--that has certain un-Aristotelian connotations.

The city is not a mere catch-all group. It is a group which, as we have said, must be self-sufficient for the purposes of life and if any of these services is missing it cannot be totally self-sufficient. A city should accordingly be so constituted as to be competent for all these services. It must therefore contain a body of farmers to produce all the necessary food; **and a body for

deciding necessary issues and determining what is the public interest. Literally, judges of what is necessary and beneficial. This latter implies both deliberative-legislative, and judicial. Now you see here in the enumeration Aristotle starts from bottom to top. What they need most urgently of course is food. and he goes up from that to the highest. This implies that government proper, the deliberative and judicial, is higher than the priesthood, or the concern with the divine things. Yet in one sense the concern with the divine things is the highest, as is indicated by this strange expression, the fifth and the first. From one point of view the fifth, from another the first. And the reason for the ambiguity is this, that from Aristotle's point of view the true concern with the divine things is philosophy. The reflection of this true concern is--religion, as we say. There is no Greek word for religion, although it offers itself almost inevitably. The word which the Greeks would use more naturally would be piety, eusebeia. It is very interesting that eusebeia, piety is not mentioned among the virtues in Aristotle's Ethics. Now let us go on from where we left off.

These points determined, a further point is still left for consideration. Should all the members share in the performance of all these services? That is a possibility; the same persons may all be engaged simultaneously in farming, the practice of arts and crafts, and the work of deliberation and jurisdiction.

**(1328b22)..craftsmen; a military force; a propertied class; priests...

Is this not clear? that while the city needs these various functions, they do not all have to be distributed in different classes. Peasants could be warriors, and could be the majority in the assembly, why not?

Or should we assume a separate body of persons for each of the separate services? Or, again, should some of the services be assigned to different sets of persons and others be shared by all? The same system need not be followed in every regime. Different systems, as we have noted, are possible; all may share in all functions, or different persons may undertake different functions. The existence of these alternatives explains why constitutions differ: in democracies all men share in all functions, while the opposite practice is followed in oligarchies.

This must be reasonably understood. Aristotle does not say that in democracies everyone is both a farmer and an artisan, but he means politically interesting functions, the deliberative and judicial.

Here we are only concerned with the best or ideal regime--

Ideal is also not a Greek word. It was coined in the seventeenth century; it didn't exist before that. If you wanted, you could say, "the regime according to wish or prayer," meaning of course, according to wish or prayer of sensible men. Now how this came to be called ideal, with a word derivative from Plato's idea, is a very long question. I will only say one point to show you the difficulty; that Plato's regime in the Republic is not a Platonic idea, it is something made by men. The blueprint is made by men. The man-made blueprint is not an idea proper; what an idea might mean I cannot now discuss. Go on.

Now the best regime is that under which the city can attain the greatest felicity; and that, as we have already stated, cannot exist without goodness. Upon these principles it clearly follows that a state with an ideal constitution--regime-- a state which has for its members men who are absolutely just, and not men who are merely just in relation to some particular standard-- cannot have its citizens living the life of mechanics or shopkeepers, which is ignoble and inimical to goodness.

Goodness is here virtue.

Nor can it have them engaged in farming; leisure is a necessity, both for growth in virtue and for the pursuit of political activities.

What does he mean by this distinction between justice absolutely understood and justice with a view to hypothesis? To an assumption? Well, there is a democratic concept of justice, there is an oligarchic concept of justice-- these are concepts with regard to an assumption, an assumption which grows up naturally, but which on reflection proves to be unsound. Justice simply is that notion of justice which stands the test of examination. So Aristotle makes it quite clear--he excludes farmers and artisans and small traders from citizenship, because they lack the leisure and dignity required for life devoted to virtue. In other words, Aristotle's final decision is not democratic. But there are functions which remain--fighting, wealth, priesthood and government. They must belong to the same men, but

in a way different groups, with a view to the natural distinctions of youth, maturity and old age. That is to say, in their youth, they are fighters; in their maturity, they are governors; in their old age, they are priests. The question we must address to Aristotle after what we have learned from him, is, How can you make such a tremendous step, throw out the dēmos altogether, after what you told us about the necessity of considering the claims of the dēmos? Is this not very strange? How would Aristotle reply to us? Very simple, you only have to read, and while reading, try to think. The best regime is a city without a dēmos. There may be slaves around, there must be slaves around--resident aliens, at any rate, unnaturalized citizens. Farming and the crafts are to be exercised by slaves and metics. There is a provision, as Aristotle points out, for the emancipation of slaves--so that if they are not satisfied with their miserable lot, a reward is held out to them--and to all slaves, as Aristotle says. Naturally he means it, that if they behave well, for a sufficiently long time, they will be emancipated. Clearly this is a great difficulty because if they can be emancipated, they can take care of themselves. Their enslavement was not natural, it was unjust in the first place. This is a major difficulty of Aristotle's construction. Of course one could say, when you take a general picture of the republic of Venice as it developed you find traces of what Aristotle says here very clearly. But there we see, as in other Italian cities, a gradual formation of a plebs. Naturally there are emancipated slaves, and these resident aliens who don't remember anymore whether they came from Sicily or Asia Minor, but are as true-born in this particular place as any full-blooded citizen, and what have you then? They are not legally a plebs; they are not recognised to be citizens. But they are human beings, and they will be dissatisfied and take action, as human nature is apt to do. Now what is the consequence? Aristotle knows that, of course. Under these conditions, after some generations, even after some centuries, a dēmos has formed itself in that best city. Well, the answer is I think obvious. Either the city makes the necessary adaptation, it ceases to be an aristocracy and becomes a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or failing that, it will perish. Necessarily. This is for Aristotle not such a threat as it would seem to us, because he is permeated by the certainty that every thing which has come into being will perish again--including Karl Marx's "realm of freedom" with all its beauties--which as we know from the mouth of Engels if not from the mouth of Marx, will perish again. As long as it lasts, the best regime is the best. And we would say, well, in our own lives as individuals, we also know that we must die, and it does make a difference whether we have lived well or ill while we could. So Aristotle's best regime embodied then the simple rejection of democracy--just as of oligarchy, of course--these are not rich people, of course, they are well-to-do, but that is not their main claim, their main claim is virtue, that they are virtuous. That is to say, he rejects that simple schēma, democracy-oligarchy, the practical schēma based on the actualities of his age from which he started. Yet the consideration of the superior claim of virtue leads to aristocracy, as we have seen, and eventually to absolute kingship, in the case of a man of outstanding virtue. What happens to absolute kingship, at the end of Aristotle's discussion of the best regime?

Let us read that: 1332b15.

As all political associations are composed of governors and governed, we have to consider whether the two should be distinguished for life, or merged together in a single body. The system of education will necessarily vary according to the answer we give. We may imagine one set of circumstances in which it would be obviously better that a lasting distinction should once and for all be established between governors and governed. This would be if there were one class in the state surpassing all others as much as gods and heroes are supposed to surpass mankind--a class of men so outstanding, physically as well as mentally, that the superiority of the ruling stock was indisputably clear to their subjects. But that is a difficult assumption to make: and we have nothing in actual life like the gulf between kings and subjects which the writer Scylax describes as existing in India. We may therefore draw the conclusion, which can be defended on many grounds, that all should share alike in a system of government under which they rule and are ruled by turns. In a society of peers equality means that all should have the same rights; and a constitution can hardly survive if it is founded on injustice. The subject-citizens will then be joined by all of the country-side in a common policy of revolution; and the civic body will be too small to cope successfully with all its enemies. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there should be a difference between governors and governed. How they can differ, and yet share alike, is a dilemma which legislators have to solve. We have already touched on a possible solution in a previous chapter.

Nature, we have suggested, has provided us with the distinction we need. She has divided a body of citizens who are all generically the same into two different age-groups, a younger and an older, one of them meant to be governed and the other to act as the government. Youth never resents being governed, or thinks itself better than its governors; and it is all the less likely to do so if it knows that it will take over the government on reaching a proper maturity.

Is this a solution to the great difficulty? Absolute kingship, and regimes of this kind, are possible only if the rulers are manifestly to everybody, superior to the ruled. No one ever has glasses among them, or needs any other artificial touches, and they lead a perfectly clean and unimpeachable life, privately and publicly, and they are of superior wisdom. When they decide on a war, one doesn't question whether the war is necessary, for example, but only whether it can be won. But Aristotle says, that won't happen. Such a manifest superiority doesn't exist. Even if a man is superior in wisdom and virtue, this superiority is clear only to people who understand something of virtue and so for example, no one would say that Winston Churchill, at least when he became older, was a man of outstanding beauty. So that when he appeared all teenagers were thrilled in addition to the members of the House of Lords. In other words, that doesn't exist. And therefore this is a final judgement of absolute kingship, which he had discussed provisionally

in book three. The utmost we can dare to hope is the rule of equals. Now this means of course a special type of men, as we have seen--the exclusion of the lower classes--there is no dēmos in this particular society. Now Aristotle--here the question arises, we need a distinction between rulers and ruled, obviously, because not all can rule. And how can it be done fairly? Aristotle says very simply, it is that the ruled, generally speaking, are the young. No one can have access to a ruling office before he is thirty. This is what Aristotle says is the best we can do, and he makes clear later on in the sequel that the absolute kingship of which he spoke in such glowing terms is possible only at the beginning of civil life. The founder--well, men like Romulus in Rome, Theseus in Athens, and in a way Lycurgus in Sparta--they were men of outstanding, surpassing virtue, and no one begrudged them their power. And we find a repetition of that in new, emergent states, where there is a tendency also to find one man, rather than more, as the father. I don't believe we should bring in psychoanalysis, but in the old sense, father of the fathers, the founder. Now of the utmost importance to the legislator, according to Aristotle is not the externals, external conditions, although they are very important, and we must discuss that at great length, but the core of his concern is education, the education of the young. The first point which he makes, which is known in a way today in this country, but was perhaps not known in traditional political teaching, education must be relative to the regime. In other words, if democratic, it must be suited to that; if in an oligarchy, oligarchic, and aristocratic in an aristocracy. This implies, this political character of education implies that education must be public. He discusses at great length how babies should be brought up, he goes very far in that, and even prenatal care is carefully considered by Aristotle--even more the good age for spouses. One of the most amazing things in Aristotle, not unamusing, is that he tries to figure out the optimum age of the husband and wife with a view to some end of their generative power. So that if they should reach that end simultaneously, they must marry when the husband is thirty-seven and the wife is eighteen. (Laughter.) Whether they like that--well, that is a political doctrine and they are not asked--the arbitrary wills of individuals do not originate that. He really figures it out very neatly.

Now we come back to the most important question, that of education. It must be public. In an aristocracy--and of course Aristotle is here concerned with an aristocracy--education will be liberal. Today liberal is used almost synonymously with democratic, not to say extreme democratic. This is understandable today, but it cannot be viewed so with Aristotle. Liberal means free from all the slavishness to which our flesh is heir. Education would be education in the liberal arts--Aristotle mentions reading, writing, gymnastics, music and drawing. Now he knows that some of them, like reading and writing, are also good for utilitarian purposes, business and your transaction with your neighbors. But this is not the key point--the key point is that we begin to think in worthwhile and not in monetary terms. Education must train the young for both business and leisure. But the end is leisure, not business. Now here is a point which has frequently been forgotten in modern times. Aristotle makes a distinction between leisure and relaxation. Relaxation is of course for the sake of business. We relax in order to be at our job tomorrow morning. And hence relaxation is subordinate to business; whereas business itself is subordinate to leisure. And man if his

business is not for the sake of his leisure is a kind of slave. A German philosopher of the present time, , has made this very sound remark, for understanding this thought of Aristotle's. Now how is leisure time, or some kind of leisure time, still called, in ordinary sensible language? ...Holidays. And what does holidays originally mean? ("Holy days.") Holy days--and what do you do in holy days? You devote them to the contemplation of and devotion to the holy. And this is of course superior to business. And one of our difficulties today is that we cannot find a substitute for holy days--it is in another way the same problem we have regarding the question of a substitute for war. Now Aristotle says the leisure of the gentleman must be devoted to such things as conversation, among them, and enjoyment of music, poetry, painting, and such matters. Now this is higher than what they do in the marketplace. It consists in the common sharing, through speaking, listening, and seeing, of the beautiful things--not in doing the beautiful things, that they do in battle or in the marketplace--but in speaking, listening and seeing. We can also say here again that the leisure activity of the gentleman is again a reflection of the theoretical life. In their way--not too impressive a way, but in their way these gentlemen devote their leisure to the contemplation of the beautiful. Now Aristotle's presentation of the best regime in books seven and eight, can be dismissed, in the spirit of Machiavelli, as the presentation of an imagined or imaginary common wealth. Wholly impractical--Aristotle doesn't give any indication that there ever was such a best regime. Certain particular ingredients--yes. The whole, never. He himself never claims that it was actual anywhere, anytime. Yet he claims that it is possible, there is no intrinsic impossibility of a society of well-bred and public-spirited men. This is not fantastic because it does not exclude the appearance here and there of some black sheep--every family has its black sheep here and there--provided the black sheep are treated as black sheep, and then nothing happens. I mean, if they are given the same respect as the white sheep, then there would be problems. And such a society of well-bred and public-spirited men is the good society. We can still defend it, if we make one assumption, the assumption of an economy of scarcity. This assumption was in fact made and necessarily so, by everyone until a very short time ago. In an economy of scarcity only a very small part of the population has the possibility of becoming educated in a politically relevant sense. I mean, not merely learning the law which was transmitted from generation to generation, but to enable them to act wisely. And no sensible man can wish the rule of the uneducated who are more likely than not to become the prey of fanatical rabble-rousers and the lot. Aristotle would deserve blame only if he had neglected to pay attention to the actual regimes, however imperfect--and this he surely did not. And now I turn to the subject of the central books of the Politics, books 4 to 6. But before I go on, is there anything which you wish to clarify? Is the connection of the discussion in books seven and eight to that in books two and three clear? Because that is in a way the nerve of the whole book. Well, we go on.

Now at the end of book 3 we are directed in one way to books 7 and 8, by the fact that the last sentence of book 3 is identical to the first sentence of book 7. By the mere order as the manuscripts have it, we are otherwise directed from book 3 to books 4 and 6. And these are the books which do not deal with the best regime. The spirit of these books--

(May I sit down, Mr. Bruell?) Thank you. The beginning of book four; and omit Barker's insertions.

There is a rule which applies to all the practical arts and sciences, when they have come to cover the whole of a subject, and are no longer engaged in investigating it bit by bit. Each of them severally has to consider the different methods appropriate to the different categories of its subject. For instance, the art of physical training has to consider 1) which type of training is appropriate to which type of physique, 2) which is the best type of training--the training best for a physique of the best endowment and the best equipment (for the best type of training must be suitable for such a physique) and 3) which is the type of training that can be generally applied to the majority of physiques--for that too is one of the problems to be solved by the art of physical training. Nor is this all. There may be men who want to have physical training, but do not want to attain the standard of skill and condition which is needed for competitions; and here the trainer and gymnastic master have still another duty--to impart the degree of capacity which is all that such men want...What is true of the art of physical training is obviously no less true of medicine, or of shipbuilding, tailoring, and all the other arts. It follows that the study of politics must be equally comprehensive. First, it has to consider which is the best constitution, and what qualities a constitution must have to come closest to the ideal when there are no external factors to hinder its doing so.

In other words, the best might not always be possible, and for some people the best regime might be bad. The best form of physical training might be bad for a sick man; so you have to adapt the regime to the people concerned.

Secondly, politics has to consider which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body. The attainment of the best regime is likely to be impossible for the general run of states; and the good lawgiver and the true statesman must therefore have their eyes open not only to what is the absolute best, but also to what is the best in relation to actual conditions. Thirdly, politics has also to consider the sort of regime which depends upon an assumption. In other words, the student of politics must also be able to study a given constitution, just as it stands and simply with a view to explaining how it may have arisen and how it may be made to enjoy the longest possible life.

The question is not, is it the best regime for these people--but rather, what is the established regime. This alone has a true equivalent in present-day political science. Then the question arises, how can this be preserved?

The sort of case which we have in mind is one where a state has neither the ideally best regime, or even the elementary conditions needed for it, nor the best regime possible under the actual conditions, but has only a regime of an inferior type.

Fourthly, and in addition to all these conditions, politics has also to provide a knowledge of the type of regime which is best suited to cities in general. Most of the writers who treat of politics--good as they may be in other respects--fail when they come to deal with matters of practical utility. We have not only to study the best regime. We have also to study the type of regime which is practicable (--"feasible"--) and with it, and equally, the type which is easiest to work and most suitable to states generally. As things are, writers fall into two different classes. Some confine their investigations to the extreme of perfection, which requires a large equipment. The rest, addressing themselves rather to an attainable form, still banish from view the general range of existing regimes, and simply extol the Spartan or some one other regime. The sort of political system which ought to be proposed is one which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to graft onto the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one; as hard to unlearn a lesson as it was to learn it initially.

Let us stop here. Aristotle raises here the claim, you see, that if political science is the study of regimes, he is the founder of this discipline...because prior to him people were concerned only with the best, say, Plato, or they were enamored of one particular regime, say Sparta, and praised the Spartans. But a true scientific theoretical approach comprehends all regimes, at least in principle, and that was not attempted by anyone, at least before him. Now in this respect Aristotle's notion of political science agrees with the notion of political science now prevailing. No kind of political or social organization must be disregarded; some may not be terribly important, but within principle they all are within the province of political science. But what is the difference of Aristotle's broad concept of political science, and the positivistic concept? ...Yes?

Student: Well, the study of regimes is still ordered by the possibility, at least in thought, of a best regime, which would have certain features, and which other regimes would be more or less similar to.

Yes, in other words, there is an order of rank among regimes, that is absolutely essential--and something else connected with that... Fundamentally, Aristotle's political science, as indicated by what he says, is guided by a practical intent. It addresses people who wish to establish a regime, and teaches them how to go about it. It is not simply theoretical. Perhaps we may go on from where we left off.

The true statesman, therefore must not confine himself to the matters we have just mentioned (the study of the best regime, or that of some one particular form such as the Spartan); he must also be able, as we said previously, to help any existing regime along the path of reform. He cannot do so unless he knows how many different regimes there are. As things are, we find people believing that there is only one sort of democracy or oligarchy. This is an error.

So Aristotle, loyal to his scientific intent, wants to have a detailed discussion of all regimes, and preferably of those which are his main interest, democracy and oligarchy. But here we have to do one thing which is the first step that Aristotle takes--never forget that democracy means a variety of regimes, and so does oligarchy. In other words, in our language of today, no abstractness, no schēmas. We have to look at each kind of democracy--we must in fact find out if it makes sense to bring these various kinds together under one heading, otherwise it would be a misleading term. Now books 4 to 6, the central books, these are the regimes other than the best--the best being aristocracy, 7 and 8, and kingship, which is however, almost a will-o-the-wisp. What is the reason for the variety of regimes? Aristotle raises this question again--he doesn't leave it at the fact of the variety, which no one can deny, but why is it so, why is it necessary? The reason for the variety of regimes is the fact that the city necessarily consists of a number of parts--farmers, artisans, etc., according to the preponderance of one or the other part there is a variety of regimes. There will always be a preponderance of some part or a combination of parts, and this preponderant thing gives the regime its character. He enumerates these parts again--farmers, artisans, traders, manual workers, fighters, judges, deliberators--deliberators means always legislators, as we said before. Some of these parts may be combined; for example, the farmers may be fighters, without any difficulty. But where does the difficulty arise? I don't believe we have time to read--yes, this is of some interest--1291a33. There is one part which he had not enumerated as such--the seventh part...

...the group composed of the rich, who serve the city with their property. The eighth part is the magistrates, who serve the state in its offices. No city can exist without a government (--"without magistrates" he means here--) and there must therefore be persons capable of discharging the duties of office and rendering the state that service, permanently or in rotation. There only remain the two parts which have just been mentioned in passing--the deliberative part, and the part which decides on the rights of litigants. These are the parts which ought to exist in all cities, and to exist on a good and just basis; and this demands persons of a good quality in matters political. The different capacities belonging to the other parts may, it is generally held, be shown by one and the same group of persons.

In other words, the farmer may be a fighting man, a member of the deliberative assembly, and he may even have a trade of sorts--but one thing is absolutely impossible, one combination, namely--what he speaks about now.

The same persons cannot be both rich and poor. ("This combination is evidently impossible--and the consequence is what?") This will explain why these two classes--the rich and the poor--are regarded as parts of the state in a special and peculiar sense. Nor is this all. One of these classes being small, and the other large, they both appear to be opposite parts. This is why they both form regimes to suit their own interest. It is also the reason why men think there are only two regimes--democracy and

oligarchy.

This popular prejudice that there are only two regimes has a respectable reason--not sufficient, however--the argument being the incompatibility of being rich and poor on the part of the same man, therefore two parts of the city. Now this is a crude view, but not groundless. As Aristotle states in the sequel, it is simply not good enough. And the chief reason is that there are various kinds of democracies and oligarchies, and this he develops at length afterwards; we will discuss it at length next time. In both democracy and oligarchy there is a preferred type--in other words, a democracy which is relatively close to oligarchy, and an oligarchy which is relatively close to democracy. The two diverge otherwise, and each becomes worse and worse. And the preferred type of democracy is the rural democracy. The majority of the citizens are farmers, who don't like to come to town every day, and can't afford it, and are perfectly satisfied if they have the right to vote, as we would call it--not the right to judge or to legislate--and leave these matters more or less to gentlemen of their trust. Nevertheless it is a democracy, because those to whom everyone in the city, regardless of how high they are, remain responsible, are the citizen body, without practically any property qualification. We will take up other questions regarding democracy--I would like to draw your attention now to one part of this central section, and that is book 5, devoted to changes of regime, or as people frequently call it, revolution. This is one of the most "realistic" parts of Aristotle's politics. But let us never forget that which is so minimized in part of the popular literature. However realistic Aristotle may be, he clings to the notion of his teacher Plato, that there is and must be a best regime in the light of which political judgements alone can ultimately be justified, and it is not important whether this regime is actual, or has been or will be actual. It must be possible in deed. On the other hand, Aristotle never forgets the fact that most of the time we are concerned with imperfect regimes, and we have to have had a good and close an understanding of the imperfect regimes as possible. But precisely if we want to have a good understanding of imperfect regimes, we must know that they are imperfect, as part of the fact--just as to know that a man who suffers from angina pectoris is sick is part of the fact of his being at that time. Diseases, decay, corruption, these are all factual things--and don't have to be mentioned in quotation marks, but as we do it in everyday life, without quotation marks. There are dubious cases--where one hesitates to say whether there was corruption or decay--but in which field of studies are there not borderline cases? that is no objection per se. Now is there any point any one of you would like to take up? Failing that, I will remind you of the fact that if everything goes well, we will have our last class next Monday--and the following Wednesday,... you will be compelled to reveal your mental nakedness. (Laughter)

Introduction to Political Philosophy
Lecture 15 March 10, 1965

To continue Aristotle's argument regarding the best regime, we turn to the statement at the beginning of book IV, where Aristotle gives a broad outline of the scope of political science as a whole. He makes it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that political science must be greatly concerned with imperfect regimes, which means, in simple language, with actual regimes; and with special emphasis on democracy and oligarchy. There he takes issue with the crude view that there is only the alternative of democracy or oligarchy. But he adds that this popular view is not entirely groundless, that there is a kind of tendency of the city to be either democratic or oligarchic. But still this is not enough, one reason being that there are various kinds of democracies^b and oligarchies. And at this point we may begin, 1291 14.

The fact that there are a number of constitutions and the causes of that fact have already been established. We may now go on to say that there are also a number of varieties of two of these constitutions, democracy and oligarchy. This is already clear from what has been said. These two regimes vary because the people, the dēmos, and the class called the notables vary. So far as the people are concerned, one sort is engaged in farming; the second sort is engaged in the arts and crafts; and the third is the marketing sort, which is engaged in buying and selling; a fourth is the maritime sort, which in turn is partly manual, partly mercantile, partly employed on ferries, partly engaged in fisheries. We note... ("This we can omit, yes?")..A fifth sort is composed of unskilled laborers and person whose means are so small that they cannot enjoy any leisure.. ("No, this is another kind, in addition to those mentioned."). A sixth consists of those who are not of free birth by citizen parents. And there may be others of a similar character. The notables fall into different sorts according to wealth, birth, merit, culture and other qualities of the same order.

In other words, if there should be any other kinds of the dēmos, of common people, or of the notables, for that matter, that could easily be inserted into the Aristotelian scheme without creating any theoretical problem.

Now Aristotle, as will appear later, preferred the rule of dēmos, on a variety of grounds. One very important one is that they live upstate, so to speak, and they cannot come so conveniently to the assembly, the common people, and they don't have too frequent assemblies, and they are in the main satisfied if they can elect and audit the magistrates and similar things. They simply have no time for that. Also a consideration is that they are regarded as the better soldiers, which is for every political society important. This view that the peasantry is the best soldiery prevailed I think up to the First World War; and there it proved for the first time that the industrial workers could be at least as good if not better soldiers, than the rural workers. That of course has to do with technology, which I have referred to frequently, which introduced a radical change into politics. But there is here a complication, which we also must consider, in 1292^b11. I give you these examples in order to show how broad the Aristotelian scheme of inquiry is.

These are several varieties of oligarchy and democracy. It should be noted, however, that in actual life, it is often the case that constitutions which are not democratic are made to work democratically by the habits of the people. Conversely there are other cases where the legal regime is inclined toward democracy, but is made by training and habits to work in a way which inclines toward oligarchy. This happens particularly after a revolution. The citizens do not change their temper immediately; and in the first stages, the triumphant parties intend to leave things largely alone, without taking any great advantage of their opponents. So the old laws remain in force, even though the party of the revolution is actually in power.

In other words, in order to see and understand a regime properly, we cannot limit ourselves to observing the laws, say the written constitution; we also must consider the habits of the people. There may be a habitual deference to the notables, of great political importance, which doesn't find any legal expression. So what is meant very frequently by the contribution of a political sociology, which looks at the actual society as distinguished from the legal-political arrangement, is for Aristotle a matter of course.

There is another point of this nature to consider, at 1293^b14.

He speaks there of a polity which looks at wealth, virtue and the dēmos, as in Carthage. This is aristocratic. Now aristocracy is here used in this whole discussion of the fourth book, in a popular sense, not a strict sense. In other words, the kinds of regimes which are called by the people aristocratic.

Accordingly a constitution which takes account of all three factors, wealth, virtue and numbers, may be called an aristocratic regime. And the same may also be said of the Spartan, which pays regard only to the two factors of goodness and numbers.

Well, let us say, virtue and the dēmos.

And where there is such a mixture, the democratic and the aristocratic principle, we may....

That is all we need. In order to understand this more fully, let us turn to 1294b7.. "As it seems to be democratic that the magistracies are elected by lot...yes?"

In the appointment of magistrates, for examples, the use of the lot is regarded as democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical. Again it is considered to be democratic that a property qualification should ^{not} be required, and oligarchical that it should be. Here accordingly, the mode appropriate to an aristocracy, or a polity, is to take one form from one regime, and another from another: to take from oligarchy the rule that magistrates should be appointed by vote, and from democracy the rule that no property qualification should be required.

Democracy strictly understood, insisting on equality, would like to make all offices available by lot. Because only if they are made available by lot, is there a serious chance for every citizen, however humble, to become a magistrate. Because if they are elected as individuals, we look at merit. And this excludes--we may be mistaken as to what constitutes merit, but the principle is this: not everyone who has the right to vote as a citizen is therefore fit to be a magistrate: an undemocratic, unequalitarian thought. And I think it is also clear that property qualification is incompatible with democracy, and is a necessity in an oligarchy. Then an aristocracy in the vulgar sense needs to take institutions from both sides, from oligarchy, the appointment of magistrates by election; and from democracy, no property qualification. From this I think you see immediately that modern democracy is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy, or more precisely, is an aristocracy in the common or vulgar sense of the term. We must keep this in mind in order not to think that Aristotle's criticism of democracy is unfair. Modern democracy has taken care of many of Aristotle's objections. And now there is another consideration, indicated at the beginning of p. 180 (1295a25).

We have now to consider what is the best regime and the best way of life for the majority of cities and men. In doing so, we shall not employ a standard above the reach of ordinary men...

In other words, not that standard which Aristotle employed in describing the best regime in books 6, 7, and 8.

...or a standard of education requiring exceptional endowment and equipment, but we shall only be concerned with the standard of life which most men are able to share, and the sort of regime which is possible for most people.

This is one important consideration for political science to find out, which regime not absolutely is best, but is the best which one can expect under ordinary circumstances.

The aristocracy, so-called, of which we have just been treating... The so-called aristocracy, are those who are generally regarded as aristocracies even though they are not so in the strict Aristotelian sense.

...either are at one extreme, beyond the reach of most states, or they approach at the other, the regime called polity, so that they are not necessary to be considered separately. The issues we have just raised can only be decided in the light of one body of fundamental principles. If we adopt as true the statements made in the Ethics, that a true and happy life is the life of goodness free from impediments, and that goodness consists in a mean, it follows that the best way of life is one which attains the mean. Further, *the same criteria which determine whether the citizen-body have a good or bad way of life* must also apply to the regime; for a regime is the way of life of the citizen body. In all cities there may be distinguished three parts of the citizen body: the very rich, the very poor, and the middle class, which forms a mean. Now it is admitted as a general principle that moderation and the mean are the best. Therefore men who belong to either extreme, the over-handsome, the over-strong, the over-wealthy, or the opposite, the over-poor, the over-weak, the utterly ignoble, find it hard to follow the lead of reason. Men in the first class tend to violence; and men in the second tend too much to roguery and petty offenses. And most wrongdoing arises either from violence or roguery.

Violence is perhaps not the best word: from insolence, insolence bred by great power, wealth, and so on. There can be crime arising from insolence, from a feeling of being superior to others, and there can be crime or defects which stem from feeling that you are an underdog, and this has more to do with petty crime. This one sentence was not translated literally enough: the regime is some kind of way of life of the city. Or, as Isocrates, orator of Plato's time, put it, the regime is the soul of the city, that which gives it its life and its character. And the reason is that the regime indicates what the end is for which the society is dedicated, and at the same time it indicates the men most akin to that goal. So that in an oligarchy, based on wealth, the men who rule are mostly akin to that goal, the wealthy. And if it is virtue, the same would follow. The answer to Aristotle's question what is the best regime on the average, is then one which is the rule of the middle-class. Now in the sequel he makes clear that it is not necessary that the middle-class be the majority which is sometimes possible, perhaps but the main point is that it can tip the balance, so that by either joining with

the lower class against the higher class, or vice-versa, it is in fact in control. And the proof of the superiority of the middle class, a popular proof, he notes the fact that the most calabrated legislators, men like Solon and Lycurgus, were middla-class men. Middla-class does not mean bourgeois; bourgeois is a name for a certain kind of middla-class which arose in modern times; to mention this in passing, the notion of the bourgeois arose in contradistinction to that of the citizen, in Rousseau, who makes it clear they are two different things. The bourgeois simply meant at that time, the average denizens of the city, the burghers, especially under the French monarchy. And the citizen is--of course, these men were entirely powerless, and led an absolutely private life. Whereas the citizen, as Rousseau re-stating the ancient use, said, a citizen is a man who leads a political life. Now this was taken up by Hegel, who accepted the Rousseauian distinction, and defines the bourgeois by fear of violent death. The Hobbeian origin of the term is obvious: meaning they are not soldiers, they do not fight for their country. The fighting was done either by the hereditary nobility or by the scum of the country, forced into the army. The citizen is a man who fights for his country and who is an active participant in political power. And the Marxian use of bourgeois is simply a modification necessitated by Marx's so-called economic interpretation.

This middla-class regime which Aristotle favors is rare, because in most cities, the middle class is not in this beautiful position that it can determine the way; either the rich or the poor preponderate. Now in the sequel Aristotle makes clear that not every regime is possible everywhere. What is the chief condition of the possibility of a given regime? Answer: those who wish the preservation of the regime must be stronger than those who wish to destroy it. Stronger does not necessarily mean more numerous; because we know it depends partly on the state of armaments, and also on other things, what is strength in any actual contest.

Finally, as far as this part of the argument is concerned, Aristotle points out that in the study of regimes, we must look of course at the meaning of institutions, not merely at their appearance. (1297a14-21)

You see, this looks very friendly to the common people; they are not compelled to take up the burden of magistracy, but they may decline it. But the rich are forbidden to decline it. And reflection shows that this is of course an anti-democratic measure. So in order to understand political institutions properly, we must not merely listen to the wording of law, we must look at its exact meaning. Again, where sociological considerations are regarded as higher than political considerations in modern times, the latter means: merely legal considerations. And the merely legal considerations can be quite deceptive.

I remember reading an article by an anti-Communist who praised the Soviet Constitution of 1936--what a wonderful thing that is--without ever raising the question of whether it had any probability of becoming in any way practical. One can leave it at that. Turning now to more detailed things: (1297b35-8a4 is read.)

Is this distinction known to you--the deliberative, the magistrative, and the judiciary? Obviously it is known, but in its Aristotelian meaning? What Aristotle has in mind is not a separation of powers; he makes a distinction of powers. Well, we cannot speak of powers, he says "parts." And of course, the same as in the modern view, the first is the deliberative, which includes legislative; then what is now called "executive," is not called this by Aristotle, but "magistracies". What is wrong with the term executive, or misleading? ...Because the execution of the laws simply, is a narrow view: not all magistrates execute laws. Locke, as you know very well, spoke of another power--the federative power. That has to do with foreign affairs, and also with warfare, in particular. And that the power of a general is--during war--not properly to be called executive, unless you say he is given a command to invade the continent of Europe, as Eisenhower in this respect executed orders. But still one cannot call it the execution of a law. And therefore magistrates is a broader term, generals being an outstanding form of magistrates in the Aristotelian sense.

But this is not sufficient. What is the reason behind the fact that in Aristotle we find a distinction of powers, whereas in Montesquieu we find the doctrine of the separation of powers?

Student: Is it because the deliberative power is in essence the final power?

Yes, but not quite, because if after all if you are condemned by a judge, the law supplies only the major of the syllogisms. But that you are the one who did these things, the minor of the syllogism, is not given by the law. That is to be found by the judge. The judicial power, as well as the power of the magistrate, cannot be reduced. The only point is that the deliberative power or function is the highest power. In that respect there is perfect agreement between Aristotle and the American Constitution, and of course also Montesquieu. But what is the difference between the Aristotelian doctrine of distinction of powers and Montesquieu in the doctrine of separation of powers?

S. Whether or not the powers can be separated depends on the kind of regime with which you are dealing. In rule by philosophy, you wouldn't want a separation,...

Well, one could say this is an extreme case with which we as hard-headed political scientists might disregard.

S. In any case, it still would require a different sort of... You might not want to separate all three.

Yes, but what is Montesquieu's solution to that?

Student: Whether or not you want a limited government?
I believe it has something to do with that.

Student: The Aristotelian purpose is to distinguish between who should properly be carrying out the functions, for whom it is more appropriate...

That is not the purpose, the purpose is that in fact there are three different functions, and that these different functions are differently employed in different regimes.

Student: I was going to say that you might go to Aristotle's conception of an organic society; you might analogize the parts of the body, each of which has separate functions but they are not really separate.

No, I don't believe this would be helpful. It is very dangerous to speak of organic in these matters, because of the vagueness, and I would think one should try to avoid it if possible, unless compelled by the text.

S. I thought the separation of powers depended on the distinction between state and society..

Yes, you can say that, but what does that distinction mean?

Well, to say it very simply...yes?

S. The purpose of separation of powers is to have a group of governing bodies that will check each other...

S. It protects the society from the state.

That was already said before. ...You see we do not know what society is, we take that for granted. We explain an unknown by an unknown. Although colloquially that is always good, but from time to time we should not speak colloquially. Yes?

S. In separation of powers the assumption is that man is not really a social animal, but he's out for his own good. It is a device to keep things going in that case. But with a distinction it is the function that is important; you might find it in the same person or in different people.

You started very well, but by your additional remarks you covered up the good beginning. Montesquieu's overriding interest, in this famous discussion in the eleventh book, is the security for the individual, and this means, society in contradistinction to the state, is only a consequence of that. Mr. Bruell, will you allow me?...

Now to make that a bit clearer, because it is, I think, of some importance. Montesquieu's presentation is given in a quasi-historical form--I mean not in general theoretical terms. He speaks of the British Constitution. Now this description of the British Constitution is modelled on a description of the Roman Constitution given by the historian Polybius, a Greek familiar with Rome, in the second century. Polybius also speaks, sometimes very much reminding of Montesquieu, of something like checks and balances between the consuls, the senate, and the popular assemblies. That is the crucial difference..and this political thought falls easily within the Aristotelian framework, although it is not explicitly stated in Aristotle. But what is the key point? Very crudely stated: Power may be misused, and therefore it must be checked. The sum total of political power must be split up; this is common, to Polybius and Montesquieu. But for Polybius there is no other principle involved. Polybius's checks and balances has nothing to do with the Aristotelian division of powers. As it were, the sum total of political power is divided into three big chunks--and how we draw the line does not make any difference, the main point is that every part, whether the consuls or the senate, or the common people, have an important

function, but a limited part of the power. Now Montesquieu has as a principle not merely for the distribution of power, this follows from the difference of function. You cannot well have two generals the head of an army, and so on. Whereas the part of the polis which is concerned with legislation, or deliberation, may very well, and should even consist, of a body of men. In certain other functions there must be a monarchic head: the simplest case is of course that of the army, but there are also other cases where someone must be, say, in an office, the one who has the last say.

So the division of powers has a principle of its own: the separation of powers has also a principle of its own, and the principle here is the greatest possible protection for the individual. If the same group, the same assembly of men, who make the laws, have also the power of executing them, mere hatred of a particular individual --accused--will make his case hopeless. But if there is independence of the judiciary, even if the law is very nasty and unfair, there is some protection. The judges may find reasons why this case may not be subsumed under the law in question.

Now this concern for the security of the individual, which of course exists also in Aristotle, is not the key consideration. And that is the meaning of Aristotle's statement that man is a political animal, the polis is prior to the individual. Whereas according to the doctrine starting with Hobbes, the individual is prior to society, and the practical conclusions from that are immense. Now no one would assert any more that the individual is prior to society; that very notion of the state of nature has completely disappeared from modern social science, as you surely know; and therefore the question of the individual and individualism, has also become somewhat obscured. Individualism had a very clear meaning when it meant, man is not by nature a social animal, but society is the work of individuals. An untenable view, but at least a clear view. Now we take today for granted that man is a social animal, molded by society, and the question is, that the rights of the individual have to be protected somehow against this state. But what about society? Is there not a possible totalitarianism of society, which is not tyranny of government? Tyranny of government is an easily recognizable thing. Is there not a phenomenon which we call conformism? not based on any law--you don't go to jail, but there is a kind of social ostracism, which can be as hard for the individual as legal consequences.

Now this is the price we have to pay for abandoning, with very good and powerful reasons, the notion that literally, the individuals, precede society, and organize society, as they as individuals, see fit; but that man, wherever we find him, is already a (quote) "socialized" being. And he can never step outside of society and make demands on it: that is, the distinction between state and society is some help for preserving the libertarian notion in our age. Book Five, to which we turn now in our very cursory study, is a high point, in Aristotle's so-called realism. It contains a discussion of 'revolutions,' as we say--Aristotle says, 'changes of regime.' Revolution as you know means originally a revolving, coming back to the same point where we were before--the revolutions of the celestial bodies. Now people observed that there are also such comings-back, such returnings, in societies: beginnings, maturities, decays, and so on. The changes have one thing in common: change of direction: now you go this way, and afterward this way. But the use of 'revolution' for a change of state is a very modern one: I do not know exactly how it came about, but probably 17th-18th century.

Now in this discussion Aristotle considers not only the destruction

of regimes, but also their preservation. Among others, he discusses also the preservation of tyranny. You see, Aristotle can be very open-minded; that is the nearest approximation to "Machiavellianism" which we find in Aristotle. But there is an obvious difference between Aristotle's treatment of the preservation of tyranny and Machiavelli's treatment. In the first place, this discussion of tyranny is only a small part of the Politics whereas one can say the whole Prince is devoted to the subject; and secondly the monstrous character of tyranny is not for one moment concealed or denied by Aristotle, whereas Machiavelli does conceal it. When speaking about the causes of such revolutions, Aristotle does not mention ideologies or anything like it. It is very illuminating to contrast this with Hobbes' doctrine, Leviathan chapter 29: "Of those things that weaken or tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth," or the parallel of that in Hobbes' De Cive, where Hobbes emphasizes the crucial importance for the avoiding of violent change--of what he calls seditious doctrines. Well, in the seventeenth century, as we know, doctrines played a very great role in bringing about political change. That was not so in classical antiquity. There is one point which I thought is particularly characteristic of Aristotle, and which I thought we should read. In 1309a32, the beginning of a chapter: three things Aristotle discusses here which are the things preserving regimes. One of them is of course the character of the magistrates, the leading men. (1309a32-9b9).

Is this clear? A treasurer in the literal sense is, a man who takes care of all the coins. The competence which he requires is not very great. He must know how thieves operate, and he probably has some guards in addition, but the main point is that he is honest. And this kind of virtue is very common. But the competence required of a general is very different, and here one may have to close one's eyes. A general may not be very good as a democrat, and he may lead a very dissolute life. What did Lincoln say in the case of Grant, when he was accused of drinking too much? He inquired what kind of whiskey he drank, because he wanted to send it to the other generals. So this is a very practical and sober discussion. (1309b9-11).. "If a man possesses the two qualifications of capacity and loyalty to the constitution, is there any need for him to have the third qualification of virtue? ..."

That's very interesting, because it is a very tough and low and solid view: if he is very loyal, absolutely loyal to the regime, say to democracy, and in addition, he is very competent, why does he need virtue? Who cares? it's his private matter.

(1309b11-16). In other words, Aristotle concludes that virtue is truly needed, even if he is very dependable. For if he lacks a certain self-control regarding anger, regarding desires, and so on, he can fail decisively. He makes in the immediate sequel another important point.

(1309b16-30).. In other words, it will be an ugly nose, whereas a snub nose can still be, as Aristotle says, beautiful and gracious, charming. But if it goes further, the face will be disfigured. And then the last stage?

"Carry it further still, and it will cease to look like a nose at all, because it will go too far towards one, and too far away from the other, of these two opposite extremes."

It will not only cease to look like a nose, it will cease to be a nose, if it goes still a step further.

(1309b30-35). Now that is of course a very important point, with which we all are familiar in one way or another. Something may be in itself much more democratic a measure than the alternative; and yet what is more democratic may be ruinous to democracy. An example which is

controversial, I know, but there is some truth in it, was proportionate representation--said to be much more democratic than otherwise. Because every vote will be counted, especially if there is a kind of total addition of the votes of a whole community. This may require the abandonment of some proposals which in themselves, strictly taken, are more democratic. Yet the most important thing for the preservation of regimes is of course, education; and it must be specific education, different in a democracy from that in an oligarchy, etc. And here he says, in the case of democracy, a development of the habits by which democracy is maintained...and not habits which happen to be popular at the moment. There is a certain difficulty here because it seems to be democratic to choose the populace, but democracy which understands itself, while admitting the principle of the popular, must use a certain qualification in its application. In other words, democracy is not simply rule of the popular will, but rule of the will favorable to the people; and something may be favorable to the people without being popular. The simplest example I know is the demobilization of the United States in Europe after the Second World War. It would have been absolutely impossible to keep up a strong army in Europe because of the disinclination of the large majority of the people to 'keep the boys over there.' And no one then, neither President Truman nor anyone else who spoke up at least, raised the question whether keeping the boys there might not be the best guarantee for not sending them there within a very short time. ..Let us turn to 1310 a-b..

We have still, however, to treat of the causes of destruction, and the means of preservation, when the government is a monarchy. Generally, what has already been said of constitutions proper is almost equally true of kingships and tyrannies.

Here I want to draw attention to the usage. Regimes, politeiai, here means obviously non-monarchical regimes, i.e., republics. And this shows that the distinction, the former distinction, between monarchy and republic, was known to Aristotle. Plato's Republic is in Greek titled politeia, a word which I translate by regime, and it of course has this double meaning already, not necessarily monarchical. Book six is devoted to a still more detailed study of the practically most important regimes, that is, democracy and oligarchy. We should read the general statement about democracy, because that is very important for understanding our own democratic convictions. 1317a40.

The assumption underlying the democratic regime is liberty.
(cont. to 1317b5)

In other words, everyone gets the same, regardless of his deserts, and not what he deserves.

On the arithmetical conception of justice the masses must necessarily be sovereign..

The masses of course doesn't exist..the multitude. Masses is a term stemming from modern mechanics, 17th century, and then taken over, especially through the French Revolution, and popularized..la vie en masse..and there are no masses there..

The multitude must necessarily be sovereign. The will of the majority must be ultimate and must be the expression of justice (to 1317b20)..Its issue is, ideally, freedom from any interference of government, and, failing that, such freedom as comes from the interchange of ruling and being ruled. It contributes, in this way, to a general system of liberty based on equality.

That is the most fundamental statement about the principle of democracy which we find in Aristotle; therefore we should look at it for one

moment. There are two characteristics: the first is freedom, and that has two decisive parts, ruling and being ruled in turn for every citizen. No citizen is simply a subject; he shall also be a ruler, if not now, after the next election. The next is: to live as one likes. Or, permissive egalitarianism. That is strange: could there not be an austere, Puritan democracy? Very egalitarian? and yet not permissive? That is excluded by Aristotle; and I believe, also excluded by modern theory; but is it not in itself possible?...you think not?

Mr. LEVY: (not clear) ..the reason, I take it, is that virtue can't be maintained in a regime when the many have become rulers..because the many are unvirtuous.

You go very far (laughter)..you may very well be accused of sedition! ..But more precisely, the things which are sometimes called Puritan democracy, or close to it, for example, in New England, or in Islam, and perhaps certain things in the Old Testament, for that matter, this is purely theocratic--under God, and under the divine law, things are democratically and equally distributed--but there is a law which is not made by the citizen body, however defective, or however good. In other words, we should not call these kinds of regimes simple democracies, we should say, these are theocracies--they can of course also be monarchistic. The end of democracy is freedom--and a free man is one who is not bossed around by anyone. An unfree man must obey his boss--whether the boss is a master in the old sense, or whether he is one's officer in an office, a boss can boss around, and no free man likes to be bossed around. That is quite clear. But unfortunately, it is altogether impossible. Everyone living in society, unless he is an absolute monarch, is being bossed around by somebody. And even the President of the United States will soon be bossed around by certain committees, or legislators. So how can we get the closest approximation to that freedom which we like? Answer: if we are never ruled by anybody who is not in his turn, also ruled by us. Political equality. Someone has the right to boss around. But a year from now, I have a chance to boss him around; so bossing is necessary, but if it is properly distributed, it is no longer resented; because while I have the burden of being bossed, I also have the pleasure of bossing; and that makes up for it.

Some things in Aristotle remind one of Rousseau, but there is a very great difference between Aristotle and Rousseau which is immediately relevant. Aristotle does not suggest for one moment here that in a democracy there must be a total submission of everyone in every respect to the general will; this would not be fair. If so, then we would not have this permissiveness--it is as important for freedom in the democratic sense as egalitarianism. This we want--to live as we like, again within the limits of the possible, an easygoing egalitarianism.

Now if you read Pericles' funeral speech you find something like this stated there--easygoingness is contrasted to the tough discipline of the Spartan regime. Pericles does not speak of democracy, mind you--he speaks of the Athenian regime--and how you call it, that he leaves to you. What characterizes their regime is the degree of public-spiritedness and of dedication to the city, which you find, according to Pericles, nowhere else. This of course is not a part of what Aristotle says in attempting to describe democracy as such and not Athenian democracy.

We may say for the sake of freedom there can be only a limited equality, political equality. Because a complete equality, say social equality, would then interfere much too much with permissiveness. It is of course understood although not said here that only a part of the inhabitants of the city will be citizens. There will be slaves, and it will be very difficult for foreigners to become citizens. In other words, there are no rights of men. Not according to Aristotle's view only, but according to ancient democracy itself. Freedom is not a right, but a privilege: that is the tacit premise.

Now this much about the theory of democracy, if you can call that a theory; that is the whole, I quote, ideology of democracy. Can you call this an ideology? I would say no, because there is no reference to any other principle taken from nature, or metaphysics, or theology, or any science. It is simply based on the feeling of the majority of the people, I don't want to be bossed, and the two implications I stated. If this were given sophisticated justification, of one kind or another--but this is not even attempted. These people, like sturdy people who have done their fighting when they are in their younger years, and know they are the sons of the soil, stemming by their descent from many generations; you know they were the ones who defeated the Persians in the Persian Wars--that is enough. It would be a gross injustice to these men to say that is an ideology. That they have opinions, that is undeniable. But to call this an ideology, there is something fundamentally wrong with that.

Now in order to see Aristotle's procedure, let us read the immediate sequel. (1317b)

Such being the hypothesis of democracy, and the root from which it develops, we can now proceed to study its attributes or institutions. There is the election of officers by all and from all; there is a system of all ruling over each and each in his turn over all; there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices; or at any rate to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill. There is the rule that there should be no property qualification for office, or at any rate, the lowest possible; there is the rule that, apart from the military offices, there should be no office held twice by the same person--(That is because generals of high caliber are very rare; thus Pericles was a general for ten years)--or only on few occasions, and those relating to a few offices; and there is finally, the rule that the tenure of every office--or at any rate, of as many as possible--should be brief. (cont. to 1317b30)

I hope you seized the spirit of this enumeration. We know first the end of democracy; and in light of the end, we understand why these institutions prevail; for example, why certain offices are only for a short time; it gives them much greater charm, for citizens to fill up these offices in their turn. I think it is a model of clarity as to how such analyses should be made. ...There are many things in these six books which deserve our attention, but we cannot take them up for now. Especially I would mention--you might read at home--in 1319b33 ff., what one can call the social policy in a democracy, what should be done by it in order to alleviate the fate of the poor, a subject now of great and immediate importance in this country.

I would like to turn in conclusion to a broader subject which we will not be able to exhaust in any way today, but at least we can begin.

Now what is the most obvious limitation of Aristotle's political science from a methodical point of view? I will not go into the question of whether he was right or wrong on every point. The most obvious thing we can say is, he did not know anything of the regimes which are of particular interest to us, contemporary modern regimes, and he did not provide for them. For his schema of the six, as you will remember, does not make provision for inserting, as you will remember, such things as liberal democracy or communism. But I would contend that Aristotle provides for the modern regimes indirectly, indirectly--because he enables us to understand the principle, the peculiar principle, of the modern regime. Now he does this by pointing to the question, which, answered in one way, leads to the regimes known to him. And answered in another way, leads to the modern view. What is that question?

In the third book he started from the polarity, the well-known polarity between democracy and oligarchy. But next passed to the polarity of democracy and kingship. In a radical sense, the city is as such democratic. In a radical sense, I have explained that. I remind you only of the fact that we have observed that the first definition of a citizen given in book three was democratic. Now what is this radical sense in which the city is as such democratic? If the dēmos, the common people, from which democracy is derived, is understood to comprise all non-philosophers, from this point of view kings, noblemen, the rich and what have you are as much common people as the poorest working man. Or differently stated, the true gentleman is the philosopher. Now if this is true, then gentlemen in the ordinary sense of the term are so only by courtesy, or by pretense. The absolute king, of whom he speaks toward the end of the third book, the Zeus-like ruler, is the political reflection of the philosopher, and only as such does he make sense in the context of the teaching of Aristotle as a whole. But of course, we have seen in the seventh book, the rule of such a man is altogether impossible. The city is recalcitrant to philosophy. Socrates' condemnation was not accidental: there is a disharmony between philosophy and the city, a tension between philosophy and the city. The city needs popularly intelligible principles, whatever the regime may be. And the true principles are not necessarily popularly intelligible. The city and the philosopher have different ends. This is we can say the premise of men like Aristotle and Plato. But one can very well raise the question, is this true?

We have heard from modern philosophers, such as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, to mention only men from that heroic age of modern philosophy, that science is for the sake of power, for the relief of man's estate, for making man master and owner of Nature. Now if this is the sound view, it follows that the ends of the philosopher and the non-philosophers are identical. If the end of the philosopher is to relieve man's estate, this end is not peculiar to the philosopher. Only the philosophers can make a contribution which the non-philosophers cannot. Now this is one side of the question.

The other side is, that in modern times the belief that philosophy will not cease to be philosophy if it diffused, if it is taken notice of if it is taken in a fundamentally passive manner, by listening, by mere reading, etc. In other words, philosophy calls for and is compatible with, enlightenment. Enlightenment in its original form was of course a very limited affair. I think the first man who can be said to have started it, a Frenchman called Fontenelle, presented the new cosmology to French nobility, who, according to all ordinary social standards, do not belong to the dēmos. But they belong to the dēmos from the point of view of Descartes. Now as

we know, since the eighteenth century and even more in our age, a matter of--which is no longer seriously considered. So much so that John Dewey could identify the method of democracy with the method of in most cases, discussion, debate...a thought which would be wholly unintelligible if stated in this way to Plato and Aristotle. Because the very simple thing is that in political debates all kinds of assumptions will be made, which are good enough for practical purposes, which in a theoretical discussion would never be permissible. Modern democracy rests on an anti-classic view of the relation of the city, the political society, and philosophy. And a part of this element is, of course, that modern science and philosophy are the same thing, makes possible the economy of plenty. Therefore the mass of the population can become educated, and therefore there is no longer any necessity that democracy should be the rule of the uneducated, as Aristotle says. In other words, the modern answer to Aristotle is that no one wants the rule of the uneducated. But who says that the majority of the population in a democracy must be or remain uneducated? Here we are. Now as for communism and fascism, they do not affect this picture at all because they are reactions to modern democracy in many ways, and can only be understood on the basis of an understanding of modern democracy. If one does not consider this aspect of the question, that modern democracies are based massively on technology, but if we go deeper into their history, on the new notion of science, developed in the seventeenth century, that if one does not take this into consideration one does not understand democracy. You cannot leave it at the mere phenomena as they strike you today at first glance, although one must surely know them, take cognizance of them--one must go into their depths, one must analyze them, and then I believe one arrives at an adequate understanding of the problem.

Now this much about the true limitations of Aristotle's political science are: at least if we remain within the limits of political science as now understood. But Aristotle's political science differed from present-day political science most obviously by the following fact: that his political science is the second part of a bipartite enterprise. The first part is called in its literary presentation, the Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and today in political science the notion that ethics should be the first part, the basic part, of political science, would be received, not with incredulity, but with ridicule. Whether this is the superiority of modern political science to the Aristotelian one is a long question into which we cannot go here. I have made some remarks about this subject from time to time.

The whole discussion in the Politics, we have seen, rests ultimately on the premise that there is such a thing as human virtue, or excellence, and of course a variety of such virtues. But this is not elaborated there; the elaboration we find in the Ethics. The great question regarding the Ethics, which we will try to develop next time, concerns the character of the knowledge of these moral principles. Today of course this is also the issue, only this issue is regarded as foreclosed. There is no knowledge of moral principles. They are somehow imposed upon us by our society, or whatnot, but there is not strictly speaking, a knowledge of them as the true moral principles. Now this is certainly the obscurest point in Aristotle's Ethics: the cognitive status of the moral principles. And I will devote at least some part of the last meeting to this subject, and if we have still time, to make some remarks on the difference between Aristotle

and Plato, the other great representative of classical political philosophy. Is there any point you wish to question..yes, Mr. Levy?

Mr. LEVY: What makes this book "philosophy"? How does it differ for instance from a highly competent statement like Ernest Barker's Reflections on Government, which is also a survey of regimes in a certain way? Or is it?

Well, I have no objection to that. Barker, as he has shown to some extent at least by devoting so much labor to bringing out this honest and useful translation--Barker has no opposition to political philosophy. Why not? I have no objection. My criticism of Barker is simply this, and this means a questioning of him as a political philosopher--that Barker was fundamentally a Victorian. The great shocks which were applied to us in our century, especially after the First World War, which was already a big shock as you know, but not comparable to what happened in the Thirties--I believe did not give him occasion to reflect, to go deeper into political problems than he had done. In other words, there is a kind of dignified classicism in Barker, which is in one way very attractive, at least to me, but in another way also not sufficient, because when the waves rise as high as they do in our age, then some toughness is needed in countering them, which I do not find in Barker. Barker in other words continues in a certain British tradition, represented by people like Green, you know, T.H.Green, and that is now no longer alive. And one could say, that is merely a deplorable fact, but it has some reason. There are needs, demands, intellectual demands, which are not satisfied by that.

Mr. LEVY: So it is completeness which defines philosophy and distinguishes it from all other kinds of studies..

Yes, comprehensiveness I would say, but equally important is the depth, how deeply you go in analysing things. There is a kind of comprehensiveness which some very clever globe-trotters have--like those who have seen the minds and laws of many lands, and are under the spell of the prejudices which they sucked in with their mother's milk. So there is very great variety and there can be something good about that--a high-class journalism, I highly respect. That is not philosophy. What you need in addition is analysis, and the bringing-out of the reasons why these things are, and that is not possible, today, at any rate, without a certain kind of historical studies. I don't say historical studies simply, because historical studies can be unenlightening, and merely antiquarian, and irrelevant. And even if people speak of history of ideas, that can be very unenlightening, a kind of exciting panorama, of the variety of opinions which men held in different times, without at any moment being concerned with the questions, which are the true ideas. You would have to say a philosophically-inspired history. And then we come back again to what is philosophy? And I must return to the very simple definition of philosophy which was suggested by both modern and ancient philosophers, and which is so simple, that it might very well appear ridiculous: philosophy is the attempt to know the truth about all things. ..I think that is a fitting conclusion for this class. (laughter)

Introduction to Political Philosophy

Lecture 16

I remind you again of the fact that you will have to be here for being tortured on Wednesday, at the same time. I will try to do that as gently as possible. Now the other point is, it is too late to announce it in the normal way--I made a change in my arrangements for next quarter. I will not give the seminar on Kant, but I will give a lecture course on Plato's political philosophy, namely an interpretation of one dialogue, the Protagoras. Now as for today, I would like to finish the discussion of Aristotle and if some time is left, to say a few words about Plato's political philosophy in contradistinction to Aristotle's. Now we have spoken about Aristotle's political science, his chief themes, the variety of regimes. We haven't yet considered its basis. The basis we can say and must say, is the end of man. The end of man consists, according to Aristotle, in the unimpeded practice of virtue. The unimpeded meaning you must have certain equipment in order to do that--you must be healthy, and not completely unsupplied with funds, because this would make it impossible for you to practice virtue in every respect. Now virtue means here primarily of course moral virtue. What moral virtue is, what kinds of moral virtue there are, is discussed in the first part of Aristotle's work concerning political philosophy, and that first part is known by the name of Ethics. There you find a detailed discussion of virtue in general, and of the various kinds of virtues--especially as they are mentioned, moral virtues. This term has been coined by Aristotle, moral virtues. Now virtue belongs somehow with morality, therefore, and also with the moral law, as it later was called, which was also more or less identical with the natural law. Natural law is a term of Greek extraction; moral law, as far as I know, is of Christian theological origin, and was originally used for designating a part of the old law, of the Old Testament law. This only in passing. There is no natural law in Aristotle. Aristotle does mention the term in his Rhetoric; but his rhetoric does not present Aristotle's own views, but the view which an orator has to use, and in particular which a forensic orator has to use.

I propose that we have a look at Aristotle's statement on this subject, which is truly Aristotle's, i.e., which he does not report, from popular opinions, but which he speaks in his own name. That is in the fifth book of the Ethics, p. 294 in the Loeb edition.

Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent: for example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice enacted in honor of Brasidas, and ordinances in the nature of special decrees. Some people think that all rules of justice are merely conventional, because whereas what is by nature is immutable and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary. That rules of

justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world, although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, ("the just by nature"), as well as justice not by nature. and it is easy to see which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it should be possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous.

The rules of justice based on convention and expediency are alike standard measures. Corn and wine measures are not equal in all places, but are larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of government are not the same, though in all places there is only one form of government that is natural, namely, the best form.

..well, which is by nature, the best. Now this is the single page which Aristotle devotes to that great subject of the ages, natural right. Now what does he mean by that? You see, there is no clear example given of natural right--we only have to figure it out. For example, when he says, to sacrifice a goat, but not two sheep--this is conventional. But what about sacrificing in general? Perhaps he means, this is by nature right, worship of the gods. And similarly to ransom prisoners for this and this amount is conventional--but that you should ransom prisoners, or more generally stated, that you should help fellow-citizens who in the course of civic duty have come into trouble--this is by nature valid. Helping citizens out of misfortune into which they have fallen as a consequence of performing a civic duty, and worshipping the gods--this is by nature right. We would then have to say as a general definition, the natural right is that right by which every city stands or falls. You see here at the beginning of the passage read, natural right is declared to be a part of political right--that does not necessarily mean that there are no natural right relations between individuals, as distinguished from citizens. Say between complete foreigners who meet somewhere in a forest. Aristotle would think that there are relations of right not established by human convention between any human beings. But what he has in mind is that only among fellow citizens, and only grownup fellow citizens, for that matter, does a right--do relations of right acquire their full density. For example, within the family, relations of right do not acquire their full density, because children ordinarily have property rights among themselves or against their parents, and so on. But if the people are fellow-citizens independent of each other, there you have the fullest density.

Now to come back to the examples to which Aristotle seems to allude, if it is correct that natural right is that right by which every city stands or falls, then we would have to say natural right is the flooring, the minimum condition. This seems to be confirmed by the example of the right-handed and ambidextrous man. All men are by nature right-handed; but we can acquire ambidexterity by training. Now if we assume that Aristotle thinks that ambidexterity is preferable to right-handedness, is a greater perfection of the man, then it would mean this, that natural right plus conventional right is higher than

mere natural right; or that intelligent conventional right is higher than mere natural right. Now if this is so, then natural right is indifferent to the difference of regimes. Whether it is a democracy, an oligarchy, in all cases these conditions would have to be fulfilled. Positive right, of course, is relative to the regime: it is either democratic or oligarchic, etc. Yet--and that is a conclusion--one regime alone is by nature best everywhere--this is by nature, not by any human establishment. This regime--the most divine regime, as Aristotle says elsewhere--is full kingship, as we have seen. But this full kingship is the only regime which does not require any laws, where the superior man rules by looking at each case and its requirements. So we would have to say, the minimum condition and the maximum, the flooring and the ceiling, are natural, and do not in any way depend on nomos, on law. Yet--we have not yet considered the key passage--all just things, whether they are conventional or natural, are changeable. Thomas Aquinas's explanation is, this is not literally true, it applies only to the conclusion from the principles; the principles themselves are unchangeable. Aristotle himself does not make this distinction. Now how can this be understood? What Aristotle literally says is that there is no single rule of justice, natural or positive, which is not open to qualification--just qualification. Now we have seen in the Politics, for instance, the case of ostracism--that a man is banished, not for any crime he has committed, but for his very virtues and excellences. Why? Because his excellences threaten the normal course of events--especially in the case of a democracy. We have also seen the case of slavery, where Aristotle lays down the clear rule, no one shall be a slave who is not by nature a slave, and then, later on, when he discusses slavery in the context of his best regime, he suggests that slaves be given the prospect of emancipation, which would be wholly impossible in the case of natural slaves; i.e., he takes it for granted that this best regime would have natural slaves. The answer would be that some infraction of justice in one way or another may be required, even of natural justice.

I referred to the difference between Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle regarding natural right in this particular passage here. Some of you may be interested in a recent discussion of which I became aware. There was a symposium at Wellesley at which Mr. Pegis of the Pontifical Institute of Toronto read a very interesting paper, about the Thomistic doctrine of natural law, asserting that this doctrine is not a philosophic teaching, but a theological teaching--I believe an interpretation which is not in accordance with the traditional view--and I was told there was a certain excitement about it, though I couldn't be present at the lecture. Still it is worthy of serious consideration. Professor Pegis did not answer the question, what is Thomas Aquinas's philosophic view of natural right, which I would have liked to hear--that is, the mere fact that the teaching that is found in the Summa is not philosophic but theologic does not answer that question.

This much about the question of natural right in Aristotle: let us now broaden the question. The principles of human action, according to Aristotle, or the noble things, as Aristotle puts it--what is their cognitive status? Now let us turn to the Ethics,
1139b14-18 (Loeb p. 331)

Let us now discuss these matters afresh, going more deeply into the matter.

He means now the intellectual virtues.

Let it be assumed that there are five qualities through which the mind achieves truth in affirmation or denial, namely, art or technical skill, scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and intelligence. Conception and opinion are capable of error.

Let us stop here. Now none of these, with the exception of the central one, prudence, can have any relevance for ethics. Let us turn to p.337, where he speaks about practical wisdom or prudence particularly,(1140a24)

We may arrive at a definition of prudence by considering who are the persons whom we call prudent. Now it is held to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, for instance what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good life in general.

The implication is this: regarding all parts of your welfare, or well-being, or most of the parts, you have experts; but regarding your well-being and happiness as a whole, there are no experts. That everyone must do for himself. Now there are people who cannot take care of their well-being as a whole: must they be sent to experts?

Well, we always have such people around--I have forgotten the delicate and euphemistic term used, which is quite common. But think simply of children. Children cannot take care of their well-being as a whole; they have parents. Therefore a mature human being, if he is not truly--what is the term they use?--moronic, more or less, must be able to take care of himself. That cannot be left to any experts, there is no expertise regarding ethics.

This is proved by the fact that we speak of people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with a view to attaining some particular end of value (other than those ends which are the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is good at deliberating in general.

But no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his power to do. Hence inasmuch as scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things whose fundamental principles are variable are not capable of demonstration, because everything about them is variable, and inasmuch as one cannot deliberate about things that are of necessity, it follows that prudence is not the same as science. Nor can it be the same as art.

Art in the sense here is not fine art, of course, but a skill, such as carpentry or any other production.

It is not science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not art, because doing and making are

generically different, since making aims at an end distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing well is in itself the end.

This is the formal definition of prudence or practical wisdom given by Aristotle. But this is obviously not sufficient; let us turn to p. 367 (1144a11).

But we must go a little deeper into the objection that prudence does not render men more capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or for some ulterior object...

Does this make sense? This simple thing, that someone may do the right thing for the wrong reason. I think you all know that, a man may act nobly in order--on the basis of very low calculation--then of course he does not act nobly, he is good only externally. So it all depends on the choice, on the intention, as one would say.

...and not for the sake of the actions themselves, although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man should), on the other hand, it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now rightness in our choice of an end is secured by virtue; but to do the acts that must in the nature of things be done in order to attain the end we have chosen, is not a matter for virtue but for a different faculty.

We must dwell on this point to make it clearer. There is a certain faculty called cleverness, which is the capacity for doing the things aforesaid that conduce to the aim we propose, and so attaining that aim. If the aim is noble this is a praiseworthy faculty; if base, it is mere knavery; this is how we come to speak of both prudent men and mere knaves as clever. Now this faculty is not identical with prudence, but prudence implies it. But that eye of the soul of which we spoke cannot acquire the quality of prudence without possessing virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form "Since the end of supreme good is so and so" (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the supreme good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.

Now what Aristotle has in mind can be illustrated by the result of Socrates' argument in the first book of the Republic, where he reaches the conclusion that the guardian, or keeper, is the same as the thief; namely, what they have to know is exactly the same. How can you be a good thief if you do not know how to open these doors and where are the things you want to get out? And to be a

good keeper you have to know this. So the intellectual element is the same. And the first reaction I think of every reader of the Republic to this particular argument would be that Socrates abstracts in a strange way from the moral intention--which of course is entirely different on the part of the thief on the one hand and of the honest keeper on the other. But then the question arises, what is that honest intention?

Now Aristotle drives the argument somewhat deeper and says, partly agreeing with Socrates, the intellectual element is more than this kind of knowledge which the thief and the guardian possess. In the case of the honest man, the intellectual virtue which he needs is necessarily tinged by virtue; whereas in the dishonest man, it is not tinged by virtue. And this he draws out, but obviously it is a distinction between a merely clever man and a prudent man. The prudent man, the practically wise man, is one whose intellectual faculty regarding practical matters is tinged by virtues, whereas that of the merely clever man is not. But this leads to a further question: how does he get his virtue? The practical wisdom, the prudence itself, only enables him to define, or to find out, what he should do in the circumstances. But how come he will only make decent choices in the circumstances? This is not yet guaranteed by prudence. Now let us take a simple example: someone needs money. There are n ways of getting money: some decent and honest, some dishonest. Now the prudent man excludes the dishonest ones as a matter of course, whereas a crook considers them also, and makes his pick. He might in a given situation choose the honest way because it is the most convenient for him, but nevertheless that is not because it is honest. How does he know, how does the prudent or decent man know, that for the sake of which he chooses this particular honest action in preference to another honest way of action? How does he know the end? Now Aristotle has said here that the choice, the intention, becomes correct through virtue, meaning moral virtue. Whereas prudence deals only with the ends, meaning what action now in order to get money. But on the premise that it must be an honest one, how does he get the end? The general answer from Aristotle can be said to be this: how do we become good, if we are not good? Answer, by upbringing, by breeding. By being told from childhood, Do that, and Don't do that, and acting on it. Perhaps because we are spanked, or given candies, as the case may be, but gradually it becomes a habit so that we cannot well act otherwise. Very well; this is good, by breeding. But how can we distinguish between sound and perverse breeding? After all, it is thinkable that a child is brought up very severely with many dos and don'ts, and yet they are--not necessarily immoral, but somewhat perverse. How does practical reason get its highest or ultimate principles? that is one of the most difficult questions in Aristotle. Now in order to understand that, I would like to give you an example. Almost any will do, but I somehow feel that the one which I suggest is the most practical. In Aristotle's Ethics, in his discussion of the individual virtues, there are two peaks, two virtues which comprise in different ways all other virtues--and they are magnanimity and justice. Justice comprises all virtues from the point of view of our relation to other human beings. Magnanimity comprises all virtues from the point of view of our self-perfection. Now let us have a look at the section on magnanimity: that is in the Loeb on p. 213. (1123a35)

Greatness of soul ("that is a more Anglo-Saxon translation of magnanimity--good") as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great objects. Let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are. It will make no difference whether we examine the quality itself or the person that displays the quality. ("In other words, whether we look at magnanimity or the magnanimous man--the practical result is the same.")

Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much. He who claims much without deserving it is foolish; but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we describe; he who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled, since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size; small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome. He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain: though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain. He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much?

Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme, by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves.

This remark about the extreme is known to every one of you from the Cow Palace in San Francisco.

...while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.

If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, greatness of soul must be concerned with some one object especially. "Worthy" is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and such a thing is honour, for honour is clearly the greatest of external goods. Therefore the great-souled man is he who has the right disposition in relation to honors and disgraces. And even without argument it is evident that honour is the object with which the great-souled are concerned..

We cannot read the whole thing, let us now turn to 1125a16, well, a1.

He will be incapable of living at the will of another, unless a friend, since to do so is slavish, and hence flatterers are always servile, and humble people flatterers. He is not prone to admiration, since nothing is great to him. He does not bear a grudge, for it is not a mark of greatness to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done you, but rather to overlook them. He is no gossip; for he will not talk either about himself or about another, as he neither wants to receive compliments, nor to hear other people run down (nor is he lavish of praise either);

and so he is not given to speaking evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he intends to give offence deliberately.

Literally, except if by insolence.

In troubles that cannot be avoided, or trifling mishaps, he will never cry out nor ask for help, since to do so would imply that he took them to heart. He likes owning beautiful and useless things, rather than useful things, that bring in return, since the former show his independence more. Other traits generally....("I think that is sufficient..well, all right.")...attributed to the great-souled man, are a slow gait, a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance; to speak in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, which does not belong to one who cares for few things and thinks nothing good.

Yes. How does Aristotle know what he tells us about the great-souled man? although I think we would recognize it, but this is not quite sufficient. There is a story of Napoleon that he never acquired that gait which the noble men of ancient times had; he always walked too fast, as if he were at the head of a platoon. Now why Aristotle says here his motions are thought to be slow, and his voice deep--who makes these suppositions? ...They are made--by people, by people who know, I mean there are people who don't see a difference between the great-souled man and others. But they are incompetent, just as people talking about colors who do not know colors are incompetent regarding colors. But some of these things are verging on the silly, others not; they all are known by opinion, by doxai. This is empirically so, no demonstration, no deduction.

Now if you compare that with the procedure of Plato in the Republic especially; Plato singles out four virtues there: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Then Plato tries to prove to you that there are these four and only these four virtues. The proof is that the soul is such that it has a desiring part, the virtue of which is called temperance; another part is called spiritedness, the virtue of which is courage, controlled spiritedness; and then there is wisdom, controlled reason, educated reason; and justice is needed in order to keep them together in one way or another.

So Plato gives us a rational account of virtue. Aristotle does not refer to that. You remember the deduction of the six regimes which he gave us in book three, and he showed us there can be these three and only these three regimes, although there may be mixtures. He does nothing of the kind in the Ethics. Now what--how can we understand that? Because we have the natural and legitimate desire to see how these virtues are connected, what their bases are, or simply how they are deduced from higher principles. If you read the discussion of the virtues in Thomas' Theologia Summa, you will see that there is such a deduction there, but Thomas uses also the material supplied by the Stoic writers, and other ancient writers, that is to say, by a school that is much closer in certain respects to Plato than to Aristotle. Aristotle does not do that. But we must nevertheless address this question to Aristotle whether he satisfies it or not, that is, how do you know this? Or, if you can know this, you must tell us why. Now as we learn from other writings of Aristotle, practical reason

receives its most general principles from theoretical reason, ultimately from the end of man. Therefore we have to know the principle from which we would start in any deductive procedure: the moral virtues are required for the end of man. Very good, but there is one great difficulty. If they are required for the end of man, are they not also choiceworthy for their own sake, and perhaps Aristotle does not want to deduce them, because a deduction would always mean a subordination..Aristotle never says that they are needed for the end of man.

In order to understand that we have to consider that for Aristotle the end of man is the theoretical life, the life of contemplation, the life of the philosopher. Does this highest end of man require the moral virtues? Aristotle doesn't ever answer the question explicitly, but Thomas Aquinas does for him. He says, prudence is the only intellectual virtue which is not possible without moral virtue. Of course, because it has to do with action, and our intellectual action must be tinged by morality, otherwise we will be knaves, or crooks. But wisdom, theoretical wisdom proper, does not require moral virtue, Thomas suggests.

But is this not wholly unintelligible? Does not the pursuit of knowledge require for example, courage, as we speak of intellectual courage--sobriety, I mean, a drunk is not likely to make great progress in finding the truth. Furthermore, does not the theoretical man have to live in society, and therefore the social virtues like justice are necessary? Obviously! But the question is, how do these virtues appear from the point of view of theoretical wisdom, which is the end. They appear only as means.

This view has been stated in a very powerful way in modern times by Nietzsche, in the third part of his Genealogy of Morals. There he says, of course the philosophers are moral people; but the morality doesn't mean what it means ordinarily. A man is moral just like a jockey is very ascetic, in order to win the next race. In other words, it is merely for the end. So the theoretical life as the highest end makes intelligible that there are the moral virtues, but it does not make intelligible why they should be choiceworthy for their own sake. Now fortunately theoria, contemplation, is not the only end of man. The other great end of man by nature is social life; and social life also needs the moral virtues. Take Hobbes: the virtues are conditions of peacefully living together. Again you take can take almost any example, say that of the habitual drunk, whose unpeaceable and noisy conduct toward his fellows makes it perfectly clear that some self-restraint is necessary, and the same is true of the other moral virtues.

If we view the virtues in the light of society as the end, we arrive at a very well-known doctrine, much-quoted and well-known, the utilitarian understanding of morality: virtue is required for living together. But here we see also in the utilitarian doctrine that the moral virtues are understood as means for something, not as choiceworthy for their own sake. Now we have this great difficulty: if morality or virtue is required only as a means for the common good, and the common good is here of course, if we do not want to argue circularly, not defined in moral terms--the common good then means something like peace, wealth, freedom--it is then at least possible that under certain circumstances, the moral vices may be conducive to that common good--Machiavelli's point. Now if so it appears that the moral virtues cannot be understood as being for the sake of the common good, nor for the sake of the city. Those positions

have a point, but they are not sufficient. The only way to proceed is to understand--in order especially to avoid Machiavellianism--to understand the city as being for the sake of the practice of moral virtue, and this is surely what Aristotle does. So in other words, the city is for the sake of moral virtue. But moral virtue is itself also for the sake of something higher. Theoria, philosophy. But if we disregard the philosophers entirely, then we see that moral virtue is irreducible to any other end than itself, and that is what decent men ordinarily say: that decency is choiceworthy for its own sake. Moral virtue is, to use colloquial terms now in use, moral virtue appears to us as empirically absolute. And that is represented, re-produced, in Aristotle's presentation of the Ethics. We can say using a non-Aristotelian theoria, moral virtue, or its implications, have the character of an unwritten nomos, which is understood by gentlemen or tolerably decent men everywhere, in Greece or in China, or wherever you look; and yet which is irreducible not because it is strictly speaking, absolute, as it is according to Kant, in modern times; but because moral virtue is as it were, situated at the point where the requirements of the two fundamental ends of man, theoretical life and society, meet. Not the ends themselves, but their requirements. And this is, one can say, the mystery of Aristotle's point of view. In fact, moral virtue derives its dignity from the fact that it points beyond the vulgar goals toward man's highest end. Moral virtue, is ultimately from the philosopher's point of view, a reflection of philosophy. The gentleman, the kalos k'agathos in Greek, points toward the philosopher, but he is not a philosopher and he is lower than a philosopher from Aristotle's point of view. And his pointing toward the philosopher is not therefore without ambiguity. To mention only one, the craftman or artisan, who by definition is not a philosopher, is in one sense closer to the philosopher, than the gentleman. A very simple reason. A gentleman cannot be petty, he cannot count every penny, it is impossible. The craftman has to be exact. Look at a carpenter, or a shoemaker. This kind of quality which the craftsman has and the gentleman despises, shows a certain affinity of the craftsman, a certain kinship between the craftsman and the philosopher. The picture is not of course as simple as it appears from a strictly political presentation of the issue.

Now the clearest statement which we find of this whole state of affairs occurs at the end of the other Ethics of Aristotle, the so-called Eudemian Ethics, from a man called Eudemos, probably Aristotle's son. There towards the end we find a discussion of two kinds of goodness, a gentleman's goodness, and a non-gentleman's goodness. I can only encourage you to read that, with some care. I think the solution is as I have suggested. In the Loeb, it is on p. 469 ff. Now with this I conclude my remarks about Aristotle on the basis of Aristotle's Politics. This political philosophy is ultimately unintelligible without an understanding of what the contemplative ideal, as it is called, means. One can say the highest theme of Aristotle's political science is philosophy as a way of life; and this was always so in classical times, in Plato as well as in Cicero, and one of the most striking differences between modern political philosophy and classical political philosophy is that philosophy as a way of life has disappeared from modern political philosophy. Of course, a political scientist, or a social scientist today still speaks of philosophy, or has other names for it, as parts of culture, which

are of great interest to the social scientist, but that is not quite the same thing. Is there any point you would like to bring up in connection with this question of the foundations? or perhaps I will continue my exposition, and then we will have a free-for-all at the end of the meeting. The clever ones among you may wish to get some inkling of what will happen next time. Yes?

Student: A while ago, you pointed to the danger of circularity in saying that on the one hand, virtue is the means to the city, and on the other, the end of the city is moral virtue. Now did we really get around that by saying that while moral virtue is conducive to the ends of the city, the end of the city is the same thing. Don't we have to ask the original question, how does Aristotle know what moral virtue is--is for itself?

Well, could one not assume, to take care of the circularity, the city is for the sake of moral virtue, and moral virtue finds its ultimate justification in the theoretical life?

Student: One would hope the justification would be in the theoretical life; but what about the other justification, that it is for itself?

Well, but let us assume someone has no understanding, has no taste for the philosophic life. What would be the highest for him?

Student: The highest would be moral virtue, to be really good himself.

Yes, that is the point which Kant makes, that moral virtue is the highest. We all can understand that, although it is not equally well understood by all people at all times. That is a peculiar heritage from the age of Enlightenment, that it seemed to be so clear, that the only thing which we can rightfully expect from a man, and for which we can rightfully respect a man, is his honesty. And I think a liberal society at its best is based on this principle, not simply on freedom, but also on the fact that only probity and decency are to be respected.

Well, then I will turn to the other great teacher of political philosophy..(tape is reversed).. but as for questions regarding Aristotle's Politics, I remind you of what I said about the end of the third book, and other difficulties of that kind. But they are not comparable in magnitude to those you find in Plato.

In the nineteenth century an approach towards Plato emerged, and not only towards Plato, which still predominates.. which we can call the historical approach. Historical means here genetic. And in a two-fold way. We have to see Plato, and the same would of course be true of Aristotle, as in one way or another an outgrowth of Greek life, of Greek life and society and understanding, or of Greekness, you can say. And the second is, we have to study Plato's thought in its own genesis, Plato's development. And there are certain views which we might find, I believe, in every book on Plato, as far as I remember: there is an early period, there is a middle period, and there is a late period, and we know exactly what Plato thought, if not in every year, in each of these periods and how they developed from each other. I must say, in honor of a former professor of the University of Chicago, Paul Shorey,

that he was the only one who opposed this view at the time when it was strongest. He wrote among other things a book called The Unity of Plato's Thought, in which he tried to show that Plato never changed his mind. I think I would agree with Shorey's thesis, only sometimes he makes things a bit easy for himself--in other words, he doesn't see that there are certain great difficulties that he cannot resolve. I do not believe that they can be solved by the way that the men who opposed Shorey thought to solve them, by thinking Plato only changed his mind; but the difficulties are there.

Now a special point of course is that among the dialogues that have come down to us as Platonic, quite a few are declared to be spurious, not written by Plato. As far as I can judge, this kind of declaration in all cases is based on a kind of presumed knowledge of what Plato could have written; this he could not have written--or, that they believe they have exhausted Plato's possibilities. There is one little dialogue called Menexenus, which is regarded as genuine, and is only protected by a quotation in Aristotle; without that, these people would have declared the Menexenus to be spurious. Because it is of a certain levity which is wholly unbecoming to this severe man Plato or either Socrates.

Now the reason why this approach is so powerful is ultimately an insufficient reflection on the form of Plato's work, on the simple fact that Plato did not write treatises, as Aristotle did, but dialogues. He also wrote letters, but apart from the fact that some people say the thirteen letters are spurious, at least most of them--letters are also not treatises, of course. There is one letter which is particularly famous, the seventh letter, the longest one, which contains a kind of autobiography of Plato, and is frequently used in interpretations of Plato's political philosophy. But let us forget about the letters, and let us speak only about the dialogues.

Now what is the consequence of the fact that Plato wrote dialogues? Very simple: that we never hear Plato speaking. Plato could have made himself a character in the dialogues, it is true; but that he did not do.

Since Plato never speaks, we cannot find Plato's views in any utterances occurring in the dialogues. The dialogues are in this way like dramas. Now when, for example, in Goethe's Faust, Faust replaces the words at the beginning of the Gospel of St. John, "In the beginning was the word," by "In the beginning was the deed," we cannot say that was Goethe's view. What we see is Faust's view. ..And so, strictly speaking, we never know what Plato thinks. But the solution to this difficulty is very simple. Every child knows that, Plato has one spokesman, his revered master Socrates, and hence what Socrates says has Plato's imprimatur, as it were. I would raise the question, how do you know? That is a long question. But even granting it, that Socrates is the spokesman of Plato, we are confronted by the fact that one of Socrates' characteristics is his irony. Now to have a spokesman who is ironical, that is almost as bad as to have no spokesman at all. Of course, we have to raise the question, what is irony, and we cannot take any modern, especially romantic view of irony. Literally translated, it means dissimulation. But a dissimulation gradually comes to mean a dissimulation of a certain kind, noble dissimulation. If someone dissembles his defects, then he is not an ironical man; but if he dissembles his excellences, then he is an ironical man. And it is clear why someone could dissemble

his excellences, simply in order to spare the sensitivities of other men: that is a noble effort. More generally, irony is such dissimulation as is practiced in the interests of other men, of interlocutors, at least as much as in the interests of the speaker. One can say, irony means, in the Socratic sense, means a kind of serpentine wisdom with the innocence of doves. If it were only serpentine, it wouldn't be noble. But this peculiar combination of simplicity and complexity. The comparison of Socrates with Jesus which this remark implies is of course very old and very plausible at first glance. Very famous is the work of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Sanctis Socrates Ora Pro Nobis, treating Socrates as a saint. But the difference between Socrates and Jesus is more or less important. And I will read you now a true Christian saint, namely Sir Thomas More, the author of Utopia, which shows that he was a very good knower of Plato's Republic. But this work called Of Comfort Against Tribulation he wrote in prison shortly before his execution: you know his fate. Here he says somewhere, "To prove that this life is no laughing time, but rather a time of weeping, we find that our Saviour himself wept twice or thrice; but never find we that he laughed so much as once." And now the great laughter Thomas More adds, "I will not swear that he never did; but in the leastwise he left us no example of it. But on the other side, he left us example of weeping."

Exactly the opposite is true of Socrates. When you go over the writings of Plato or Xenophon, you will never find Socrates weeping. You find him, however, laughing twice or thrice. And this is an indication of a fundamental difference. We can say there is a slightly greater kinship of the Platonic dialogue with comedy than with tragedy. We cannot call it comedy, surely not. But there is a slightly greater kinship with comedy than with tragedy.

Irony means, to state it somewhat differently, to speak with a view to someone: speaking differently to different kinds of people. And all Socratic utterances are in this sense, ironical. If we want to understand these utterances properly, we have to consider the people to whom he speaks, the time, the place, the moral and intellectual qualities of the people with Socrates. We always have to be able to translate, as it were, the statements made, say, toward Crito, in the Crito, with what Socrates might say to Plato. We can say the understanding of a Platonic dialogue consists in transforming something in two dimensions, that is a plane, into something which is three-dimensional, which requires an effort on our part to discover. We must consider not only what Socrates says, but how he says it. Not his voice or intonation, but when he spoke, to whom he spoke, and under what circumstances. I mention another point only in passing, a very important difference, that some Platonic dialogues look like dramas. At the beginning you find the characters enumerated and then it begins. And there are also narrated dialogues: which have the form, "and then I asked him.." and so forth. But here the great question arises, why is the Republic for example a narrated dialogue, and the Gorgias a performed dialogue? These questions are as important for the understanding of a Platonic dialogue as the understanding of an

actual discussion. I think all errors of interpretation are based on this crucial fact. You see, it is much more difficult to understand a Platonic dialogue, however simple and early it is, than Aristotle's Politics. Now we find at the entrance of Plato's work--not literally, but with qualifications--the Apology of Socrates and the Crito. I will discuss this as an example. Some people say that in the Apology you see Socrates as a rebel who stands up for freedom of speech, or whatever it may be, whereas in the Crito we see Socrates the law-abiding citizen. And therefore we find on the lower level of interpretation two schools of thought: the revolutionaries, who like the Apology, and the conservatives, who prefer the Crito. Needless to say, this is an arbitrary selection. Both things are Socrates. This tension between Socrates the law-abiding citizen, and Socrates the rebel, is Socrates. By understanding that tension, one has made considerable progress toward understanding of Socrates. Socrates is neither simply the rebel, nor simply law-abiding. It is perfectly clear from the Apology itself, that he would not obey a law that is manifestly unjust. What about the law which condemns him to die? He obeys it--is it a just law? Is he justly condemned? One of his younger friends, the most enthusiastic but not the most intelligent among them, is a young man called Apollodorus, and he told Socrates after he was condemned to death, "How terrible that you have been condemned to death, unjustly!"

Whereupon Socrates said, "Would you like it better if I had been justly condemned?" This is one of the very rare occasions where it is explicitly said that Socrates laughed. Now to speak more particularly about the Crito, of this famous statement demanding absolute lawabidingness without any qualification--that is, with this qualification, that if you have the right to emigrate with your property, and you have not availed yourself of that right, then you are obliged to obey the laws. By your staying there, you have made a kind of tacit contract to obey them. Now this leads to all kinds of interesting questions: let us assume the only property you have is landed, which you cannot well take with you, or you may not be able to sell it--what are you to do then? In this dialogue, Crito is afraid of what people will say about him if his friend Socrates is executed. And this is particularly grave because he is a very wealthy man, and it was apparently a matter of course that by prudent application of bribes you could get a man out of jail in Athens.

Now what Socrates actually does in the dialogue is to supply Crito with a defense of Crito...what Crito can say to the people who accuse him of not trying to help his old friend Socrates, who has been so helpful to him. In other words, what Socrates presents here fits Crito, and his accusers--whether it would fit man on a higher level, needs investigation. As for the Apology of Socrates we have some direct clue in Plato's dialogue called Gorgias, where Socrates discusses his situation if he would be accused of a crime in Athens. He makes it clear that if he were accused he would be in the position of a physician accused by a pastry-cook before a tribunal of children. These children would say, you have taken away our pastries, our pleasures, or our toys, for that matter. And how could he possibly explain to these children that the bitter pills which he gave them, the bitter truths, are better than these sweets? The Athenians would be wholly unable to understand him. And therefore he must adapt what he tells them to their capacity. And that is the way in which one

would have to study the Apology.

Now a few words about the most famous political work of Plato, the Republic. I heard that in this country it is sold much more than any other work of Plato. Now the Republic is distinguished from the Apology and the Crito and even from the Gorgias by one very obvious fact, appearing to the simple reader--a radical, extreme critique of democracy as such. In the Gorgias he criticizes certain democratic statesmen--Themistocles, Pericles, and so on--but here democracy as such is radically criticised. The context of course is the presentation of the best regime, of the truly just regime, and democracy is viewed in the light of that. Now this truly just regime is characterised by three institutions--absolute communism, communism regarding property women and children--equality of the two sexes--and rule of philosophers. And the reasoning justifying these institutions takes up a relatively short space, chiefly in the fifth book. But there is a kind of hidden reasoning which starts at the very beginning. The question is raised, what is justice? and the first answer given is, justice consists in restoring property to its rightful owners. But there is an obvious difficulty here. Let us assume the property is a knife, and the owner is insane. Obviously justice does not consist in restoring his property to him. Then only if such restoration is good for the owner. We must of course enlarge it, because there are actions of justice which have nothing to do with restoring of property. And then we would say, as the Western tradition does, justice consists in giving or leaving to everybody what belongs to him. But here we have the same difficulty. In giving or leaving to a man what belongs to him, if the individual concerned is a vicious playboy, it would be much better for him to be deprived of what he owns than for him to keep it. In other words, there is a conflict between justice understood as giving or leaving to everyone what belongs to him, and the other equally reasonable proposition that justice is good. This difficulty has been stated very well by Plato's fellow student of Socrates, not to say friend, in his Education of Cyrus...a story which I have retold, I believe, in almost every class I have given.

There was a big boy who had a small coat, and a small boy who had a big coat. And young Cyrus, future founder of the Persian Empire, was in a school of justice, because in Persia they have schools of justice, not of reading, writing and arithmetic--and there he was asked: If the big boy took away the coat of the small boy and gave him the small coat, how would he judge the case? And he said, that is fine; now each one has what fits him. And then he was spanked. He was not requested to decide what is fitting, but what is right in the sense of legal. But if we are concerned with justice pure and simple, not with secondary considerations, we have to find an order in which everyone gets what is good for him; and that means of course the abolition of private property; the very simple fact that men who now are well-served by having a big estate under their control may tomorrow be wholly unfit for it means that there cannot be private property. And who is to do the assigning? Only competent men, who are able to say what is good for whom. A kind of physicians of the soul; and that is the reason why there must be absolute rule of philosophers, and why they must have common property.

Now regarding the rule of the philosophers, we find this very extreme statement, in the center of the Republic more or less, that all evils will cease from the cities if the philosophers are kings. In the immediate context this means the philosophers' becoming kings is a necessary and sufficient condition. Incidentally in the seventh letter this is also repeated; and in the seventh letter there is not even an allusion made to communism and the equality of the sexes.

But even in the Republic I think that is clearly indicated. If the philosophers' becoming kings is the necessary and sufficient condition for the cessation of all evils, then there is no need for absolute communism or equality of the sexes. What is the basis of the demand for equality of the sexes in the Republic? The reasoning supporting that equality is that the difference between the two sexes is not more relevant than the difference between bald-headed and not baldheaded men. I believe this is a very insufficient statement about the difference between the two sexes. The only difference is said to be a difference of strength. Granting that for one moment, would this not be very important for the military profession? And women are supposed to be soldiers in the same way as men. To say nothing of the importance of the difference between the two sexes for war altogether, that the loss of many men is much less dangerous for the future of the city than the loss of many women--because a small number of men can generate a large number of children, and the same is obviously not true of women.

But to go back to this general statement, that all evils will cease if the philosophers are kings. This wonderful order will come about if when the philosophers become kings, everyone older than ten will be expelled from the city. So the rule of the philosophers is only a primary condition, then they will expel everyone older than ten and start almost from scratch. The question of course arises, who will do the expelling? These one or two philosophers--well, there are the soldiers around, but the soldiers have not yet been educated. In other words, the best regime as presented in the Republic is impossible. Why then does Plato create the appearance of presenting to us the best regime? Cicero has said somewhere that what Plato does in the Republic is not to present the best regime, but, in Latin, the ratio rerum civilium, the nature of political things. By making this extreme experiment, this impossibility, Plato lets us see why it is impossible, and therewith what are the limits, the character, the nature, of political things. One illustration, that is the famous noble lie, which Socrates demands be accepted by the city. The first half of it is that they all must believe that they have been brought up within the earth; in other words, that they all are simply children of the earth. And when speaking of them Socrates makes a slight change: he replaces the word "earth" with the word "land"--territory, this particular part of the earth. The noble lie suggests that each political society is natural, whereas what is natural is only the unity of the human race, and proven by the simple fact that generally speaking, a male human from one society and a female human being from another, can generate a human being. There is other evidence for this Platonic view, if it deserves being called Platonic, because it is elementary in other Platonic dialogues. This is the natural, this natural unity is not politically possible, however. And the political community must be ascribed a naturalness, a sacredness, which it cannot truly claim, but which is necessary for its being a unity. The soldiers are to be like dogs, according to this. Dogs are, as we all know, nice to acquaintances and nasty to strangers. The famous fact that here the polis, individual political society, is cut off from the other political societies, which are potential enemies, even if allies for the time being. And the joke here is quite obvious, that Socrates says here, is this not the sign that the dog is a philosophic animal because it distinguishes between good and bad people only on the basis of whether it knows them or not. Knowledge is its sole criterion--what a

philosophic beast!

In a word, the polis as polis rests on opinion, of questionable truth. And yet it is absolutely necessary. The polis is the cave. Leaving the cave is possible only for philosophers, i.e. a tiny minority of the human race. This is the ratio rerum civilium, the nature of political things, of which Cicero had spoken. And this of course is only an extremely brief summation of the subject-matter of the Republic. I leave it at these remarks, and in a few minutes we can have discussion, if you like. Yes?

Mr. Levy: How can the naturally right regime be both the best regime and the floor? Either the floor can be improved on, one would think, or it is the best, and every other regime is defective in some way. There is no floor, there is no minimum base, or everything must become a poor reflection of the best. That raises another question: how do we distinguish the absolutely barbarous from the moderately civilized?

I beg your pardon? The last question.

Mr. Levy: How do we distinguish the absolutely barbarous, such as we see in modern times, from the moderately civilized?

I believe one would say this is a question of the flooring--the barbarous or simply tyrannical regimes are those that do not respect the very flooring of civil life. But the fact that a society respects the flooring, i.e., has a minimum of decency, does not make a perfect society of it. It can be very imperfect. There are--one can say that the various regimes which Aristotle discusses with the exception of tyranny are as regimes, above the flooring, accept the flooring. They do not practice cannibalism, they do not habitually--well--exterminate human beings, and so on.

Mr. Levy: In other words, the mark above which is civilization and below which is barbarism. The best civilizations are the highest.

Yes, the highest would be one, although this is not feasible, in which philosophy is the highest, and is recognized by the city. That is not possible, according to Plato nor according to Aristotle. Therefore the maximum you can have is a regime in which educated men with a certain deference to philosophy, rule. An example was for them Pericles, educated in a way by Anaxagoras. There would be others. Yes?

Student: I'm still unclear about the relationship of philosophy to the πόλις. On the one hand, there seems to be a tension between them; and on the other, the end of the best regime, and the best life, would be the life of philosophy. On the one hand, public worship is the necessarily highest form of philosophy of which the city is capable; and on the other, since philosophy transcends the city, it is not essential to the city. Then when would philosophy and the city be in harmony with each other? Only in the best regime?

That philosophy would be openly in control--well, theoretically, yes, only in the best regime as Plato described it. The question is whether that is feasible.

Student: I was referring to Aristotle.

And then?

Student: Well... when, in the.... when would philosophy be in harmony with the city? In Aristotle's scheme? And when would there be the tension between philosophy and the city? And what would be the cause of that tension?

Well, you gave one very important example, there are the gods of the city. That is exactly the point. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle could not accept these gods and the stories regarding them. And the city, according to their view, necessarily makes such demands. And Plato has discussed it most clearly in the tenth book of the Laws. In the Laws there is officially no rule of philosophers--just a kind of very much improved Sparta. But then the question arises, must the city not have gods? Of course. And here Plato experiments with a theology which is acceptable to philosophy; and to the extent to which there were such a theology, acceptable to philosophers, there could be harmony. In a way, what the Enlightenment tried to do, in a way, a rational religion, a natural theology, as the sole demand which human society makes on everyone, including the philosophers, would be such a solution. Do you know something about these men of the Enlightenment? ...No, in other words, my brief reply tells you something?

Yes. Well, I was referring specifically to Aristotle. And you had mentioned, that in listing the various requirements of the polis, one of them was public worship--and you had said that philosophy could be considered the highest form of public worship because it deals with things divine. Now this would seem to contradict the statement that because philosophy transcends the city, it is therefore not essential to the city.

This I do not see. The contradiction is this--which Aristotle expresses very clearly in the passages which I quoted: public worship is the fifth or first of the functions of the city. Now it would be the first, according to its intrinsic claim in the eyes of the city. But this claim is not as such recognized by Aristotle.

There is a contradiction, but the contradiction is not one for which Aristotle or any other philosopher is responsible. The difficulty is this, that what Aristotle regards as the highest form of worship of the gods, is not recognized as such by the city. Aristotle may call the ruling intelligence "Zeus," condescending to what the people say--but this is of course not what they mean. And in the moment this becomes clear, then he will be in for trouble. Something like this happened to Socrates. So the tension would be possible--I mean, the clearest discussion of how to avoid the tension of which I am aware, is the tenth book of the Laws, which is an amazingly liberal statement, contrary to the now prevailing view that Plato was very nasty, and tried to introduce a kind of Inquisition into Athens. What he did was infinitely more liberal than the practice of Athens. Plato wanted to re-write, as it were, the Athenian law regarding impiety, in such a way that Socrates could be tolerated by the city of Athens, which he could not be according to the purport of the law of impiety, as understood by the majority of the citizens.

Did I answer your question? Yes..

Student: Why does Aristotle end the Politics with a discussion of education, and in particular, of musical education?

Well, as you know, in the eighth book of the Politics there are quite a few references to things which "we will discuss"--and which we do not find discussed. Therefore it seems likely that we do not have the end of the Politics, that it is lacking. God knows how many books it originally had. But that he discusses music as such does not surprise you, I suppose. Or does it?

Student: No, it doesn't surprise me that he discusses it, but what surprised me was the indefiniteness with which--

Yes, that is I believe due to mere accident, that the mice nibbled away a considerable part of the Politics. Something like this must have happened; for a number of years, many years, Aristotle's writings were buried somewhere in a cellar in Asia Minor. For, I do not know how many, for quite a few decades. And then they were recovered. Aristotle had to run away from Athens, and whether this had anything to do with an accusation of impiety, or with this fact that he was connected with the Macedonian royal family, or with both--that we don't know. Aristotle is said to have said that he was fleeing from Athens lest Athens sin again against philosophy, i.e., as it had done before. So well, then I wish you good luck.